Challenging Uhuru Kenyatta as “Richest Person in Kenya”

Forbes classification criteria questioned; Uhuru’s wealth is stolen wealth

Uhuru Kenyatta is a beneficiary of stolen wealth from the people of Kenya and should not be on Fotbes list

Forbes Magazine recently published a list of Africa’s 40 richest persons with Uhuru Kenyatta ranked 26th and number one richest person in Kenya. His net worth is an estimated $500 million, which translates to almost 50 billion Kenyan Shillings.

This is how Forbes described his wealth: “Kenya’s Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta is the son of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, and heir to some of the largest land holdings in Kenya. He owns at least 500,000 acres of prime land spread across the country. The land was acquired by his father in the 1960s and 1970s when the British colonial government and the World Bank funded a settlement transfer fund scheme that enabled government officials and wealthy Kenyans to acquire land from the British at very low prices. Uhuru and his family also own Brookside Dairies, Kenya’s largest dairy company, as well as stakes in popular television station K24 and a commercial bank in Nairobi, among other interests.”

In a WikiLeaks cable dated June 26th 2009, former US ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger described Uhuru’s wealth this way: “Although his wealth is the inheritance from his father’s corruption, the Kenyatta family still holds a special status”. Yet another description from veteran Kenyan journalist and lecturer Joe Kadhi on his blog ‘Msemakweli’ goes: “Among the haves, Uhuru represents the pinnacle of cornucopia. He has wealth he hardly worked for. Wealth that was acquired by his father through the use of despotic powers. All this, when children of true freedom fighters are languishing in indescribable poverty, caused by the exploitation by the very people who opposed the fight for independence.”

Did Forbes investigate the origins of Uhuru Kenyatta’s wealth? According to the magazine, it does not include political leaders on its list of the richest because it is not easy to calculate how they have generated their wealth. Ironically, Uhuru is a Member of Parliament for Gatundu South, Leader of KANU Party and Deputy Prime Minister. Information on its website notes that: “Forbes has long separated rulers and dictators from our annual rankings of the World’s Billionaires, distinguishing between personal, entrepreneurial wealth and wealth derived largely from positions of power, where lines often blur between what is owned by the country and what is owned by the individual.” How many generations does it take to “clean” allegedly ill-begotten wealth?

Since Uhuru is now on the Forbes list, Moi’s son Gideon should be considered at a certain point because his father was also president, yet gathered wealth unscrupulously as noted in the Kroll Report commissioned by president Kibaki in 2003 and submitted in 2004. It is alleged that Moi and his relatives “siphoned off more than £1bn+ of government money.” Gideon Moi was then worth £550m.

Kenyatta: The biggest land grabber in Kenyan history
The naming of Uhuru as Kenya’s richest man generated mixed reactions from Kenyans in the social media. Many felt that his father Jomo Kenyatta, used his position as president to grab land and accumulate enormous wealth. There are documents indicating that Jomo Kenyatta acquired land through resettlement schemes organized by the then British government and the World Bank. Uhuru Kenyatta has mentioned in the past that his wealth belongs to the “Kenyatta family”. In November 2010, the online business magazine “Africa Investor” wrote that Uhuru had estimated his family’s wealth at $10 billion.

Journalist John Kamau reported in 2009 that by September 1963, Jomo Kenyatta had consented to the transfer of Kikuyus from the transit farm Bahati in Rift Valley, to the tsetse fly-infested Mpanda Settlement Scheme in Tanzania. This was basically because the Kenyatta family and other African elite, had taken over most of the farms formerly owned by Europeans who had decided to sell. The ex-Mau Mau fighters who returned to reclaim their land found nothing and were pushed by Kenyatta to Rift Valley. It was only after many protests by Kikuyus that the Mpanda transfer was abandoned.

In 2009, a Kenyan-run blog Kumekucha, wrote that Pio Gama Pinto (who was an appointed politician in the House of Representatives in 1964), discovered that “Kenyatta had allocated himself a total of 50 farms in Central province and Rift valley. Some of the farms had poor Kikuyu squatters who were to be evicted. Others were farms that had been owned by whites and sold back to the Kenyan government. Pinto was incensed by this and despite making overtures to Kenyatta not to go ahead with the evil he was doing, Kenyatta adamantly stuck to his guns. Pinto decided to move a vote of no confidence in Kenyatta. Kenyatta confronted him within the precincts of parliament and challenged him over the no confidence vote. When Pinto refused to back down Kenyatta called him a bastard to which Pinto immediately responded by telling Kenyatta in front of witnesses and other cabinet ministers that he (Kenyatta) was also a bastard. A stunned friend pulled Pinto aside and asked him how he could call Kenyatta a bastard to which Pinto retorted, ‘he called me one first’. It was shortly after this incident that the decision was made to kill Pinto.”

In June 2000, journalist John Kamau published an article named “Kenyatta in trouble 22 years after his death”. He cited people who questioned how he had acquired so much wealth in only 15 years as president, while others called him murderer, tribalist and land grabber. “Kenyatta’s family must account for its wealth,” retorts Wanyiri Kihoro, the opposition MP from the Democratic Party of Kenya. He hails from the same populous Kikuyu tribe as Kenyatta. But he is unfazed by tribal loyalties. “We all know that Kenyatta was a land-grabber”, Kihoro adds somewhat irreverently. Luke Obok, the Chairman of the Kenya Pipeline Company: “Kenyatta’s regime was worse [than Moi’s]. Nobody was allowed to question the ills of his government. It is sad that under him, many Luos [from the other big tribe in the country] who were in top positions were frustrated and those in the army and police were summarily dismissed”.

Links to illegal trade in Ivory and forced Kenyatta shares in companies
“How did Kenyatta amass all that wealth given that he was in detention for eight years”, asks Martin Shikuku, a member of the team that negotiated Kenya’s independence constitution at Lancaster House in London in 1962. An outspoken member of Moi’s cabinet, Francis Lotodo, has even demanded that Kenyatta should be tried posthumously for “crimes committed against Kenyans”. Says Martin Shikuku: “It is common knowledge that Kenyatta’s regime thrived on the plunder of the national economy. He surrounded himself with a gang of tribalists that controlled his government.” Shikuku was detained without trial in 1976 by Kenyatta, for saying in parliament that the ruling Kanu party was dead.

Shikuku is particularly scathing in his attacks. “[Kenyatta] was not a nationalist as depicted by historians, he was a manipulator,” Shikuku says. “He concentrated too much power in the presidency, no wonder the colonial governor (Sir Patrick Renison) referred to him as `a leader unto darkness’.” But the respected former Kenyan freedom fighter, Bildad Kaggia, who was detained with Kenyatta in 1958 by the British, appears to have finally twisted the knife by saying that Kenyatta tried “many times” to harm him. Kaggia fell out with Kenyatta in 1969. He now says he refused to amass wealth like other cabinet ministers and that was why he was sidelined. Today, he lives a pauper’s life, operating a small posho mill in central Kenya.

In May 2011, a staff reporter at “investmentnewskenya.com” wrote that an American news magazine noted in 1979 that the Kenyatta family estate was worth $200 million. In a recent report by Kenya’s Citizen TV, the family’s wealth was more that $ 1.9 billion. It is questionable that Forbes reported Uhuru owns 500,000 acres of land, which is equated with the size of Nyanza province. This ownership has always been mentioned under the Kenyatta family. When did Uhuru become the sole owner of his family’s wealth? How did Forbes sort out what was owned by whom? Uhuru’s younger brother Muhoho is noted as the person largely running the family business. Earlier, it was his mother Mama Ngina who was seen as the force behind the vast Kenyatta business empire, which constitutes diverse investments ranging from dairy farming, banking to real estate, among others.

Rumours abound about Uhuru’s elder step sister Margaret Kenyatta, and Mama Ngina’s links to ivory smuggling in the 1970s. On May 22 1975, Jon Tinker wrote in the New Scientist magazine about elephant poaching in Kenya, which involved some prominent persons. Sections of the article are quoted verbatim here: “Kenya has perhaps 120 000 elephants, and every year between 10 000 and 20 000 elephants are being killed for their ivory. At this rate, the Kenyan elephant will be virtually extinct within a decade. Kenya’s ivory trade is currently worth around $10 million a year, but little of this money goes to the poachers. Not much goes to the government of Kenya either, for officially it has banned all private dealing in ivory. The profits are made by a few merchants in Nairobi and Mombasa, who bribe the game department and the wildlife ministry, the customs and the police to let them ship ivory by the ton to Europe, Hong Kong, Japan and People’s China.”

Enough money to compensate the PEV victims
The identity of these ivory queens is a matter of common gossip in Nairobi, and the most prominent of them are said to be Mama Ngina and Margaret Kenyatta, respectively wife and daughter to the President. In Kenya today, you can be sent to prison for what is called rumour-mongering, so in this article I shall confine myself to provable fact. And there is now documentary proof that at least one member of Kenya’s Royal family has recently shipped over six tons of ivory to Red China. Moreover, in spite of repeated denials from the Kenyan wildlife ministry that they have issued any licences to deal in or export raw ivory, this trading is being carried out with the active connivance of the highest officials in the game department.”

Tinker wrote that despite the government’s ban on private ivory export in August 1974, Margaret Kenyatta had since then “illicitly sent over 6 tonnes worth $200 000 to People’s China”. The United African Corporation (Kenya) Limited was a key exporter of ivory to China, Hong Kong and Japan. Records at that time showed she held 16 per cent shares in the company which was registered in 1964. However, by 1974, she held 49 per cent and had become chairperson of the company.

John Kamau’s investigative articles about Kenyatta’s estate published in Kenya’s “Business Daily” in May 2009, did not indicate the amount of money paid to some parcels of land acquired by Jomo Kenyatta and Mama Ngina. Instead, a lot was shown to have been bought under the names of his elder sons, Peter Muigai and Magana Kenyatta. “The only farm registered in Jomo Kenyatta’s name in 1964 was a 5 acre farm he bought from a Mr. J.R. Wood and for KSh 400.” Kenyatta paid KES 45 000 to buy 400 acres of land in Dandora, as trustee to minor son Uhuru.

Logically, Kenyatta’s salary as president was not enough to buy 500,000 acres of land in the 15 years he ruled. There have been rumors of Kenyatta having forced all foreign companies to offer 15 per cent of their shares to his family before trading in Kenya. This might explain the high stakes they have in many businesses. It was recently noted by Citizen TV that the Kenyattas have shares worth $830 million in the privately-owned Commercial Bank of Africa.

There are no records of Uhuru paying taxes on his salary as Gatundu South Member of Parliament since 2002 or as Deputy Prime Minister, since 2008. Did Forbes investigate how much property taxes he pays to the Kenya Revenue Authority? What about reports about large sums of money “disappearing” at Treasury since he became the Finance Minister? What of all the Parliamentary and media reports of the highly-priced and single-sourced procurement of low fuel consuming official cars for ministers? Since Mama Ngina has other chidren beside Uhuru, how did Forbes determine how much Uhuru is worth within the Kenyatta estate? On the other hand, the International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo must be marvelling because he wants a stop on the transfer of all movable and immovable assests he owns, in case he will be found guilty in the ongoing post election violence (PEV) case. Uhuru is rich enough to compensate the PEV victims if found guilty.

In conclusion, the background of Uhuru Kenyatta’s wealth is awash with alleged illegal acquisitions by other members of his wider family, so it was unethical for Forbes to list him as the richest man in Kenya and the 26th richest man in Africa.

Dr. Jared Odero

263 comments

  • The Kenyatta family only became rich through unscrupulous,damn………..time for truth will always come no matter how long it takes

  • Read the useless Methodology applied by Forbes to select Africa’s 40 richest:

    METHODOLOGY

    The list focused on citizens of African countries –thereby excluding potential members like Sudanese-born billionaire Mo Ibrahim, who’s a U.K. citizen; South African-born Ivan Glasenberg (the CEO of commodities trader Glencore, who is an Australian citizen) and former South African billionaire Donald Gordon (who has become a British citizen and lives in the U.K.). We calculated the fortunes using stock prices and currency exchange rates from close of business Wed. November 2. To value privately-held businesses we couple estimates of revenues or profits with prevailing price-to-sales or price-to-earnings ratios for similar public companies.

    We have purposely excluded dispersed family fortunes such as the Chandaria family of Kenya and the Madhvanis of Uganda, because the wealth is believed to be held by dozens of family members. We do include wealth belonging to a member’s immediate relatives if the wealth can be traced to one living individual; in that case, you’ll see “& family” on our list as an indication.

    http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2011/11/16/africas-40-richest/

    • NON HAVE COME OUT CLEARLY SAYING KENYATTAA TOOK THIS MY PEACE OF LAND ,ITS A POLITICAL PROPAGADER IN THE ARENA OF MULTIPARTYISM

      • Mama ngina mwizi wa mashamba

        Leonard Odongo: In Kenya one cannot take a president to court. Jomo Kenyatta died while president so no one could accuse him. However, Mama Ngina was recently accused for allegedly grabbing the land of Jomo Kenyatta’s brother.

        Attorney-General Githu Muigai wants the High Court to throw out a suit where Mama Ngina Kenyatta has been sued by her brother-in-law for allegedly grabbing 3.5 acres in Gatundu the kin claims was seized by Kenya’s first president.

        The AG wants the suit filed by Peter Mungai Ngengi against Mama Ngina thrown out, arguing that it holds little merit in court.

        Mr Ngengi moved to court in 2012 seeking to have the land transferred back to him, and to be compensated for imprisonment he claims was instigated by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta for him relinquish the land.

        Prof Muigai on Wednesday filed an application seeking to dismiss the suit, arguing that Mr Ngengi has failed to demonstrate to the court why he waited for more than 12 years to lodge the suit.

        “The petition is one full of subjective opinions and personal convictions which do not warrant the invoking of Section 80 of the Land Registration Act as read together with Article 40 of the Constitution,” he said.

        Attorney-General Githu Muigai wants the High Court to throw out a suit where Mama Ngina Kenyatta has been sued by her brother-in-law for allegedly grabbing 3.5 acres in Gatundu the kin claims was seized by Kenya’s first president.

        Mr Mungai sued Mama Ngina and President Uhuru Kenyatta, accusing them of taking over the land after the death of the first president. But Mr Mungai in August last year reached a deal to remove the President from the suit after reaching an agreement with the Kenyatta family.

        Mr Mungai says he is the only surviving brother of the late Kenyatta who was adopted by his father Ngengi Kungu after being orphaned at a young age.

        He accuses the first President of using his powers to grab his land at Ichaweri village in Gatundu. He claims the senior Kenyatta, through the Lands ministry, evicted him and his family from the property and merged it with another where he built himself a presidential palace.

        Justice Joseph Onguto ordered the AG to serve Mr Mungai with the application, and directed both parties to appear before him on December 18 for hearing of the objection.

        Mr Mungai claims he was jailed in Gatundu Colonial Prison, until Jomo Kenyatta built him a home in Mutomo, where he lived for two years before it was also demolished.

        He alleges that he was threatened with death if he did not relinquish the land, through a visit by one of the late president’s bodyguards.

        “If I am told to shoot you with all your family I am going to obey the order of the president and I am going to wipe out you and your family. You don’t joke with a king,” he said of the visit allegedly paid to him by the bodyguard.

        He further said in suit papers he turned down an offer from Mama Ngina in 2012 to build him a home in Munyu, where he now resides with hope of being reallocated
        the 3.5 acre land he claims was grabbed.

        He has faulted the previous governments for not acting on the alleged grabbing, which was his basis for enjoining the AG in the suit.

        The suit had been filed in the Constitutional Division but was transferred to the Lands Court by Lady Justice Mumbi Ngugi last year.

  • Am l shocked???mmm..not really….why cant the goverment inverstigate? coz, they cant wezi tupu hao.Send alshaahab to kenyan parliament.

  • Folks ,it has taken all this time to see the obvious.Man we Kenyans have lost it in so many ways .To establish order ,there must be ,and repeat must ,a clean sweep of the present as it still holds sway over so much government.As a beginning let Kenyans vote with their convictions not with balkaninsed theiving ideas such as tribe as so forth.
    Ean Wuod Luo

    KSB: Tonny, give me a call when you can.

  • Who owns Kenya?

    Friday October 1, 2004

    By Otsieno Namwaya, East African Standard

    Kenya’s two former First Families and the family of President Mwai Kibaki are among the biggest landowners in the country. A residual class of white settlers and a group of former and current power brokers in the three post independent regimes follow them closely while a few businessmen and farmers, many with either current or past political connections, also own hundreds of thousands of acres.

    The extended Kenyatta family alone owns an estimated 500,000 acres approximately the size of Nyanza Province according to estimates by independent surveyors and Ministry of Lands officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

    The Kibaki and Moi families also own large tracts of land though most of the Moi family land is held in the names of his sons and daughters and other close family members. Most of the holders of the huge parcels of land are concentrated within the 17.2 per cent part of the country that is arable. The remaining 80 per cent is mostly arid and semi arid land.

    In fact, according to the Kenya Land Alliance, more than a half of the arable land in the country is in the hands of only 20 per cent of the 30 million Kenyans. That has left up to 13 per cent of the population absolutely landless while another 67 per cent on average own less than an acre per person.

    The building land crises in the country, experts say, will be difficult to solve because the most powerful people in the country are also among its biggest landowners. The tracts of land under the Kenyatta family are so widely distributed within the numerous members in various parts of the country that it is an almost impossible task to locate all of them and establish their exact sizes.

    During Kenyatta’s 15-year tenure in State House, there was an elaborate scheme funded by the World Bank and the British Government, the Settlement Transfer Fund Scheme, under which the family legally acquired large pieces of land all over the country. Among the best-known parcels owned by Kenyatta’s family, for instance, are the 24, 000 acres in Taveta sub-district adjacent to the 74, 000 acres owned by former MP Basil Criticos.

    Others are 50, 000 acres in Taita that is currently under Mrs Beth Mugo, an Assistant minister of Education and niece of the first President, 29, 000 acres in Kahawa Sukari along the Nairobi Thika highway, the 10, 000 acre Gichea Farm in Gatundu, 5, 000 acres in Thika, 9,000 acres in Kasarani and the 5, 000-acre Muthaita Farm. These are beside others such as Brookside Farm, Green Lee Estate, Njagu Farm in Juja, a quarry in Dandora in Nairobi and a 10, 000-acre ranch in Naivasha.

    The acreage quoted in this report is not extracted from official government records; there are none and those that exist are scattered and some cases incomplete but are estimates based on close to a year of interviews with farm staff, independent surveyors, Ministry of Lands experts and land rights NGOs.

    Other pieces of land owned by the Kenyatta family include the 52,000-acre farm in Nakuru and a 20,000-acre one, also known as Gichea Farm, in Bahati under Kenyatta’s daughter, Margaret. Besides, Mama Ngina Kenyatta, widow of the former President, owns another 10, 000 acres in Rumuruti while a close relative of the Kenyatta family, a Mrs Kamau, has 40,000 acres in Endebes in the Rift Valley Province.It is understood that in the late 1990s, the Kenyatta family started considering the possibility of disposing of parts of the land in Nairobi.

    In the lead-up to the 2002 general elections, for instance, there were indications that the family was considering selling the 100-acre piece of land in Karen. But even with that, the Kenyatta family would still own a sizeable part of Nairobi, such as the 1,000-acre farm in Dagoretti owned by Kenyatta’s first wife Wahu.

    It is also understood that part of the land on which Kenyatta and Jomo Kenyatta Universities are constructed initially belonged the Criticos family. The government bought the land from him in 1972 under the Settlement Transfer Fund Scheme. It is alleged, though there is little compelling evidence, that the land was transferred to the Kenyatta family the same day Criticos sold it to the government. Neither is it clear how much the family paid for it. Land for the two universities was subsequently donated by the family.

    Under President Kenyatta, most of the power wielders either formed or were associated with land buying companies through which they acquired huge chunks of land around the country, especially at the Coast and in Rift Valley. They took most of the land previously owned by the former white settlers, which had initially been earmarked for resettling those who had been turned into squatters by the colonial land policies. One of the most famous land buying companies was Gema Holdings. Most of the people including retired President Moi and his former Vice President, Mwai Kibaki who had considerable political influence in the Kenyatta regime, were given the opportunity to buy as much land as they could.

    One of President Kibaki’s earliest acquisitions is the 1,200-acre Gingalily Farm along the Nakuru-Solai road. He bought it in the late 1960s. And in the 1970s, Kibaki, who was then the minister for Finance under Kenyatta, bought 10, 000 acres in Bahati from the then Agriculture minister Bruce Mckenzie. Kibaki also owns another 10, 000 acres at Igwamiti in Laikipia and 10, 000 acres in Rumuruti in Naivasha. These are in addition to the 1,600 acre Ruare Ranch that came to the limelight when it caught fire last year.

    Just next to Kibaki’s Bahati land are Moi’s 20, 000 acres although his best known piece of land is the 1,600 Kabarak Farm on which he has retired. It is one of the most well utilised farms in the area, with wheat, maize and dairy cattle. The former President owns another 20, 000 acres in Olenguruoni in Rift Valley, on which
    he is growing tea and has also built the Kiptakich Tea Factory. He also has some 20, 000 acres in Molo. He also has another 3, 000-acre farm in Bahati on both sides of the Nakuru/Nyahururu road where he grows coffee and some 400 acres in Nakuru on which he was initially growing coffee.

    The former President also owns the controversy ridden 50, 000 acre Ol Pajeta Farm part of which has Ol Pajeta ranch in Rumuruti, Laikipia. Last year, the family put out an advert in the press warning the public that some unknown people were sub-dividing and selling it.

    Land transactions are ongoing and some of these farms may have changed hands. Lands minister Amos Kimunya said yesterday the Government is formulating a land policy, which will address the question of idle land. “If it is lying idle, the Government will definitely apply the law to the letter to ensure it is put to productive use,” he said.

    “The policy is being developed by the people. At the end of it all, views that emerge are to be synthesised to come up with prudent policy.” But the Government has no quarrel with the size of land one owns. “The question is, is that land, notwithstanding the size, being put to productive use?”

    http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hm_news/news.php?articleid=2189

  • What is STFS?

    Upon the exit of colonial settlers at independence, Jomo Kenyatta’s new government offered to BUY land being vacated by the white settlers – land they never paid for in the first place. Jomo Kenyatta conspired with the British government and the World Bank to sign a loan called the Settler Transfer Fund Scheme (STFS) which was to be used to compensate these departing colonial settlers for the land they had earlier grabbed. The loan was signed on the backs of Kenyan taxpayers – payable over decades.

    Kenyatta had lied to Kenyans that the loan was justified and worthy because it would benefit transfer of colonial land titles to previously expropriated indigenous owners of land. But what happened as soon as the white settlers were compensated became the greatest betrayal of Kenyans – an issue that led to the fallout between Kenyatta and his then Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.

    Without shame or guilt, as indigenous land owners were ignored, Kenyatta not only transferred the land titles to his name, to his family, and to cronies and tribesmen, he also used the STF and more tax-payer money to acquire further land in other regions of Kenya. That is how the Kenyatta family alone ended up with an estimated half a million acres of arable and prime land.

    Kenyatta’s then right hand man, Mbiyu Koinange, helped himself with tens of thousands of acres, on top of a Sh 7 million STF loan (a lot of money then), to acquire a white settler’s farm (Mr. Powys Cobb) in Mau Narok. Today, the Koinanges are yet to clear the original Sh7 million STF loan credited to them at taxpayer guarantee.

    Via email

  • Uhuru/Kibaki govt Bulldozing Middle-Class Houses>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4MlteYAMxI&feature=player_embedded#!

  • How ‘big shots’ gobbled up the finest farms

    By John Kamau, Business Daily November 10, 2009

    The take-over by the rich of farms meant to settle the poor in the high-potential areas infuriated the British government and confused officials who did not want to take action or stop continued allocation of the 100 acre plots to the elite, otherwise code named Z plots in government documents.

    Only one man — James Wanjigi Maina, then Director of Settlements — dared to issue a directive to stop the allocation but he was quickly overruled by Lands Permanent Secretary, Peter Shiyukah. Maina was actually asked by Shiyukah to compile a list of the VIPs — or “big shots” as he (Shiyukah) later described them — who had received such land.

    These details reveal why the settlements went wrong from the beginning and why the land equation in the country was tilted in favour of those close to power. But angry that government officials had started to allocate themselves development funds, and plots in schemes they had funded to settle the landless, the British Ministry of Overseas Development asked the High Commission in Nairobi to seek more details.

    Key politicians
    On June 18, 1965, a year after funds from the World Bank and CDC had been used on the Z plots without their knowledge, the British High Commission in Nairobi wrote to Peter Shiyukah asking whether the proposal to set aside “some of the best farm houses….with a certain amount of surrounding land had been implemented”. By the time Neil Brockett of the British High Commission was writing this he already knew that some key politicians, among them Jomo Kenyatta, had acquired land in the schemes.

    It appears that an April 1964 warning that use of the World Bank/CDC money to finance the elite takeover might backfire by the officer administering the settlement fund N.S. Carey Jones, was not heeded. Business Daily can now report that this warning, nay appraisal, was given to the Settlement Fund Trustees who were then ministers James Gichuru (Finance), Bruce McKenzie (Agriculture) and Jackson Angaine (Settlement) suggesting that they should refer the change of policy to the British government which had given money to purchase land for the settlements schemes.

    Mr Jones suggestion, dated April 15, was that the Z Plots could “perhaps be accepted against IBRD (World Bank) schemes without reference back, provided that the buyers are men with agricultural experience and sufficient capital. If they are not then I would foresee that we could not claim any development loan finance for them and this could in turn raise with the British government the use of the land purchase money,” wrote Jones in the Directive paper No. 35. Actually nobody contacted the British government on the same and by July 1965, the Financial Controller (Settlements) after “searching through old files” could not find such a letter. “We have therefore now to approach the British Government to obtain approval for the existing arrangements to continue…”.

    One person took the bold initiative to stop any further allocation of 100 acres on July 29, 1965. He was the director of Settlements, James Wanjigi Maina. In his directive, after a special visit by the World Bank and CDC officials Maina stopped any further allocation of Z Plots because they appeared “to be inconsistent” with the financial agreements reached between Kenya and the lenders. “Until this matter is cleared with the lenders, I am afraid we have got to discontinue any more approvals for 100-acre plots,” said Maina.

    But when these directive reached Peter Shiyukah, he called Mr Maina to discuss the subject and followed it up with a letter. Apparently Shiyukah was one of the beneficiaries of the Z Plots … He wrote: “I confirm once more that if the decision of suspending the allocation of 100 acre plots is implemented, it would be met with a lot of opposition from the President, Ministers and the public at large.” “I agree that as a first step we should have asked permission from the World bank and CDC to make alterations in our agreements with them. While we are negotiating with them it is not necessary to halt our practice of allocating 100 acres plots since we are too far advanced in it,” wrote Shiyukah.

    As he gave this directive, Shiyukah also wrote a three-page explanation to the British High Commission alluding that the original proposal came from the Officer Administering the Settlement Fund. It was a lie for in all the documents the directive had come from Kenyatta. One of the worry of the lenders was that 100 acres were not envisaged in the funding proposal since those type of farmers could have acquired land by private means and without using the British funds to get access to such loans.

    Actually, on September 6, 1965, Bruce Greatbach of the British High Commission wrote to Shiyukah asking: “Have any development loans been issued to the purchasers and if so how much?” That was where the scandal was. When the list was compiled some of the purchasers who had also taken development loans were omitted.

    Documents also indicate that some of the land was dished by Kenyatta without paying a penny. For instance, it is noted in a confidential document that Cilliers House in South Kinangop “was given free to Jesse Kariuki by President and he paid nothing.” Kariuki was a pioneer freedom fighter. So secret was the administration of this Z plots that when Angaine was to go out of the country in November 1965 his PS, Shiyukah, asked whether he could delegate “your power of approving application of 100 acres and the Low and High Density plots to the Assistant Minister as opposed to the Acting minister” Angaine replied: “To await my return!”

    When Shiyukah asked Maina to compile the list of all those who had received land, he appears to have left out some names. But Shiyukah was glad that he finally had a list of who had received what land. “I thank you for this list you have produced which has names of the big shots who have been allocated 100 acre plots by the ministry of lands and settlement,” wrote Shiyukah.

    Missing names
    “On examining the list with (ministry of lands), we have discovered that there are many more persons who had been allocated plots but their names do not seem to appear on your list. For example Mr Lugonzo, the Deputy Mayor, Mr Ngaira, the chairman, Public Service Commission, Mr Robert Ouko, PS Ministry of Works, Mr Ndisi, PS Labour Dr Minjo, Mr Kibaki, Assistant Minister Planning etc….” Shiyukah said that “the minister would like a list of these persons to be included even though some other snags are still existing…”

    “In addition, the minister (meaning Angaine) would like a list of other persons who obtained other type of farms from us which are not within the settlement schemes e.g. Mr Muliro etc.” Former President Moi appears to have been a late entrant in seeking his share of 100 acres.

    New details now show that it was only in 1966 that Moi applied to get Gunson’s House within the Perkera Scheme in Eldama Ravine. Initially left as a State Lodge. Moi had a reason to ask for the house and told the Lands PS Peter Shiyukah that “most MPS and other prominent people have bought 100 acre plots with houses.” “I do not know how many acres are there. All I know is that the value of the land surrounding this house is very poor and I would like to buy it so that I can keep a few cattle on it”, wrote Moi.

    When lands minister, Jackson Angaine received Moi’s letter he asked the Director of Settlement to check whether he can “demarcate 100 acres to make the house more attractive.”

  • ogiga pia ni mwizi lakini uhuru knows how to invest his money so stop siasa za peni moja!

  • Kenya: Insider’s View of Jomo Kenyatta – President, Farmer And Family Man
    15 December 2006

    Copyright © 2006 The Nation. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com).

    Nairobi — Duncan Ndegwa was Civil Service head in Kenya’s first Government after ‘uhuru’. In his newly-published memoirs, ‘Kenyatta Struggles’, he gives an insight into Mzee’s life, party politics and the people who shaped today’s Kenya.

    The social, political and economic tensions that featured in Kenya at independence demanded unambiguous measures to restore peace and stability. Jomo Kenyatta, the Prime Minister, could have opted to use force but there was no hope of success if such a path had been followed. Kenyatta was directly responsible for the many changes that took place prior to and in the process of formation of a central government. Despite numerous contradictory observations about Mzee, it was clear in my mind that, to him, the livelihood of the people came first. Kenyatta’s handling of the Mau Mau may have been criticised as a let-down to people who had given their lives to the freedom struggle.

    But in my view, his was a practical approach to an issue that would have exploded and changed his image as a national leader. Only he, among Kenya’s independence leaders, for instance, could order fighters who were still in the forest to come out. Though he was defied by some, like General Baimunge, the response was overwhelming. Baimunge and his colleague, General Chui, were later killed in a police swoop on outlawed camps in forests around Mount Kenya on January 27, 1965.

    The Prime Minister sent one of his ministers, Mr Mbiyu Koinange, to Ruring’u Stadium in Nyeri where the bulk of Mau Mau fighters were supposed to assemble to lay down their arms. Perhaps sending Koinange was a mistake because he was not the kind of man to face such an issue squarely. Although I was not a politician, Kenyatta sent me to Mwea, to a tobacco collection centre, to receive fighters who were surrendering in Kirinyaga and Murang’a areas. I told those who attended the meetings that I had authority from the Prime Minister to order them to return to their homes. They took my word and obeyed.

    I explained that I was just Kenyatta’s messenger. Those war veterans wanted to fill up the ranks of the police but they had been so battered by the Mau Mau war that it was not possible to absorb them into it. We could not enrol them in the army either, for the same reasons.

    Indeed, years in the forest seemed to have impaired their sense of reality. Kung’u Karumba, for example, shared the same prison term with Kenyatta but saw things quite differently. He once went to Kenyatta to ask him to appoint him a DC. When Kenyatta told him that he did not have the right qualifications, he retorted: “What do I need certificates for? Mine is not to write but to administer! I will, of course, have a literate secretary to write down my instructions.” Karumba’s vision was the return of a clan system headed by an elder.

    Even if they were physically and academically adept to qualify for enlistment in the forces and other positions, Kenyatta was hesitant to fill those positions with former Mau Mau fighters because eventually we would have ended up largely with a Gikuyu army, a Gikuyu police force and a Gikuyu Civil Service.
    One day, Kenyatta said to a delegation from Nyeri: “I will fill my Government only with educated leaders. He had in mind Wamuthenya who was trying to cut an image for himself in the Ministry of Natural Resources as an assistant minister. For “squatters” he would pronounce, “Thiguotaz” and “g”o was “ngo”. In despair, Mzee wondered whether there was an English language training institute where I could take MPs like Wamuthenya.

    Wamuthenya was not alone. My own MP, Kiboi wa Wairi, M.A, had once caused a rumpus in the political arena by suggesting that Mzee had too many powers. Another politician, a Dr Muriuki made it a habit of contesting the same seat as Mr Mwai Kibaki. Neither Mr Muriuki nor Mr Kiboi could produce attestation of their degrees.

    The Government policy recognised a commitment to the landless, the poor and the unemployed. Kenyatta was so pushed by the urgency to settle former freedom fighters and other landless people that he, on some occasions, took personal charge of the programme.

    Ol Kalou Settlement scheme was the best example of Mzee’s reforming zeal. He grew impatient with an exercise that he thought should have been quick and efficient. The then Nyeri District Commissioner, Mr G.K Kariithi, visited Ol Kalou on hearing that some farmers were threatening to abandon their farms before Independence Day. He then asked those among the European farmers who wanted to leave to raise their hands. Sixty of them did. Mr Kariithi told them it was in order for them to leave and all he needed was their forwarding addresses. When he asked them to commit themselves in writing, only 28 of them did.
    On that day, Mr Kariithi met Mzee in the company of Agriculture minister Bruce Mackenzie, Finance minister James Gichuru and Land and Settlement minister Jackson Angaine.

    When the situation was explained to him, Mzee asked why the Ol Kalou land could not be distributed before Independence Day. There was no answer from the ministers. Kenyatta rose, stretched out his walking stick like a measuring rod and asked, “Why can’t you parcel out the land…?” There was a moment of silence once again and then Mzee said: “I am going to give land to Africans in two weeks. I want you to go and organise for that.”

    True to his word, Kenyatta went to Ol Kalou and spent the entire day parcelling out land with the assembled settlement officers.

    Lighting fires all over
    In the course of the exercise, he came across a mansion abandoned by a white settler. The mansion had about 24 rooms, each of them with a chimney. Kenyatta was disappointed that the Africans who had now taken it over were lighting fires all over in charcoal braziers. He decided that such property must be protected. He ordered that from then on, any farm that had such property would be given to individuals in lots of 100 acres – hence the emergence of the type of settlement farms called “permanent improvement units”.

    At the end of the tiring day, he could not resist sequestering one permanent improvement unit surrounded by a beautiful orchard for himself. He sighed, Ni ka minoga (It is for hard work).

    ***
    Prime Minister Kenyatta’s Gatundu home had not been provided with enough security. A threat to Kenyatta’s security was right outside his Gatundu home gate in the form of a neighbour who felt aggrieved by Kenyatta’s presence.

    The road to Kenyatta’s house passed through his health assistant neighbour’s farm. The man would glumly bear Kenyatta “trespassing” on his land until one Sunday when he fortified himself with alcohol and stood on the road with a panga (machete) in hand. He then shouted: “Let those who are calling themselves Kenyatta and other big names dare pass here now. I will turn them into minced meat!”

    The matter was later amicably settled by the two neighbours. That is the home Kenyatta ended up in the day he was supposed to spend his first night at State House. His hurried journey from State House to Gatundu, with almost no security, was caused by the croaking of frogs on the grounds of State House. Kenyatta argued they were the ghosts of colonialism. To my knowledge, he never spent the night in State House for a day.

    It was to that Gatundu home that I would be summoned early in the morning. Kenyatta would, as a matter of fact, telephone me routinely when kings and queens were asleep. He would be awake at that hour and ready to mind this and that business, including travelling to his Nyandarua farm where he grew plums, among other crops.

    Attend to other issues
    I would arrive at Gatundu very early, weighed down by matters of State and thinking that I would have a brief meeting with Mzee and then attend to other issues. If I found Mzee having breakfast, he invited me to join him. His breakfast was a stately affair; a king’s meal. Kenyatta, the man who did not suffer fools to speak to him, expected you to talk as he listened and enjoyed his breakfast I counted myself lucky if, after breakfast, Kenyatta did not take me on a guided tour of his five-acre Gatundu farm. Like the good farmer that he was, he knew where every banana and orange fruit tree was. When I visited Gatundu, I did not dread the farm tour as much as finding that an Italian building contractor called Campagnola had preceded me. When Campagnola visited Gatundu, Mzee abandoned everybody else and the two got deeply engaged in plans to modify the Gatundu house.

    Poor Campagnola was hardly paid for his labours at Gatundu. Instead, he was promised Government contracts. However, he had to go through tenders like any other contractor. Sorting out letters was at one time the cause of friction between Eliud Mathu, then the State House Comptroller, and I. Mr Mathu wanted to keep keys to the post office and thus be a conduit for Mzee’s letters. I objected on grounds that, in my official capacity as secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil service, I had the first duty to check those letters. The same letters made Kenyatta unhappy. He initially wanted to open the letters himself but we reminded him of the dangers inherent in that, including the possibilities of a letter bomb. The apartheid regime in South African was specialising in that form of assassination.

    Mr John Michuki got a dose of Mzee’s anger in a case concerning letters, while serving as Secretary to the Cabinet in an acting capacity. Mr Michuki failed to heed a request by Mzee on a particular parcel that he had wanted to open personally and went ahead to open it. It contained a watch and he proceeded to give it to Kenyatta.

    The President flew into a rage in the presence of Njonjo. Michuki was quick to defend himself, saying: “Sir, I would never wish the house of Michuki to be bestowed with the ignoble role of having led to the death of the first President of the Republic of Kenya after handing him an explosive device when he could have prevented it. The matter ended with Mzee bursting into loud laughter.”

    Mr Mathu finally kept away from Mzee’s mail and stuck to minding his (Mzee’s) diary and hospitality at State House. I don’t really know how he ended up there, having lost his esteem in the eyes of his fellow nationalists. In the first place, he supported the wrong cause when he threw his weight behind the so-called Beecher Report of 1948, which had recommended a separate education system for Africans. Then he had committed the crime of being lukewarm about Kenyatta’s release.

    Mr Mathu turned out to be an efficient Comptroller of State House, but never became a power broker. On one occasion, Mr Mathu was seized by passion we could not understand. He disappeared from Kenyatta’s official residence at Thiririka for two days.

    He was later found inebriated beyond recall at Ganjoni, where he declared to those who had been sent to get him that he had had enough of State House. However, when he sobered up, he returned to State House and the matter died a natural death. Perhaps because Mr Mathu had had a stint as a journalist, Mzee avoided confrontations with the media. Instead, he chose to deal directly with individuals within media institutions when an issue arose.

    Stirred by Akorino songs
    Mzee also advised against confrontations with churches, although he could not be described as a Christian who expressed belief in the Holy Trinity or in the life there-after dogma. However, he never considered any church a challenge to his Government. He attended church only for wedding and funeral services and fund-raising meetings. He, however, had a soft spot for Bishop Benjamin Kahihia’s African Independent Church of Africa, most likely because of its nationalist affiliations. His heart was also stirred beyond measure by the effervescent singing and the dancing of the Akorino sect, one of the indigenous African churches.

    There are only two events which I remember almost bringing Kenyatta’s Government in collision with churches. One was the taking over of Catholic Church-sponsored schools by the Government and the abolition of denominational bias in the curriculum. The Catholic Church was not willing to see its grip on the schools go but the matter was amicably settled after consultations between Mzee and Bishop Mackay of the Catholic Church.

    The other event arose from the death of Tom Mboya, when the Agikuyu were said to be taking an oath of allegiance to Kenyatta and to the tribe. In the process, they were accused of terrorising Christians who declined to take the oath. The then Catholic Bishop of the Nyeri Diocese went to protest to Kenyatta.
    After listening attentively in his characteristic pose of supporting his chin with his fore-finger, Kenyatta reportedly told Bishop Gatimu: “When the Anglicans ring their bell, that does not prevent the Presbyterian Church of East Africa from ringing its bell. When the Orthodox Church rings its bell, it does not prevent the Catholic Church from ringing its bell. Is there any harm in the Agikuyu ringing their bell?”

    Mzee did not mind anyone believing in the Christian dogma and indeed his family was of the Catholic faith. His brother in-law, Mr George Muhoho (now managing director of the Kenya Airports Authority), was a Catholic priest until he got a special dispensation from the Pope to marry. Before he left priesthood, Muhoho used to be taunted by Mzee about the abode of the Almighty being above the skies and would tell him: “When the Apollo Eleven astronauts went to the moon, they brought rock as souvenirs to world leaders, including myself. Now, tell me Muhoho, where is this heaven you talk about. The Americans who went to the moon did not see it?” Then he would go lyrical and sing, Iguru, kwa Ngai! Nitugacemania o kuo! (In Heaven, God’s abode; There we shall meet!)

    Visit farm at short notice
    It is difficult to say what Kenyatta was worth in gold but the farmer that I knew him to be owned a tea farm close to Aberdare ranges which had been excised from public land and duly gazetted, besides the fruit farm in Nyandarua which he would visit at short notice.

    Mzee had an eye for aesthetics, including beautiful women. That is how Miss Elizabeth Mumbi, later wife of Marsden Madoka, (the Kanu MP for Mwatate) came to work at State House. He had spotted her during a beauty pageant to mark independence and asked that she be put on the State House staff. She served diligently as a social secretary. Kenyatta’s first secretary, Mrs Ruth Njiiri, married to an MP, was equally efficient but had to leave when Njonjo accused her of releasing State secrets to an adversary.

    Although Kenyatta was larger than life and devoted to his family, he acted ex-cathedra in matters relating to the State and to his family. He was conscious of the possible conflict of interest between the two. One such incident involved his son Muigai, who had reneged on his income tax returns payments and successfully shielded himself from that commitment. When the matter reached Mzee, I was present with the Minister for Finance, Mr Mwai Kibaki. Pointedly, Mr Muigai was reminded by his father of his duties as a tax payer: only Kenyatta was by law exempt. Mr Muigai protested when Mzee demanded for a preparation of tax returns. “Dad,” Mr Muigai responded,” they would rifle everything. I have an Indian accountant!”

    The same son had interests in the public transport sector. When the Government imposed a maximum axle load on vehicles using the Nairobi-Mombasa road, Mr Muigai used his influence to have the legal notice repealed. Mzee, once again, intervened and the notice was restored.

    Copyright: Duncan Ndegwa, ‘Kenyatta Struggles’

  • Kenya: Why Central Elite Is Turning to Raila
    Julius Sigei
    11 November 2011

    Central Kenya’s rich elite gravitation towards Prime Minister Raila Odinga in his quest for the presidency is causing ripples in a region where his nemesis, at least according to the latest opinion polls, Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta comes from.

    University of Nairobi Chancellor and President Kibaki’s confidant, Dr Joe Wanjui, Kiambaa MP Stanley Githunguri, businessman Peter Kuguru and former Attorney General Charles Njonjo are all said to be warming up to Mr Odinga.

    It is intriguing given the love-hate relationship between the region’s elite and the Odinga family, which dates back to the 1960s.

    Others are Royal Media Group chairman S.K. Macharia and businessman James Koome.

    Played key role

    While founding Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga played a key role in securing Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency by turning down an offer to become prime minister and instead pushed for his release, they soon fell out after independence.

    Jaramogi would remain in the political cold until 1992 when he returned to Parliament after the reintroduction of multi-party politics.

    History repeated itself in 2002 when the younger Odinga declared ‘Kibaki Tosha’, effectively handing the presidency to then opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki.

    But as had happened 40 years earlier, Mr Kibaki soon differed with Mr Odinga and, as they say, the rest is history.

    While former Kiambaa MP Njenga Karume has not categorically voiced support for Mr Odinga, his statement that he could “vote for anyone for President” has been interpreted in some quarters as warming up to a candidate from outside Central Kenya.

    This is especially so because Mr Karume has been closely identified with Mr Kenyatta, the man he dumped Kibaki for in 2002.

    Both would later throw their lot with the President in 2007. But perhaps Dr Wanjui’s statement was the more dramatic and intriguing given his closeness to the President.

    “I have been President Kibaki’s supporter and friend for many years. I am still his friend and supporter. But after looking around and searching far and wide, the only person capable of consolidating the leadership and development Kibaki has established is Raila Odinga,” he is reported to have said at the PM’s home in Karen.

    Former Subukia MP Koigi wa Wamwere said by supporting the PM, the Central elite hoped to kill two birds with one stone.

    “They want to be with the winning team so that their massive wealth does not come into any danger and at the same time pay the debt of the injustices meted out to both Mr Odinga and his father,” Mr Wamwere said.

    The elite reckoned Kenyans may not elect another Kikuyu and wanted a safe bet, he said. “Raila fits the bill as a property owner himself. They are not doing it out of any high ideal, but because of self-interest.

    The best candidate for them is the one who wins,” Mr Wamwere said. Senior counsel Paul Muite agrees.

    “Business people the world over are concerned more with the preservation of their wealth than with ideology, the community or the country.

    And as to whether they are right or wrong in their gamble is a subject for another day,” said Mr Muite, who also wants to be president.

    But he dismissed the idea that the Kikuyu owed Mr Odinga a favour, insisting the presidency was “not about individuals or communities.”

    “We fought for a robust democracy that must allow any individual to aspire to any office, including the presidency.

    “When prices of goods go up, they do so for everybody irrespective of ethnic origin. If Kenyans do not want another Kikuyu, they will say so at the ballot,” he said.

    Dismissing the elders’ ability to sway the Central vote in favour of Mr Odinga, Sports assistant minister Kabando wa Kabando said the election would not be determined by older men but by the youth.

    “Reincarnation of the past won’t rhyme with the present. The politics of Kenya is not about personal wealth and private clubs or an alumnus of expired regimes,” Mr Kabando said.

    His sentiments were echoed by Naivasha MP John Mututho who said the rich were not the sole opinion shapers.

    “Opinion shapers can be that boda boda chairman or the local councillor. In Nairobi, the Kikuyu opinion leaders are Embakasi MP Ferdinand Waititu and his Starehe counterpart Bishop Margaret Wanjiru, not the super rich,” he said.

    He added that the business elite were “only thronging to Mr Odinga for business connections”.

    Kirinyaga Central MP Joseph Gitari supported this, saying, Mr Kenyatta had taken a tough line on businessmen who were given government land and were reselling it to the State at exorbitant prices for resettlement of IDPs.

    “They are trying to blackmail the DPM, but he will not succumb because he is not threatened politically,” Mr Gitari said. But Mr Wamwere said the elders’ move would bear fruit if Mr Kenyatta were to drop out of the race.

    “If Uhuru, for one reason or another does not vie, the elders’ decision will divide the community in the middle, with his camp having a slight edge,” he said.

    The ICC has indicated that Mr Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto would not be barred from contesting the presidency even if their cases were confirmed.

    Crowded field

    Mr Odinga’s attempt to make inroads into Central will also be compounded by the recent entry of the Internal Security Minister, Prof George Saitoti, who is touted as a fallback candidate for the group coalescing around Mr Kenyatta.

    Gichugu MP Martha Karua and Planning assistant minister Peter Kenneth (Gatanga) are the other presidential candidates from the region.

    United States International University journalism lecturer Isaiah Cherutich says Mr Odinga’s chances will depend on who the G7 alliance fronts as their flag-bearer.

    “If it is Mr Kenyatta, it will be difficult given the antipathy for Raila created by the ICC and the accompanying political propaganda. It also depends on how well he assures the community of its well-being in concrete terms,” he said.

  • Corruption created Africa,at the partition of Africa in Berlin,in 1884,european powers corruptly slicing their “booty”(a continent) among themselves.African states were created specifically for economic plunder,of natural resources,cheap/forced labour and to enrich their populations at the expense of African people.These countries were created without consultation with the original nations that existed before, and lumped together into colonies,and splitting others. In Kenya for instance,the colonial”tribe”,for over 70 years,made themselves rich with no regard for the other people who also lived there.The powers ,e.g the british, benefited from the slave trade,slavery,plunder of the Indian subcontinent and Ireland,taxation of the entire Empire. The Kikuyu elite led by Kenyatta inherited a state created for the sole purpose of making one nation richer over the other.After the british colonial nation,it was the turn of the Kikuyu nation to plunder,and passed on to Mr.Moi’s nation to plunder and then back to the Kikuyu nation.And after everyone’s turn,they then protect each other with their wealth.All the proceeds seem to go back to the same place,the capitals of colonial powers,from Paris to London.The western countries then create too much bureaucracy,to stop the cash from being repatriated back. Githongo’s work was made tough by serving an old people’s government,who still have a colonial mentality and look at loyalty in a tribal angle,a duty to the tribe,and are very difficult to change. The younger generation have lost their tribal loyalty,but corruption will go on,not along tribal or racial lines,but on class and social status. It is the same everywhere,from South Africa,Zimbabwe,Kenya the story is similar. It is good to look at the historical context of corruption instead of the ”good” westerners complaining about an African problem that everyone has participated in.Only a change of attitude will end corruption.

    Joe Fitzpatrick

  • “If the Attorney General cannot prosecute known land-grabbers and the ordinary citizen lacks the locus standi to take such cases to court, who will save Kenya?”

    Dr. Wangari Maathai, 1977

  • Naming Uhuru richest person in Kenya is the biggest joke Forbes has ever made. Apart from being part owner of the Kenyatta family business, is he a CEO or head of any operations? He is a politician and Finance Minister, meaning he can influence procurements to favor his businesses.

    The number one position should have gone to Manu Chandaria, who was omitted by Forbes claiming his business is spread among family members. Chandaria is not a politician and has a respectable business with links across Africa. Selecting him as a pioneering industrialist with many business awards could have been more legitimate than Uhuru, whose record includes being a drunkard who enjoys money he never worked for, stolen by his father Jomo Kenyatta.

    Uhuru’s capital base lies on land which is the most controversial possession Jomo Kenyatta is blamed for. History has documented how he kicked Kikuyus out of Central province and into Rift Valley after grabbing their land. True Kikuyu freedom fighters (Mau Mau) suffered and later their children and grandchildren still suffer because Jomo never sympathized with them. He never went into the forests to fight the colonialists, yet became the biggest beneficiary of their war. After gragging 500,000 acres of land mostly in Kikuyu area, he wanted them to be squatters in Uganda and Tanzania. Imagine kicking your own people outside the country to other places because of taking their only property, land. Forbes should be ashamed for naming the son of a thief as the richest person in Kenya.

    The late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga should have listened to Kenya’s last Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, who offered him Kenya’s leadership. Kenyatta the fake leader later kicked Odinga out of the government for calling him a land-grabber and dictator.

    According to Professor Ali Mazrui: “A more dramatic blow for democracy struck by Oginga Odinga occurred when he was invited to the residence of the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, and offered the leadership of the first African government in colonial Kenya. This event occurred in Government House (now called State House) in Nairobi in 1960.

    The British Governor and the Kenyan nationalist were both standing when the offer was made. It seemed to be the chance of a lifetime. It turned out to be Oginga Odinga’s last opportunity to become premier of Kenya on the eve of independence. Oginga Odinga is reported to have responded as follows to the Governor:

    “If I accept your offer, I will be seen as a traitor to my people. The British cannot elect me leader to my people. Kenyatta is around, just here at Lodwar. Release him and allow him to lead us; he is already our choice.”

    Sir Patrick Renison was temporarily stunned. He then summoned the driver to take Mr. Oginga Odinga back to his native quarters in Nairobi.

    We now know that Oginga Odinga struck a blow against external selection of African leaders. He had sacrificed what turned out to be his last opportunity to lead Kenya. His incumbency could have transformed the ethnic configurations of postcolonial Kenya.

    If Oginga Odinga had accepted the Governor’s offer, then he could have presided over the release of Jomo Kenyatta, and Kenyatta might have become Odinga’s Vice President instead of the other way round.

    If Odinga’s first blow in favor of democracy was to reject the external selection of African leaders, Odinga’s second blow in favour of democracy was to challenge the doctrine of one-party monopoly of power.”

  • No Larry Madowo, You Must Stop Threatening Journalists And Bloggers Now

    JACKAL NEWS – Kenyan business news reporter Larry Madowo abused online commentators calling them “know-it-all” as he went on the offensive to fight off accusations relating to a list of supposedly wealthy individuals Forbes published – and which Madowo was consulted on.

    No, the Jackal News reject this kind of bullshit, which includes threatening the expose the publishers of the popular blog Media Madness, perhaps with the diabolical intention of silencing them.

    Madowo appeared to be losing the fight over the subject online, but managed to kow-tow a popular Kenyan blog to pull down a post describing him as having ‘‘sex appeal of a wet Naivas paper bag”.

    Madowo was not the author of the Forbes list – he was simply consulted on wealth perceptions of rich Kenyans – but has taken in so much flax over the flawed list.

    Online commentators took issue with Forbes for listing Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta – the son of Kenya’s first President Jomo Kenyatta – as the wealthiest Kenyan, and number 26 in Africa.

    Commentators – many Tweeting and posting on Facebook via mobile phones – said Kenyatta was not worth 500 million dollars as Forbes said, and rather the wealth was in the name of his extended family.

    On its website, Forbes acknowledged contribution of Madowo and several other individuals and companies in drawing up the list.

    ‘‘We have purposely excluded dispersed family fortunes such as the Chandaria family of Kenya… because the wealth is believed to be held by dozens of family members,’’ Forbes said of its methodology.

    However, sources told The Jackal News that the Uhuru Kenyatta as an individual does not own that much wealth; rather, the property in question is owned by the extended family of the late Jomo Kenyatta.

    Tweeting on 17 November, LarryMadowo said: ‘‘I contributed a small part of the research for Forbes magazine’s 40 Richest Africans’’.

    Facing unfair firestorm of rebuke over the list, which had businessman Chris Kirubi at number 31 with 300 million dollars, Madowo sought to clarify in a tweet: ‘‘People are incredibly clueless around here. There’s a difference between contributing research & consulting on Forbes’ 40 Richest Africans’’

    And when the critical deluge continues an angry Madowo tweeted: “In any case, if the know-it-alls were that good, Forbes would have called them. An internet connection is hardly a stamp of authority’’

    Meanwhile, as the storm spiralled, a Larry Madowo was engaging in a different battle, relating to his character.

    Media Madness, a popular scandalous Kenyan blog published a commentary on Larry Madowo, poking fun on the journalist.

    In its salutation, Media Madness had said:”I’d like to send a shout out to one Larry *crickets* *goat bleats* *acapella of jogoos crowing* Madowo.”

    In response, the red-faced Madowo, unnecessarily fired on all cylinders, throwing a tantrum: “I’m writing a tell-all post about @MediaMK, how it began, who’s behind the blog & who writes for it. This has gone on for too long.”

    http://thejackalnews.com/media-news/news-media/1252-no-larry-madowo-you-must-stop-threatening-journalists-and-bloggers-now

  • Kenyans should be aware of this man Raila n what does the name raila means, i guess its da biggest fish in lake victoria or a big dictator in da village of sinyaru n who can vote 4 da fake man like this we need changes.

    KSB: Stop posting with different names and using abusive languange. Your other two abusive comments posted with different names have been deleted.

  • Kenyatta’s Reaction
    By John Kamau – Business Daily – November 10, 2009

    Jomo Kenyatta was infuriated by the dictations that Britain was giving concerning the Z Plots. When the Cabinet finally deliberated on the issue on April 25, 1967, official minutes say that Kenyatta “strongly objected to the fact that the British Government, through its High Commission had interfered” in the sale of 100-acre farms.

    Kenyatta ordered that the sale of 100-acre farms should be resumed and that the Treasury “should guarantee the funds involved” He also directed that the agreement with the British government on the settlement fund repayments should be reviewed.

    This became a tricky affair for the ministry officials since it was both political and financial. It was not clear who was to assume responsibility for the other costs of settlements that were triggered by the excision of 100-acre plots. Kenyatta’s order meant that the Kenya taxpayer was to shoulder the burden of assisting the 100-acre farm owners by having a special fund to cater for the upkeep of their farms.

    The financial implications of the British refusal to fund the elite from the settlement budget was prepared by M.A. Collings, Kenya Ministry of Lands Financial adviser. He handed a copy to J.G. Kibe, then an under-secretary at the treasury. The onus of informing the British Government on Kenya’s stand fell on John Michuki. He admitted that the issue of 100-acre plots “raises considerable financial difficulties” His letter was a
    lengthy 5-pages whose bottomline was that Kenya government was to shoulder the 100-acre package. Britain had proposed that if the Kenya government agreed to take over financial responsibility of 100-acre plots, Kenya would be allowed to convert certain some loans into grants. Some of those who benefited from Kenyatta’s order included Mwai Kibaki and GG Kariuki who got a house in Nyahururu Scheme No 206.

    What worried John Michuki at the Treasury was that these houses were not sold by tender and the deal was contrary to recommendations of the Van Arakdie Mission which said that future“seemed to have completely ignored” the Arkadie Mission report.

    Unknown to Michuki, somebody scribbled in his letter after it reached Shiyukah’s office: “This recommendations negative and unacceptable.” One letter from the Kisii District Commissioner, N.G. Mwangi, today indicates that there was little support on the ground on the allocation of Z Plots. He wrote a Confidential letter to the PC Nyanza saying the government is being criticized by the people for only considering the rich.

    Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President Geofrey Kariithi got a hold of the letter and told Angaine: “It looks to me as if something is wrong..” Kariithi was getting worried that the Z Plot owners had also not been paying for their plots. On June 11, 1969 he wrote a letter to John Koitie, the PS lands and settlement. “It is very sad that it is the public servants in receipt of regular salaries who have been the worst offenders in the loan repayment for these plots … as the Controller and auditor general has commented, the civil servants will get unfavourable criticism. I cannot see any reason why anybody having committed himself to buying a property cannot organize himself to make regular payments.

    I intend to raise the subject of ministers who are defaulters with his Excellency the President.” By 1971 the list of defaulters included Lands Minister Jackson Angaine, Cabinet minister Dr Gikonyo Kiano, University of Nairobi Vice Chancellor Dr. Josephat Karanja and many others.

  • Uhuru Kenyatta With Money and such gangsters>Four cops on patrol in Majengo, Nairobi, found themselves in an embarrassing situation when they were ambushed by a gang of eight young men armed with AK47s who have terrorised the residents for a long time. The cops were made to lie down in the mud by the gangsters who took their guns and bullets and walked away.

    KSB: That was hilarious! I can picture the cops rolling on mad as their bullets are taken away lol! I hope someone will not blame KSB for having inspired the wajambazi oki doki…

  • Uhuru Kenyatta Is very rich man Mngiki>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tkx9i1-xxQ&NR=1

  • Kikuyu karíng'a

    Wealth is created , not fished.

  • Uhuru na Ma-Drugs Zokozu Zukosu Akinyi Kuoth Kuoth >http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=th4U2CDRdhI

  • Are Kenyatta buddies’ children paying for sins of their fathers?
    Published on 23/08/2008
    By Juma Kwayera

    They called themselves the Family or Nyumba. But inside the brotherhood gravitating around President Jomo Kenyatta there was a savage hunger for opulence.

    The hunger created two classes of the super rich and an army of lowdowns.

    After his death on August 22, 1978, Kenyatta left behind a gang of “political orphans” determined to stop retired President Moi from ascending to power.

    Three decades on, little is said about the clique that ‘owned’ Kenya. Neither have their children attempted to stake a claim in the country’s political sphere.

    The ‘Family’ was Kenyatta’s Kitchen Cabinet. Some of them ruled Kenya with impunity and maintained a tight leash on national politics and economy. The effects are still felt today.

    It consisted of a former Minister of State in the Office of the President Peter Mbiyu Koinange, former Defence Minister James Gichuru, Munyua Waiyaki, Dr Julius Gikonyo Kiano and former Minister of State Njoroge Mungai, who doubled as Kenyatta’s physician.

    The business community was represented by Stanley Munga Githunguri, now Kimbaa MP, who was chief executive of the National Bank of Kenya and Njenga Karume, who lost to the former in last year’s General Election.

    Karume and Githunguri were founders of Gema (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association), which in practice represented the interests of the ‘Family’. It is estimated this clique owns more than 500,000 acres of land.

    Three decades after Kenyatta’s death, the mess the ‘Family’ wrought on the country is still evident. This year’s post-election violence being the nadir of the nation’s politics.

    However, one thing stands out: Their legacy has been an impediment to the families that wielded political and economic power at the time, save for Kenyatta’s son, Uhuru Muigai.

    Were it not for former President Moi, it is widely believed even Uhuru would have given politics a wide berth.

    “The child will pay for the sins of his father and for Kenyatta’s Kitchen Cabinet. This is the moment of reckoning for their families,” says former Nyeri Town MP Wanyiri Kihoro.

    As the country marks the 30th anniversary of Kenyatta’s death, history appears to have shunted members of the ‘Family’.

    Their children, Kihoro says, missed an opportunity to correct the ‘wrongs’ of their parents.

    “History judges us harshly when we make mistakes. From the onset, they had a limited vision of the country. The nation’s interests were subordinate to theirs, which is why they went on a wealth-amassing spree,” Kihoro observes. Kihoro, a human rights lawyer and author who has published extensively on local politics, says the ‘Family’ failed the country.

    The group sprung up after independence amassed wealth and power, and grabbed land and plum jobs.

    Kihoro says the group initiated a system where national resources could not be distributed equitably. Former Kabete MP Paul Muite says the group planted the ‘First Sin’, which latter generations are paying for.

    “They had power and called the shots. Mbiyu Koinange was Kenyatta’s bosom friend and is responsible for the mess we are in,” Muite says.

    Like Kihoro, Muite is of the opinion had Koinange not happened on the political scene, Kenyatta would have been a better leader.

    But why are children of these great Kikuyu leaders not interested in politics except Uhuru Kenyatta?

    “It is a question I would rather not an answer. I cannot explain it,” said Muite.

    Kihoro says: “Would they have the courage to solicit for support from voters? Most of them are managing their parents’ property.”

    Peter Mbiyu Koinange

    He died in 1981, three years after Kenyatta’s death. However, his reign as the “Kissinger of Kenya” when he was minister in the Office of the President is synonymous with the political excess of the Kenyatta regime.

    Henry Kissinger was US secretary of State associated with the superpower’s despised ‘gun diplomacy’.

    Kihoro and Muite concur the once powerful minister, also Kenyatta’s brother in-law, was the face of dirty politics.

    “He did not brook any criticism of Kenyatta. He was the angel who invented the devil by ignoring economic reforms and nationalism,” Kihoro told The Standard on Sunday last week.

    Koinange, who represented Limuru in Parliament, was among first Kenyans to obtain bachelor and masters degrees.

    He spent his years of exile in Britain and in Ghana, where he was adviser on international affairs to Ghana’s founding President Kwame Nkrumah.

    A February, 1960 Time magazine, said Koinange was co-opted into the struggle for freedom as a counterweight to youthful trade unionist Tom Mboya by Kenyatta and Nkrumah, who viewed him as an upstart rival.

    James Gichuru

    He would have been President had he not surrendered the chairmanship of Kikuyu African Union, which later became Kenya National African Union (Kanu) in 1946, to Kenyatta on his return from studies abroad.

    He also did the same when Kenyatta was released from detention in Kapenguria.

    Although a member of the Kitchen Cabinet, people who knew him, say he was not imbued with greed characteristic of his colleagues.

    Muite says Gichuru was a down-to-earth leader and loyal to the country.

    “He was independent-minded and indulged in the excesses of the Kenyatta regime. He loved his drink, but never went to posh hotels and his friends were his driver and the voters,” he says.

    Gichuru was Kenya’s first Finance minister and also held the Defence portfolio. In his autobiography, Walking in Kenyatta’s Struggles, Duncan Ndegwa, describes Gichuru a chronic alcoholic in his sunset days.

    A common thread in the ‘Family; is the obscurity of the offspring. “No one knows for sure the children of Kenyatta’s henchmen. All I remember of Gichuru’s children is he had a son and three daughters,” Muite says, but does not know where they are.

    A number of Kiambu leaders The Standard on Sunday talked to remember Gichuru’s daughter Dorcas Ndungi, but none know her whereabouts.

    “Power never got into Gichuru’s head and his family lived a modest life unlike Kenyatta’s other men,” says Kihoro.

    Gichuru died in 1979.

    Julius Gikonyo Kiano

    Like Gichuru, Dr Julius Gikonyo Kiano was a moderate member of the ‘Family’.

    At independence, says Kihoro, “he set out to empower the people of Murang’a economically, but failed to engage nationally.”

    Kiano’s contemporaries, view him as a traitor of sorts. Muite says when Jaramogi Oginga Odinga refused to accept the presidency from the British until Kenyatta was released from detention, Kiano, then a member of the Legislative Council or Legco (a precursor to parliament), had accepted the mantle.

    “It was Odinga who twice persuaded Kiano to decline the offer by the British to press for Kenyatta’s release,” Muite says.

    Kiano’s wife, Jane was a founder member of the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation, which was supposed to address issues related to women’s economic and social empowerment. However, it was transformed into a well-funded political machine for the Kanu governments until 1992.

    Kiano’s influence in national politics vanished at his death in August, 2003, and his six children are hardly known in politics.

  • Mkenya mwenyewe

    SOME HISTORY ON THE BEGINNING OF CORRUPTION AND HOW IT HAS AFFECTED KENYANS TO DATE

    By 1964 after independence, the Queen’s powers had been transferred to the Kenyan government, which – through the Commissioner of Land – could then dispose of the land without recourse to anybody else.

    Many of ordinary Kenyans had hoped that with independence, the Kenyatta government would facilitate the return of their land.

    But this was not to be, yet the British Government had offered funds to help Kenyans buy back the land that was once theirs.

    This system of ‘Buy Back’ was administered under the ‘Settlement Fund Trustee’ (SFT), a state corporation that was supposed to buy the land held by British settlers and offer it to the community on the agreed understanding that the latter were to repay agreed sums of money on easy terms.

    Today, there is a whole body of literature showing that the SFT aided the Kenyatta cronies and his community to resettle its own people.

    By buying off or grabbing the land offered for sale by departing British settlers in Central Kenya, the Kikuyu political elite – in a way – continued the process of disinheriting their own people. Most of other communities were left out by the Kenyatta regime during the allocation of land soon after independence.

    KENYATTA DISTRIBUTED THIS LAND TO A few members of his Kikuyu community; the White Highlands formally owned by colonial settlers. This is evident by names given to huge tracts of land they still own, i.e. Kiambaa, Kimumu, Rurigi, Rogoini, Nyakinyua, Kimuri, Yamumbi, Gitwamba etc.

    KENYA CORRUPTION ROOTED IN HISTORY
    Kenya as Country was forged on land brutality and brutal land grabbing. First was Imperial British East African Company (IBEA), a private firm that later handed over the territory to the British East Africa, and later the British Crown handed it over to Jomo Kenyatta and he shared it with his Cronies. Moi and Kibaki’s terms have not seen any changes.

    Via Email

  • Kenya: Lesson From Kikuyu Elite’s Political Shift
    Wambugu Ngunjiri 14 November 2011

    opinion

    Last week started with news that several Central Kenya elites are gravitating towards the Prime Minister’s camp in preparation for the 2012 presidential elections. Close on the heels of this news was the ‘counter-spin’ from rivals camps to the PM who explained that the shift by these rich Kikuyus had nothing to do with what was best for the Kikuyu community. The message was ‘Ignore these rich fellows. They are being driven by selfish interests’.

    In my opinion rather than ignore what the elite Kikuyus are doing we should all learn from it. Politics is about numbers and interests and it behoves all of us to understand how this game is played if we are to benefit from it, even as spectators. If we do not we will always end up as sheep led to the political slaughterhouse.

    First let me admit that the Kikuyu elite have played the political game perfectly. This is a group that is brought together by the common interests of landholdings, wealth and property, and the desire to protect and propagate these interests. They seem to have looked at what each presidential candidate has to offer, negotiated according to their specific interests, and shifted their political support, accordingly.

    This is the lesson to all Kenyan voters, and especially the ‘un-elite’ Kikuyu. This is what we must do.

    First we (I belong to the ‘un-elite Kikuyu group) need to determine our interests. Unlike the rich Kikuyu most of us can barely squeeze in 3 meals a day so it is not land, wealth, or industries. Our interests are more fundamental.

    Our interests could be a desire for equitable re-distribution of land, which would be achieved through implementation of the clause in the new constitution that will set a limit on maximum landholdings per individual. They could be a reduction in the rich-poor gap within the community through strategic redirection of investment from macro-industries to small scale farming and/or enterprise. They could be the recognition of our Mau Mau heroes through the establishment of tourist attractions where they were born, to increase domestic and foreign tourism into those regions, with all related benefits to locals.

    Or maybe our interests are the pursuit of justice for Mau Mau survivors, extra judicial killing victims, and any other disenfranchised members of our community. We might even want to understand why it is possible to offer amnesty to international criminals like Al Shabab, but not to the Kikuyu-based Mungikis. We might also be interested in an increase in government education bursaries for poor but smart children so that success does not necessarily depend on ones social background, and hopefully so that the annoying question of ‘… & who did you say your father was?’, can end!

    Once we understand what our specific interests are, we must then organize into a distinct vote bloc around these interests. Votes, in this game, are the currency used in negotiation and we must distinguish our votes from those of other interest groups, especially those from within our community.

    Now we are ready to get into the field and be a player in the game, but to be a real player we cannot have favorites. We must engage anyone who wants our votes, and we must be selfish as we interrogate what they each have to offer in return for our votes. This requires us to compare what one candidate is offering, with the next candidate. It also requires us to negotiate even more, as concessions, before we make a decision.

    In the meanwhile the candidates are working as hard as they can to explain to us why our interests group will benefit most, from supporting them. Since they are doing this to many groups, they are also trying to balance all the interest groups, such that their acceptance of the terms of one, does not make them loose votes in the other.

    Another key strategy they will use is to try and reduce our interactions with as many of their rivals as possible, so that they reduce our ability to negotiate. Some of the unscrupulous ones will even use ethnic political mobilization, and argue that if you come from the same tribe with the candidate then you share common interests and are duty bound to support them.(the best part of understanding your specific interests is that you realize there is nothing like a ‘kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, etc’ interest. Our interests tend to affect different social status individuals across tribes!)

    The strategy behind all these moves by the candidates is to create a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ discussion, and then brand some of their rivals as ‘them’ and make us accept that they are part of ‘us’. Their idea is to herd us into vote baskets that they can use to ascend to public office, or to trade amongst themselves, for such offices.

    We can avoid falling into their trap if we realize that the game is about mutual interest. We give ‘our votes for our interests, for your position’. As interest groups we must therefore ensure that our votes go to the candidate who best serves our interests. This is the game as per the ‘Siasa Mpya Campaign’ and you can be a part of it by writing to

    The writer is the head of Change Associates.

  • Identifying continent’s richest is wild goose chase

    Published on 25/11/2011

    Otuma Ongalo

    In Africa wealth declaration is a serious taboo. It is a taboo because many of those who have amassed riches constantly look over their shoulders due to morbid fear. Even if you toiled through the straight and narrow you don’t go around declaring your worth. In a continent fraught with endemic poverty, there will be so many outstretched hands waiting to reap from your sweat.

    The cousin to step-son of your grandfather’s second cousin – whatever the relationship is – will never tire reminding you that the blood that flows in his vein is the same as yours. In Africa, the left hand does not know what the right hand owns. Many fellows whose trumpet call is sounded leave their families impoverished in spite of having millions of shillings in their bank accounts.

    It is a gigantic task trying to unravel who owns what in this unique continent. And that is why I take with a pinch of salt the so-called Forbes Africa’s bid to unravel the continent’s billionaires. The inititive is noble but can we take to bank the report on 40 most moneyed individuals on the continent? I don’t know about others elsewhere but the revelation that got my attention was that Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and business mogul Chris Kirubi are Kenya’s richest people.

    Uhuru is allegedly the richest in Kenya and 26th in Africa at Sh45 billion while Kirubi is second and 31st in Africa, valued at Sh27 billion.

    Now, it is not in dispute that Uhuru and Kirubi are men of means. It is even possible there are worthy much more than the figures released by Forbes Africa, not the Forbes that often keeps the world inundated on the movers and shakers of the capital world but a franchise.

    The flamboyant Kirubi is business savvy and Iam yet to sniff a whiff of impropriety in his dealings. In fact, he is the epitome of the dictum that hard work pays and the world is full of opportunities for those who dare to dream. However, I refuse to believe that CK, as he is popularly known, is the second most chumed man in Kenya, with a mere Sh27 billion.

    When you look at the Forbes Africa list you cannot help but wonder aloud the whereabouts of the Chandarias, Merallis or billionaire “mzungu” businessmen.

    Several Kenyans are damn rich and would reduce the likes of Kirubi and Uhuru to ordinary millionaires but their real worth will never be known.

    It will never be known because they would rather die than discuss their rise to financial stardom. For how do you, for instance, tell the whole world that you are what you are after many years of dealing in narcotics and reducing millions of individuals into zombies? How do you confess that your place on the financial pedestal is courtesy of turning public service opportunities into time of eating?

    The initiative by Forbes Africa is noble but the real truth of who owns Africa in general and Kenya specifically will never be known if it simply scratches on the surface and relies on rumours.

    The method used to arrive at findings leaves many yawning gaps while the outlined sources of information are clearly wanting. Forbes missed an opportunity to unravel the otherwise very interesting topic. You do not use the West’s yardstick to assess riches in Africa.

    Forbes initiative risks suffering the fate of political opinion polls, which have now sunk so low that, it is difficult to separate serious pollsters from political mercenaries.

    Time is ripe for real Forbes ranking to come to Kenya and Africa, but it must be convincing. That mainstream media gave the “who is richest” story a wide berth is clear indictment of its credibility.

    I do not know how the list of billionaires has been received elsewhere in the continent but if Kenya’s case is anything to go by, the many billionaires around are yet to stand up.

    It is easy to fall prey, but Forbes Africa should not lose heart and hope. Their intentions are noble but should be more realistic in endeavours to tell a credible story.

  • Kenya’s Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta is an alleged warlord, confirmed alcoholic, and worst of all, a feudal monarch. To make matters worse, he’s also Deputy PM. To make matters worse still, he commands a lot of popular support in some parts of the country.

    Things may be elephant very soon for our Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta at The Hague and at home is it not better. The economy is in stormy waters as the shilling remains unstable against the US dollar as inflation rises.This time round, Uhuru’s ‘hands off’ policy over the Central Bank may just be his Achilles’ heels. CBK Governor Njuguna Ndung’u has run out of ideas, and is at best confused, as reflected in his policies on the currency in the past three months: blaming speculators, banks, low interest rates, current account deficit, global turmoil and just about any reason he can find.

    FINANCE MINISTER IS AN INTERNATIONAL SUSPECT of crimes committed against humanity; not just Kenyans in general, but also his own tribes mates – (Now that we see the links to Mungiki, which has been Killing their own tribesmen and at the same time being in the Government that allowed Kwekwe squad to perform extra judicial killings among young Kikuyu men.

    Because of the new constitution, the cost of running government post 2012 – both locally and nationally – will sky rocket, will leave less money to invest in the much needed infrastructure to re-ignite the economy.

  • Apart from declaring an open war with Prime Minister Raila Odinga, I have never heard or read anywhere about Uhuru Kenyatta’s reasons for contesting the presidency in 2012. Uhuru is just riding on the thought of his father Jomo having been president, so he also deserves the seat.

    For Kenyans to succeed in uplifting their standards of living, they don’t need another GEMA elite. Uhuru’s current Ksh1 trillion 2011/12 budget is dead on arrival with Kenyans suffering beyond comprehension. GEMA leadership is gone to the dogs. Under President Kibaki, Kenyans have seen more financial agony than ever before.

    Uhuru knoweth no poverty or the sufferings of ordinary Kenyans. How then shall he raise them from poverty? His own Kikuyus are suffering in tattered cold IDP camps for the past three years, yet Uhuru has 500,000 acres of land. Does he have a bit of humanity in him? Can’t he donate a portion of that to these people? I mean donate, not sell as he did at an exhorbitant price a few years ago. Uhuru has so much money to buy MPs and others to vote in his favorite MPs during by-elections, yet his own Kikuyus are suffering. Can’t he do better than his father whose record is pathetic in terms of re-settling ex-Mau Mau fighters after independence?

    Uhuru, be a human being and do something kind. We don’t want you to be proud of giving money you have won from lawsuits to charity. Dish out your own money so we begin looking at you differently. We want Uhuru’s human face, the face we saw on Churchill Live, not this aggressive, arrogant elite who sits on a pedestal far from his “subjects”.

    Now he is bulldozing his way back into Kanu after running away from them for for years. Please Uhuru, stop misusing Wakenya.

  • New Law Threatens Uhuru, Ruto Cash
    Francis Mureithi – 26 November 2011

    JUSTICE minister Mutula Kilonzo has revealed that the government is preparing a law that will govern how the wealth of Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta wealth and MP William Ruto could be used to compensate victims of post election violence. Under the international law, the wealth of persons convicted by ICC should be used to compensate victims but Kenya currently lacks legislation to govern such compensations and reparations.

    Mutula told the Star that his ministry, the Office of the Vice President, the Attorney General and the Constitution Implementation Commission are presently drafting a Bill covering compensation for the PEV victims.

    The office of the VP is involved because it is in charge of prisons and correctional facilities in the country. “The ICC registrar has demanded assurances about the assets of some of the suspects in the Hague, partly because when a person is convicted of international crime, the compensation or reparation does not just come from individual suspects, they also derive authority from assets from the persons who have been convicted,” said Mutula.

    Uhuru, Ruto, Public Service head Francis Muthaura, Tinderet MP Henry Kosgey, former Police commissioner Maj Gen Hussein Ali and radio journalist Joshua arap Sang are awaiting a ruling by ICC Trial Chamber on whether they will be charged in connection with the 2008 post election violence. The ruling is expected next month or early January.

    Recently, the ICC formally wrote to the Kenya government requesting it to stop suspects from transferring their assets to third parties until the cases at the Hague are concluded. The ICC wants the government to place caveats on all movable and immovable property belonging to the Ocampo Six so that they cannot transfer or hide their property.

    Mutula added that the proposed law will provide clear mechanisms for identifying genuine victims of PEV and the compensation required. “We do not have express legislation governing how to determine whether someone is an IDP, the extent of his problem, and if at all how to handle him,” he said. “It is not enough to talk just about housing. Some people were running businesses, some had shops, others had residential housing and commercial properties for leasing and letting, and others were tenants in buildings,” added the minister.

    “Suppose a child lost a mother, or father, how do you compensate them? You may take the responsibility of their education. If it is a minor child like those traumatized in Naivasha or Kiambaa church and you give them money, it will end up in the hands of uncles or relatives who might abuse it. Compensation in my view as a ministry will take a format that will ensure it is real compensation and not just superficial,” he said.

    In April, the Star exclusively reported that the ICC was quietly tracing and profiling the assets of the suspects worth Sh 20 billion, mainly belonging to one suspect. The ICC used different asset tracing companies to track down money being moved around countries by two suspects.

    According to the Rome Statute, once a suspect has been summoned or a warrant of arrest issued, the ICC Judges have powers to freeze the assets and accounts of suspects as a “protective” measure in case the suspect is convicted and fined. Once the suspect is convicted, the judges issue an order to transfer of such assets into the Victims’ Trust Fund for disbursement to victims as reparations. But if the suspect is found innocent, the court is obliged to unfreeze the assets.

    Mutula said that the provisions of the Rome Statute not withstanding, the new constitution still requires Kenya to enact a law to govern compensations of victims. “I haven’t met anybody in government who thinks that victims should not be compensated or given reparations. The only thing lacking is legal infrastructure to do so,” he added.

    The Justice minister said the government has primarily been looking at those who were evicted from their land. He said it would not be possible to compensate all Kenyans who suffered during the PEV. “I am not aware of any currency since the Pharaohs that would be able to buy back that short history of December 2007 to March 2008,” said Mutula. He said the government was waiting for ICC ruling before deciding on what other steps to take.

  • Forbes is useless

    Uhuru’s diehard supporters think he is Jesus yet he has no known accomplishments or reform credentials and is facing all sorts of murder charges! He is a drunkard, bhang-smoking, alleged organizer of PEV murders in Naivasha, whose daddy Jomo Kenyatta stole half of Kenya’s land and killed hundreds of innocent Kenyans when he was president.

    Uhuru is a lazy no good ICC candidate with no record of running a company, so wonder why the stupid Forbes investigators listed him as the richest man in Kenya. His wealth is due to his father’s greed as Kenya’s first president which led him to “allocate” himself huge tracts of land for peanuts. Moreover, the money sent by the British for settling the landless was used by Jomo and his cronies, thus the never-ending land disputes in Kenya. Forbes should have done a thorough assessment of Kenyatta’s wealth and its origins then would know that political ties running from Independence is why the family made it. Jomo was a water meter reader and had a small store selling basic provisions in Dagoretti-Nairobi, during the colonial era. He was later jailed and got released just before Independence. How could he have afforded to buy 500,000 acres of land? Every wealth Kenyatta got was because of his presidency.

    The Nigerian-born Mfonobong Nsehe who gathered much of the information used to credit Uhuru as the wealthiest man in Africa, is a writer who has lived in Nairobi as a student. In this case, and going by Forbes’ criterion of not listing politicians because of their influence in getting favors to boost their private wealth, he could have asked any Kenyan older than him who has knowledge about the Kenyattas. He could have then listed Uhuru on Forbes list of richest “Suspects”.

    It’s a shame that Dr. Manu Chandaria, a renowned industrialist, could not make it on the list with claims that his wealth is spread among his relatives. This is a lame excuse because the same Forbes says that “We do include wealth belonging to a member’s immediate relatives if the wealth can be traced to one living individual.” Chandaria’s wealth should be traceable to at least an immediate relative.

    This was a mediocre method of wealth analysis that graded a lazy man like Uhuru as the richest person in Kenya. Forbes did not even write Uhuru’s personal efforts in steering the mentioned companies to success. He is Kenya’s current Finance Minister and we see how wrong things are financially from the Government level to citizens. He has posted a killing budget that cannot be sustained and the economy runs on domestic borrowing. His cousin and health minister Beth Mugo, benefitted both during her uncle Jomo’s presidency and later Moi’s. She is well known for grabbing land with ruby mines in Taita from American investors in the 1970s and enjoys profits without giving back to the local community.

    Former US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger said this about Uhuru on Wikileaks: “Kenyatta’s liabilities are at least as important as his strengths. He drinks too much and is not a hard worker (though he surprised everyone by the acuity of the budget, which reportedly resulted from some tough work over long hours). Perhaps most importantly, Kenyatta has been closely linked to the Mungiki (which emerged in the aftermath of the Mau Mau and began as a movement in defense of Kikuyu traditional values, but which has long since morphed into a well-organized mafia-style criminal organization). The reason that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the Mungiki. (The links between the Mungiki and various Kikuyu politicians are at best murky.) Ironically, Kenyatta,s links to the Mungiki make him one of those who feels strongly that extrajudicial killing must stop (since many of the extrajudicial killings have been carried out by the police, under Commissioner Ali’s direction, against the Mungiki).”

    Why didn’t Mfonobong investigate Uhuru’s suspected links to the violent Mungiki and his alleged political ties that made him part of the Ocampo Six? Is Forbes not interested in understanding how his wealth is tied to inhumane and brutal acts?

    Maybe because Mfonobong was born in 1987, his worldview does not allow him to dig beyond the digits shown at the Nairobi Stock Exchange, showing Kenyatta’s holdings with millions of shillings in profit. If Forbes contradicts its policies, then it should list the sons and daughters of former African dictators who robbed and killed to keep their families rich. I am emphatic in challenging Mfonobong despite the list having been drawn together with his other colleagues, because the new era of rewarding hard working African millionaires should NOT be clouded with doubts. Do not bring corruption in recognizing hard working Africans. We are crying for the eradication of corruption and other forms of manipulation, and don’t want such a biased methodology.

    Uhuru is not recognized by anybody except the international criminal court system at the Hague (ICC) and by the usual throng of local murderous Mungiki Kikuyu gangs in Kenya.

    The following was written by Maina Kiai about Uhuru Kenyatta’s budget allocation to favor the Ocampo Six during their hearings at the Hague. Kiai is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. No considerations were given to the post election violence (PEV) victims.

    “And while victims and survivors are steeped in their misery and grief unsure if they are really Kenyan or not, Uhuru Kenyatta quadruples the “hospitality” budget for the Kenya Embassy in The Hague to more than Sh9 million! More, incidentally, than that of the Dutch Embassy in Kenya, a country that is seventh in the UN Human development Indext to our 128th!

    There can hardly be a more self-serving and crass decision than this. This budget is for taking care of the needs of the Ocampo Six and their supporters when they visit The Hague for their cases! It would probably have seemed a little less crass — though no less odious — had the decision been made by someone with no personal interest in this “hospitality!”

    I was at The Hague when the Ocampo Six made their appearances, and I watched some of them troop off to the Movenpick Hotel — with their band of cheering supporters — and eat, drink and laugh together.

    The bill was then picked up by a woman, who signed a check. Now I know that this was my tax money and yours being used to feed and fete suspects of the worst crimes imaginable — and who can more than afford it personally.

    Yes, the suspects are innocent until proven guilty. But somehow in this Kenya, these suspects seem to have way more rights, way more privileges and way more stakes in Kenya than the victims, who are — lest we forget — also innocent, and will never be proven guilty!

    But their innocence has become a punishment, and is never shouted from the rooftops and nor is it fed with food and drink at taxpayer expense.

    Compounding matters is that to fund this largesse at The Hague, Uhuru cut the budget for scholarships for poor students! And then he increased the allocation for hospitality for State House and the Prime Minister’s Office!

    And I am willing to bet that the legal fees, travel and other costs for the suspects are coming from our taxes, while we seem unable to care for the survivors.

    Rarely have we seen such obvious contempt for the weak, the poor and the majority. And they do this because they think they can get away with it by dividing us and making us turn against each other on flimsy grounds — as they have in the past. It’s a sign of decadence and decay. Will we let them get away with it, laughing at us?”

  • Muhumbili Mhumbili

    Civil-War is the Answer to the marginalized communities of Kenya .A well planned and coondination actions ,by good leadership and armed men7women7youth and seek support from hostile countries to Kenyas failed leadership

  • Forbes is useless

    Chris Kirubi, who was listed as Kenya’s second richest person worth $300 million, has equally enjoyed political connections since Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency, and remains a very close business associate of President Kibaki.

    However, he has a checkered background with claims that he accumulated wealth as then CEO of the defunct Kenya National Transport Corporation (KENATCO) in the 1970s. He and other 13 co-accused, were in court several times since 2008 for allegedly defrauding Uchumi after selling part of its prime property in Nairobi. In May 2011, they were acquitted of wrong-doing in the typical Kenyan fashion despite earlier pointers on inside trading, misappropriation of cash, etc. If the ruling that set Kirubi free claimed Uchumi was not a government parastatal, why did was it bailed out to resume business using the taxpayer’s money?

    During a session of Parliamentary debates on June 13, 2006, MP Musila said the following: “It is clear that Uchumi Supermarket Limited is going under because of inside trading and manipulation of its shares. This can be equated to the recent case of Enron in the United States of America, whereby the US Government has taken action against the directors of Enron. We know that prosecution took place and people were jailed. We know for sure that Mr. Kirubi, who has been bragging around that he is extremely rich, was responsible for the collapse of the Kenya National Transport Company (KENATCO) Limited but nothing happened to him. He was subsequently given Uchumi Supermarkets Limited to manage, which has now suffered the same fate as KENATCO Limited. Could the Minister assure this House that proper and genuine criminal proceedings will be taken against the directors responsible for the collapse of Uchumi Supermarkets Limited and that we will see convictions?

    A Kenyan blogger wrote the following about Kirubi:

    What Was Chris Kirubi’s Role In The Collapse Of Uchumi? Who is Chris Kirubi? What sort of a person is he? (This is a significant question because character is essential for anybody running a public institution, let alone the chairman of the board). How did he make his current fortune? What was his role in the collapse of Uchumi?

    I have deliberately put these questions together because they are related. It is amazing what short memories Kenyans have. I will not make any claims or wild allegations but will instead present a few facts.

    Chris Kirubi did not inherit his fortune. During the coffee boom 1975/1976 when many Kenyans made millions smuggling coffee from chaotic Uganda at a time when Brazilian coffee had been heavily hit by frost thus pushing world coffee prices to an all time high, Chris Kirubi was a mere employee of a parastatal transport company known as Kenatco.

    Without making any wild allegations, before the coffee boom Mr Kirubu was a penniless ordinary employee of Kenatco. After the coffee boom, he emerged an extremely wealthy man. He used his connections and friendships made during the coffee boom to clean up and enhance his image. Foreign companies coming into Kenya looking to appoint a director with their ear to the ground and good reliable powerful contacts had turned to Chris Kirubi in increasing numbers and in no time at all he was “Mr Clean”. Meanwhile this shrewd unschooled man picked up all he could from the many boardroom appearances he made, the rest as they say is history and today he is one of the wealthiest and most powerful men in the land. But now it seems that his past is rapidly catching up with him.

    The key question to ask here, is what were Mr Kirubi’s priorities and loyalties when he was appointed chairman of the board at Uchumi? Were they to further enhance the well-being of this public company or was it to consolidate his own personal interests?

    Mfonobong should be kicked out of Forbes for being a lazy reporter who never dug the background of those he listed as richest Kenyans.

  • Uhuru Needs To Tell Us More About His Record .
    Friday, 04 November 2011 00:23 BY SARAH ELDERKIN

    In this era of openness and transparency and public vetting, it is naturally right that all would-be presidential candidates tell us more about themselves – and Uhuru Kenyatta has apparently decided to lead the way.

    Mr Kenyatta took the opportunity of his 50th birthday last week to set up a website devoted to celebrating his life so far, clearly hoping that you, the reader, will celebrate it with him. All I can say is, Good grief! What a mistake THAT was on the part of his marketing gurus! For the sad truth about Uhuru’s past half-century is that he has virtually nothing of note to recall.

    A number of prominent Kenyans have in recent years published their autobiographies, full of hundreds of pages of fascinating stories and detailed insights into political affairs. Other similar tomes are expected. But Uhuru’s published lifeline appears remarkable for one thing only – the poverty of its content. It seems to consist of a few bare details, most of them an attempt to bask in other people’s glory.

    On the website, you are invited to “Click through the decades”. OK. 1960s. October 26, 1961, Uhuru is born and named “in anticipation for Kenya’s upcoming independence”. Next entry – more than two years later, December 12, 1963 – “Kenya attains her independence”. Next entry, October 26, 1968, Uhuru celebrates his seventh birthday at State House. (Well done!)

    These events, no achievement at all on the part of Mr Kenyatta, are the vehicle to allow the accompanying four pictures of ‘me and my dad’ – just in case the significance of Who I Am has passed you by. And that’s it for the 1960s. On to the 1970s, which start with another picture of ‘me and my dad’, apparently in 1971 – before a sad one, a funeral picture, after Uhuru unfortunately lost his father in 1978. We can sympathise with that.

    The 1970s covered Mr Kenyatta’s schooldays. Only two things about him are noted in this entire decade. One, the young Uhuru was a winger in the school rugby team, and two, he won the school history prize at A-level in 1979. There’s a picture of him receiving it. And the prize is being presented by then vice-president Mwai Kibaki. Top connections, eh?

    On to the 1980s. Woohoo! That must have been a difficult one for the website planners. Very confusing. It begins with “1979-1980 Upon return to Kenya, Uhuru worked as a teller at the Kenya Commercial Bank, Kipande House branch”. But wait a minute – upon return from where did Uhuru get this luminous job? Oh, next entry. It seems to be in the wrong order. “Uhuru joined Amherst College [USA] to study Political Science and Economics”.

    But he only left school in 1979 – so if he worked as a teller from 1979 to 1980 “upon return to Kenya”, when did he attend Amherst College? No year of entry is noted. No year of exit. And, astoundingly, that’s all we hear about Amherst College. How long was Mr Kenyatta there? When did he leave? What did he achieve there? Did he graduate, and with what?

    At the risk of sounding like Donald Trump banging on about Obama’s birth certificate, wouldn’t it be nice to see Mr Kenyatta’s college graduation certificate? There are two more entries for the 1980s, along with a picture of Uhuru sitting on a motorbike. One is “Uhuru starts his own company, Wilham Kenya Limited, where he used to personally pick up and transport horticulture for export on his pickup truck”.

    Wow. Fantastic. Imagine that. Uhuru driving a pickup! And starting a company! I wonder how hard he had to struggle to get a loan from the bank to do that? Hmm. Final entry for the 1980s – “1989 Uhuru joins politics”. Really? Doing what? And where? Nobody else knew anything about this, and the website is silent on detail.

    In fact, in the absence of any further information, this website entry can only be described as misleading. As far as the record shows, Mr Kenyatta’s first personal political involvement did not come until eight years later, in 1997, when he became chairman of Kanu in his home area. The same year, he stood for election to the Gatundu South parliamentary seat. He lost and, in a fit of pique, quit politics.

    Mr Kenyatta’s eventual entry to parliamentary politics did not come until 2001, and that was through nomination by then President Daniel arap Moi. The following year, Mr Kenyatta stood for president. He lost. But finally, in 2002 – just eight years and 10 months ago – Mr Kenyatta was elected MP for Gatundu South.

    Anyway, back to the website. Mr Kenyatta gets married in 1991 and campaigns in 1992 for Kenneth Matiba, of whom there is a picture, superimposed over the picture of a large crowd – all totally unrelated to Mr Kenyatta, of course, but he hopes you get the idea. Mr Kenyatta sells Wilham in 1994 and is appointed to head the Kenya Tourism Board in 1999.

    In other words, there is hardly any clue as to how Mr Kenyatta spent his time or how he was gainfully employed for nearly two decades, 1980-1999. So we move on to the 2000s. We start with a 2001 picture of Mr Kenyatta being “received” after his nomination as an MP by later vice-president Kijana Wamalwa. Wamalwa wasn’t vice-president at the time of the picture, contrary to the caption on the website. But it sounds good.

    After losing the 2002 presidential election, Mr Kenyatta became opposition leader by virtue of heading Kanu, thanks to Mr Moi. (Sadly, no picture of Mr Moi. Perhaps that’s a connection Mr Kenyatta would like us to forget.) Next, in 2007, Mr Kenyatta “supported Mwai Kibaki’s presidential bid”, and in between that and meeting Nelson Mandela (cue picture) became deputy prime minister and minister for finance.

    And that’s it – a litany of unaccounted-for years interspersed with pictures of other, more impressive, people – Jomo Kenyatta, Mwai Kibaki, Kenneth Matiba, Kijana Wamalwa, Nelson Mandela – people whose radiance Uhuru Kenyatta obviously hopes will reflect on him. We certainly need to know what there is to know about our presidential candidates. In his own case, Mr Kenyatta has now told us: Not a lot.

  • Dark secrets of Kenyan presidency

    Even writing anything on Kenyatta was difficult because he seemed to have his ears everywhere. A fascinating story told by a Daily Nation editor for many years, Philip Ochieng is very revealing in this regard. Sometime in 1967 Kenyatta is said to have suddenly collapsed in Mombasa. He later recovered but the then editor in chief of the Daily Nation, controversial George Githii who was also very close to Kenyatta insiders decided that his newspaper would never be caught unprepared in the event of Kenyatta’s death. He summoned Phillip Ochieng for what appeared to be a strange mission. He was locked up in a room where he spent weeks studying, making calls and writing many biographical articles on Jomo Kenyatta. These articles were locked away for 10 years and were used extensively in 1978 when Kenyatta died.

    However it is believed that this little assignment (that is standard procedure in many media outlets in the world) may have cost George Githii his job as Nation’s editor in chief. Much later after the articles were written, a member of Kenyatta’s inner circle heard about the articles and told Kenyatta that somebody was “imagining his death.” That was it. The Nation could not have continued to operate as a newspaper with Githii as the editor and he had to go. He was probably lucky to have escaped with his life.

    Here is another interesting tale to illustrate just how real the fear of Kenyatta and his government was in Kenyans.

    A Kenyan well known to this writer took a trip to the UK in the mid 70s and while watching British TV discovered that the Observer newspaper had that morning published an article about one of the members of the Kenyatta family. They quietly slipped out of their hotel carefully looking over their shoulders several times and purchased a copy of the newspaper from an outlet that was some distance from the hotel. They then returned to their hotel room with the newspaper well concealed and carefully locked the door to read the article that described in great detail a business that first lady Mama Ngina was involved in of mining and then exporting precious stones mainly from the Taita Taveta area. The piece revealed that the first lady was already one of the wealthiest individuals in the country. Hardly a seditious article on the first family, but on finishing reading the piece with his heart thumping violently against his chest, the man burnt the newspaper and flushed the ashes down the toilet. That was the fear that Kenyans felt in those days and it did not matter that one was thousands of miles away from home in London.

    In this kind of scenario the attitude of Kenyatta’s inner circle was hardly surprising. They behaved as if they were gods and never missed an opportunity to convince Kenyans that there was nothing they said that the government did not know about.

    Jomo Kenyatta himself made a surprising revelation in one of his speeches that left many Kenyans shell shocked for a long time.

    Usually, President Kenyatta’s speeches were boringly predictable. He would always warn people about playing around with the valuable Uhuru which had been won by bloodshed. (Clearly he was implying that threatening his presidency was “playing around with Uhuru”). He would often pepper his Kiswahili speeches by suddenly breaking into Kikuyu vernacular. Rarely would he translate what he had just said for the benefit of those Kenyans who were not Kikuyu or did not understand the language. All his speeches were so humdrum because somewhere along the line he would always congratulate ordinary Kenyans for the hard work that they were putting into nation building.

    So Kenyans were shocked one day when in his speech the president went down an unfamiliar path and said that it had come to his attention that some people were saying that he was incapable of fathering children. These people, the president said, claimed that when the colonialists had detained him they had tortured him to such an extent that he had lost his manhood and ability to sire children. There was shocked silence at first with many ultra-conservative Kenyans of the time embarrassed that the president would even talk about such things in public.

    Kenyatta went on to castigate the people spreading such lies about him and said that any Kenyan who doubted his manhood should go ahead and ask Mama Ngina. The president’s fourth and last wife was seated right there at the dais a few short paces from where Kenyatta was making his speech. She was visibly shaken and very embarrassed (wouldn’t you be?).

    Although the president’s speech had the desired effect many Kenyans still wondered. Were the rumours about Kenyatta no longer being able to sire children true? Was Kenyatta just bluffing? Or was it all untrue? It is difficult to tell and we will probably never know. But the point here is that such petty bedroom talk would actually reach the president’s ears.

    There are many analysts of the time who hold onto the belief that Kenyatta the man was not really a bad person. To them it was the people who surrounded the president who did all the damage. However, the incident that we have just detailed would imply otherwise. That the president was often well aware of what was going on around him, even in the years that he became increasingly ill.

    Additionally, an incident within the precincts of parliament some time in 1965 should be an eye-opener on those who would want to absolve the old man from everything that was evil.

    The telling episode just outside parliament was a confrontation between Pio Gama Pinto and Jomo Kenyatta. Few people know that Pinto and Kenyatta had a long history. Kenyatta had met his family in the days when he was a water meter reader for the Nairobi City Council. Right from the days before and after Kenyatta was detained, Pinto used to run errands for him and fund raise as well. Pinto paid for his links with Kenyatta dearly because just 5 months after getting married he was arrested in 1954 with many others in what came to be referred to as operation Anvil which was designed to snuff out all opposition to the colonial government during the state of emergency that had been declared two years earlier. He was detained without trial in Manda Island for four years. Now the confrontation outside parliament buildings was triggered by Pinto discovering that Kenyatta had allocated himself a total of 50 farms in Central province and Rift valley. Some of the farms had poor Kikuyu squatters who were to be evicted. Others were farms that had been owned by whites and sold back to the Kenyan government and were essentially supposed to be distributed to the landless. Pinto was incensed by this and despite making overtures to Kenyatta not to go ahead with the evil he was doing, Kenyatta adamantly stuck to his guns. Pinto decided to move a vote of no confidence against Kenyatta. The president confronted him within the precincts of parliament and challenged him over the no confidence vote. When Pinto refused to back down Kenyatta called him a bastard to which Pinto immediately responded by telling Kenyatta in front of witnesses and other cabinet ministers that he (Kenyatta) was also a bastard. A stunned friend pulled Pinto aside and asked him how he could call Kenyatta a bastard to which Pinto retorted, ‘he called me one first’. Shortly after this incident Pinto was reversing his VW Beetle from his Westlands home in Nairobi going to work with his small daughter in the car when he was shot at close range. He died instantly. Undoubtedly one of the things that cost Pinto his life was the mistaken belief that the Kenyatta he knew was not capable of such a murderous act.

    And it was not only Pinto who held onto this belief. In fact Pinto’s close ally for many years, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had earlier arranged for him to hide in Mombasa until things cooled off and if necessary sneak out of the country from there. However Joseph Murumbi (who was to be appointed Vice President later that year) heard about this and said it was not possible for Kenyatta to kill Pinto. He promised to speak to Kenyatta himself and diffuse the situation. He told Odinga to put Pinto on the train back to Nairobi and pick him up from the station. Interestingly Pinto fled to Mombasa after his arch political rival, Tom Mboya warned him that he was going to be assassinated. Pinto refused to believe this at first and only accepted to leave town on being urged by his lawyer who was present at the time.

    The day of Pinto’s death he was to move the motion in the afternoon session. Impeccable Kumekucha informants gave me never-before-published information on what happened that morning.

    Two Fiat cars drew up at Pinto’s house on the morning of his assassination. They were both taxis. The drivers had been paid Kshs 7,000 each (a fortune in the 1960s) to do the job. There were plain clothes CID officers with them in the car to ensure their escape. Pinto was killed in cold blood. It has never been revealed before but it was the realization that Pinto’s assassination had been carried out by Kenyatta insiders that led to the resignation of Joseph Murumbi as Vice President a few years later.

  • Uhuru going back to KANU and the visit by Kaparo to Raila is turning out to be no coincidence after all,as a matter of fact, reliable sources intimate that the secret dubai trip may have triggered all the political movements currently being witnessed. It is claimed Uhuru insisted on Ruto being his running mate to avoid a run off scenario, a position that all members unanimously endorsed, and which would have seen Uhuru run on a UDF ticket and not KANU,Ruto expressed his fears that this option might result in kalenjin splitting their votes to the advantage of ODM and by extension Raila,he requested for two weeks to consult his inner circles, and upon coming back he hurriedly convened a retreat in Naivasha for the so called UDM friendly MPs attended by among others Keter,Mwakwere,Kazungu,Ethuro,Kuttuny among others.

    In the Naivasha meeting Ruto and the Rift Mps stood their ground and insisted that UDM must have a presidential candidate. It is understood that Ruto immediately made a phone call to Uhuru, whom upon hearing the news became furious and murmured some words in kikuyu to Mr Justin Muturi and went into what seemed to be a very deep discussion.
    It is not known at which point Uhuru decided to run on KANU, but insider sources indicate that his decision was informed by Rutos decision not to be his running mate. By rejoining KANU,Uhuru hopes to kill two birds with one stone.First,he hopes to pick Gideon Moi as his running mate and hopes Kalenjins come back to the KANU fold,His argument is that with Gideon as his running mate,he can appease to the kalenjins in run off.

    Back to the UDM camp, upon learning on the latest developments in KANU,(which came as a shocker),Ruto is believed to have run into panic mode and hurriedly convened a another secret meeting on the sidelines which included Kamwaro, Kaparo, Duale, Chirchir, Keter, and decided to put plan B in action ASAP. The plan B turned out to be reaching out to ODM,but on one condition-Koech (a Raila ally to relinquish UDMs chairman position apparantely out of court settlement),and also ODM to withdraw the court case seeking to expell the five rebel Mps. (the two Rutos, Keter, Duale and Kuttuny).

    Kaparo was given the responsibility to initiate the talks and immediately called Dalmas Otieno (who has been seen to be sober and neutral) to inform him of the latest developments, it also happened that Raila was touring south rift and western regions and the meeting was therefore set for Bondo.Present in the Bondo meeting were Raila,Oburu,Dalmas,Orengo,Koech,Kaparo,Kibor. Details of the meeting remain scanty but ODM is said to have asked for more time to look into the proposal.

  • Mars Group points out Sh251bn error
    By ALPHONCE SHIUNDU, June 22 2011 at 21:42

    Parliament’s Budget Committee has been alerted about a Sh251 billion mathematical error in the 2011-2012 Budget.

    The House team was also notified of a repayment plan for a non-existent fertiliser factory, in which Sh1.2 billion will be paid out to an Austrian firm over the next three financial years.

    Speaking on Wednesday at a meeting in Parliament’s County Hall, Mars Group bosses Mwalimu and Jayne Mati said the errors are some of the reasons why Treasury and the Executive were pushing Parliament to approve the Budget under the old constitutional dispensation.

    The two have been on the forefront in scrutinising the national budgets since they exposed the Sh10.7 billion error in the supplementary Budget two years ago.

    In the error pointed out to the committee members Elias Mbau (Maragwa), John Mbadi (Gwassi), Nelson Gaichuhie (Subukia), Alfred Sambu (Webuye) and Martin Ogindo (Rangwe), Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta had indicated a surplus of Sh87.3 billion, instead of a deficit of Sh163.8 billion.

    The figures in the annex of estimates of revenues for state corporations presented to Parliament shows that there will be a total income of Sh610 billion.

    Against this, the recurrent and capital expenditure comes to Sh774 billion. So instead of a surplus of Sh87 billion as indicated by the minister, there’s a deficit of about Sh163.8 billion

    “What’s the reason, excuse for this variance? It is a simple issue just to take a calculator and find out that there’s a problem. Did the Treasury issue any explanation?” posed Mrs Mati.

    “This committee needs to go through this entire Budget with a toothcomb and we are confident that you will do so.”

    The shocking details reveal that Mr Kenyatta and his mandarins at Treasury went ahead and allocated Sh1.2 billion for the payment of KenRen fertiliser factory — which was never built — even after Parliament’s unanimous approval that the payments be stopped, because the country was being conned.

    The MPs were taken aback when they saw that under the External Debt Redemption, the government had actually earmarked Sh372 million to be paid to the Austrian firm Bawag, for the fertiliser factory for the 2011-2012 financial year.

    The amount then rises to Sh404 million in 2013 and to Sh437 million in 2014. “This sort of impunity is alarming. This sort of money is being introduced year in, year out,” Mr Mati told the committee.

    “There’s a demand that you pay taxes, but we warn you that even your taxes may go missing.”

  • patriotic mkenya

    Whoever categorized Uhuru as the richest person in Kenya messed up because he inherited wealth from his father who got it using his influence as president. It could have been fair if Uhuru had no political ties, so as to win the number one position. There is so much political evil linked with the Kenyattas that Forbes invesigators should have given Uhuru a wide berth.

    KENYA: Did Uhuru Kenyatta lie?
    By Standard Team

    Could Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta have duped MPs into passing an extra Sh9 billion in the Supplementary Budget presented to Parliament last week?

    This was the shocking question confronting Parliament yesterday, prompting the Speaker to order for a ministerial statement on Wednesday.

    It all began when Imenti Central MP Gitobu Imanyara rose during Question Time to demand a ministerial statement, claiming the Finance minister had misled MPs to believe he would need only Sh22 billion, but had used their approval to withdraw Sh31 billion. Imanyara, who tabled figures to back up his allegations, claimed the amount could be funneled into questionable contract payments such as Anglo Leasing and the Ken-Ren projects, or a secret kitty.

    The Standard last night was unable to reach Uhuru nor any of the Treasury officials for independent comment.

    The Imenti Central MP said the figures presented by Uhuru, also a Deputy Prime Minister, when requesting the estimated Sh26 billion Supplementary Budget for eight ministries and the Judiciary for the remainder of the 2008/2009 financial year, are manifestly different and higher than those he actually intended to withdraw from the public coffers.

    Imanyara suggested that Treasury officials could have conspired to falsify the figures “to steal Government money to secretly pay (pending bills) such as Anglo Leasing and Ken-Ren”.

    “If these figures are falsified, we need to be told,” charged the MP.

    Wondering who was responsible for the apparent contradictions, the MP asked whether Uhuru was aware that he tabled falsified documents in the House.

    The figures tabled by the MP showed that the Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of Home Affairs had been allocated Sh374 million for personal allowances in Uhuru’s Supplementary Budget, yet Parliament actually approved just Sh62 million.

    According to Imanyara’s figures, the minister had given Sh593 million to the Agriculture ministry when Parliament had voted just Sh478 million.

    Parliament approval

    And in the Medical Services ministry, the minister had allocated Sh127 million, yet the House had approved Sh58 million. A similar case obtained for the Ministry of Public Works with Sh121 million against parliamentary approval of just Sh12 million.

    For the Judiciary, according to Imanyara, it had been allocated Sh288 million yet Parliament had approved Sh227 million.

    Imanyara’s figures indicated the Government had allocated Sh8 billion more for the Ministry of Education Parliament approved Sh21 billion but figures showed a whopping Sh29 billion for the sector.

    The Finance Minister, according to Imanyara, also published figures suggesting that Parliament approved Sh63 million for personal allowances in the Immigration ministry, yet in actual fact the House approved only Sh33 million. In the Ministry of Youth Affairs, there was a figure of Sh52 million, yet Parliament’s records showed an approval for only Sh2.6 million.

    Finally, Parliament approved Sh510 million for the Ministry of Science and Technology, but the documents showed that a higher figure of Sh603 million from the Treasury.

    Additional funds

    Separately, corruption watchdog Mars Group’s analysis of the Supplementary Budget and comparison of figures within the Approved National Budget showed systematic differences that may have caused Parliament to vote for additional funds that were not necessary.

    It showed that there were more than 200 such budget line items across 35 ministries, and that the total figure in dispute was just over Sh9.6 billion that was removed from last year’s Approved Estimates for unknown reasons.

    Mars said the effect was an unexplained Sh36.3 billion discrepancy and actual loss of Sh9.6 billion plus “the unjustifiable request and approval of Sh26.6 billion on 200 budget line items.

    “The business of tax money is serious. The report made to Parliament through the Supplementary Estimates is inaccurate. It is criminal to mislead Parliament that the figures in the Supplementary Budget are the same as the approved estimates,” said Mars Group, whose chief executive is Mwalimu Mati.

    The group posed: “Parliament passed the Budget in one afternoon without scrutiny. Can Kenyans claim to have representation in Parliament?”

    “The Kenyan citizen will have to ultimately seek accountability from Parliament and the Executive to end corruption and impunity, if Kenya is to survive the problems it has so as to deal with in Agenda 4 of the National Accord,” Mars said.

    The Standard

  • November 5, 2011
    By Joe Adama

    Why the Centre Cannot Hold – the ‘Nyumba’, Raila and the House On the Hill

    The unilateral investiture of James Njenga Karume as the Central Kenya communities’ spokesman and senior-most sage elder last weekend is the surest sign yet that it is no longer business as usual in the Mt. Kenya vote bloc, the nation’s largest and most cohesive in terms of insularity. The installation was attended by at least 5,000 elders and other people and its expenses were met by Karume himself, the billionaire underwriter of many another political initiative and campaign throughout Central Kenya over the years.

    Another signal was sent out by the University of Nairobi Vice Chancellor, Dr. Joe B. Wanjui, when he said that he had looked far and wide for the person most likely to succeed President Mwai Kibaki and actually take his legacy forward and had alighted on none other than Prime Minister Raila Odinga.

    Dr. Wanjui endorsed Raila at the latter’s own residence in Nairobi in a recent meeting also attended by Karume, Charles Njonjo, MP Stanley Munga Githunguri, Nation Media Group Chairman Wilfred D. Kiboro (who is also the Standard Chartered Bank Group Chairman), Royal Media Group Chairman SK Macharia, the PNU Chairman, Colonel (Rtd.) James Imbui, businessman/golfer James Koome, MP Mithika Linturi and others.

    The Power Barons Take a Stand

    Karume, a former Kiambaa MP and one-time Defence Minister and Wanjui, a one-time CEO of multinational East Africa Industries (now Unilever Africa), have long been among President Mwai Kibaki’s staunchest election campaign financiers and advisers. They have been with him since at least his exit from the Daniel arap Moi regime on December 25, 1991, and the formation of the Democratic Party.

    Karume, most probably Kenya’s first African millionaire in any denomination, was one of founding President Jomo Kenyatta’s most ardent supporters and courtiers. Karume and Dr. Wanjui remain among the richest, most powerful and influential people in Kenya, separately consulted and confided in by other power players, foreign envoys and regional leaders.

    Dr. Wanjui endorsed the PM in the following fulsome terms: “I have been President Kibaki’s supporter and friend for many years. I am still his friend and supporter. But after looking around and searching far and wide, the only person capable of consolidating the leadership and development Kibaki has established is Raila Odinga”.

    A recent measure of Karume’s enduring clout in Central Kenya and among Rift Valley Kikuyus is that despite not making it back to Parliament in 2007 and being in his 80s, after his eldest son Joseph Karume Njenga died in a road accident in September this year, his funeral was attended by the President, Prime Minister, Vice President and scores of other dignitaries from all sides of the political spectrum, all of whom spoke from the podium and praised both father and son and yet the son had never held public office nor even dabbled in politics.

    The power elite from all large ethnic communities and quite a few smaller ones were there to be seen to mourn with Karume, a pillar of Mt. Kenya politics and business and a leader of the Gema (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Mbeere) communities.

    The return of Njenga Karume

    Another measure of Karume’s clout was provided by Raila himself at the height of the 2007-08 post-election violence (PEV) and soon after. At an international press conference on January 3, 2008, Raila accused Karume of financing the banned sect Mungiki in the PEV and of doing this at meetings attended by Uhuru Kenyatta at State House, Nairobi. Later, as Prime Minister, Raila went far out of his way to apologise to Karume over his allegations and to seek to absolve him of any such wrongdoing. But he has never extended the same retraction to Uhuru.

    Now that Karume has been invested leader and foremost elder of the entire Mt. Kenya region in a controversial ceremony at the Mukurwe wa Nyagathanga shrine in Murang’a, which symbolises the Agikuyu myth of origin, and has been thus elevated in opposition to Uhuru Muigai, son of Founding President Jomo Kenyatta, and Dr. Wanjui has joined the ranks of wealthy powerful Kikuyu elder statesmen who have declared they have no problem with a Raila Presidency, it is quite clear that things have fallen apart deep inside Mt. Kenya and the traditional centre cannot hold.

    That centre has revolved around the Presidential families of the Kenyattas and the Kibakis, around which all other factors in the Mountain circle like satellites.

    This is not the first time that a vast ethnic centre based around a Presidential family has failed to hold and the regional vote bloc voted with its feet in a direction not sanctioned by the patriarch(s) – it happened to the Daniel arap Moi hold on the Rift Valley at the 2007 General Election, in full view of the still-living patriarch, retired President Moi himself. Not only could Moi’s own children, including favourite son and heir Gideon, not get a word in edgewise to get themselves elected, but the fallout had the same figure at centre-stage – a Raila Odinga making a bid for State House.

    Dr. Wanjui joins founding Attorney General Charles Mugane Njonjo and Kiambaa MP Stanley Munga Githunguri in declaring that Raila is fit and ready to be the Fourth President of Kenya. Although he has yet to make a public pronouncement on the matter, Karume, by seeking to wrest the position of Mt. Kenya communities’ spokesman from Uhuru during the younger man’s greatest hour of need and relevance, has demonstrated that there is a potent struggle at the top in Central Kenya for post-Kibaki political control.

    The Kenyattas Deserted

    Njonjo, Karume and Githunguri were among Jomo Kenyatta’s most loyal faithful retainers and enjoyed their greatest eminence during his watch. That they should now part ways with Uhuru in this fashion, while Kenyatta’s youngest widow, first First Lady Mama Ngina, the DPM’s mother, is still alive and has a voice in Mt. Kenyan affairs, bespeaks war in heaven.

    Alone among Kenyatta’s most faithful retainers, Njonjo has never subscribed to the idea that a Kikuyu should succeed a Kikuyu at State House, not even when Kenyatta was alive. Other power, politics and business elite operatives seem to be coming around to Njonjo’s view, a generation after Kenyatta’s demise. Karume, who led the brazen and tribally chauvinistic Change the Constitution movement in the mid-1970s when Kenyatta was clearly at the end of his tether and Moi, having been VP for a dozen years and therefore Principal Assistant to the President, was poised to step in, has never been known to support a non-Kikuyu for State House.

    It speaks volumes for great wealth that Karume not only survived the Presidential transition occasioned by Kenyatta’s death and Moi’s rise to State House but thrived and was always consulted by Moi throughout his 24-year-long Presidency. Any day now he should make his views explicitly known on the all-important tacit protocol question of whether a Kikuyu should succeed a Kikuyu at State House. All indications are that Karume has fundamentally revised his views and that this underpins his wish to lead the Central community from the front.

    Karume was, after all, the powerful and controlling leader of Gema in the flashpoint year of 1969 – the year of the Argwings Kodhek fatal road accident and the Tom Mboya assassination – when a wave of atavistic oath-taking rituals such as had not been witnessed since the early 1950s spread throughout the Mt. Kenya region to the accompaniment of the chilling, trance-like chant “Bendera ndikoima Nyumba ya Mumbi (the Flag will never leave the House of Mumbi)”.

    Githunguri, who was Executive Chairman of the National Bank of Kenya in Kenyatta’s final years, is Karume’s nemesis in Kiambaa and was initially an adversary of Moi’s, has seconded Njonjo’s support of Raila since at least 2005 and Kenya’s first national referendum, the Yes/No vote on the then Proposed New Constitution.

    Dr. Wanjui has been a Kibaki insider throughout the President’s two terms in office and his breaking ranks with his old friend’s closest advisers on the matter of Raila’s suitability to take the Kibaki legacy forward is indicative of a deep schism in the President’s innermost inner circles.

    The Center Cannot Hold

    That the Mt. Kenya centre would not hold became apparent only recently, with the prospect of Uhuru’s crimes-against-humanity case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague proceeding to full trial and putting his political career into a tailspin for the foreseeable future looming larger by the day. When the three-judge bench of the ICC’s Pretrial Chamber II indicated that its decision on whether the cases of the so-called Ocampo Six would proceed to full trial would be announced on the same day, date and time, instead of a month apart for the first three accused and the second three, all signs were that a bleak near-future awaits Uhuru and his five co-accused.

    Wealthy and powerful individuals like Karume, Njonjo and Dr. Wanjui have their own feelers and pointers deep inside the media, security, diplomatic and other investigative communities, both local and international, and consult widely, deeply and constantly. Their separate no-confidence votes in Uhuru must be based on the sort of strategic considerations that saw them build their business empires, nurture and grow them through the vicissitudes of the three Presidential administrations. Karume became a wealthy man even before Independence, under the British, and has grown his wealth and clout in all-weather conditions, politically speaking, for longer than Uhuru has been alive. For instance, Karume was among the very first Kenyans, in the very early 1950s, to be allowed by the colonial authorities to operate bank accounts in institutions like Barclays and Standard Chartered.

    It was interesting that Karume felt constrained to deny that despite being crowned Mt. Kenya’s sage elder and national spokesman he had no interest in an elective political position. In recent years, Karume has not only acquired a wife who is half his age, he has also published an autobiography, From Charcoal to Gold, with the assistance of Mutu Gethoi of Embu County. Added to the feather-in-cap investiture as top elder, these accoutrements seem in the eyes of many to point to higher political ambitions for Karume. “I do not want to become the King of the Agikuyu but a leader because every community must be directed by one person,” Karume told the gathering of elders and locals at the shrine after his installation. Why he thinks that he ought to be the chosen one and why now are matters Karume left to speculation, but he promptly came under massive attack from Uhuru-compliant councils of Kikuyu elders, including an outfit that styles itself the Rift Valley Kikuyu Council of Elders, led by one Wachira Kamana.

    Cracks in the Mountain

    With these cracks in the Mountain, the Central Kenya vote bloc, which has concentrated all its energies on Kibaki since 1997 when it comes to Presidential elections, is clearly up for grabs. It is the most cohesive vote bloc in the nation and the most inward-looking, never having expended its votes on a candidate outside the Nyumba ya Mumbi (the House of Mumbi) to send him to the House on the Hill (State House). That there has been an intimate connection between the Nyumba and the House is evidenced by Kenyatta’s 15-year stay and Kibaki’s 10 years, making it 25 years in all so far. All eyes are now on how the Kikuyu intend to use their vast electoral clout in the absence of a Kikuyu candidate who can attract at least two other major blocs.

    Can the Nyumba, or even just a significant proportion of it, finally find its way to handing the House on the Hill to Raila, as highly recommended by Dr. Wanjui, Njonjo and Githunguri and, any day now, Karume? Or are these men just dinosaurs from the dawn of Independence who have accumulated too much, have too much to lose and have no business seeking to tell a new generation of Mount Kenyans what’s good for them?

    In the final analysis, Dr. Wanjui, Njonjo, Githunguri and Karume have only four votes between them and not three more general elections (Njonjo, for one, will be 92 next year). However, if the Mt. Kenya vote bloc’s latest generations learn the smarts of the kind of cohesion that dispenses with insular behaviour, a cohesiveness already enjoyed by the Luo and the Kalenjin, who are on record, unlike the Kikuyu, as having voted cohesively but not selfishly, they could well discover a completely new clout and niche – that of swing-vote factor and kingmaker. And it could well be a clout that is useful for much longer and much wider purposes than the navel-gazing self-regard of the past.

  • An Uhuru presidency could be Kenya’s doom
    by Wandia Njoya December 19th, 2011

    Hassan Omar Hassan’s article on Kibaki’s Kikuyu-centric presidency captured the very disturbing scenes in the TV news reports about the soaring fuel prices and the volatile Kenyan shilling. It was really discomforting to see that the two of the most important sectors of the economy – energy and finance – were headed by members of the Gema community, especially when we all see people getting so rich while the majority of Kenyans get poorer. In fact, I’m surprised that Hassan’s remarks had not been publicly made before.

    Hassan’s article has since attracted unconvincing accusations of hate speech. However, Hassan was, in reality, quite polite when he tried to offer redemption to Kenya by saying that a Kikuyu cannot win the next presidency. We all know that an Uhuru Kenyatta presidency is very possible because of ethnic mathematics.

    And history suggests that such a win would be tantamount to civil war.

    In the United States, it took a civil war to dislodge the power of old money and plantation aristocracy that had grown rich through slavery, an aristocracy which is not much different from the Kikuyu one which Uhuru embodies. Like the plantation owners, the Kikuyu aristocracy made their wealth was made through colonially founded privilege and injustice, and is backed by ethnic numbers. Rumor has it that even the nouveaux rich cannot join, no matter how much money they flaunt around.

    War became inevitable because politics failed to enforce the American constitution that declares all men equal. Politicians made deals that rendered slavery impossible to abolish legally. The three fifths compromise rendered slave holding states powerful because it allowed those states to count slaves as the population, albeit as three fifths of their actual numbers and despite the fact that slaves could not vote. In other words, slaveholders’ power was based on numbers, just like for the Kikuyu aristocrats.

    But the US plantation owners were not only powerful; they were also retrogressive. The continuation of their cheap labor economy represented an obstacle to the US’s entry into the new economic dispensation of the industrial age.

    Similarly, an Uhuru win will be proof that even the constitution is powerless to dislodge the Kikuyu aristocracy which Uhuru represents.

    It will also mean that Kenya will remain intellectually and morally stagnant in the feudal era we are now in, unable to progress into the information age. That is because the Kikuyu aristocratic class also thinks like Lord Delamere and his contemporaries of two centuries ago. They privilege business over nationhood, farming as the most reliable ticket to economic improvement (to the great disadvantage of Kenyans living in arid areas), and land – rather than ideas, industry and technology – as the primary economic currency.

    And like any aristocracy, this class has an ideology; namely the ideology of “merit.” According to this ideology, Kikuyus occupy positions of power on “merit” and because they can “do the job,” while the Kenyans from the other communities are employed for the sake of tribal balance.

    It is this aristocracy that Uhuru Kenyatta embodies. He was listed by Forbes as the 26th richest person in Africa, and the only one in the top 40 list whose wealth was not made from business, but from land which his family acquired due to government advantage.

    And it does not help that Uhuru demonstrates that he cares about anything more than entrenching the ethnically defined financial and military dominance of his boy’s club.

    He banged the table in front of TV cameras when Marende vetoed the judiciary appointments, declaring in his harangue that the country cannot be held to the wiles of one man. A weekend later, he was asking whether people think Kibaki is their kihii, an ethnically charged insult directed at Raila and which should have earned Uhuru prosecution for hate speech.

    Last week, Uhuru attended a dinner hosted by Meru professionals (whose education should have made them know better) in which he said that he has the credentials for president because he has a development agenda. He then repeated the very condescending statement that it doesn’t matter what tribe the president is, what matters is the president’s agenda.

    But the soaring prices of fuel and basic commodities as well as the unstable shilling do not demonstrate any “merit” or “agenda” of those in charge of the energy and finance sectors; rather, they are the face of incompetence and impunity, and a morbid indicator that the Kikuyu aristocracy is milking our economy to entrench its power so that the next president becomes its puppet.

    Vilifying Hassan for promoting hate speech is a poor excuse for confronting a serious and deadly possibility of Kenya disintegrating into war. I know that this issue is intimidating and even depressing to consider, but it is a reality. Rather than take the criticisms of Kibaki personally (which I don’t understand why), voters must start to think and make strategic decisions about how they will vote in 2012. We must choose as the next president someone who represents Kenya’s talent outside Central province, and who presents to Kenya a new ideology and a new vision that correspond with the 21st century.

  • A rapacious Idiot Kisii Rap-dog writting to the ICC>Division, ICC (Read 60 times) omwenga
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    Open Letter to President, Pre-Trial Division, ICC
    « Thread Started Yesterday at 11:19pm »

    ——————————————————————————–
    Via Email

    The Honorable Judge Sylvia Steiner
    President, Pre-Trial Division
    International Criminal Court
    The Hague, Netherlands

    Re: Kenya PEV Cases

    Dear Hon. Judge Sylvia Steiner:

    I am a Kenyan currently residing in the United States and write to you in hopes I can share my thoughts with you, which I also believe are the views of many other Kenyans both in the Diaspora and at home.

    In ideal circumstances, you are called upon as the honorable judges you are to dispassionately apply the law to the facts established by the record before you or those proven at trial.

    The case now pending before you involving the six suspects from Kenya, otherwise commonly referred to in Kenya as the “Ocampo Six,” does not present itself as one where you can dispassionately apply the law to the facts established by the record before you or at trial, which means decisions you make about the cases must be informed from not just the law and facts but also drawing from other considerations before rendering decisions such as to whether to allow the case to proceed to trial, and if so, what the outcome at trial must be.

    The preamble to the Rome Statue under which this Court lives and breathes, states in part, that “all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.”

    What is equally true but not reflected in the preamble, and therefore not an integral part of ICC jurisprudence, is the fact that there are idiosyncratic factors peculiar to any given culture not present in any other and therefore must be taken into consideration in initiating and adjudicating cases before this Honorable Court separate and apart from those that cross all cultures.

    Tribalism, a vice and stable feature in Kenya is one such an example.

    To be sure, tribalism exists in other countries, including Rwanda where this Court has and continues to play a key role in seeking justice for the victims of genocide in that country that occurred back in 1994.

    However, even though that violence was primarily between two tribes, the Hutus and Tutsis, the level of hatred between the two tribes and underlying reasons for the hatred and ultimately reasons for the genocide is different from the hate or underlying reasons for what happened in Kenya in early 2008 and the reason the Ocampo Six cases are before you.

    It is important to understand that distinction for no outcome can be rendered with respect to the Ocampo Six that would be deemed justice or otherwise accepted by all concerned, unless these underlying reasons are taken into consideration.

    Rather than going into a detailed exposition to analyze and/or explain these underlying reasons, it is sufficient to say, and I believe there is enough in the record to reach this conclusion, that the dynamics that resulted in the post-election violence in Kenya (PEV) are three dimensional:

    There was evidence the elections that took place in Kenya in 2007 were rigged and the winner at the presidential level was not sworn in as president but the incumbent who lost, was.

    The incumbent president and more so his close people utilizing state machinery ensured that his being sworn as president despite the glaring evidence he had not won the elections ruled the day.[1]

    This created an environment where violence took place not to exact revenge for the perceived wrong-doers in executing the flawed elections, but to settle old scores primarily between the Kalenjin and Kikuyus and those scores have everything to do with land and not the elections of 2007, even though politics is at the core of why they arose in the first place and this goes back to the dawn of our country’s independence in 1964.

    I note above that the Ocampo Six is not your typical case to dispassionately apply the law to known or proven facts.

    The reason I say this is because of the third dimension above and that is, as long as the land issue is not addressed to the satisfaction of these two communities, no outcome other than the non-trial or acquittal of both Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto is going to be seen as fair or just in their respective communities while the trial or conviction of either and acquittal of the other will be seen as unjust in the eyes of the community of the one convicted and therefore foment even more tribal animosity as between these two communities made worse only by the chipping in of the rest of the country’s communities likely to ally with one or the other as a matter of political and tribal necessity, especially if such acquittal or conviction occurs in the heat of the campaign period for the elections to be held in the country later on this year.

    This is obviously a dilemma that you must resolve in the national interest of Kenya and, given where things are today, that certainly must be committing the cases to trial, to at least get the story right and either convict both of these individuals or acquit both.

    The rest of the suspects are basically irrelevant as you can send them all to the gallows and you will not hear even as blip from anyone other than perhaps their relatives and friends.

    Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto are the face of ICC; with their fate, so goes their communities but the same cannot be said about the rest of the suspects many don’t even know who they are.

    Not confirming the charges against the two, namely, Kenyatta and Ruto, or acquitting both will leave the matter in status quo until the communities themselves successfully tackle the issue with the help of the national government, led by the next president to be elected later this year.

    Such an outcome would not change the fact that the very prosecution of these Ocampo Six has forever changed Kenya in that we are unlikely to see anything even remotely close to what happened in 2008 because all Kenyans know we are on a path to ending impunity locally and internationally, ICC is there to ensure no one even attempts to engage in crimes against humanity, let alone genocide.

    In this vein, the new government working with Parliament must find a way to compensate PEV victims, including solving the problem of the IDPs and one way I have recommended is to have these suspects tried locally and if no convictions are forthcoming, Parliament should pass laws to allow for civil penalties for those found to have been responsible for PEV.

    One would think the very suspects would be readily willing to pay civil penalties under those laws to put an end to this sad chapter in our country’s history than go to jail.

    In other words, letting everyone go at this point would not be worse than convicting some but not all, especially as between Uhuru and Ruto.

    I therefore hope you take all of this into consideration as you deliberate and decide the way forward in the proceedings against the Ocampo Six and may God grant you the wisdom to do the right thing.

    Sincerely,

    Samuel N. Omwenga, Esq.,
    Silver Spring, United States

    Cc: Sir Adrian Fulford, President
    Trial Division, ICC

    [1] The official then in charge of conducting the elections said after PEV and maintains to this day he doesn’t know who won the elections as president. Other observers say it’s not clear who won but contemporaneous evidence clearly points to someone other than the incumbent winning and some even say in a landslide.

    «

  • The Sum of All Fears
    Saturday, 07 January 2012 00:11 BY JOE ADAMA

    Why the Kikuyu myth about fear of an Odinga Presidency holds much less water than the Luo dread of Mt Kenya dominance – and what this portends for 2012

    For an office widely billed as being on the verge of losing most of its imperial trappings and becoming much more a chairmanship of the nation’s Board than a command and control centre, the Kenyan presidency is still attracting many of our most assertive political operatives.

    They are falling over themselves in a headlong dash, seeking after a de-fanged national CEO-ship that looks suspiciously like a hankering after maximum power and influence.

    The presidency will, of course, still be the apex office in the land. It may no longer prorogue Parliament at will, it may no longer decide the carving up of the national development and opportunities’ cakes and even its nominees to the Cabinet and most other public sector offices will be subject to fairly autonomous vetting. But it will still retain the command-in-chief of the Armed Forces, the intelligence communities, both local and international, will be at its disposal, the Treasury and administrative structures will still, in many key respects, defer to State House and Harambee House.

    WAZEE JOMO, MOI AND KIBAKI

    What’s more, even a comparatively toothless presidency can still play the political scene like a chess master, impacting both regions and the nation powerfully and enduringly. The presidency is still the top office, even when shorn of certain ‘personal rule’ characteristics enjoyed by Wazee Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki.

    Finally, an Odinga – Prime Minister Raila Amolo Odinga – a man who hails from a political dynasty that has spent the bulk of its career ensuring that the office is indeed shorn of its immense powers, looks poised to make an unassailable bid for the presidency.

    Given Raila’s game-changing endorsement of Kibaki in October 2002 and the fact that the two men are now the power-sharing principals of the Grand Coalition regime, the outgoing PM ought to have a much easier time of stepping into Kibaki’s shoes. Instead, some of the stiffest opposition to Raila becoming president emanates from Kibaki’s own political backyard of Central Kenya where it has long been conventional ethnic wisdom that the presidency must under no circumstances go to a Luo.

    The Kikuyu-Luo rivalry is one of those abiding tribal hatreds that are underpinned by passionate prejudices of a blood-feud-like intensity, which, however, when examined in the clear light of day by rational minds, can barely stand scrutiny. What does it consist of, beyond the fact that Kenyatta and the Jaramogi led Kenya into Independence in one of the most inspiring and triumphant political alliances in our history and then had a dramatic falling out?

    The sense of betrayal on both sides of the fence would be laughable if it did not have such dire consequences over the years. The Kikuyu felt betrayed in that the Jaramogi took on the foremost of his fellow founding fathers, Jomo, so soon and so openly after Independence; the Luo felt betrayed that the Kikuyu elite gathered around Jomo were divvying up the new nation among, excluding everyone else and buying out the White Highlands and other assets of the fleeing colonists across the nation. The Kikuyu settlement in the Rift Valley took the ominous pattern early of Kiambu Kikuyu, Kenyatta’s own people, not of Nyeri or Meru people, for instance.

    THE AGE OF ASSASSINATIONS

    And then the fallout turned deadly. On February 24, 1965, Jaramogi’s right-hand man, Pio Gama Pinto, a nominated MP of Indian (Goan) descent who had also been jailed as a Mau Mau sympathiser by the British, was gunned down in the driveway of his residence on Nairobi’s Lower Kabete Road (near where Sarit Centre now stands). This killing came a month after the slaughter in Nyeri by elements of the army and the paramilitary General Service Unit of the Meru Mau Mau general known as Baimungi and his supporters, who were threatening a return to the forests if their ragtag forces were not absorbed into the Armed Forces.

    The same week Pinto was gunned down, in the faraway US, five armed men rose from a crowd and mowed down Malcolm X, the firebrand American civil rights leader. It was the age of high-profile political assassinations. Barely 20 days before Kenya’s Independence, in Dallas, Texas, the 35th American President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, was shot dead as he rode in an open limousine on November 22, 1963.

    In 1968, two great American leaders were assassinated within two months. First came Dr Martin Luther King in April of that year and then, on June 6, presidential brother and candidate Robert Francis Kennedy, who had served his brother JFK as Attorney General in 1961-63. That was the year that the first post-independence general election was scheduled in Kenya, but it was postponed for a year after Kenyatta fell seriously ill while holidaying in Mombasa.

    The following year, 1969, was the flashpoint year for Kikuyu-Luo relations. Between January and early November that year, the Luo community lost two senior Cabinet ministers and suffered the imprisonment without trial of the Jaramogi himself. First to go was Foreign Affairs Minister CMG Argwings-Kodhek, one of Kenya’s first and most courageous African lawyers and a nationalist of note in a road accident near the Pan Afric Hotel. The accident has remained suspicious to this day. And then came Thomas Joseph Mboya, gunned down like his friends from Boston, the Kennedy brothers, allegedly by a lone assassin on Saturday July 5, 1969. Mboya’s nationalist credentials were of the first water.

    A murderous top cabal somewhere at the very top in Kenya in the 1960s was mimicking the worst and most sinister of American events and literally getting away with murder. After the riotous incident at the Russia Hospital in Kisumu in October in which the president’s motorcade was stoned and Odinga’s detention as well as that of the entire top leadership of the Kenya People’s Union was ordered, Kikuyu-Luo relations lay in tatters that have yet to be mended to this day.

    FIRST OATH SINCE THE 1950s

    The Kikuyu elite around Kenyatta at the time, widely referred to as the “Kiambu Mafia”, even went to the extent of organising the first oathing ceremonies in the Mt Kenya regions since the early 1950s, when Kenyatta had been jailed by the British for “managing Mau Mau”. These ceremonies enjoined all Gikuyu, Embu, Mbeere and Meru people aged 12 and over to ensure that bendera ndikoima Nyumba ya Mumbi (the flag [the Presidency] will never leave the House of Mumbi]). Most of the rest of Kenya sleepily initially assumed that all this open-secret oathing was pointedly aimed at the Luo and the Luo only.

    Kenyatta, who was Mboya’s elder by 40 years, lived another nine years after 1969, during which he consolidated his imperial Presidency in ways that alarmed not only the Luo but much of the rest of the nation. In their classic study of the African phenomenon of “personal rule” in the 1960s to the 80s, Why Africa’s Weak State Persists, US analysts Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (the latter co-wrote The Myth of Mau Mau with John Nottingham) noted that its key characteristics were, “Widespread removal of constitutional rights and protection from political opponents, the elimination of institutional checks and balances, the termination of open party politics and the regulation and confinement of political participation, usually within the framework of a ‘single party’ ’’.

    This was the route Kenyatta took after Mboya’s assassination and Odinga’s banning and detention, all the time taking the greatest care not to remove the constitutional guarantee of a multiparty state but in practice making Kanu the only legitimate political entity in the land. When the bendera finally left the House of Mumbi in 1978 upon Kenyatta’s death and Moi ascended to the presidency, the new Big Man proceeded to give Kenyans an object lesson in the “personal rule” paradigm that would last 24 years and become even more egregious than the Jomo model.

    Moi actually removed the constitutional clause that allowed for more than one political party and then, using Vice President and Minister for Finance Mwai Kibaki and Attorney General Charles Njonjo in early 1982, inserted the nefarious Section 2(a), explicitly making Kenya a one-party state and the Kenya African National Union the only legal political organisation. Kibaki moved the motion and Njonjo, although no ally of his, seconded him. The Moi era had well and truly begun.

    In the political sector at that time, the only voices heard in opposition to this draconian move were those of the Jaramogi and George Anyona. On August 1, 1982, elements of the Kenya Air Force mutinied and attempted a coup. It was brutally crushed.

    POWER, PATRONAGE, PURGE

    According to Jackson and Rosberg, the constituent components of the system of personal rule include clientilism, patronage and purges to perpetuate rule. Kenyatta and Moi wielded these components with abandon. And although he has managed a presidency that was distinctively different from that of the Kanu chieftains, Kibaki has nonetheless also exercised a degree of clientilism, patronage and purges. For instance, he purged the entire Cabinet after losing the first national referendum on the then proposed new constitution in November 2005, firing the whole lot of them except Vice President Moody Awori and Attorney General Amos Wako.

    The next President of Kenya will, constitutionally speaking, exercise much more restricted options than even the outgoing Kibaki’s. The presidency is unlikely ever to regain its clout of the Kenyatta era or of the Moi era until the removal in November 1991 of Section 2(a). The next President will not even enjoy Kibaki’s largely unused clout. If the Kikuyu myth of why a Luo should not be President is that because he would avenge the terrible falling out of the 1960s, the very context of such revenge has been removed by constitutional evolution and bitter experience. The prospects of personal rule inside the presidency have receded forever, however powerful and overwhelming a personality he might possess – and Raila does possess a political persona like none other, a fact that will increasingly come to the fore the nearer Kibaki’s exit from the scene looms.

    MUTUAL MYTHS

    The Luo myth of why another Kikuyu must not succeed Kibaki is an inhibition that is shared by many other communities beyond Luoland and seems to hold more water than the mere fear of reprisals expressed by many a Kikuyu in reference to the prospect of a Luo ascendancy to the presidency. The Luo, like many other Kenyans, fear that an Uhuru Kenyatta presidency would last a decade, taking all the way to 2022 and bringing the number of years that a Kikuyu will have been the occupant of State House to 35 (including Jomo’s 15 and Kibaki’s 10).

    Perhaps the sum of all these fears is basically unfounded, given that the new constitutional order has moved Kenya beyond the fiat of personalised rule. Jackson and Rosberg’s long-ago conclusion, that, in most African states, non-institutionalised governments “where persons take precedence over rules” prevail, may be effectively out of date now, certainly with reference to Kenya. President Raila Odinga will not necessarily preside over the destruction of Kikuyu Cabinet ministers nor will he detain anyone without trial just because such things happened 40-plus years ago, much less a Kikuyu communal figurehead of his father’s standing. Nor would a Kikuyu president replay the Great Betrayal of the 1960s and re-oath the Nyumba regarding the bendera. It is high time two of Kenya’s most iconic communities exposed their most deep-seated fears to rational scrutiny and watched them wilt in the light of day.

  • Forbes Spreading Lies About Uhuru Wealth – Githae
    Jane Mugambi 22 November 2011

    Nairobi metropolitan minister, Njeru Githae is alleging that there are leaders conspiring to tarnish Uhuru’s name.

    Speaking at Kandong’u ACK in Kirinyaga South district, Githae said that the Forbes magazine rating Uhuru as one of the richest people in Kenya is meant to tarnish his name as the information is just propaganda being peddled to soil the Finance minister’s name. “Where did they get the figures from, to look at what he owns and even do the valuation,” added Githae.

    The minister said that those who were behind the report thought that they would finish him politically citing that instead they have built his name. “Those that did the report thought that they will finish him politically, Let me tell them that there mission has aborted” added Githae.

    He said that the valuation done was the wealth of all his family members and those that are connected to him either through blood relationship. “The question is when did a few goats or cows in some shamba owned by Kenyatta constitute to the money he owns” he wondered.

    He said that Kenyatta does not own 50 billion shillings saying that they are rumors being peddled by his haters saying that through the KRA declaration forms, the country could have been aware of his wealth.

    Githae said that what is important is not what Uhuru owns but how he portrays himself saying that he is an ugali nyama choma person like his colleagues adding that if he owes could be eating more expensive food. “He is a down to earth person, simple man” he added.

    He said that the figures are aimed to destroy his political career saying that if he has such billions then he is fit to be the countries president as he will not misuse the country’s money spent in his favor., He said that the letter written from ICC freezing the Ocampo six assets is not called for citing that they are not thieves. He said that the six should not be subjected to such humiliation to be denied their rights as Kenyans adding that investigations are not yet through.

    Githae added that there are four classes of people from Mt.Kenya region the first of pretenders who think that they can win, the second of hangers on who think they can do, the third is of jokers who want their names to be in the ballot papers to have a name that they contested ones.

  • Naming Uhuru the richest person in Kenya was the damnest Forbes did because the wealth he inherited is suspect. From this year, Forbes should make a list of the sons of former and current African tyrants to join Uhuru. They should not be named on the list of rich suspects.

    . Teodorin Obiang, the 41-year-old son of Equatorial Guinea’s dictator, is the agriculture minister in his father’s government but spends much of his time in California, with a $35 million mansion in Malibu, a fleet of luxury cars and a private jet. His government salary is $6,799 a month — making him certainly comfortable by U.S. standards but extremely wealthy compared with others in his home country. But even on that salary, it would still take him 4,600 years to pay for the luxury yacht he’s ordered.

  • ICC To Commit Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto To Full Trial Over Kenya Violence
    Saturday, 14 January 2012 17:25 BY MK, Associate Editor

    JACKAL NEWS – A senior government official has told Jackal News that judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) will confirm charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, in a classic case of putting forward political correctness ahead of the letter of the law.

    Let the law take its course.

    President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Ministe Raila Odinga are aware of the same information which was communicated to the two leaders by an arm of the ICC a few weeks ago, the source said.

    From a confidential conversation with the source, who regularly briefs Kibaki on issues touching on the state of national security, Jackal News could not find reason to doubt the authenticity of this information, although this writer was not shown any documentation to back the information the source gave.

    ‘‘Basically the ICC has confirmed Ruto and Kenyatta cases. The judges have committed them to trial. And this is what I was briefed on so that I can start doing something,’’ the source said in Nairobi weeks ago, while not drunk.

    ‘‘It looks like the judges are still assessing the evidence against the other four,’’ he said, referring to MP Henry Kosgey, president’s secretary Francis Muthaura, ex-Police chief Mohammed Hussein Ali and radio journalist Joshua Sang.

    The communities from which Kenyatta and Ruto hail from – Kikuyu and Kalenjin – were the main protagonists in the 2008 violence that started when Odinga, a Luo, claimed President Kibaki stole his victory.

    Before the ICC judges, it appears that if any case is to go to trial, then it must feature the two main protagonists in the violence, a political commentator said, ‘‘which is simplistic and cheap’’.

    Weeks after getting this tip, Jackal News sought to asses any indications that top government officials and NGOs were aware of ICC communication that cases facing Kenyatta and Ruto were to be confirmed.

    Our investigations revealed that USAID has been running road shows across north Rift Valley in the past nine weeks to tell residents in the area that ‘‘even if charges against Ruto were confirmed, that does not mean he is guilty, yet’’. USAID insisted that it is not mentioned as the sponsor of the road shows.

    Similar messages have been echoing in Kikuyu central Kenya, home of Uhuru Kenyatta. The ICC will rule on cases against the six Kenyans on 23 January. Analysts say the future of the court lies in how it handles/mishandles the Kenya case.

    The court has been sucked more into the politics of Kenya. It has come under serious criticism for concentrating its work primarily in Africa, while ignoring other crimes in the world, notably in Syria, where over 5,000 have died in government crackdown on pro-reform protesters. In Kenya’s 2008 violence, about 1,300 people were killed and thousands displaced.

  • Uhuru the thief

    Kenya’s Richest Man To Face Trial For Alleged Crimes Against Humanity
    Kenya’s richest man, Uhuru Kenyatta, is to stand trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for charges of crimes against humanity following post-election violence in 2007 in which over 1,000 Kenyans were killed and over 500,000 people were displaced.

    The ruling from the ICC, which came Monday, suggests that Kenyatta, a son of Kenya’s founding president and currently the country’s deputy prime minister, played a pivotal role in directing thugs to rape and murder innocent Kenyans after the country’s highly controversial 2007 presidential elections. The violence initially started off as collisions between supporters of the two rival presidential candidates at the time- Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, but quickly escalated into a series of gruesome murders and rapes. Kenyatta, a close ally and campaigner for President Mwai Kibaki, is believed to have funded the violence – a charge he vehemently denies.

    The ruling could have significant consequences for Kenyatta, who plans to run in Kenya’s presidential elections slated for March next year. Kenyatta, who is immensely popular among Kenya’s young electorate, is believed to stand the brightest chances of winning.

    ICC presiding judge Ekaterina Trendafilova however warned that the ruling does not translate to guilty verdicts against Kenyatta or any of the suspects, but simply means that there is ample evidence to send them to trial.

    “We are not passing judgment on the guilt or innocence of the individuals,” she said at the ruling.

    http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2012/01/24/kenyas-richest-man-to-face-trial-for-alleged-crimes-against-humanity/

  • Uhuru mungiki leader

    Mungiki Sect to Support Kanu, Saitoti And Uhuru in Poll
    (“The East African Standard,” March 4, 2002)

    The controversial Mungiki sect will back President Moi and Kanu and not the opposition in the coming General Election, their National Co-ordinator, Mr Ndura Waruingi, has said.

    The group will also back the Vice-President Prof George Saitoti to capture his Kajiado North parliamentary seat and reject the National Opposition Alliance (Nac).

    Addressing members of the sect in Ngong town, Waruingi told the sect to ensure that Saitoti won back his seat as he has never engaged in politics of mudslinging.

    Separately Mungiki vowed to back Uhuru Kenyatta in his political ambitions. And to this end, about 10,000 members of the group launched a campaign to support him during a function at Njorua High School in Laikipia.

    The sect members transformed the Laikipia harambee function into a campaign platform for Uhuru and their National Chairman Maina Njenga, who is contesting the Laikipia West seat on a Kanu ticket.

    On his part, Waruingi said the three main opposition chiefs, Mwai Kibaki, Charity Ngilu and Wamalwa Kijana were bound to fail in their unity bid as each one of them was power-hungry.

    “We would rather vote President Moi and Kanu back to power than the doomed opposition alliance”, said waruinge.

    Earlier at the Laikipia function, Waruingi had said that with the available enormous resources, they would field over 150 candidates countrywide.

    He said Mungiki was awaiting the March 18 Kanu/National Development Party merger meeting to decide who to back as the presidential candidate.

    He told Kenyans not to underrate the sect as it had people and resources to change politics in Kenya. Mungiki adherents later disclosed that they had used over Sh1 million to mobilise the supporters for the occasion.

    Kanu officials opposed to the Laikipia Kanu branch chairman, Mr Waweru Githua, said they will not allow the party to be hijacked and misused by Mungiki.

    Before Uhuru’s representatives Paul Hato the Thika vice-branch Kanu branch chairman headed to Ng’arua, the two rival groups exchanged bitter words in Nyahururu.

  • odm mouthpiece this blog is.

  • Uhuru mungiki leader

    ‘We, the uhuru generation’: Mungiki and the Uhuru project

    Mungiki’s leaders claimed that their endorsement of Uhuru’s presidential bid was based on generational interests rather than ethnic affiliations. ‘Mungiki’s political agenda’, said the movement’s chairman and spiritual leader, John Njenga Maina, ‘is to campaign for youthful leaders and phase out the older generation. That is why we are supporting Uhuru since he is young’. On nomination day, writes one commentator, hundreds of thousands of Mungiki youths ‘came in buses and mini-buses, donkey-carts and on foot, descending on Nairobi streets from all directions’ in a procession that caught many Nairobi residents by surprise. Imagining themselves as the iregi revolutionaries of Kikuyu mythology, these Mungiki youths wielded machetes, clubs or sticks, in a dramatic parade that resembled the interahamwe in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

    The Kenyan press accused the law enforcement agencies of duplicity for tolerating what it had called ‘anarchic’ youths. ‘The police’, it was said, ‘looked like they were actually guiding demonstrators carrying placards and snuff boxes to the venue, where speeches denouncing the Local Government minister’s [Uhuru Kenyatta’s] political enemies were made’. The attorney general, Amos Wako, also censured police behaviour as a ‘serious dereliction of duty’. A few days later, supporters of NARC were violently dispersed from Uhuru Park by riot police. Opposition leaders accused the government of double standards in dealing with all parties to the elections.

    Uhuru Kenyatta himself swung between publicly distancing his campaign from Mungiki’s acts of terror and covertly soliciting Mungiki’s support, arguing that ‘anybody had the freedom to support whoever he wanted’. He represented Mungiki youth as victims of Kenya’s economic meltdown, arguing that ‘Majority joined the sect because they were idle but they are still our brothers and sisters who should not be hated or secluded from the society but encouraged to reform’. However, Uhuru’s staunch Kikuyu supporters like the Nairobi mayor, Dick Waweru, and Juja MP, Stephen Ndicho, had no qualms about openly supporting the sect on the grounds that ‘despite their militancy on some contentious issues, Mungiki followers were Kenyans and should be accommodated as they also had a role to play in nation-building’.

    But perhaps Mungiki’s spokesman, Ndura Waruinge, may have gone too far when he told the BBC’s Focus on Africa programme in August 2002 that Uhuru Kenyatta was actually a member of Mungiki. This opened a barrage of public criticism, with some challenging Uhuru to go public about any links with Mungiki ‘because we are being told he is a member’ and others censoring the government for giving protection to the movement despite its unlawful activities. In November 2002, Uhuru denied that he was a member of Mungiki, declaring that ‘I am a Catholic and so is my whole family’. He emphasized his distance from Mungiki by recalling an occasion in August 2000 when the sect’s members had accused him of being used by the government to harass them, burning his effigy outside his father’s mausoleum in Nairobi.

    Uhuru’s denial was followed by highly publicized police swoops against Mungiki followers in Nairobi and Central Province and the invalidation by the party headquarters of the nomination of Mungiki chairman John Maina Njenga to vie for a parliamentary seat in his Nyahururu home on a KANU ticket.69 The nullification of Njenga’s nomination sparked protest from Mungiki followers who escorted Njenga in a fleet of 50 vehicles to the Electoral Commission offices in Nairobi.

    Nevertheless, Mungiki continued to support Project Uhuru. Whatever damage these measures may have done to individual Mungiki leaders, it was clear that the core of patron–client relations between KANU stalwarts and the movement was not touched. The KANU elite moved quickly to covertly reassure Mungiki and to deepen its relations with the sect’s leadership at this hour of need and to encourage it to take a more active role in mobilizing Mungiki members in support of Project Uhuru. As part of its deal, the government aided Mungiki’s controversial takeover of the most profitable matatu (public taxi) routes to Nairobi’s Kayole, Dandora, Huruma and Kariobangi estates, whereby it extorted daily levies from drivers, touts and taxis. In addition to the breakdown of public order that David Anderson has lucidly analyzed, the government closed its eyes as criminal elements within the Mungiki movement stepped up collection of protection money from households in insecure estates and indulged in carjacking, armed robbery and, to a lesser extent, gun-running activities.

    Although Mungiki’s entry into the urban milieu from its pristine origins in rural Kenya ensured that it absorbed many criminal elements within its membership, it was at the peak of the battle for the presidency between July and December 2002 that its criminal element eclipsed its origins as a social movement. Not surprisingly, Uhuru’s defeat in the December 2002 elections was perceived as a major threat to the power and prestige of the
    Mungiki leadership and to the livelihood of some of its urban membership, which thrived on KANU’s patronage and on the political economy of public disorder that pervades Kenya’s criminal underground.

    For Mungiki followers, who still truly believed that Project Uhuru offered a chance for the consummation of the ituaka through a generational change of guard, the triumph of Kibaki and the NARC came as a betrayal of the youth and the ‘iregi revolution’ by their Kikuyu kith and kin. Their frustration found echoes in Mugo-wa-Kibiru’s own disillusionment with his contemporaries:

    The seer was rejected by the people of the ridges. They gave him no clothes and no food . . .

    Mungiki had already outstripped other groups in acts of violence. Now, as Kenya crossed to the post-Moi era, it entered a new phase in its metamorphosis, becoming a full-fledged criminal group.

    ‘POWER TO UHURU’: YOUTH IDENTITY AND GENERATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA’S 2002 ELECTIONS. By PETER MWANGI KAGWANJA (2005)

  • Uhuru mungiki leader

    FACTBOX: Key facts about Kenya’s Mungiki gang

    Here are key facts about Mungiki:

    * The gang consists mainly of youths from Kenya’s largest tribe, the Kikuyu, and began as a hardline offshoot of the Tent of the Living God, a religious sect that espoused a return to traditional tribal beliefs and a rejection of Western values.

    * The word Mungiki means “multitude” in the Kikuyu language.

    * The group at first advocated female circumcision and tobacco sniffing. It later adopted rituals like swearing oaths and wearing dreadlocks, like the Mau Mau rebels who fought the British colonial government before independence in 1963.

    * Its size is unknown but it claims thousands of members, especially unemployed youths including some whose communities were destroyed in tribal clashes in the 1990s. It has adopted a politically militant tone, siding with the poor against rich elites it accuses of doing the bidding of former colonial masters.

    * It has long run extortion rackets in the lucrative minibus taxi industry.

    * Police say Mungiki is Kenya’s version of the mafia: involved in murder, extortion and racketeering, levying protection fees on the urban poor and supplying electricity and water illegally at a monopoly price. They say it commits kidnappings and hires out thugs as political muscle.

    * Security experts say gang members swear an oath of secrecy not unlike the Italian mafia, and can leave the gang in only one way — by dying. Any betrayal is punishable by death.

    * The group has links to politicians and powerful Kikuyu families and is suspected of colluding with crooked police officers in exchange for a cut of their extortion schemes.

    * The government banned the gang in 2002 after knife-wielding members killed more than 20 people in a clash with a rival gang in Nairobi’s Mathare slum, a Mungiki stronghold.

    * The gang is said to be behind the beheadings of up to eight people in June 2007. The heads were placed on poles and body parts scattered in the bush around Central Province and near the capital, a Mau Mau tactic to instil fear.

    * U.N. special investigator Philip Alston said he backed a human rights group report saying the Kenyan police had killed around 500 young men in an attempt to wipe out Mungiki in 2007.

    http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/06/us-kenya-gang-mungiki-sb-idUSTRE52537620090306

  • The nature of Kenyan “leaders”

    Kenya is a country infested with a curious blend of leaders. In actuality, calling them “leaders” is a misnomer and political science students and scholars can come up with a litany of other colorful adjectives that more appropriately describe them. These individuals are complemented by a citizenry which in most times, seem to be on leave of their senses, or is it that they have been so brow-beaten as to be numb of the body punches they are witlessly led into? Oh well, that is not the concern right now.

    The concern is the predictability with which the entire class of 2007-2012 is conducting themselves. It seems as though not a single one of them can be accountable to what we are led to believe is tantamount to high treason. How in God’s green earth can a bunch of leaders stand accused of masterminding the biggest carnage since our fight for independence and their fellow compatriots in government stand around mesmerized as if waiting for the accused to say “oh, I am sorry, I did not think they would kill each other so much”?

    It stands to reason that Kenyans did not one day wake up, find all kinds of crude weapons stacked on their door steps, and inexplicably decide they would go out and kill their milk-men and vegetable vendors. Sorry, that simply did not happen. Similarly, the people vying for leadership did not find themselves suddenly embroiled in a situation where if “their” people killed more “other” people, they would benefit politically. Stuff like that does not come out of the blue! Even when it rains, clouds gather first and people seek shelter.

    It is obvious that those that benefited the most either a) sat down and meticulously planned the carnage or b) either retaliated or stood by and did nothing because such action would assure them of victory at the polls.

    Either way, none of them qualify to be leaders.
    What should have happened is a complete stoppage of the electoral process, prosecution of the thugs and murderers, and resumption only after the country was safe enough for people to exercise their democratic rights. That did not happen and we should not dwell on it, but we must acknowledge that the last five years in Kenya have been leaderless!

    The laughable ICC process has just concluded and has told us 4 people have a case to answer. The accused insist that games are being played again. None of the so-called leaders give us, the wananchi, the benefit of having any common sense. If they did, they know, that we know, that the impending elections will be a sham where the anointed ones will once again go through the charade of an election, complete with more violence and loss of life, for the right to continue plundering us some more. The other holders of office apart from the starring characters are very busy enriching themselves and could not care less whether 1,000 or 50,000 more Kenyans get killed later this year as the gluttonous elite cannibalize each other “at the eating table” with sacrifices of human blood in the killing fields of rural Kenya.

    Kenya, we must wake up and realize that just like obesity is a disease, political power can be addictive if left unchecked. Nobody is going to give us our country back. We must go and get it back even if from our very own relatives. Remember, they only consider us their relatives when our votes mean their being in power. As long as we keep toeing the line and accept being told what to do, we are enablers. Do not be tempted by half-truths such as “we kill to protect ourselves against them”. We must heal what ails our arms, but not by amputating our legs.

    Via Email

  • And the wild Goose Chase begins… Its more than naming him the richest person in Kenya. There is more behind this guys…Hague…..Elections….? Makes sense?

  • Elihah Gikonyo Thuo

    JOHN NJOROGE MICHUKI 82 Years old Born 1932 in Iyego Kangema Central Province Owner of Windsor Hotel& Golf /Country Club (exclusive) without paying a Penny !These Michuki Hotels were bought with stolen-loot from THE KENYA COMMERCIAL BANK (KBS)
    http://www.windsorgolfresort.com/index.asp

  • We begin with the intensifying heat on the political scene, in the wake of house speaker Kenneth Marende’s rejection of president Mwai Kibaki’s judicial nominations. Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta addressed a second public rally in as many days directing his anger at the speaker and prime minister Raila Odinga. An angry Uhuru also hit out at claims that there was an attempt to mobilise support for the president’s nominees because of the International Criminal Court’s indictments. Uhuru says he will face the Hague court and come back a free man. Robert Nagila reports.

  • The kenyatta family will pay through the icc

  • Kenya: Four Reasons Why Uhuru is No Jomo Kenyatta
    By Makau Mutua, 16 April 2011 opinion

    Nairobi — They say that fire begets ash – in most cases. That’s the fear of every high achieving parent. Which begs the question: did Mzee Jomo Kenyatta produce a replica in Uhuru?

    There’s no doubt that the scion of Kenya’s “founding father” is a near spitting image of old Jomo. But do the similarities end there? If not, what else did the Finance minister – the most prominent member of the Ocampo Six – inherit from his famous dad?

    The crucible that is The Hague trials has been a pressure cooker for Kenya’s prince. The man who would be president has exposed a soft underbelly. Methinks the Burning Spear would not have approved. Surely the dad must be turning in his famous mausoleum.

    There’s a world of difference between father and son. The first, and most important, is that the Ocampo Six are not the Kapenguria Six. The Kapenguria Six – Mzee Kenyatta, Paul Ngei, Achieng Oneko, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia and Kung’u Karumba – were bona fide anti-colonialist heroes.

    No one accused them of killing, raping, and pillaging fellow Kenyans to gain power. Quite the contrary – the British committed crimes against humanity on them. The Ocampo Six are accused of flipping that coin and committing crimes against humanity on fellow Kenyans.

    The difference between the two is night and day. One is virtuous while the other is vicious. That’s why it’s sacrilege for Mr Kenyatta to analogise The Hague trials to Kapenguria.

    The second difference is that the Kapenguria Six were tried and convicted by a rogue colonial kangaroo court. The ICC, on the other hand, is a legitimate international criminal court to which Kenya has subscribed voluntarily. In fact, African states are the largest single bloc in the membership of the ICC.

    That’s why any suggestion that the ICC is a Western tool against Africa is feckless. If anything, the ICC may do for the “little people” in Kenya – the IDPs and victims of post-election violence – what the State will not do.

    Yes – the ICC is likely to deliver justice to victims. The Kapenguria trial delivered injustice.

    Mr Kenyatta and the Ocampo Six would do well to remember this fundamental difference. Mr Kenyatta and the Ocampo Six were repeatedly – and sternly – warned by the ICC to put a halt to hate speech.

    That includes inciting Kenyans against the ICC. It’s time for a reality check for him and his colleagues. May be they should try channelling Buddhism which teaches humility.

    If they are innocent – as they profess – why all the fulminating and name-calling? Blaming PM Raila Odinga and ODM for their woes is cowardly and hypocritical.

    This is my free advice – when in a hole, stop digging! Belligerent political rallies and cancerous talk are the best proof that one should not be elected Kenya’s next CEO. Uhuru must remember that his dad was persecuted for loving Kenyans, not dividing them.

    The third difference between son and dad is one of temperament and character. They say that you must never let them see you sweat. That’s especially true when “they” are your political enemies or opponents.

    Mzee Kenyatta comported himself with remarkable dignity throughout his Kapenguria ordeal.

    He knew the cause of Kenya’s independence was just. Like other anti-colonial greats – among them Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela – his inner strength was oak-like. He was not petty. It’s true that in later age he fell off the moral wagon, but history hasn’t questioned his early nationalist credentials.

    During this period of personal tribulation, Mr Kenyatta may do well to study his dad’s character. Jomo’s sturdy centre of gravity lacked frivolity.

    The fourth difference between the liberation hero and his son was ideology. For most of his life, Mzee was anchored in nationalism and Pan-Africanism. His worldview expanded during his studies and sojourn in Europe.

    With Kwame Nkrumah and W.E.B. Du Bois, Mzee Kenyatta was a major player in the pivotal 1945 Pan-African Congress organised in Manchester by George Padmore. It’s unfortunate that in his dotage Mzee abandoned these high ideals and tribalised the Kenyan state.

    But, unlike the father, the son does not seem to have any identifiable ideology, except a thirst for power. But he may believe in crude capitalism. Unlike his father at a similar age, Uhuru seems to be seduced by ethnic baiting.

    We know that Jaramogi, Mr Odinga’s dad, declined the presidency for Mzee Kenyatta until he was freed. This was a remarkable feat of self-sacrifice. It’s one of Kenya’s most tragic curses that the two fell asunder.

    They became bitter rivals. Ironically, Uhuru is falsely accusing Raila of orchestrating The Hague trials against him. The curse is playing out at Kenya’s expense. It’s as though the scions of Kenya’s most famous politicians are each other’s evil twin. Jaramogi took a back seat for Mzee only to be persecuted by him.

    We shouldn’t visit the sins of the father on the son. Perhaps there is a moral lesson for Uhuru here. He should ask himself what his dad, the Pan-Africanist, would do.

    But my conclusion – based on the available evidence – is that Uhuru is no Kenyatta. I know he badly wants to reclaim the State House for the family. But he hasn’t demonstrated a compelling vision and the grit of nationalist credentials.

    The “little matter” at The Hague will either make or break him. If he is clearly exonerated – absent a legal technicality – he may bounce back stronger. But his goose will be cooked if he’s convicted. Which will it be?

    Makau Mutua is Dean and SUNY Distinguished Professor at the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School and Chair of the KHRC.

  • ‘Who’s to blame? It depends where you begin the story’

    The tribal violence that has swept through parts of Kenya during the past month has been blamed on a disputed election. But in fact it has been simmering for decades, ever since British colonialists unjustly carved the country up – and Kenya’s own leaders followed suit. Chris McGreal reports
    The Guardian, Thursday 7 February 2008

    Charles Mugo never thought much about the history of his family. He knew that his ancestors were driven off some of the most fertile land in Kenya to make way for white settlers, and that for years after they lived in grinding poverty as little better than indentured labour for the colonists. His father told him that some fought with the Mau Mau to liberate the country and, more importantly, the land. But the Mau Mau later became a national embarrassment so not much was said about it.
    He can’t even say exactly where it is they all came from, just somewhere in what the British called the White Highlands beyond Nairobi, where many Kikuyu once lived. In any case, by the time Mugo was born 34 years ago, all that was regarded by the family as ancient history. His father had a one-and-a-half acre plot in the Rift Valley given to him in the late 60s by the first post-independence government of Kenyatta. Admittedly, it was far from where the Kikuyu had traditionally farmed but it was land, the key to economic and social advancement, and it fed the family. Charles Mugo inherited the plot and made his living growing watermelon, tomatoes and other vegetables, and selling what the family did not eat at a stall alongside the main road north from Nakuru. As far as he was concerned, a historic wrong had been more or less put right.

    That was until last week, when his home was razed by the neighbours and his crops plundered in the violence that swept through the Rift Valley over the disputed December 27 election. All that is left is his father’s grave.

    Mugo doubts he will ever farm his land again. The people who burned him out were his Kalenjin neighbours who said he never belonged there in the first place, and that he was little better than a squatter planted on their land by Kenyatta, a Kikuyu favouring other Kikuyu. So far as they were concerned, righting the wrong against Mugo’s family was at their expense.

    Mugo suspected trouble was coming so he had already sent his wife and children out of the Rift Valley. Now living in a corner of a large Red Cross tent in a stadium in the town of Nakuru, he says the best hope of rebuilding his life is to return to what he calls his “ancestral lands”, a place he has never seen. He doesn’t know what he will find there, or who, but there is no turning back after the events of the past week.

    “If they want the Rift Valley to be peaceful it is best for the Kikuyu to leave. They [the Kalenjin] do not want us here and as long as we are here they will try and get rid of us, there will not be peace,” he says. “The British started this but we have not had good leaders. I used to think that we were all Kenyans and we could all live together. Now I think we all have to go back to where we were before the British arrived and begin again. That is the only way we can live together in Kenya.”

    Ask a Kalenjin who is to blame for the mess of Kenya’s land crisis and they say the Kikuyu. Ask a Kikuyu and they say the British. It just depends where you choose to begin the history of land policies based on greed and tribalism – whether by the white tribe of settlers or Kenya’s post-independence rulers – that continue to drive large numbers of Kenyans deeper into grinding poverty and to be the most divisive social issue in the country.

    Mugo thought he had escaped all that but a century after his ancestors were turned off their land he too finds himself landless and destitute. He is not alone.

    At the beginning of the 20th century, the colonial administration justified seizing land for European settlers on the grounds that with a population of just four million Africans there was sufficient land in Kenya for everyone, although the true nature of the confiscations is exposed by the fact that the Europeans took the best land for themselves.

    More than 30 million people live in Kenya today, a high proportion of them concentrated on the lush Central Highlands, Rift Valley and western Kenya. The demand for land has grown because of the scarcity of paid jobs. The majority of Kenyans are like Mugo, scraping a living from the soil. Almost 60% of Kenyans live on less than a dollar a day. They include many of the others who have sought refuge in Nakuru’s stadium, including Jeremiah Oiruria, 77, who got a one-acre plot in Moro in 1971. He was in his house when the mob set fire to it and has burns down the right side of his face and body. “I was saved by my wife who pulled me out,” he says. “That land is everything we had. I don’t know where we go or what we do but I don’t think we can go back. They don’t want us. They told us we don’t belong here.”

    Jackson Mugo, 56, from Burnt Forest, only survived by hiding under his recently harvested corn cobs. From there he watched his neighbours haul off his four cows and raze his house. “They told me before they were going to do it. They told me Kenyatta should never have sent me here. They took everything, my cattle, my bicycle, my radio. I could see them searching everywhere for the Kikuyu,” he says.

    Nakuru’s town clerk, Albert Leina, a Masai, says it was tragic to watch Kenyans killing each other but that it has happened before and will go on happening until there is a government that chooses to address the legacy of the country’s history. “We voted almost in a tribal, ethnic kind of way. You’re talking about human beings. That’s facts. But if all this was not triggered by the elections it would have been triggered by something else. We are talking about historic injustices and the national cake,” he says.

    Colonisation in Kenya was one long campaign of dispossession. “The British idea of land ownership was in total contradiction with the African idea,” says Odenda Lumumba, coordinator of the Kenya Land Alliance, a network of organisations campaigning for land reform. “The British deemed that Africans didn’t own land, they merely used it, and so any land lying fallow was deemed to be unused and the British took it. This made Africans essentially tenants of the crown. This was never understood by Africans. Who was this crown? Whose grandfather was it? Because all landownership was traced to grandfathers.”

    The Kalenjin and Masai lost more acreage but it was the Kikuyu who were hardest hit because they were robbed of almost all their land and suffered the biggest displacement, mostly from fertile areas beyond Nairobi that the colonists called the White Highlands.

    A growing population of Kikuyu was crowded on to the remaining land – “native reserves”, as the white people deemed them – that were little more than labour pools to provide workers for land they had once farmed themselves. On top of that Kenyans were deprived of the land they needed to move on in life with dowry payments that would help them climb up the social scale.

    “The British took the land promising employment, but unemployment started soaring. Slums started developing in the urban areas. Africans were put in a helpless situation,” says Lumumba. The situation was exacerbated after the first world war with an influx of former army officers in search of a better life that they found on yet more expropriated land.

    The settlers weren’t particularly productive – many had never farmed before – so to maintain the illusion of white superiority, the colonial administration stacked the odds against African farmers even further by banning them from growing cash crops that competed with the settlers, particularly tea and sisal.

    The colonial administration introduced a “tribal chiefs” system that came to wield more power than the traditional councils of elders. The chiefs were foremost loyal to their paymasters, the British, and enforced colonial edicts with an iron fist.

    Mwalimu Mati, head of Mars, an anti-corruption group campaigning to call Kenyan leaders to account for past abuses, says that at independence in 1963, Kenya inherited what has been described as one of the most skewed patterns of land distribution in the world, comparable with countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Brazil. “The struggle for independence and the Mau Mau rebellion were primarily a land grievance. The white settler population had a system of apartheid. We ended up with a situation where the best land was in the hands of a very small section of the population. The rest of the population was driven on to dry, rocky, waterless areas,” he says.

    Kenyans looked to the first post-colonial government under Kenyatta to put the situation right. But in the hard-fought negotiations for independence he bowed to British demands for white settlers to remain on their farms if they wanted and for land only to be transferred through a “willing buyer-willing seller arrangement”, also the source of the present wrangle over land in Zimbabwe.

    Some white people did remain but enough left that large tracts of land came up for redistribution. The Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Masai prepared to go home. But, says Mati, that wasn’t Kenyatta’s plan. “The root cause of our crisis is that the land did not get bought by the people who lost it but by the Kikuyu elite of the time. That was the situation in Central province where the Kikuyu came from. Kenyatta then settled the poor landless Kikuyu in the Rift Valley on land that had belonged to the Kalenjin,” says Mati.

    Mugo’s father was among the poor Kikuyu resettled on Kalenjin land. He was a minor beneficiary. Others did much better. What evolved in the following years was little more than a land grab by Kenya’s new elite, which used British land law and Indian colonial statutes introduced to Kenya as a mechanism to distribute land as political patronage while keeping a large slice of the pie for themselves.

    The largest landowners in Kenya today are the families of the only three presidents the country has had since independence – the Kenyattas, the family of his successor, Daniel arap Moi, and the present president, Mwai Kibaki, who served in the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. A little further down the scale are a residual group of white settlers, senior politicians and businessmen with political connections.

    The extended Kenyatta family alone owns an estimated 500,000 acres (2,000 sq km). That represents a large chunk of the 28m acres (113,000 sq km) of arable land in Kenya. The remaining 80% of the country is mostly semi-arid and arid land. The Kenya Land Alliance says more than half the arable land in the country is in the hands of only 20% of the population. Two-thirds of the people own, on average, less than an acre per person. There are 13% who own no land at all.

    Three years ago the government launched the Ndungu commission to investigate the illegal distribution of publicly owned land. The commission found that Kenyatta and Moi both grossly abused their powers to grab public land and former white-owned farms, and parcelled it out “as political reward or patronage”.

    “As a result a large number of the genuinely landless … remain locked in a cycle of poverty,” the commission said in its report. The commission members included Lumumba, who says, “The land belonged to the government or was in trust for the people but the trustees, particularly the presidents, behaved as if they were estate owners. They handed out individual titles to parts of national parks and gave trust land as political favours.”

    After Moi came to power in 1978 the land grabs evolved away from the vast tracts of farmlands that had already been parcelled out to all kinds of other publicly owned land. State corporations such as the railways, airports authority and power company have been plundered of land at a cost of “colossal amounts of money” to the public.

    “Under Moi you used to get people turning up at a piece of land and they’d both have titles issued by the same government, sometimes by the president,” says Mati. “If Moi wanted to give someone $1m, he didn’t give them cash. He gave them the title deed to land and they’d sell that using the government land registry. Moi gave lots of people land. That was his way of governing.” Other high officials, such as successive commissioners of lands and private interests such as bankers, lawyers and architects, contributed to this “unbridled plunder”.

    The commission said: “In every corner of the country today, there is a significant number of squatters who trace their landlessness to historical injustices and the failure of the post-independence governments to undertake a comprehensive resettlement programme. Their status as squatters has also left them in grinding poverty and vulnerable to all manner of human rights violations, including incessant evictions. This historical failure has given rise to a deep seated sense of grievance.”

    This is not the first organised violence over land. Moi unleashed a form of terror and ethnic cleansing against the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley 15 years ago because it was Kikuyu politicians who were pressing hardest for the introduction of multi-party democracy. No one knows how many were killed, but it ran into the thousands. Moi repeated his assault ahead of the 1997 general election, targeting Kikuyu communities on the coast as well as in the Rift Valley. That helped unleash regular localised violence over land grievances separate from the immediate politics. For instance, a low-level insurgency in the Mount Elgon district has pitted rival clans against each other over land with 22 people killed in an assault on Kimama village on December 31 alone, and another 50 in the areas around in the following week. Many of them were hacked to death as they worked in their fields.

    A group calling itself the Sabaot Land Defence Force has targeted specific communities in order to drive them off their land. Human rights groups say they have documented nearly 400 deaths during the violence in the area in the past six months. About 80,000 people, a third of the district’s population, has been displaced. “The violence was going to happen so long as the original grievance was not addressed. It never has been,” says Mati.

    The Ndungu commission agreed. “Forty years of independence is a long time during which any historical injustices regarding land should have been resolved. The fact of the matter, however, is that there are certain deep-rooted injustices that still rankle whole communities in Kenya … The politically ignited land clashes of the 1990s are a manifestation of deep-rooted grievances that cannot be glossed over in a reform process,” it said.

    Kibaki came to power in 2002 promising reform. Little has happened. Mati says the only way to address the issue is to break up the vast land holdings of the Kenyattas, Mois and others. “There is a massive youth population that doesn’t have land and that is unlikely to get it the way things are. And yet land is ingrained to them as the key to life. We have to address this or live with the consequences,” he says.

    The upheaval of the past month has created the greatest ethnic migration since the end of British rule. “To say you are taking people to their ancestral homelands is ridiculous,” says Lumumba. “It’s like you are going back to the native reserves because what will they find when they get there? There is no room for them there. They will end up on the periphery of the urban areas trying to survive. It will be another time bomb,” he says.

    Charles Mugo says there is no future for him or any other Kikuyu in Nakuru, and it is best just to go. “There were good Kalenjin. Some of our neighbours tried to protect us but they were threatened and told that next time their houses would be burned. That is when I knew that we wouldn’t come back. The good people have lost out to the bad. We can never feel safe here again,” he says.

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/07/kenya.chrismcgreal

  • Mzee Jomo Kenyatta planted the first seeds of Tribalism in Kenya. He not only grabbed land but also made Kikuyus have the feeling that they were entitled to the leadership and resources of this country. This feeling has persisted and was a major cause of the 2007 electoral theft. There was a feeling among the Kikuyu elite that they could not just hand over power like that. Jomo Kenyatta also caused animosity among the Kenyan tribes by trashing them, by ridiculing them and by killing their leaders. Today, the death of Tom Mboya, Pio Gama Pinto and many others, are associated with State-sponsored assassinations orchestrated by the Kenyatta Administration.

    The Kenyatta family today own land that is EQUAL TO NYANZA PROVINCE – 500,000 acres – and the annoying fact is that NO POLITICIAN wants to talk about this and UHURU KENYATTA has totally refused to admit that many of their lands were grabbed from Kenyans. He still goes on national platform to campaign to be elected the President of this country and get support from his community, while many Kikuyus are squatters and IDPs. Kenyatta did not even give any land to the so called War Veterans (ex-Mau Mau). He trashed them and told them that there was nothing for free.

    Actually while we stay with the truth, Kenyatta betrayed the cause of UHURU (Independence). He is the main cause the Land chaos in Rift valley. He transferred many Kikuyus into Rift valley, and many settled free of charge at the chagrin of many Kalenjins. Land Reform is therefore a major plank in the development of this country but also for peaceful co-existence of the people. Watch the documentary film ‘Making of a Nation’ and you will see how Kenyatta ruled this country with an iron fist and dished all lucrative jobs and appointments to his fellow Kikuyus. The development of central province is not about hard work. It’s about State supported development both through infrastructure and dishing out of major public procurements, but also loans that enable Kikuyus to start Businesses, offered as early as Kenyatta’s days. Many of them were also sponsored by the State to study abroad. This is the truth that many would never want to talk about. The skewed development in Kenya has always been POLITICAL and TRIBAL. Nothing like someone is more hardworking than the other….

  • Festus gacuri gitonga

    Why blamed Uhuru for the wrongs that were committed by his father.by blaming him u mean if my father ws a thief ad die b4 being arrested u prosecute me as a theif

  • #67 – Festus Gacuri Gitonga, can you point any blame against Uhuru in the article? It has only pointed on the facts concerning Uhuru’s wealth that was accrued from his father’s corruption. Learn to read and understand before commenting.

  • Uhuru Kenyatta was promoted by Daniel arap Moi because of his family name, not his leadership skills. He was to safeguard Nyayo interests (including his own, of course). He then gradually maneuvered himself into a guardian of the Kikuyus because of the shock of the post-election killings. But he did this in the wrong way. Who was it that said that an eye for eye simply leaves the world blind? This is the problem when a leader is not vetted and sneaks in through a side door. Now Kikuyus think they are stuck with him and must stand by their man. In actuality, he is a suspect in horrific crimes. He and William Ruto should be spending this time preparing for a very important trial. This does not mean that Raila Odinga should get a free pass. No, it means that other candidates should be encouraged to step up. That is all. But this is really hard for many to accept. So we are headed into very interesting times. Kikuyus are going to beat their chest in support of Uhuru. On the other hand, civil society and the international community are going to beat their chest for the victims of post-election violence who clearly deserve to get justice. Will impunity or justice win? Let us wait and see.

  • Uhuru with all the money stolen by his father is headed for The Hague apende asipende. Kikuyu thieves have done enough damage to the country. Forbes made a stupid mistake and it does not matter what other kyuks defend about Uhuru. His money was stolen by his father, mother and other relatives. Thieving runs in the blood of Kikuyus.

  • Insight: Kenyatta rises as tribal loyalty trumps ICC charge
    James Macharia
    Reuters, 11:10 a.m. CST, February 15, 2012

    GATUNDU, Kenya (Reuters) – Next door to the mansion where Kenya’s richest man, presidential contender and now war crimes suspect Uhuru Kenyatta grew up near the capital Nairobi, stands Francis Karanja’s mud hut with a tin roof.

    Father of two Karanja voted for the 50-year-old Kenyatta to be his member of parliament, hoping the son of Kenya’s founding father, Jomo Kenyatta, would help him rise out of the poverty that traps millions of Kenyans.

    “As you can see, Kenyatta is my neighbor. I feel he has neglected me since we voted him into parliament. We still struggle to make ends meet,” said Karanja, 39, who ekes out a meager living selling milk he pours from a large jerrycan into one-liter bottles for his customers.

    But despite his disappointment, and Kenyatta’s indictment last month for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Karanja says he will vote for the Kenyatta scion in a coming presidential election.

    “I feel sympathy for him because of the charges he faces and will vote for him again. We Kikuyu are loyal to our own,” said Karanja, referring to the largest of Kenya’s more than 40 tribes to which both he and Kenyatta belong.

    This is a sign that tribal alliances trump ideology, or even a government’s record of rule, in East Africa’s biggest economy, which was shaken by bloody post-poll violence following disputed 2007 elections.

    At least 1,220 people were killed in the worst communal fighting in Kenya’s history and more than 300,000 were driven from their homes by the bloodshed which forms the basis of the ICC charges against Kenyatta and three other prominent leaders.

    The ICC move has split the country, with some saying the war crimes court charges make Kenyatta unfit for public office. Kenyatta, however, is appealing, and has vowed to keep alive his bid to be elected president in polls due by March 2013.

    Far from relinquishing his political ambitions as a result of the indictment, he has quit his government job as finance minister, swapped his designer suits for a baseball cap and Nelson Mandela-style shirts, and hit the campaign trail.

    Rivals had hoped the confirmation of the ICC charges would signal his political demise but the opposite seems to be happening.

    An opinion poll issued by Ipsos-Synovate Kenya on February 6 showed his ratings in the race to be president have risen since the ICC charges, while the lead of Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the frontrunner and Kenyatta’s political nemesis, is slipping.

    “Uhuru is a hero because of (the) ICC,” said Hezbon Ngaruiya, a church minister near the Gatundu home of Kenyatta, whose first name Uhuru means “freedom” in Swahili, a widely-spoken language in the country and in East Africa.

    “The case has not hurt him, in fact it has made him more popular than ever. He will save a lot of money which he would have used on publicity during the campaigns,” said Ngaruiya.

    “A LOT OF BITTERNESS”

    The ICC says Kenyatta mobilized an outlawed Mafia-style Kikuyu Mungiki criminal gang to kill members of the Kalenjin and Luo tribes, which both backed Odinga in the 2007 election.

    Kenyatta, who is ranked Kenya’s richest man by Forbes magazine, has rejected the war crimes charges.

    The post-election violence erupted after supporters of Odinga claimed that President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, had stolen victory in the polls. Attacks on Kikuyu supporters of Kibaki triggered a bloody cycle of retaliatory attacks against Kalenjins and Luos.

    A graduate of prestigious Amherst College in Massachusetts in the Unites States, Kenyatta is heir to his late father’s vast business empire, spanning land ownership, the country’s biggest dairy company, five-star hotels, and interests in banking, insurance and exclusive schools.

    In his Kikuyu heartland, many of those driven from their homes by the violence in 2007 and 2008 are still destitute and languishing in camps more than four years later. Their leaders’ promises to find them new places to live have come to naught.

    Yet many still express ethnic loyalty to Kenyatta. A feeling prevails among many Kikuyus that Odinga’s Luo tribe has escaped judgment by the ICC, and this will sway their vote in the upcoming election.

    Anthony Nganga lives at a camp in Kikuyu-dominated Nyandarua, far from his Kiambaa farm in the Rift Valley where his family was attacked and had to flee to save their lives.

    “Three-quarters of those who should be in The Hague are still free,” said Nganga, a Kikuyu like Kenyatta.

    “The Luos also killed Kikuyus and none of their leaders was charged. We have a lot of bitterness about that. This is why people feel the ICC process is flawed and dismiss it altogether. It is also why Uhuru is still popular even here,” he said.

    Nganga’s wife Mumbi and newborn son survived the worst single attack of the violence when a Kalenjin mob torched a church on New Year’s Day 2008, killing nearly 30 people.

    ALLIANCE AGAINST ODINGA

    Kenyatta wants to be a flag-bearer for the Kikuyu, but that bloc alone would not be enough to propel him to the presidency.

    Staying a step ahead of his rivals, he has formed a new alliance with William Ruto, an ethnic Kalenjin, the third largest tribe in the country.

    Ruto has also been indicted by the ICC for mobilizing the Kalenjin to fight the Kikuyu after the December 27, 2007 election.

    So the alliance both unites two communities that attacked each other, and also forms a strong voting bloc.

    Kenyatta’s clarion call to his supporters is “tuko pamoja” in Swahili meaning ‘we are together’, alluding to the tribal alliances he is forging.

    At joint rallies since the ICC ruling, Kenyatta is regularly feted like a rock star, as he and Ruto kneel side by side to receiving the blessing of priests and pastors.

    But with both men running for president, it is not clear who would take the back seat when it comes to a vote, although for now they profess a common enemy in Odinga.

    The prime minister is the man standing between Kenyatta and his ambition to walk in his father’s footsteps. Odinga commands a cult-like following among his Luo tribe which hails from the west of the country near Lake Victoria.

    Odinga, 67, known as “Agwambo” which means controversial or daring, represents the strongest challenge yet to the Kikuyu.

    Two of Kenya’s three presidents since independence from Britain in 1963 have been Kikuyu, the exception being former president Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin like Ruto.

    Many Kikuyus have said they fear an Odinga presidency. Critics express fears that he would be anti-business.

    They cite Odinga’s remarks in a biography indicating he was a plotter in a failed coup attempt in 1982. The fact that he was educated in former communist East Germany – he named his first-born son Fidel after Cuba’s Fidel Castro – has raised eyebrows.

    LUOS SAY “NOW OUR TURN”

    Although Odinga projects himself as a champion of the poor, he is part of Kenya’s rich elite with interests in oil, a liquid petroleum gas cylinder maker and a molasses factory producing ethanol for export. But his wealth is dwarfed by Kenyatta’s.

    Odinga’s constituency includes Nairobi’s Kibera slum, one of Africa’s largest and a haven for bandits. Critics say he has done little to fight poverty in Kibera, but again, ethnically-aligned supporters seem ready to forgive this.

    “Why can’t they leave it to Raila (Odinga)? He gave Kibaki votes, it is now our turn,” said Roslyn Akinyi, 36, a Luo, squatting on a low stool poking her fork at fish sizzling on an open fire in Kibera.

    Many Kikuyus say they are grateful to Odinga for throwing his weight behind Kibaki to help him win the presidency in 2002, crushing a challenge from his then rival Kenyatta.

    But it seems few now countenance returning the favour.

    The Kikuyu and Luo have had a bitter feud that goes back to when Odinga’s father was vice president to Kenyatta’s father. They fell out, and Odinga’s father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, became a vocal opposition critic of Jomo Kenyatta.

    This still counts in Kibaki’s home turf, where tea estates owned by the president and other neighboring farms carpet the hillsides in green. With Kibaki not eligible to run, this means Kenyatta gets the nod here, not Odinga.

    “We cannot vote for someone we don’t trust. Uhuru is our son,” said Simon Kiboi, a 60-year-old tea farmer in Kibaki’s constituency of Othaya deep inside central Kenya.

    LEGAL HURDLES?

    It is not however certain Kenyatta will be allowed to run for the presidency with the ICC charges hanging over his head.

    Rights groups have asked the High Court to bar him and Ruto from running for the top seat.

    The court has banned public debate about whether they can take part until it decides whether the ICC charges disqualify them. This gag also extends to the media.

    Whatever the High Court decides, either party is likely to appeal, and the case could end up before Kenya’s Supreme Court and could take months to resolve.

    Should the ICC grant them the green light to appeal against their charges, it would also take months for the appeal court to hear their petitions, during which time Kenyatta could potentially still run for the presidency and win.

    If their appeals to the ICC are rejected by the court, a trial may start this year. This could lock them out of the race because it could be unworkable to attend court sessions in the Hague and mount a serious campaign in Kenya at the same time.

    Were Kenyatta to be put on trial and excluded from the race to the presidency, the Kikuyu say they would lack a strong candidate to retain their hold on power. It is not clear if he would back another candidate if he was barred from running.

    “The Kikuyu would have no real leader if Kenyatta does not run, there is no precedent for such a scenario,” said anti-corruption campaigner and political commentator John Githongo.

    “VOTE OUTSIDE THE BOX”

    There are other presidential hopefuls too.

    Martha Karua, a lawyer who hails from a tribe that is a cousin to the Kikuyu, and Peter Kenneth, a Kikuyu junior minister with a background in banking, also want to follow in Kibaki’s footsteps and are challenging Kenyatta.

    Analysts give them little chance of succeeding, but they concede the two would gain more supporters if Kenyatta was locked out of the presidential race by a possible ICC trial.

    Karua, known as the ‘Iron Lady’ after walking out on Moi at a public rally years ago, told Reuters at her constituency near Mount Kenya that electing leaders based on tribes does not pay.

    “Those displaced by the post-election violence are Kikuyus like Kibaki. Are they not still living in tents?” she asked.

    Kenneth’s supporters, mainly well-to-do Kikuyus, say he should be president because he has helped create new jobs. But even in his constituency, some say Kenyatta would get their vote because Kenneth has not yet been tested on the national stage.

    While Kenyatta’s support among poor Kikuyu appears strong, among the young, educated, wealthy or urban professionals where Karua and Kenneth have found support, backing for the son of a Kenyan political legend is more ambivalent.

    In Gatundu, Naomi Kamau, a 25-year-old teacher born in the area said not all Kikuyus were behind Kenyatta.

    “I’m unlikely to vote for someone facing such charges, and secondly I don’t trust the company keeps. I’ll vote based on their policies, even if it is Odinga or Karua,” she said.

    “We have to start voting outside the box.”

    (Editing by David Clarke and Pascal Fletcher)

  • No doubt PEV helped Uhuru a lot. Before this he was struggling to claim tribal leadership. But once PEV happened and he was deemed to be a njamba, you also started to see a make-over in terms of how he was being presented. He was not only a njamba but he was also Kenyatta’s son. Mama Ngina appeared, when the ICC thing began to heat up. She laid her hands on him in a much publicized show. Being who she is, there was more to this picture than simply wishing her son well. She was coming out not only as a mother but also as Mama Ngina, Kenyatta’s wife. Kikuyus were supposed to fill in the blanks with their emotions. He became tribal property. You started hearing things about we do not want colonialism in Kenya. This was code for saying that just like Jomo fought the colonial people, Uhuru was also fighting Ocampo (another colonial). This was a manipulation of history to save Uhuru’s behind. From what we know of Uhuru, he has lived the good life and definitely loves Western things (went to Saint Mary’s, Amherst and so on. We never saw him in the streets during the anti-Nyayo protests). To suddenly give him anti-colonial clothes to wear is absurd. But it was a sly move. You can see how effective it was by the reaction of some here to any criticism of Uhuru.

  • UHURU KENYATTA AND WILLIAM RUTO SHOULD READ THIS AND RESIGN>
    http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/02/2012217101341425171.html

  • Kikuyus cannot stand up to this hypocrite because they are themselves compromised due to their support for Uhuru. Yes, Kenyatta’s son is himself accused by the same international court of crimes against humanity. This is the price being paid for Uhuru’s decision, after the 2007 elections, that two wrongs make a right. A very serious mistake. Kikuyus should not have stood by him, despite the shock of the Kalenjin killers in the Rift Valley.

    Show me a Kikuyu proberb that justifies what Uhuru did.

    So now it is left to Raila to stand up for the IDPs. Isn’t that ironic? Where is Mwai Kibaki? Where is John Michuki? Where is Kiraitu Murungi? Where is Njenga Karume? They are all compromised? What is worse, they want future generations of Kenyans to pay for their mistakes. Make no mistake, when things like the post-election killings and displacement take place and no one is punished, enmity is passed on to the next generation. We only need to look at the assassination of Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki and others. Furthermore, it is not the elites that suffer. It is the ordinary folks such as those Kikuyus who perished in the Church fire in Eldoret or the Luos who were hacked in Naivasha.

  • do Luos think Raila will make a better prezzo? OK maybe he should be tested but if he fails, should be kicked out within the first five years.Those calling kiuks thieves should know that many are hardworking and make their wealth honestly

  • Following an emergency family gathering called by family matriarch Mama Ngina Kenyatta, a resolution was passed that Uhuru should take a sabatical from politics, forego presidential ambitions and instead work to defend himself at the ICC and restore the good name of the late Mzee Kenyatta for the sake of younger Kenyatta siblings.

    Interestingly, Uhuru is now deemed internationally as the most prominent indictee in Africa going by the prominence his name and that of his late father has received in global coverage including BBC, CNN, NYT, FT, FORBES and others since the announcement of the pre-trial chamber decision. BBC World Service even featured Kenyan case on its popular ‘Have your say’ talk show which has the widest reach of any radio talk show in the world and is very popular with African listeners.

    Some Kenyatta family members are upset that Uhuru continues to take the flack and bear responsibility for a presidency which Kibaki is enjoying and apparently enjoying ICC immunity from despite having been the one who issued orders for co-operation with Mungiki. The hostility being shown towards Kibaki by some Kenyatta kin is understable given Uhuru has always been the favourite and heir apparent of the Kenyatta sons.

    Sources also inform us that the Kenyatta family is apprehensive about a possible asset freeze of the extensive Kenyatta estate by the ICC for purposes of compensating post elections violence victims. Having already profiled the assets of all suspects and now Uhuru reportedly being advertised as the wealthiest Kenyan in the world, the ICC indictment could not have come at a worse time for Kenyatta family. Uhuru’s personal wealth was subject of close courtroom examination my ICC prosecutor Moreno Ocampo during the hearings in 2010.

    The Kenyatta family takes the threat of asset seisure by ICC seriously and would rather fight to defend the family wealth than finance another unbankable presidential bid by Uhuru in 2012 against an opponent like Raila Odinga. Some Kenyatta family members have even suggested sending an olive branch to the ODM supremo given the history between their fathers and that the senior Odinga actually gave up the presidency of Kenya to Kenyatta during independence.

  • Reasons for Maina Njenga’s Assassination Plot
    November 26, 2011
    Collins Wanzala

    The refusal of the former leader of Mungiki sect in Kenya Mr Maina Njenga to appear as one of the witnesses of a suspect at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague is one of the reasons behind an assassination attempt threat on Njenga. Speaking at his homes in Ngong, Njenga flanked by his lawyer who is also a Presidential aspirant Mr Paul Muite said that he was ready to travel to the Hague and serve as a witness for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Mr Uhuru Kenyatta but was denied visa to travel to the Hague and also did not have money to purchase air ticket to the Hague when Kenyatta wanted him to do so.

    He said that he was informed by an Assistant Minister from the populous Kikuyu community whom he did not mention his name that Mr Kenyatta was furious with his denial to travel to the Hague and act as his witness in the case facing him and five other Kenyans. Kenyatta, alongside head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet Ambassador Francis Muthaura, former Cabinet Ministers William Ruto and Henry Kosgey together with former Police Commissioner Major General Hussein Ali and Radio Journalist Joshua Arap Sang, are indicted for crimes against humanity committed after the controversial 2007 Kenyan elections that saw President Kibaki re-elected for a second term in office.

    During the post-election violence in Kenya, more than 1000 people were killed and close to half a million left homeless after their houses and homes were torched. The most affected areas were Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi Provinces.
    At Thursday’s press conference, Njenga said five Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers had been send to his home to record statements from him and other two witnesses who received death threatening calls on the life of Njenga and also witnessed vehicles trailing him but abandoned recording statement after their boss, the Divisional Criminal Investigation Officer in Langata called them and told them that Njenga’s case was being handled by their superior, the Provincial Criminal Investigation Officer (PCIO) in Nairobi Mr Peter Muinde.

    Lawyer Paul Muite said that the Provincial Criminal investigation officer was a busy person and would have left his juniors to do the work of recording statements. He said that a call by the Nairobi crime Chief investigator to his juniors proved that police were not serious with this matter and were just buying time as they discover a way on how they will cover for themselves after carrying out the alleged murder.

    The former Mungiki boss said that the Assistant Minister, who disclosed to him that Kenyatta was not happy with him, also told him that he (Njenga) refused to accompany him to The Hague because he knew (Njenga) had send former Mungiki members to The Hague to testify against Kenyatta. In the case which is at The Hague it is believed that some former Mungiki members are part of a team that the Chief Prosecutor at the ICC, Louis Moreno Ocampo will be presenting as his key witnesses.

    According to Njenga, during the burial of Njenga`s murdered wife Virginia Nyakio and her driver George Njoroge alongside two other slain Mungiki top leaders Ndungu Wagacha and Naphtali Wainaina, Uhuru Kenyatta had volunteered to pay KShs6 million for preservation of the four bodies at a morgue called Umash funeral home in Nairobi. But surprisingly, after the turn of events especially from the ICC, it emerged that whoever was sent by Kenyatta to pay for the morgue service only paid KShs4 million and now Njenga says he received a letter from the court handed over to him by the Assistant Minister from the Kikuyu community instructing him to pay the remaining two million shillings. Njenga said that the Assistant Minister told him that Kenyatta was very much infuriated by him and was no longer willing to assist him in any way and he has to look for a way to pay the balance that the mortuary is demanding.

    The sect leader whose organization was blamed for running an extortion ring in the multi-million ‘Matatu’ industry which is a public service Vehicle transport system in Kenya had at the Wednesday press conference claimed that his problems began from his recent attendance of a meeting in Central Province where he was among people who endorsed former wealthy cabinet Minister Mr Njenga Karume as the spokesman of the populous Kikuyu community instead of the Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta. Njenga has claimed that the assassins are demanding two million from him as they allege they have already been promised a million shillings upon finishing the killings. Njenga believes that the two million KShs is the one remaining to clear the mortuary debt.

  • The name of the real ruler of Kenya is President Cash Money.

    This explains the reason why business and politics can never be separated in Kenya. And I am not talking about small business here. And it is also for the same reason that the list of the top 100 wealthiest Kenyans always reads like a who-is-who in Kenyan politics past and present.

    The Kenyatta family made its vast weath from grabbing land. Pure and simple. It was often said that the old man (Kenyatta) never saw a fertile piece of land that he could resist getting his grabby old hands on. In fact at public meetings, Kenyatta would often talk of “shamba iko na rotuba nyingi sana” (fertile land) and you could see the saliva literally oozing out of his mouth in excitement. It is said that every time the Kenyatta family gets cash broke, they simply sell off a small parcel of the vast land they own countrywide.

    This is the reason why it was very juvenile for any Kenyan to have expected both the Kenyatta and Moi family to support the new constitution during the historic referendum of 2005. How do you cut your own two feet with an axe as you watch? If you are still confused just find out what the proposed constitution said about land and a truth and reconciliation commission.

    Another corruption technique used by the Kenyatta family to acquire vast wealth was what was popularly known in those days as the “10 per cent rule.” Before any foreign investor opened for business on Kenyan soil, it was mandatory that 10 percent of the shares of his company would have to go to a member of the Kenyatta family. This explains the family interest in numerous tourist hotels at the Coast for example.

  • Dear Uhuru Kenyatta,

    We’ve actually met once. Chances are you don’t remember me. But it’s all good. I tried very hard to be incognito during that occasion.

    I wish you all the best on your recent ICC tribulations. It must be rough being accused of all the things you are accused of. May justice prevail in the end.
    There’s something I’d like to ask you.

    Increasingly of late, you have been saying “Tuko pamoja”, (We are together) presumably as a way of indicating solidarity with WE, the unwashed masses.
    You probably mean well, but I find it difficult to relate with you.

    Perhaps I can explain:
    1. You don’t pay taxes.
    2. As wealthy people go, you and your family are not doing too badly.
    3. You have a handsome housing allowance.
    4. Your vehicle transportation is paid for, so you won’t notice the fuel hikes.
    5. You fly abroad at taxpayers’ expense, and stay in fairly good hotels at taxpayers’ expense as well.
    6. While at airports, you use the VIP lounge.
    7. You don’t know where to get matatus for Komarock.
    8. Few of us have airports named after their fathers (JKIA).
    9. Few of us have streets named after their mothers (Mama Ngina Street/Drive).
    10. Few of us have institutions named after their mothers (Mama Ngina Children’s Home/Girls Secondary School.
    11. Few of us have streets named after our family name (Kenyatta Avenue).
    12. Few of us have universities named after our family name (Kenyatta University).
    13. Few of us have conference centers named after us (KICC).
    14. Few of us have hospitals names after us (Kenyatta Hospital).
    15. Your home is palatial. (And absolutely awesome sir. Very well done!).

    How then, Sir, are we ‘Pamoja’? On what possible fronts can you relate to the common man who has been crippled by the constant rise in kerosene and food prices?
    If I may be impertinent enough to presume to offer you unsolicited advice – I suggest you adopt another catchphrase.

    I know you mean well, but it may – MAY come across as a mockery.

    Warmest regards,

    A Suffering Kenyan

  • Mama Ngina rich from corruption

    Who’s Killing Kenya’s Jumbos?
    Jon Tinker, New Scientist 22 May, 1975

    At the present rate of attrition, Kenya’s elephants may be exterminated within a decade. Although the Kenya government banned the private export of ivory last August, Margaret Kenyatta, mayor of Nairobi and the daughter of the President, has since then illicitly sent over 6 tons worth $200,000, to People’s China.
    There are a few substances which excite human greed out of all proportion to their intrinsic worth or utilitarian value. Gold, for example, and diamonds. And ivory. Gold and diamonds are dug out of the ground, but ivory comes from a living creature: the elephant. To obtain ivory we must first kill a member of the largest animal species walking the Earth, and then hack the tusks out of its face.
    Most of the world’s surviving elephants—and most of the ivory—come from the savannah and rainforests of east and central Africa: from Zaire and the rest of the Congo basin, from Tanzania, from Uganda, and from Kenya. By bullet and poison arrow the elephants are slaughtered, to make billiard balls and piano keys, delicate carvings and tourist curious—and to lie in the bank vaults of the shrewd and the rich as yet another hedge against inflation or revolution.

    Kenya has perhaps 120 000 elephants, and every year between 10 000 and 20 000 are being killed for their ivory. At this rate, the Kenyan elephant will be virtually extinct within a decade. Kenya’s ivory trade is currently worth $10 million a year, but little of this money goes to poachers. Not much goes to the government of Kenya either, for officially it has banned all private dealings in ivory. The profits made by a few merchants in Nairobi and Mombasa, who bribe the game department and the wildlife ministry, the customs and the police to let them ship ivory by the ton to Europe, Hong Kong, Japan and People’s China.

    The identity of these ivory queens is a matter of common gossip in Nairobi, and the most prominent of them are said to be Mama Ngina and Margaret Kenyatta, respectively wife and daughter to the President. In Kenya today, you can be sent to prison for what is called rumour-mongering, so in this article I shall confine myself to provable fact. And there is now documentary proof that at least one member of Kenya’s Royal Family has recently shipped over six tons of ivory to Red China. Moreover, in spite of repeated denials from the Kenyan wildlife ministry that they have issued any licences to deal in or export raw ivory, this trading is being carried out with the active connivance of the highest officials in the game department.

    There has always been poaching in East Africa, and probably there always will be. To the hungry herdsman or peasant farmer, wild game is just meat on the hoof. In Swahili, the very words are the same: nyama means both meat and game. But without European, American and Asian demand fro leopard skin coats and zebra rugs, rhino horn aphrodisiacs and carved ivory souvenirs, poaching could be contained within tolerable limits. As it is, illegal hunting in Kenya is clearly out of control. During the 1974 drought, 5000 zebras were poached from the Kitengela area which borders Nairobi National Park, most of them from inside a game reserve. And even the well-policed Tsavo National Park is currently losing 2000 out of its total of 35 000 elephants each year.

    Officially, poaching is viewed with strong disapproval. “No effort will be spared to stamp it out”, declared vice-president Daniel Arap Moi earlier this year. “Poaching benefits only the few, who make huge sums at the expense of the country.” But how can poaching be stamped out when it is organized by the highest in the land?

    Anti-poaching measures
    On paper at least, Kenya has tried her best. On August 7, 1974 the Minister for Tourism and Wildlife announced the government was taking sole responsibility for trading in raw ivory; dealers were warned that they had only until 20th August to export any legal stocks of raw ivory they might be holding. The special anti-poaching unit began to haul some of the small fish at least into court. In Nairobi this month, assistant wildlife minister Clement Lubembe assured me that the situation was now “under control”. “Of late,” Mr Lubembe stated, “we have not had any very serious reports.”

    Perhaps Mr Lubembe does not read Kenyan newspapers, for they have carried plenty of reports that the ivory situation is far from “under control”. Ion March 5, 1975 customs officials at Nairobi’s Embakasi Airport held up an ivory shipment due to be flown to Hong Kong; over 4000 kilograms worth around $140 000. According to the customs, the documents were “irregular”; according to the Daily Nation, the shipment lacked an export license. A few months earlier, on December 29, 1974, a raid on a warehouse belonging to a Mombasa brick company in Nairobi’s industrial area found around 800 large tusks of 25-30 kg each, packed ready for shipment. Their value was placed at $1.4 million, but within a few days the haul had mysteriously shrunk to 295 tusks worth only $55 000. Although the name of the firm owning the ivory—a notorious Nairobi curio merchant—is well known in every bar, no arrests or charges have yet been made. Indeed, the same firm successfully exported at least one further large consignment of illicit ivory within a month of the raid.
    Jewels and Antiques of Nairobi owns a large shop in Kimathi Street, opposite the New Stanley Hotel where I was staying a few weeks ago. Inside, one counter was piled high with small-sized uncut elephant tusks, weighing from three to five kilos and priced at 300 shillings ($40) per kilo. Minister Lubembe had assured me a few days previously that no private permits existed to trade in raw ivory, although dealing in worked ivory curios was still allowed. So I asked the assistant if it was legal for foreigners to buy tusks. “oh, we’ll get you a permit, don’t worry,” he replied. But surely trade in all raw ivory was illegal? “Ah, but these tusks are polished, not raw,” he replied with a smile. He smaller tusks may indeed have been polished, but the mammoth pair over two metres long marked “sold” quite certainly had not.

    Stopping such blatant High Street evasion of the Kenya government’s ban on ivory trading is child’s play compared with the problems of suppressing the international traffic. Through the 1960s, the world ivory market was stable at the traditional price of £1 per pound; $6 per kilo. At the end of 1969, prices tripled to around $18, and in November 1972, they tripled to around $55. The second price rise is widely thought to have been engineered by a few big suppliers holding back their stocks: a classical instance of cornering the market. As prices peaked at $80, the word spread back to poachers throughout Africa. During 1973 and 1974, elephant-killing reached an all-time high. Today, the glut has lowered the price to $30-35 per kilo, although large tusks still fetch as much as $50.

    With money of this sort at stake, the government’s half-hearted ban on ivory trading has had little chance in Kenya’s freebooting, entrepreneurial society. The “Harambee” (let’s-do-it-together) spirit which Mzee Jomo Kenyatta symbolized in the heady years after Independence has since 1970 given way to an unprincipled scramble for power and riches among the new ruling class—and surly, discontented rumblings among the people. As MP Martin Shikuku put it in 1972: “There is a wholesale grabbing of money in Kenya … These big men steal public funds, and they have friends of influence, and they get away with it.” Corruption is widely considered to start at the top, and Kenyatta’s Royal Family is the target of increasing dislike.

    In March 1974 MP J. M. Kariuki made a speech in Parliament condemning the growing gap between rich and poor, and within a few days he disappeared. His brutally-murdered body eventually turned up under another name in a Nairobi morgue, and his wristwatch was found on a police station roof. While no one suggests President Kenyatta was directly involved, there are ugly tales that his responsibility resembled that of Henry II for the death of Thomas Becket: “Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?”

    Scathing denunciations
    Kariuki was no saint—while he was assistant minister for wildlife in 1974, his wife was fined £450 for illegal possession of elephant tusks and rhino horns—but his scathing denunciations of corruption seem to have struck a chord among the people, Kenya is at present in an uneasy state, with messages of loyalty to President Kenyatta from local councils and political groups matched by daily government attacks on “rumour-mongers and subversives”. Parliament, too, is in an assertive mood, and against the advice of the government has appointed one special commission to enquire into Kariuki’s assassination, and another into corruption.

    It is against this background that poaching in Kenya must be seen: a lucrative trade which involves the police, the civil service, the game department and at least one of Kenyatta’s closest relatives. A conservationist friend of mine was in a Nairobi gunsmith recently. In came an official of the Prisons Department, and asked for quotes for large quantities of sporting ammunition. After he had gone, my friend asked why the prisons needed bullets for wildlife. “Oh, it’s their taxidermy unit,” the gunsmith replied. “Occupational therapy, you know.”

    Occasionally, perhaps because they forget to provide the appropriate rake-off for those above them, a few middlemen appear in court. On October 9, 1974 for example, Major Paul Kimani of the Kenya Army was jailed for 18 months for possession of a cheetah skin, and on March 26, 1975 Njagi Kamau, superintendent in command of the CID in Eastern Province, was jailed for four years after being caught with half a tone of ivory in his police Land Rover. These convictions represent merely the tip of the iceberg. The government’s support for its small but uncorrupt anti-poaching unit which made these arrests is perhaps indicated by the fact that in mid-April the unit ran out of petrol. If the East African Wild Life Society had not made an emergency grant of £1000, the unit would have been immobile until the new financial year starts in July.

    The anti-poaching unit is part of the Game Department, which operates the nation’s game reserves and in its turn comes under the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. The same Ministry also oversees the Kenya Parks Board which runs the national parks under a group of independent trustees. It is the government’s intention to combine the somewhat venal game department with the smaller but incorrupt parks department. Conservationists see this as the beginning of the end. “The difficulties of the game department come from their hands being ties,” Perez Olindo, national parks director, told me guardedly. “We wouldn’t oppose the merger provided it was under independent trustees.”

    The government’s plans, however, provide for the new wildlife service to be directly controlled by the ministry, and other African conservationists are more outspoken against the scheme. “The game department [staffers] are deliberately encouraged to involve themselves in poaching,” one of them told me. “It’s a well-organized racket, involving police chiefs and other top people. The national parks refuse to join in, and that’s why the game department wants the merger. This corruption is something we have inherited from nowhere,” he added bitterly. “The gap is widening between the rich and poor, but they just don’t care. And so far as the law is concerned, talking about it is just rumour-mongering.”

    A private investigation
    Last year, worried by the relentless attrition of Kenya’s elephants, a group of local white conservationists commissioned a private investigation. A research worker toured the ivory haunts of Kenya, Europe and Hong Kong, and two copies were made if the fat dossier which resulted. In January 1975, one copy was placed in the safe of a prominent Kenyan businessman, while those who had commissioned it sought an interview with President Kenyatta. They did not get the interview, but Kenyatta got the report, for in the middle of April the Kenyan Special Branch came and took it away. The other copy is secure at the headquarters of the World Wildlife Fund in Switzerland, where it has so far been read by only a handful of leading world conservationists. But if private pressure produces bi result, the report and all the names it contains will have to be published.

    In Nairobi this month, assistant minister Clement Lubembe told me repeatedly that no licenses to trade in or export raw ivory had been issued since last August, and that all licenses issued before then had been withdrawn. I put it to him that conservationist circles in Nairobi had been told by the CID that between 200 and 400 such licenses were currently in force. “We categorically deny that we are aware of even one license issued after last August,” Lubembe insisted. His permanent secretary Mr Y. Komora, confirmed this: “Nobody is licensed to deal in ivory today, not even via unexpired licenses issued before August.”

    Minister Lubembe and permanent secretary Komora seem to be lamentably misinformed. Such licenses do exist, and they have been authorized by the ministry for which these two men are responsible. License LE 37755 issued in Mombasa on May 11, 1974 permits the export of almost eight and a half tons of ivory, worth at least a quarter of a million US dollars. The first batch left Kenya on August 5, 1974 two days before the government’s export ban was announced, and a second consignment was exported on August 7th, the very day of the Minister’s speech. The third batch left Kenya on September 7, 1974 over a fortnight after the ban was supposed to have come into force, and the fourth was dispatched on April 8th. Under license LE 37755, over a thousand more tusks can still be lawfully if not openly exported.
    License LE 34649 was issued in Nairobi to the same company on July 16, 1974 and authorizes the export of 147 pieces of ivory weighing 1082 kilos. These tusks were all exported on April 8, 1975 although the weight of this consignment exceeded the licensed amount by nearly half a ton.

    The ivory shipment of Tuesday April 8th – one and a half tons under LE 34649 and nearly four tons under LE 37755—went out on Sabena flight SN 494. This took off from Embakasi Airport, Nairobi, at 2200 hours local time, and was bound for Athens and then Brussels.

    The shipment’s value was declared to be 666 000 Kenya shillings: about $94 000. Most of the tusks were small ones, averaging less than 10 kilos, but there was a special batch of 20 with an average weight of 25 kilos. The declared values of $16 per kilo for the small tusks and $32 per kilo for the large tusks are about half the current market prices, suggesting that the buyer was to pay the balance into a foreign account.

    This shipment could certainly be described as illicit, since it was in clear contravention of the Kenya government’s ban on the private export of ivory. But this was not illegal, for in spite of Minister Lubembe’s categorical denials, it was supported by perfectly normal export licenses. However, the consignors were armed with a document even more important than Licenses LE 37755 and 34649. A letter signed by a senior official in the Game Department of the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife and dated March 19, 1975 specifically authorized the export of this five and a half tons of ivory. Lest there be any unfortunate misunderstanding, this missive was addressed individually to the Collector of Customs of Embakasi.
    Where was Sabena taking this ivory? According to the export licenses, 3-8 tons were destined for China Light Industrial Products and 1.5 tons for China Natural Products Import-Export, both of Peking in the People’s Republic of China. But the Game Department’s letter told of a different story: 3-8 tons were going to Hong Kong, 0-5 tons to Mutsubishi Bank, and one tone to Takecho Bank, both of Tokyo. As with the declared values, the nominal destinations probably changed several times during the journey.

    Who, then, was exporting so many tons of ivory to Red China (or to Hong Kong and Japan, depending on which documents one believes)? The exporter was the United African Corporation (Kenya) Limited, whose offices are on the third floor in the IPS Building on Kimathi Street, Nairobi. This company (unrelated to a Unilever subsidiary of similar name) was incorporated under Kenya law on September 8, 1964 “to carry on business as merchants, exporters, importers, growers, manufacturers, commission agents, brokers and warehousemen of commodities of every description…”. Its initial shareholders were two Zanzibari merchants, two Mombasa merchants, and a lady from Nairobi.

    This lady at first held a 16 per cent share-holding in the £K 5000 company, but by September 30, 1974 she owned a 49 per cent stake worth a nominal £K 12 250. Today, she is chairperson of United African Corporation. She is also the Mayor of Nairobi. She is also the daughter of Kenya’s first President. She is Miss Margaret Wambui Kenyatta.

    I rang the offices of United African Corporation, and spoke to the company secretary, Britisher Keneth Pusey. Could he tell me something about his company’s activities? “I don’t think my directors would want me to do that. They like to keep a low profile.” But surely, I said, one of his directors was Margaret Kenyatta, Mayor of Nairobi. “That’s why we like to keep a low profile,” he replied. Well, was it true that his company was engaged in ivory export? “No comment.” Was he refusing to deny that UAC was in the ivory trade? “I don’t know you, bwana, so I think we’d better cease this conversation.”

    President Mobutu of Zaire said recently that Africa could not boast the ancient cathedrals or historic monuments found in Europe. “The heritage or our ancestors,” he stated, “is the natural beauty of our country, our rivers, large streams, forests, insects, animals, lakes, volcanoes, mountains and plains.” Part of Kenya’s heritage is her elephants, an invaluable capital asset, which given wise management could provide in perpetuity an annual income to the national purse, in the form of tourist revenue, hunting licenses, and ivory. Already, a tourist industry largely based on wildlife brings Kenya more foreign exchange than any other export: $68 million in 1973.

    At present this resource is being destroyed so fast that it may be virtually gone in a decade. There is an alternative. Kenya could join together with Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and perhaps other African nations to form an elephant consortium along the lines of OPEC, which would control the supply of ivory coming onto the world market in order to maximize the income from it. At present, a few wealthy Kenyans are making millions of furtive dollars in depleting this capital of 120 000 elephants by as much as 15 per cent a year. No one knows exactly what annual crop a stable elephant population could sustain, but the figure is probably in the region of 3 to 5 per cent. By selecting large-tusked animals, this could provide a sustainable annual yield of 300 tons of ivory from Kenya alone, worth $25 million even if prices could be jacked up no higher than their 1973 peak.

    Heritage of the people
    Blacks are rightly sensitive when white conservationists like myself, with little knowledge of the poverty and hunger which besets so much of Africa, urge them to do this or that with their own countries. “It is true that our wildlife may be a world heritage, but the land belongs to Kenya,” minister Clement Lubembe told me. And permanent secretary Komora added: “It is wrong for anyone outside Kenya to say that our national resources belong to them. First of all, they belong to Kenya.”

    I agree. Kenya’s wildlife does indeed belong to the wananchi, the people of Kenya. It should not be treated as the private fief of the present ruling elite, a wasting asset to be ravaged and plundered into Swiss bank accounts. It is hard to believe that President Kenyatta can personally be aware of the way in which his own immediate family is involved in the ivory trade, and friends of Kenya must hope that since facts have now replaced persistent rumour, he will act decisively to save the inheritance of his people.

  • Martin mwangi thinwa

    I agree uhuru is the richest and despite from inheriting he is very hardworking.LONG LIVE UHURU!

  • Mr uhuru it is true that u bear many titles more than many other politician. Martha and ruto have a peasant origin. It is true u were born in palace with a golden spoon in ua mouth. You have not struggled much in politics either. It is also clear u have a following of the largest community. The gema will easily pick u up coz of your pedigree. My pick is that i have never seen u struggle. U think that conspiracy can achieve everything. You are not a bold politician who can stand for change. You always seem in a hurry and impatient. You have alot to learn from the iron lady. Redundant wealth is not enough hon uhuru to grab power with. Avoid shortcuts and teach yourself to struggle. Let the father tag and father figures go. Dont be a project of others. I support Martha Karua.

  • Kabete MP Linus Nguyai (the parrot) basically destroyed Uhuru’s chances at ICC. He admitted that Mungiki can actually go to clean and posh hotels unlike Uhuru’s testimony that Mungiki cannot be allowed at places like Nairobi Club. Nguyayi held meetings with Mungiki and knows the leaders themselves. He did not even report these dealings to the police, but the PS for internal security. Go figure who is the Mungiki BOSS.

  • ICC deserves help in seeking justice for all
    Louise Chappell and Andrea Durbach
    February 14, 2012

    Opinion

    Australia has a role to play in strengthening the court’s global reach.

    Even the most cursory look at the crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court makes one thing clear. Humankind’s capacity to inflict unimaginable suffering upon its own is breathtaking. Yet far too few of the perpetrators of the very worst of such atrocities have ever been called to account.

    A decade after the International Criminal Court was established in The Hague, amid great optimism about a new, just world order, not a single judgment has been handed down. The court’s first judgment – in the case against Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first person taken into custody by the court – is imminent, but it has taken almost six years to reach this point.

    The recent ICC ruling on Kenya does challenge the immunity so long enjoyed by that nation’s political elite. The court directed Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s Finance Minister and richest man and the son of the nation’s founding president, and three others to stand trial for murder and rape over the orchestration of post-election violence in 2007 in which more than 1200 people died.

    However, the ICC’s founding vision of “justice for all” through the provision of courtrooms in which the most senior officials accused of heinous crimes against humanity must defend their actions remains a distant goal.

    All 14 of the cases the ICC has on its books are in Africa, which can only reinforce the impression of a legal institution with too few teeth picking on the world’s weakest states.

    The ICC is also hampered by the geopolitics of international justice. The world’s biggest powers, including the US, China and Russia, have not signed on, nor have many nations in our backyard, the Asia-Pacific region. This limits the court’s reach and erodes the ideal of a globally endorsed set of standards for all.

    The ICC has no shortage of detractors and its short-comings to date cannot be glossed over. However, such criticism is not particularly constructive; imperfect, yes, but it is difficult to argue that the world would be better off without a permanent international criminal justice process.

    The horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s sufficiently galvanised the international community to establish temporary, ad hoc international criminal tribunals, just as World War II led to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. An agreed international system can only improve on such an arduous, often politicised, case-by-case approach by which justice can be done only once a despot has fallen.

    This means the real challenge is to strengthen the ICC so it can better meet its brief.

    Preliminary examinations being undertaken by the ICC in Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Palestine, Honduras, Nigeria and North Korea suggest the court can go beyond its Africa-centric beginnings.

    The anticipated elevation to chief prosecutor of Fatou Bensouda, who has a reputation for resilience and as a champion of female victims of violence, also promises to consolidate the expansion of the court’s reach.

    How the ICC can deal with cases more swiftly is partly just a matter of time; in any new area of law the development of jurisprudence is initially slow, but the establishment of a suite of precedents will inevitably reduce delays.

    For a middle power such as Australia, which has long been committed to the ICC, the question might be: what can we do? The most useful contribution Australia can make, apart from contributing expert personnel to the court, is to promote the ICC in its own region. Australian-led aid programs to strengthen democratic and legal institutions and processes in neighbouring countries are a good start, but need to go further.

    Key regional players, such as Indonesia, Thailand and India, are not signatories to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, nor are a number of Pacific nations. Although 120 nations have now signed on, including the Philippines, Vanuatu and the Maldives only last year, the ICC will remain hobbled without the world’s largest powers and influential Asian nations. It is in the Asia-Pacific region where Australian diplomacy can make a mark.

    An International Criminal Court will never mean international police to turn to on every street corner; nor will most of the world’s victims of crimes against humanity ever get their day in court. The toll that world wars, regional conflicts, guerilla wars, localised violence, state repression and terrorism took throughout the 20th century was unprecedented, and we have the weapons and imaginations to wreak even more grievous harm in future. But international laws do give us cause to pause and think, if only by establishing clearly what is wrong and who should be held to account.

    Professor Louise Chappell and Associate Professor Andrea Durbach are co-convenors of the conference ”Justice for All?” at the University of NSW today and tomorrow.

    http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/icc-deserves-help-in-seeking-justice-for-all-20120213-1t23x.html

  • Uhuru Kenyatta is a member of the country’s self-serving political elite, and reportedly the richest man in the country and one of the wealthiest in Africa, largely thanks to land holdings mainly grabbed for the family by his father Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first leader. Kenyatta Jr has also been charged with politically-motivated crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court.

    Meanwhile, millions of Kenyans — some of whom have voted for him — carve their homes out of the ever-expanding slums that encircle the capital like a squalid necklace.
    The “trickle down effect” of rising GDP is just that — a trickle – for most the drudgery of earning enough for food, school fees and housing is unchanging. The narrative of ‘Africa Rising,’ of world-leading economic growth and an expanding ‘middle class,’ does not ring true.

  • The Kikuyunization of Kenya under President Jomo Kenyatta

    Although the State continued to talk of Kenya as one nation, and to de-emphasize ethnicity in its public statements and policies in land, service delivery and jobs, the unifying rhetoric of nationhood concealed a less palatable truth. The 1970s saw the entrenchment of Kikuyu power via a web of both formal and informal networks. As with the security forces, the senior civil service was increasingly Kikuyu dominated. The crucial posts of provincial commissioners, for example, were held by a small group of conservative insiders, more than half of whom were Kikuyu from 1967 until Kenyatta’s death, and three of whom were sons of chiefs. Appointments to statutory boards and parastatals showed the same trend.

    These men were powerful, educated, intelligent and able, and they effectively ran Kenya in the interest of Kenyatta, themselves (they all had substantial business investments) and the country. Just as their colonial predecessors had done, they disliked local politicians, whom they treated as competitors, and made no pretence of democracy. Provincial Commissioner (PC) Eliud Mahihu was particularly well known for his dictatorial attitude and concern with development. As he said in 1998: ‘About calling us governors, I had no problem … we were employed to govern our provinces and we did.’ Simeon Nyachae was in a class of his own as the most able, politically astute non-Kikuyu PC with direct personal loyalty to Kenyatta (though he had married a wife from Nyeri). His governorship of Central Province was a critical ethnic balancing act. Moi’s influence was seen in the appointment of two Kalenjin PCs, and Kenyatta took care to ensure that the Luo were governed not by a Kikuyu, but by a Kipsigis.

    The same pattern was seen elsewhere. In the central government, Geoffrey Kariithi (a Kikuyu from Kirinyaga and educated at Alliance High School) headed the civil service from 1967 to 1979). Other senior figures included Kiereini (ex-Alliance, also from Kirinyaga and an ex-detention camp warden) who ran the Ministry of Defense, Peter Gachathi (Alliance, Kiambu) was education secretary from 1969 to 1979. Duncan Ndegwa (Alliance, Nyeri) was governor of the Central Bank. Joseph Gethenji (Nyeri) was director of personnel from 1968 to 1978, while Joseph Kibe (Murang’a) was permanent secretary for commerce and industry. Of course, there were powerful civil servants who were not Kikuyu, but they generally played a secondary role. A study of top civil service posts in 1972 showed that Kikuyu now held 50 per cent of the top jobs, a rapid increase since the 1960s. There were reports that a Posting Committee in the Office of the President (OP) made civil service appointments in advance of interviews by the Public Service Commission, and that this committee was dominated by ex-Home Guard Kikuyu.

    The situation was a little different amongst the parastatals. Many heads of parastatals, appointed by Kenyatta or his ministers, were also Kikuyu. There is no doubt that these were intelligent, competent individuals. Many had gone through the elite forcing-ground at Alliance High School and knew each other well. Whether they were the best men for the job was another question, as personal loyalty to Kenyatta was critical. Kenyatta was lucky that he had an educated, able cadre of loyalists to choose from, a luxury that Moi did not have a decade later.

    Amongst private sector organizations not led by Europeans or Asians, Kikuyu dominance was equally strong. Francis Thuo (Murang’a) was chairman of the Nairobi Stock Exchange during 1970-83. Joseph Wanyoike (Murang’a) was managing director of Kenya Cooperative Creameries from 1968 until 1978. Bethwell Gecaga (Murang’a) chaired BAT from 1967 until 1995. His son and Kenyatta’s nephew Udi Gecaga was then Lonrho chairman. Ex-permanent secretary Kenneth Matiba (Alliance, Murang’a) ran Kenya Breweries until 1984, while Joe Wanjui (Kiambu) ran East African Industries until 1993.

    The Kikuyu dominance at the top filtered down to other levels. Each appointment generated power and income for its holder and a trickle-down to their home area through contracts, jobs for clients and preferential allocation of development funds. A self-reinforcing structure of privilege was built which 24 years of Moi’s rule never fully dismantled. In October 1973, Shikuku presciently warned that if the Kikuyu did not share the fruits of Uhuru with others, they would eventually be ‘eaten’ by the other 41 tribes ‘like a satisfied hyena was eaten up by hungry hyenas’. Not every job was set aside for the Kikuyu, however. The ethnic sifting process worked much the same way when a non-Kikuyu ran an organization. There were protests in 1970, for example, that East African Airways (EAA), the National Housing Corporation (NHC) and the KNTC were the ‘monopoly of Abaluyias’.

    The Luo received little preference from the State. The 1965-66 split and the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) era had alienated Kenyatta permanently from the community and as Kenya Times suggested: “Henceforth, the Luos became second class citizens of Kenya. They were viewed with suspicion in all quarters and they were given the lowest rating whenever it came to jobs. Apart from the Kisumu-Busia, Kisumu-Kericho and Kisumu-Kisii roads, Luo Nyanza roads were not tarmacked.”

    While the Kamba had the military, the Luo—with some of the best-educated and most active elites at Independence—had few avenues for their energies. They had no large settlement schemes and most of Luo Nyanza was unsuitable for coffee and tea. They could go into business, but the commercial sector was tilted in favour of the Kikuyu and they had capital. Distrusted in the military, parastatals and politics, they focused instead on the civil service, the professions, trade unionism and religion. Luo increasingly blamed their marginalization, both real and apparent, on the Kikuyu, and built a mythology of resistance and social cohesion around opposition to the Kikuyu elite’s political and economic goals.

    It was now clear that the Kikuyu and to a lesser extent their Mount Kenya neighbours in Embu and Meru were embedding a sense of pre-eminence in their collective culture. There was growing assumption of their right to rule. Many Kikuyu believed they were smarter, more entrepreneurial and had suffered more under colonialism. They compared themselves with Europeans, and viewed other Kenyans as backward and likely to destroy the economy if given power. Their widespread antipathy to the Luo was not based on their failure to practice male circumcision (though it was a genuine point of cultural tension), but on the threat they posed because of their numbers and history of recent conflict. By the 1980s, under Moi, the Kikuyu had become firmly associated in the popular imagination with competitive differentiation and ‘money grabbing’, while their Luo counterparts had come to epitomize indolence, poverty, socialism and rebellion. Jaramogi Odinga and Jomo Kenyatta symbolized this cleavage: Odinga was the dispossessed; Kenyatta the benevolent dictator but simultaneously ‘the chief architect and patron of the Greater Kikuyu Community’.

    KENYATTA’S KEY PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS

    Paul Boit — PC Central, Western and Nairobi (1964-80) Kalenjin – Nandi, son of chief

    Isaiah Cheluget — PC Nyanza (1969-80). Kalenjin – Kipsigis

    Charles Koinange — PC Central and Eastern (1967-80). KIKUYU from Kiambu, son of senior chief, Mbiyu Koinange’s brother and Kenyatta’s brother-in-law

    Eliud Mahihu — PC Eastern and Coast (1965-82). KIKUYU from Nyeri, colonial administrator and ex-Home Guard

    Isaiah Mathenge — PC Coast, Rift Valley and Eastern (1965-82). KIKUYU from Nyeri, ex-Home Guard and detention camp warder

    John Godhard Mburu — PC Coast, North-Eastern, Nairobi and Western (1964-79). KIKUYU from Murang’a

    Simeon Naychae — PC Rift Valley and Central (1965-79). Gusii, son of chief

    SENIOR KIKUYU PARASTATAL HEADS IN THE 1970S

    Ephantus Gakuo — Director-general of East African Railways (later Kenya Railways), 1987-1970s. MURANG’A

    Bethwell Gecaga — Chairman, Industrial Development Bank (1976-9). MURANG’A

    Julius Gecau — Managing director, East Africa (later Kenya) Power and Lighting Company (1970-84). KIAMBU

    James Karani Gitau — General manager, Kenya National Trading Corporation (1969-79). KIAMBU

    Stanley Githunguri — Executive chairman, National Bank of Kenya (1976-9). KIAMBU

    Charles Karanja — General manager, Kenya Tea Development Authority (1970-81). KIAMBU

    John Matere Keriri — General manager then managing director, Development Finance Company of Kenya (1972-82). KIRINYAGA

    Peter Kinyanjui — Chairman, East African Harbours Corporation (later Kenya Ports Authority) 1970-80. KIAMBU

    John Michuki — Executive chairman, Kenya Commercial Bank (1970-9). MURANG’A

    Philip Ndegwa — Chairman, Agricultural Finance Corporation (to 1974). KIRINYAGA

    Matu Wamae — Executive director, Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (1969-79). NYERI

    By Charles Hornsby (2012)
    Kenya: A History Since Independence (Pages 254-258)

  • diasporadical

    Forbes Magazine claims that Uhuru Kenyatta, 2012 presidential aspirant, International Criminal Court suspect and son of former president Jomo Kenyatta, is the richest man in Kenya and 26th richest man in Africa. Does it not bother us to have one surname owning over 500,000 acres of land in Kenya?

    Frankly, I pray that Mr. Kenyatta never sees the inside of State House in 2012(although he was born there 50 years ago)because I have a sneaky feeling that Kenyatta would be among those that oppose all broad-based land reform/land redistribution policies that would be made pursuant to the new Constitution. All in all, I find it all very sad that he sits on all these huge tracts of prime land, most of them unused, yet we still have displaced persons living in camps all over the country.

  • Who Was CMG Argwings-Kodhek?

    Argwings-Kodhek [a Luo] was a barrister, politician and cabinet minister for more than 16 years. He was founder and first president of the Nairobi District African Congress (NADC) in 1956. He was a member of the legislative council between 1961 and 1963, before being elected member of the house of representatives for Gem as a KANU representative. He died in a mysterious accident on Hurlingham road (now Argwings-Kodhek) in Nairobi on 29th January 1969, still believing in the National Project. Is there a place for the ‘Mau Mau lawyer’ in the Heroes and Heroines Corner?

    When today we take the right of workers to organize and call a strike to defend themselves for granted, we should pay tribute to those brave souls who sacrificed their lives to fight for this democracy in the labor movement, during the dark days of colonialism. In those uncertain days, calling a strike was synonymous with losing one’s job or asking for detention.

    Although during the early 1990s there were many Kenyan lawyers who earned great prestige and enormous sums of money by calling themselves human rights lawyers, during the Emergency period, there was only one African advocate, Chiedo More Gem Argwings-Kodhek. The human rights campaign he championed had an enormous impact, in that it provided support for the various dissident elements and freedom fighters. The ethical dimension of politics motivated the people’s power crusade in Kenya and human rights movements in Africa. In short, Argwings-Kodhek used ethical principles to demand independence and to champion human rights.

    Frequent large-scale violations of human rights, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention or imprisonment, restrictions on people’s freedom of movement and assembly and the severe repression of the slightest expression of freedom, were part and parcel of political life in Kenya in 1952-63. Almost single-handedly, Argwings-Kodhek took on the formidable challenge of defending the rights of ordinary Kenyans during this critical period. He argued that human rights are indivisible and universal and that freedom cannot be appropriate in the West yet inapplicable in Africa. Human rights are also applicable to all human beings, including Africans.

    Born in 1923 in Gem, Siaya district, Argwings-Kodhek had a reputation as a man of sharp wit, fluent and forthright in expressing himself about issues of the day. An ex-Makerere teacher, Argwings-Kodhek was granted a scholarship to study social sciences at the University of South Wales and Monmouthshire in 1947. But after a term at the university, he applied to the Kenya government to allow him to take law instead of social sciences, the subject he had originally wanted to study. His request was rejected.

    However, with assistance from the university and some friends, he joined the law degree course and in December 1949, he passed his final examinations. He also got his degree in social sciences. The barrier to law studies for Kenya Africans was thus broken by Argwings-Kodhek.

    Before his return to Kenya in 1952, he threw another challenge at the colonial regime by marrying an Irish woman, Mavis Tate, the daughter of an Irish engineer. It was still illegal in Kenya for an African to kiss a white woman or walk hand in hand in public, let alone share a house. What was he to do in Kenya? Jomo Kenyatta had married a white woman in England in 1942, but he was wise enough not to bring her to Kenya until 1963.

    In Nairobi, Argwings-Kodhek was not allowed to live in Westlands because that was a white man’s area, and his wife could not live in Kaloleni because that estate was reserved for Africans. So in his personal life, he had to fight for the basic human right of husband and wife living together, a battle he eventually won.

    Defended Mau Mau freedom fighters pro bono
    Argwings-Kodhek faced similar problems of injustice and racial discrimination with regard to employment. He was offered a job in the attorney-general’s department at a third of the salary of an ordinary white which he declined. He therefore joined the firm of Chanan Singh for a while, before setting up his own law practice in Church House where he defended Mau Mau freedom fighters.

    Most of the people he defended were poor and could not meet his professional fees, and he therefore offered free legal services. It was extremely difficult and risky to collect evidence or to have access to his clients. The use of incognito witnesses (who could not be questioned by the counselors for defense), the abolition of preliminary investigation and the Mau Mau cases he handled were so many, often took so long to resolve, and were so often heard in makeshift courts in remote places, away from his office in Nairobi, that he hardly accepted any other cases. When, for instance, about 500 persons were arrested in connection with the Lari massacre of 26th March 1953, in which a total of 150 loyalists, mostly government employees and home guards, including ex-chief Luka Kahangara and 26 members of his family were killed by Mau Mau fighters, mass trials followed in a cattle shed at Githunguri, which was turned into a supreme court. Argwings-Kodhek, the only African practicing lawyer at the time specializing in criminal law, helped 48 of the accused to make successful appeals, on a legal technicality, against conviction of taking part in the massacre.

    Among the Mau Mau fighters who benefited from his erudite legal knowledge and courage were Kiriri Wakihoto, who became a councilor in Nyeri in independent Kenya, and the former MP for Nyeri and cabinet minister, Waruru Kanja, who was to be hanged. Kanja had been arrested and detained by colonial administration for smuggling arms to Mau Mau nationalists. He was sentenced to death and spent several months on death row, but because of the still defense Argwings-Kodhek offered, he was instead committed to life imprisonment and was finally released at the end of the State of Emergency.

    By Bethwell A. Ogot

    Mau Mau & Nationhood: The untold story (2003). Pages 27-28

  • Jomo Kenyatta the murderer
  • 1) I hope Uhuru will not try to drag the whole Kikuyu tribe to the trial in order to manipute tribal emotions. The trial is only between Uhuru, William Ruto, Francis Muthaura, and Joshua arap Sang and the ICC. They should not try to drag their respective tribes into the mix in order to give themselves cover. After all, when they committed the alleged crimes, they did not come to their tribes and ask for guidance. So they should bear their own crosses.

    2) I hope people will not assume that what Uhuru owns, making him the richest man in Kenya, is from his hard work alone. I hope that Kikuyus and Kenyans have by now realized that there is no way that Uhuru could have amassed the wealth he has in a legal way. It is high time we stopped pretending that his wealth is due to some brilliance on his part. We are now living in a new Kenya where the truth cannot be suppressed. The wealth that Uhuru has should be considered in terms of the Kenyan fight against impunity for he acquired it thanks to his father’s manipulation of unchecked presidential powers. We should stop pretending and face the facts.

  • UHURU/RUTO WILL BE ARRESTED BY THESE COMMANDOS SENT TO KENYA>http://www.smh.com.au/national/secret-sas-teams-hunt-for-terrorists-20120312-1uwhy.html

  • According to some Kikuyu ministers, to gain entry into the Central Kenya region (read Kikuyu nation), it ‘must’ be through Uhuru Kenyatta.

    It is really disheartening to witness the desecration of the dream of the beginnings. But again, what does one expect from the privileged son of Jomo Kenyatta? With all the wealth, vast lands all over Kenya, what clicks in his mind is to collapse all else that can stand in the way of ‘protecting’ the Kenyatta ‘heritage’.

    And for that reason, he can clothe himself in any banality in order to make his ‘tribe’ realise the danger inherent in Raila Odinga’s presidency.

    And, to play around with Saro-Wiwa, Kenya kills its sun. Always!

    Lennox Odiemo-Munara

  • Though its true he has acquired wealth from his corrupt father, retaining that wealth and position of the family is his effort that we should recognize. Brookside dairies, K24 and many more companies were never started by the Late president. Uhuru has success in his own way

  • uhuru the tribal chief
  • I am fed up of this talk. What has Uhuru done for Kenyans? One of the largest land owners by virtue of his father corruption, yet he cannot even donate .oooo1% of it to the IDPs. Sickening; we are just perpetuating the same sycophancy we have had in our leadership since independence. Does it mean that you are automatically a leader if your father was a president?

    How has he articulated his visions for this country? What are his achievements in helping the small mwananchi?

    Please Let us not make another mistake of thinking a brilliant mind makes a good statesman! Uhuru still belongs to the ‘nouveau riche’ Kikuyus who really don’t care for the ordinary man and who have been a source of class problem in this country.

    Kikuyus should stop glorifying this man who inherited stolen wealth!

  • Kerry Dolan and Mfonobong of Forbes are the ones who researched Uhuru’s wealth. In one of Kerry’s answers to the question by a commentator as to why they did not mention Gideon Moi among the richest Kenyans, she replied that he belongs on the ‘List of Suspects’.

    However, I wonder what makes her think that Uhuru Kenyatta’s wealth is not ‘suspect’ yet its background is full of theft by his father the dictator Jomo Kenyatta. Surely, they must be blind to their methodology in collecting data which should not include persons who are in political power, because they may use such connections to amass wealth. In rearching Uhuru’s wealth, they should have first known that his father was the architect of corruption. How could he have ‘bought’ 500,000 acres of land in a poor country immediately after independence in the 1960s? Not even in the developed world would one amass that much of acreage in 15 years unless they are multi-millionaires.

    Kerry and Mfonobong should accept that their classification was faulty and unethical.

  • Stop this obssesion with kenyattas

  • Mama Ngina rich from corruption

    Doctor sues Mama Ngina over land
    By NATION CORRESPONDENT
    Posted Sunday, April 1 2012 at 22:30

    Nakuru

    A Nakuru man is claiming ownership of three prime plots belonging to former First Lady Mama Ngina Kenyatta.

    Dr Isaac Kirubi claims in an affidavit filed in court that the plots were forcibly transferred to Mama Ngina on May 7, 1974 by then Commissioner of Lands, Mr James Aloysius O’Loughlin.

    A document Mama Ngina filed in court shows she was allocated the land by her husband, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, after paying Sh30,000.

    But Dr Kirubi describes the transfer as compulsory acquisition. He says he was about to develop the land when he lost it.

    Dr Kirubi, who was Nakuru mayor at the time, claims he was summoned to State House in Nakuru by Mzee Kenyatta.

    “He ordered me to surrender my rights to the land in favour of Mama Ngina but I refused,” the retired medical doctor says in his affidavit.

    He claims after defying the order, the President ordered Mr O’Loughlin to cancel his title to the land and register it in Mama Ngina’s name.

    The case will be heard on July 2.

  • And most of the so-called younger generation of leaders don’t understand party affiliation. What a disappointment they have proved, when older leaders, and even leaders of the past, are and were more enlightened. We see it most clearly with Uhuru Kenyatta, who last week responded enthusiastically to calls from his supporters that he just name his party, and they would support him, wherever and whatever. Such parties are not worthy of the name. They are merely conveniences. There is no question of commitment to a party philosophy – “Just give us a name so we use it to get to a position of power!”

    It is equally true of Kenyatta, who couldn’t make it to parliament in 1997 even in his father’s old constituency, then got nominated to parliament by President Daniel arap Moi in 2001, then became Moi’s project (and failed in his presidential bid) in 2002, finally got himself elected to parliament that year and has since evolved as the project of President Mwai Kibaki and others of his tribesmen.

    In late 2008, after the Kriegler and Waki reports on the 2007 general election were submitted, ODM sat down as a party with its national executive council and parliamentary group to discuss the matter, eventually deciding to suggest that a local tribunal be established to try those suspected of being instrumental in post-election violence. The party issued a statement to this effect.

    Ruto was not present at that meeting, being away in The Netherlands, allegedly negotiating a fertiliser deal. But as soon as he arrived at Nairobi airport, he told the press that he was opposed to the establishment of a local tribunal. He said such a tribunal would end up trying only the small fry, while letting the big fish go scot-free. Ruto then teamed up with Kenyatta to make a career out of opposing the tribunal idea, and the two of them ‘lobbied’ (to put it politely) hard among MPs to oppose the parliamentary motion that sought to establish a local tribunal independent of the judiciary.

    In the meantime, Odinga, Kibaki and then justice minister Mutula Kilonzo tried their best to persuade their parliamentary colleagues to support a local tribunal.
    When it came to the vote, Ruto, Kenyatta and their pals voted against the local tribunal and carried the day. They appeared to imagine that the matter of justice would thus be delayed (Ruto even stating at one point that it would take 99 years for the Hague cases to be heard) until they were in government themselves, whereupon they would presumably ensure non-compliance with the Hague and the matter would go the same way as so many other scandals in our history.

    After parliament rejected the local tribunal, Annan arrived and categorically stated that The Hague was not a good idea. He said he would give parliamentarians another six months (beyond the original deadline of the end of 2008) to rethink. Failing a change of attitude, he would have no choice but to hand over to the ICC the sealed envelope of perpetrators’ names given to him by Justice Philip Waki. Annan then held on to the envelope from January to June 2009. Kilonzo spearheaded a second attempt to have parliament agree to form a local tribunal. His efforts were shot down by Ruto and Kenyatta in Cabinet.

    A third attempt was made in parliament by Imenti Central MP Gitobu Imanyara. This was also shot down. At every stage of this process, Ruto and Kenyatta strongly opposed the local tribunal, while Odinga, Kibaki, Kilonzo, Imanyara and several others continued to support it. In the end, Ruto and Kenyatta succeeded in killing completely the idea of a local tribunal, and Annan was left with no option but reluctantly to hand over the sealed Waki envelope to ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.

    Even then, Ocampo himself volunteered that he did not have to prosecute – if only Kenyans could get their act together. Minister for internal security Professor George Saitoti led a team consisting of Kilonzo, the then attorney-general Amos Wako and lands minister and shadow attorney-general Orengo to the ICC, where they told Ocampo they needed more time. Ocampo gave them another four months.

    But opposition led by Ruto and Kenyatta was still so strong that Saitoti’s team could achieve nothing. Finally, Ocampo gave up, went to the pre-trial chamber and sought permission to begin his investigations. This was granted in March 2010. The ICC began its work. On December 15 that year, Ocampo named the six suspects he considered had the biggest responsibility for the crimes committed. And then, suddenly, out of the blue, it was Raila Odinga who was the author of the whole thing! He just wants us out of the way, said Ruto and Kenyatta, so that he can win the election.

    Excerpts from Sarah Elderkin
    http://www.the-star.co.ke/weekend/siasa/70306-raila-and-ruto-what-caused-the-split?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=

  • Kenyattas r land thieves

    Daily Nation News
    Monday, March 6, 2000
    ——————————————————————————–

    Kenyatta’s son named in prime land scandal
    By EDMUND KWENA

    A son of President Jomo Kenyatta was allocated 50,000 acres of prime land at the Coast, an MP has claimed.

    Mr Peter Muigai Kenyatta, Mzee Kenyatta’s eldest son, was allocated the land at the Mpeketoni scheme in Lamu District, Lamu West MP Fahim Twaha said.

    The MP’s remarks came amidst growing controversy across the country over the Kenyatta regime, which critics have accused of political repression and corruption while its defenders say the charges are unfair.

    Mr Twaha told a public rally held at Mkunguni in Lamu town on Friday that the land was given to Mr Muigai Kenyatta because of weaknesses in the land processing system.

    He told a rally attended by Lands Minister Joseph Nyagah and assistant ministers Zebedeo Opore and Francis Tarar that flaws in the land acquisition process had denied a lot of people their rightful share.

    “I am not attacking Peter Kenyatta as a person, but how can one justify that in the same settlement scheme in Mpeketoni, a total of 3,600 families were allocated 36,000 acres while one man got 50,000 acres?” he asked.

    The MP said that the planned review of the Constitution should cover land issues. He called for the decentralisation of land allocation so that decisions affecting wananchi would be taken at the grassroots level.

    “As it is now, someone can come from Nairobi and claim your land because the decisions on land allocation are being made in the capital,” he said.

    He suggested that even decisions to employ government officers and concerning government expenditure be referred to the locations.

    He said: “District land allocation committees are not democratic as they consist of five members – the district commissioner, town clerk, planning officer, land officer and chairman of the county council,” the MP said.

    “The only local person is the chairman of the county council, who is directly accountable to the people. Unfortunately, either because they are outnumbered or are corrupted with offers of choice plots for themselves and their families, they tend to betray the local people.”

    On a promise by Minister Nyagah that the government would issue title deeds to Coast people, Mr Twaha said persistent calls for federalism appeared to have woken the government out of its slumber.

    “Our calls for independence of the Coast Province appear to have been a wake-up call for the government, which is now moving fast to release titles to the people in the Coast Province,” he said.

    He said the fact that Mr Nyagah had flown to Lamu “with a high-powered delegation and in a military plane”, showed that the government was finally listening to Coast people.

    He said the Shungwaya Association, which obtained a court injunction stopping all new land allocations in Lamu District, wanted an assurance that there would be no more land grabbing in the district before withdrawing the injunction.

    “The association is ready to withdraw the injunction but the government on its part must also give guarantees that land grabbing will no longer occur in the district,” Mr Twaha said.

    Minister Nyagah has been on an extensive tour of Coast Province to address the thorny land issue.

  • An open letter to Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru
    By MUKHISA KITUYI
    Posted Saturday, March 31 2012 at 16:43

    Greetings Ndugu yangu. I choose to address you through this most public of mediums because the message I share with you in these lines is of significant public interest and may be in your best interest to be heard by your foes and, particularly, friends firsthand.

    I congratulate you on the phenomenal success you have had in building a solid political following within the populous Central Kenya region and the significant forays you continue to make in the wider Kenyan population.

    It is not easy to amass such goodwill and following these days. First you come from a community that is famously apolitical and rarely finds a common voice on anything.

    Secondly, you are the scion of an aristocratic heritage that divides more than it unites opinion both in your community and across the country.

    Third you live in an era of political cynicism and apathy especially among the younger intelligentsia. And fourth, Kenya remains polarised by the wounds of recent political skirmishes.

    With your firm grip and bear hug; your ability to make your immediate audience feel like you really consider them important; your networks and nationwide rallies; you have patiently and systematically ridden out many of these challenges.

    Your oratory and simplicity have wrung significant gains from the resources you have invested in siasa.

    Yet, as your star shines its brightest, as you appear to tickle the Kikuyu electorate more than anybody since Kenneth Matiba, as your visage increasingly rises in national profile, ugly clouds are drifting in your direction.

    Tactical blunders will easily unravel everything you have invested in. Those singing your praises do not build you.

    Often they want to ride your train to their destinations. A daunting task before you is this Gema thing.

    We all saw the emotional outpouring at Limuru and the solid endorsement you received from notables. But proceed with caution.

    Although the Kikuyu community and, by extension, Gema, has provided two of our three presidents since independence, Kenya has never had a Gema president. How do I mean?

    At independence, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta was a leader of the nationalist party Kanu.

    He coalesced the main progressive forces blending the heroism of Mau Mau, the organisational skills of Tom Mboya and the raw energies of Oginga Odinga, among others, to present credible leadership as opposed to the colonial comprador called Kadu that was designed, financed and organised by the settler elite.

    Mzee did not set out as a candidate of the Kikuyu. He stroked that constituency for Kanu after winning leadership of the national party.

    At the start of this millennium, as the opposition made its most concerted effort at a common front, Mwai Kibaki was brought forward into leadership of the fledgling NAK alliance, not as a Kikuyu candidate, but as the consensus leader between those taming their ambitions in order to win power.

    At the time he was not even necessarily the most popular politician in central Kenya. To date Kibaki has never been endorsed as a Kikuyu or Gema candidate.

    Kenyans can have a leader from any community. But they do not embrace one presented to them as a candidate of a community.

    Indeed Limuru frightened a lot of non-Gema viewers as they witnessed a group of notables frantically engineering emotional nexus for binding them together in a way that throws a cordon around them.

    It had the same effect that the many oaths your people tend to take in times of anxiety triggers among the other communities.

    The legacy of Gema presents you with a problem that has been long in the making. Central Kenya has a well developed business leadership and a very under-developed political leadership.

    The moment in the early seventies when they elevated successful businessmen to define and popularise the community agenda, the Gema wazee basically subordinated political skills to money-making skills.

    The drought around you today as the independence generation retires and expires is a direct consequence.

    If you look at your suitors in Limuru, they should frighten you. Some announce that a bus is waiting for you and then shift to ask you for a bus for them to get into.

    Others promise you harvests beyond the yields of their fields. Yet others construct a popular history that easily falls short of our collective memory.

    They are not building you my friend. They want you to build them. After Limuru, few of the friends you traverse the country with believe that your community can rally around anybody other than their own.

    Your travails with ICC have built you an empathetic constituency with significant bonds of emotion.

    Always remember how fickle such a following is. It may help you not to over-ride this horse. There are a lot of positives in you that can replace the message of prayer rallies.

    Listen to people who tell you uncomfortable truths, they are more important to your future than those choruses of hypocrites that will praise the king’s cloths (nakedness). You will miss the services of Mutula Kilonzo.

    The writer is a director of the Kenya Institute of Governance. mkituyi@kigafrica.com

  • lets not bury our heads in the sand .uhuru may have benefited from ill wealth, but who is clean? don’t pretend your fathers would have done the same or even worse. even your angel( raila) corrupted his way into possessing molasses plant ,beside his elder brother now trafficking drugs.we know where all this hate leads to. (42 against one) raila’s rallying calling in 2007) round hii hamtoboi.if uhuru benefited did all Kikuyu benefit.reason for once and learn to work hard . jealousy wont take you to heaven

  • Igram Iglorious

    Kenya police, have their hands still tightly tied behind their back (Ref: the Commish and the CID chief) in the matter of the hacker, but not so in the case of Matsanga’s complaint. Maina Kiai anf Prof. Mutua were contacted by police officers regarding a complaint made presumably by Matsanga’s lawyer that they were interfering with ICC witnesses, and have defamed him through articles in the Daily Nation Newspaper.
    Usually any paper that publishes such articles should also be accused in the complaint. But here it seems it is not. Also noteworthy is Kenya police now deal with defamation cases which is always handled by lawyers and courts.
    The police officers, one Mr. Kariuki and one Ms. Rop have kindly provided their private e-mail addresses to the accused, Kiai and Mutua.
    It’s also interesting that the same officers are dealing with the hacking case. This gives us much hope that the case will be cracked soon.
    However, the M-Pesa or bank a/c numbers of the officers were not indicated. So it can be safely assumed that they are not after ‘chai’.
    Oh, Good Lord, when will you give us a police force?
    ======
    An international arrest warrant should be out immediately if the ICC is serious in curbing attempts to scuttle its programmes. He may hide in Kenya, Sudan, China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, and he will remain hidden for ever. Museveni may even charter a plane to take him to the Hague if he dare set foot in Uganda, his mother country, after the warrant is out.

    A Like Reply 12 hours ago 0 Like F

  • Imanyara says ‘willing to die’ after night ordeal
    By ALPHONCE SHIUNDU
    Posted Wednesday, April 18 2012 at 10:58

    Imenti Central MP Gitobu Imanyara has recounted to a shocked Parliament chilling details of a night ordeal where he says he was accosted by four thugs.

    Mr Imanyara said the goons forced him pledge support to a leading presidential aspirant during the 11.30pm incident, which happened at State House Crescent Tuesday night.

    He told stunned MPs that he was coerced into saying “Uhuru tuko pamoja” (Uhuru we are together) three times and told to swear facing Mount Kenya.

    “I am willing to die, but will not accept a situation, where any Member will direct how I will think and who I will associate with,” he said.

    The slogan is the rallying cry of supporters belonging to Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, who has indicated his intention to succeed President Kibaki as Kenya’s fourth president.

    In Parliament, Mr Imanyara said the thugs also asked him not to attend the controversial Limuru 2B rally, whose organisers say was aimed at bringing together Kenyans from all regions to champion non-tribal alliances ahead of the General Election.

    Police cancelled the meeting on grounds that youth planned to cause mayhem.

    “I will not be party to any attempts to compartmentalise me or some parts of this region to think in a certain way,” he said.

    “Security being a major consumer issue, one hopes that police will investigate the matter as soon as the MP reports the complaint.”

    Internal Security assistant minister Orwa Ojobe promised to get to the bottom of the matter and urged MPs to “use their bodyguards”.

    “I want to tell MPs that you are safe,” he said.

  • 5 Reasons Uhuru Kenyatta May Not Be Next President!
    18/04/2012 21:33:00 Jamhuri Team

    In prayer meetings in Kenya thousands will flock to hear Uhuru. If you go to any gathering of Kenyans abroad who follow Kenya politics the name Uhuru Kenyatta is bound to be mentioned. For Uhuru to become the 4th President of Kenya he has an uphill battle. The first thing toward becoming President is getting in the presidential ballot about 45 days before elections. “Uhuru will not qualify because of the ICC case!“ Kenya based human rights lawyer Njonjo Njue told us during his visit to Boston. However if he were to qualify to win the Presidency one would have to win 50% plus one or the highest 2 percentages to be in the run-off. In the run-off one would have to win 50% plus one. Looking at the requirements it is indeed true, Uhuru Kenyatta, can become President but he may have to find a way to overcome the following 5 reasons that may limit him from becoming the Presidenct of Kenya 2012/3.

    1. International Crime Court -ICC case

    When the case of Uhuru was confirmed by a 2 to 1 ruling by the ICC judges it meant he had an international criminal case filed against him. If Uhuru were on the ballot and he won the Presidency, Constitution Article 143. “(1) Criminal proceedings shall not be instituted or continued in any court against the President or a person performing the functions of that office, during their tenure of office,” would automatically suspend the ICC case. Kenyans can indeed decide to suspend the case with their vote. However, his words even though well chosen when he resigned as finance minister “The Ministry of Finance deals with very sensitive issues that affect the lives of millions of Kenyans and therefore requires maximum attention. I am not one to juggle the affairs of such an important portfolio with the baseless mob lynch mentality that is being orchestrated in some quarters.“ Unless he finds a way to get this case closed or found Not Guilty, the case could beat him and put him from getting on the ballot.

    2. 500,000 Acres

    The 500,000 acres recorded as wealth by Forbes Magazine and which have led to the statement of “Uhuru has land equivalent to the size of Nyanza when IDPs are living in camps.” With those determined to use this wealth against Uhuru, he may have an uphill battle if the Internal Displaced Persons IDPs are conviced that Uhuru does not care for them. Once the tone of campaign is upped these wealth that he inherited could indeed defeat him especially if it is used to sub-divide the Kikuyu’s between the Mau Mau descendants who did not benefit with land and those who benefitted with land.

    3. $500 million or Kshs 40 billion Wealth

    When Forbes recorded Uhuru Kenyatta as worth $500 million which is today interpreted as Kshs 40 billion he was posted as the person with money. This will also work against him as the campaign continues as he will be expected to pay every bill. Having assets valued at Kshs 40 billion and having the assets generating income for one are two different things. Uhuru assets may not necessary be generating millions every day. Without a constant supply of cash or a well thought out strategy he could find himself without ready cash and this would mean a sudden deep in popularity if he is unable to pay for campaign expenditure.

    4. Kikuyu factor

    Uhuru Kenyatta starts at a disadvantage this time around since there is a feeling in the country right now that the Kikuyu have occupied the top seat for 25 years and the Kalenjins for 24 years and it is time to have other tribes. A challenge of GEMA by the youth and other leaders shows that to keep the Kikuyu block vote will also be a challenge. With strong candidates like Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka a Kamba, Musalia Mudavadi a Luyha, Raila Odinga a Lou, this time around all 5 major tribes in Kenya Kikuyu, Luyha, Kalenjin, Lou and Kamba intend to have their candidate on the presidential ballot. For Uhuru to win his strategy would be to win the 1st or 2nd position which if all presidential candidates stay and he gets the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru vote as a block would mean he is in the run-off. The question becomes who would win in: a Uhuru verses Mudavadi run-off?; a Uhuru verses Odinga run-off?; or a Uhuru verses Kalonzo run-off?

    5. Development Record & Leadership Acumen

    Uhuru Kenyatta is now a political leader for 10 years. His record will be asked for and his Gatundu background paraded for all to see. He also is serving as Deputy Prime Minister and has served as Minister of Finance. During his time as Minister of Finance the shilling depreciated to its worst possible rate in Kenya history to exchange at a record high of Kshs 107. Many will note that took the ministry when the shilling was exchanging to the dollar at the kshs 70’s when he became minister and left when it was in the Kshs 80’s. Supporters will note that during this tenure as Minister of Finance he oversaw the creation of Infrastructure bonds that raised funds for infrastructure development. As he moves forward and looks for the support of the business sector, his leadership style in the past especially when he was in Finance ministry will also be in the campaign trail. His chances of capturing the state house will be improved and diminished by the last 10 years of his leadership.

  • GEMA and Ethnocentrism-Strategy that May Not Favor Uhuru Kenyatta
    BY FR JOACHIM OMOLO OUKO, AJ
    NAIROBI-KENYA
    MONDAY, MARCH 26, 2012

    Endorsement of Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta for president by the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (Gema) was not well received by some Meru MPs, not because Uhuru is a bad leader but because the move has taken ethnocentric line.

    Originally Gema was seen as vehicles to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru communities. It was also to promote education, welfare, the spirit of brotherhood among the communities and to preserve their cultural heritage.

    The association became more attractive to the communities when it set up a Child Welfare Fund to help orphans and destitute children. Young people were lured into it through the formation of Gema football clubs.

    Even though its first office bearers were dominated by Gikuyu prominent politicians such as Julius Kiano, Minister for Local Government as its chairman, Mwai Kibaki, Minister for Finance, Economic Planning and Development, treasurer, Jomo Kenyatta, patron, the Embu and Meru were only given two positions, that is Jeremiah Nyagah, Minister for Information and Jackson Angaine, Minister for Lands and Settlement.

    The Embu and Meru began to see light during the 1970s when Gema was widely associated with moves to change the constitution of Kenya in an attempt to prevent the, then Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi, not only from gaining automatic succession if president Kenyatta became indisposed, but because that president was meant to come from Gikuyu community.

    Mr. Kihika Kimani who made the call for constitutional change was seen by Embu and Meru communities as hijacking the association from them to Gikuyu. Other prominent Gikuyu members who dominated the association included Njenga Karume and Njoroge Mungai.

    When Mzee Kenyatta died in his sleep in 1978, Attorney General Charles Njonjo who was ordered by President Kenyatta to register the association in 1971 convened a Cabinet meeting in which it was resolved that the presidency would go to Gema.

    Although kingpins such as Koinange, Mungai, and Angaine had been seen as possible candidates to succeed Kenyatta, the whole idea was still that it must be occupied by Gikuyu.

    In 1980, months after Moi ascending to power, the association was banned, along with other groups perceived to have been ethnic-based. It is, however, believed to have continued to function under the guise of Agricultural and Industrial Holdings Ltd.

    The association was revived in 2003, when President Kibaki came to power, though in a different outlook: Gema Cultural Association with its chairman retired Methodist bishop Lawi Imathiu assisted by retired ACK Bishop Peter Njenga.

    This is not the first time the Gikuyu elite have used other ethnic communities to achieve their political interests. Months of formal partnership between Kanu and Kadu Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya were used from Luo community for similar interest.

    Paul Ngei had to break from Kanu to form the African People’s party when the Mboya group in Kanu challenged his leadership of the Kamba people. The threat was however, that if other political parties, associations or movements were formed it would weaken the Kenyatta’s hidden political ambitions. Kadu for that matter was a threat.

    Kanu was predominantly Luo and Kikuyu party. Kadu on the other hand was formed specifically to federate the Kalenjin political alliance, the Maasai United Front, the Kenya African People’s party, the Coast African political Union, and the Somali National Association before it attracted other minority ethnic groups.

    Had these movements survived Kenyatta would have been removed from power during presidential election. British settlers supported the small tribes against Gikuyu and Luo for the reason that if one of the small tribesmen took over presidency their properties, including land were safe.

    Kenyatta and other Gikuyu elites could not wait to see this happen because grabbing the land from the British settlers was one of the main agenda. It explains why Gema became associated with land buying companies through which they acquired huge chunks of land around the country, especially at the Coast and in Rift Valley.

    They took most of the land previously owned by the former white settlers, which had initially been earmarked for resettling those who had been turned into squatters by the colonial land policies.

    One of the most famous land buying companies was Gema Holdings. Most of the people including retired President Moi and his former Vice President, Mwai Kibaki who had considerable political influence in the Kenyatta regime, were given the opportunity to buy as much land as they could.

    That is why when chaos erupted in the Rift Valley shortly after the controversial 2007 Presidential vote tally, the land question became the bone of contention. Kenyatta led a pack of ministers MPs and civil servants in getting plots, mainly in Rift Valley.

    Politicians with power and money as well as businessmen with liquid cash managed to acquire thousands of acres. For instance, hardly a year into Kenyatta’s regime, Mama Ngina bought 1,006 acres in Dandora from Messrs Hendrik Rensburg for Sh200, 000.

    In the same area, Peter Muigai Kenyatta bought for Sh51, 000 some 700 acres and a further 1266 acres North East of Nairobi for Sh87, 000. Mr Kenyatta also paid Sh45, 000 to acquire 100 acres in Dandora as a “Trustee for minor son Uhuru.”

    Former President Daniel arap Moi had by 1964 bought 2,344 acres in Kampi-ya-Moto for Sh60, 000. Mr Kenyatta’s right hand man, Minister of State Mbiyu Koinange, also bought 645 acres in Limuru for Sh497, 000 among others.

    First Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga appears not to have bought land using his name but did so under the Luo Thrift and Trading Company. In 1964 he bought 394 acres from the estate of B.H. Patel in Miwani and a further 401 acres in 1965 from C. Patel for Sh255, 000.

    Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was convinced only Kanu could unite Kenyans. He was the leader of the elected members of Legislative Council (Legico). He took the floor of the house and maintained there would be no independence without Kenyatta and Kanu.

    It was only later on that Oginga admitted he calculated falsely that merger of Kadu and Kanu, far from strengthening the party, introduced dangerously divisive policies and forces into Kanu’s policy from within.

    It is against the background that Gema is now using G7, PNU-Alliance among other parties to make sure that after Kibaki the power must go back to them. It explains why former Thika County Council chairman, Francis Wakahia was quoted to have said that: “Tukuenda ruuri rucoke mukaro na nowe tu ungihota” (we want the river to return to its original course and you are the only person capable of doing this). (Standards, January 28, 2002).

    It explains further why according to Limuru MP Peter Mwathi, any Kikuyu politician who doesn’t support Uhuru Kenyatta will fall ill, some of whom include former Cabinet minister Joseph Kamotho who refused to support Uhuru during his address meeting in Murang’a.

    According to the MP Njenga Karume fell ill because he was installed a Kikuyu elder contrary to the traditions and against wishes of respected elders who had installed Uhuru as their “king”.

    The Gema believe that within the G7 Alliance that brings together Mr Kenyatta, fellow ICC suspect William Ruto, Saboti MP Eugene Wamalwa, Matuga MP Chirau Mwakwere and other putative community leaders would be a force to bar Prime Minister Raila Odinga from becoming the president. With this number Gema is convinced Uhuru will get it to State House.

    Nigerian Catholic bishop Albert Obiefuna was right to say during the first African Synod assemblies that in Africa, the blood of family, clan and tribe is thicker than the water of baptism that is why Christians or even Muslims for that matter are able to fight each other.

    This was already seen in Rwanda in 1959 when bishop Perraudin in his famous Lenten pastoral letter saw the ethnic problem in Rwanda as the source of the social injustices. More so when the bishops of Rwanda in 1992 wrote: “Rwanda will never know peace if Hutu, Tutsi and Twa do not understand and accept each other as equal.

    Two years later the bishops came to realize that the core of the problem was the ethnic antagonisms following the 1994 genocide. Ethnicity in itself is not bad-it only becomes a problem when it takes the form of ethnocentrism or tribalism, like Gema, G7 or other tribal alliances.

    People for Peace in Africa (PPA)
    P O Box 14877
    Nairobi
    00800, Westlands
    Kenya

  • RACE 2012
    Does Uhuru have what it takes?
    BY OTSIENO NAMWAYA – July 7, 2011

    It is forever going to be a matter of conjecture as to whether Uhuru Kenyatta would have been a better choice for Head of State than Mwai Kibaki in 2002. For, clearly, the young Uhuru was partly a victim of anti – Moi sentiments, and thus anti – Moi protest vote, in that poll. That is not in any way meant to discount the weight of some factors that played out, including that he was the scion of Kenya’s founding Head of State, Jomo Kenyatta, who was himself guilty of a litany of national ills. But the more legitimate reason advanced by his opponents was that he was far too naïve politically to be trusted with a job so important as the presidency. Uhuru was a new face in public office, literally being shepherded around by former President Daniel Moi, and with no track record against which he could be objectively assessed – so it was impossible to answer the question of whether he was indeed a better choice than Kibaki.

    But with the benefit of hindsight, and with full knowledge of what the Kibaki presidency is like, it would now appear reasonable to attempt to confront that question. Uhuru Kenyatta, now 51 with a wealth of experience in government, is no longer the same Uhuru of 2002 whose only claim to public duty was that he had been nominated to parliament by Moi in 1999 and propelled to prominence systematically later on. Other than being the Deputy Prime Minister and minister for Finance, Uhuru has also served as minister for Local Government and leader of the official opposition. Uhuru, by virtue of being linked to Kememe FM, K24 TV station and The People Newspaper, aside from being the chairman of his late fathers’ sprawling business empire, can now also be described as an investor of no mean repute.
    It means therefore that, should he make good his threat to give another stub at race for the presidency next year, and should personality and tribal politics give way to issue based politics, then there is a solid basis upon which we can assess how his presidency is likely to be, and thus whether he is the right person to deal with the numerous challenges that face the country today. The yardstick against which his candidature is to be measured is already laid out – his ability to tackle the challenges facing the country today. These challenges include corruption, which is the biggest problem of our time, followed closely with tribalism and feelings of marginalization. It must be noted however that feelings of ethnic marginalization also go hand in hand with sentiments about ethnic domination.

    The report released this year by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission titled The Ethnic Composition of the Civil Service will show that these grievances about ethnic domination are not entirely unfounded. On the other hand, his ability can be discerned from his record since 1999 when Moi first thrust him to the public.
    The question then is whether, in view of his record in government to this day, Uhuru is the answer to Kenya’s problems. There are many challenges, but let us limit our assessment of Uhuru to just two – his demonstrated ability to fight corruption and deal with blatant tribalism in the public sector today. But a few things ought to be pointed out here. First, to be fair to Uhuru, the existent tribalism in the country is a product of the skewed sectarian policies – or lack of it – perpetrated by Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi and now Mwai Kibaki. The only issue would be whether Uhuru has what it takes not just to perform better than his father did but to redress the challenges the country faces today. It is notable that Uhuru is yet to show sensitivity to the general feeling that most of the problems – corruption and tribalism in particular – that the country faces today are traceable to his father’s failed policies that included unbridled acquisitiveness and cronyism. That is already a bad sign. It might suggest that, as president, he might be keener on protecting his fathers’ name than acknowledging where the mistakes have been. It might even suggest that Uhuru is actually proud of his father’s legacy and therefore might be tempted to govern the way his father did, or even go a step better.

    That sets the first yardstick against which we must measure Uhuru. It is worth noting that Uhuru has not been conscious, as a leader keen on becoming president of Kenya, with regard to the question of tribalism. This is not about the fact that the charges Uhuru faces at the International Criminal Court include inciting his ethnic community, the Kikuyu, against other communities – for that is a matter yet to be determined. But it is regard to the simple things that test his sensibilities as a leader. If it is true, for example, that Uhuru actually acknowledges tribalism as a challenge the country faces today, and knowing that Uhuru has a majority stake in K24, how would it be that his media company shows little sensitivity to that fact?

    For, all the outlets of Mediamax Ltd, which include Kameme FM, The People and K24 TV and which are owned by Uhuru, have a staff portfolio that makes nonsense of the recent public pronouncements by Uhuru about the need to fight tribalism. Has Uhuru ever taken time to look at the staffing question at this media house that he owns? If he has, how does he feel when a TV station associated with him, for example, parades a list of managers, reporters, anchors and support staff that is all from one community in a country that has 42 communities? How does he feel to know that, in fact, that station is broadcasting on frequencies irregularly acquired from the national broadcaster, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, and that not a shilling has been paid for the frequencies to this day? On the basis of this alone, therefore, Uhuru is incapable of tackling Kenya’s tribal question if elected as president. If anything, he might make it worse than it already is – just as bad as it is on K24 where the only qualification for recruitment is ones’ ethnic identity.
    The situation does not look any better with regard to the second question of whether Uhuru can tackle the question of corruption. His record at both the ministry of Local Government or even during his tenure as the Deputy Prime Minister or as the minister for Finance is worrying, if not depressing.

    While at the ministry of local government in 2008, Uhuru can be remembered for ignoring the law on the nomination of political parties, replacing the councilors nominated by the then opposition ODM and coming up with his own list. That is dangerous in many, but more importantly is that failure to respect the law is the genesis for corruption. But that was not all. As soon as Uhuru moved to the ministry of Finance in 2009, there was a surprising budget error of Ksh10 billion. Although he insisted that it was a computer and was cleared by the parliamentary committee on Finance of any wrong doing, it has since emerged that all the ministry top brass were aware of the error even before it went to parliament. What that might mean is that someone senior in the ministry was hoping that parliament would fail to notice the excess of Ksh10 billion on the budget and thus pocket it – that is the only way to explain it. It should be noted that this was the first such budget error since independence 47 years ago.

    But, again, that was not all. Last year, it emerged that the ministry of Finance had under reported on what the tax collected by the Kenya Revenue Authority by a whopping Ksh105 billion. While KRA clearly showed what it had collected the previous financial year and backed it with records of remittance to the ministry of Finance, the ministry’s records of what it had received from the tax man were Ksh105 less. To this day that matter has not been addressed and Uhuru, as the Finance minister, is at the centre of it. It should be noted again that this is the first time in history that the ministry and KRA are engaged in such a tussle. Besides, this year’s budget has been replete with a lot of budget errors like never before. Soon after the budget was read in early June, an anti corruption civil society organization, Mars Group, cited an error of up to Ksh89 billion. The government, and Uhuru in particular, are yet to respond decisively to this alarming issue. A few weeks later, it emerged that there was an extra Ksh5 billion carefully hidden in the budget under the vote on defense, which is usually barely scrutinized owing to claims that it can endanger national security. This, again, is the first time such mischief is being noticed in the national budget and Uhuru has not been able to respond to it despite speculation that all these errors are “deliberate”, as individuals in government attempt to outdo each other in raising finances for next year’s election campaigns.

    There are also those who would take issue with the way Uhuru handled the two reports showing corruption in government. Despite an audit in the Free Primary Education Fund showing that up to Ksh4.6 billion was basically stolen, Uhuru seemed to emphasise the fact that the amount constituted just one percent of the entire budget for free primary education. Besides, Uhuru was accompanied at the press conference where he released the report by the minister for Education, Prof Sam Ongeri, who himself has questions to answer. The second report Uhuru hinted at was that of corruption in the World Bank funded Arid Lands Resource Management Project, and he attempted to emphasise the word “preliminary” more than the fact that funds had been stolen. Since then the ministry of Finance has gone mum, at times appearing to side with the culprits.

    Against this background therefore, the verdict on Uhuru is that he will not fight corruption in government should he become president after next year’s elections. It means then that, on all counts of corruption and ethnicity or tribalism, Uhuru scores very poorly and, thus, should these issues be the basis upon which the country should select the next Head of State, then Uhuru should not even be on the cards for consideration as a serious contender. But this is Kenya, and therefore other considerations other than his ability to deliver on the main issues of the day might come into play.

    Publishef by Media Centre for Africa

  • THE PARADOX OF UHURU’S POWER .
    Friday, 20 April 2012 23:51 BY JOE ADAMA

    DPM is not the traditional power-behind-the-throne, neither is he the historical ‘grey eminence’ nor a primus inter pares, yet he influences and manipulates policy in President Kibaki’s final phase at State House with much more clout than these categories of previous power players put together . . .

    Not since the “Total Man” phenomenon of Nicholas Biwott during the Moi era has a figure outside the presidency exercised as much clout as Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta now undoubtedly wields over the final phase of Mwai Kibaki’s two-term stint at State House.

    Kenyans have seen Presidential powerbrokers come and go, beginning with the prototypes that surrounded Uhuru’s own father, founder-President Jomo Kenyatta – Tom Mboya, Mbiyu Koinange, Dr Njoroge Mungai and Charles Njonjo. But none of them, not even “Total Man”, wanted to be President as badly as the DPM does. Mboya was gunned down on suspicion of merely hankering after the position and being superbly equipped to go for it in a situation where Kenyatta was no longer at the helm for whatever reason. Mungai was highly suspected of eying State House for himself and Njonjo was actually accused and investigated over the same long after the prize had passed to Daniel Moi, but cleared and pardoned.

    DPM’s Unique Niche

    Uhuru has wanted to be President since at least the time 10 years ago when Kibaki was incoming. Today, as the drama of the Kibaki succession races towards one of the greatest climaxes of Kenyan political history, Uhuru occupies an unprecedentedly complex and powerful position in our politics. He stands accused of crimes against humanity at The Hague and yet is able to influence, among many other things, a Cabinet reshuffle, a gathering of Gema at the highly controversial Limuru II Conference and the series of “prayer meeting” rallies around the country that is shaping the General Election campaign in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley.

    Both Limuru II and the follow-up GCA-GEMA meeting at the Landmark/Jacaranda Hotel of the late regional elder and powerbroker Njenga Karume endorsed the DPM as the region’s political supremo and preferred Presidential candidate.

    Unlike all other Presidential powerbrokers before him, Uhuru is not exactly the traditional “power behind the throne”, which is normally an aide, a spouse, a minister or even groupings like the Kenyatta era “Kiambu Mafia” and the Moi era “Rift Valley Mafia”. Uhuru appears to be parallel to the throne, not standing behind it and whispering into the king’s ear. The way Uhuru sets and manipulates policy in Kibaki’s final months on the job circumvents the offices of Prime Minister, Vice President and Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet.

    He is also different from the historical éminence grise (French for “grey eminence”), whose role is secret and unofficial, the proverbial Hidden Hand. Uhuru operates in plain sight, in the public domain, residing in what is virtually an extension of State House grounds. And, as he made clear at The Hague, he actually grew up at State House. But so did Gideon Moi but he enjoys no political clout outside the husk of former ruling party Kanu.

    Unlike Biwott and Njonjo in their respective heyday, Uhuru is not a primus inter pares (Greek for “first among equals” or “first among peers”). He has no equal. He is the nearest thing that the Mt. Kenya region comes to political royalty, a contradiction in terms but the most proximate way to describe Uhuru’s niche.

    Uhuru and his mother, the first First Lady, Mama Ngina Kenyatta, appear to exercise an enormous influence over President Kibaki, the man who, when he was incoming, hit Uhuru like an express train at the 2002 transition General Election, but who now bends over backwards to accommodate the Kenyattas in their hour of greatest need (the ICC case) since the 1950s.

    Not even operatives like Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka and National Security Minister George Saitoti, respectively Kibaki’s third and final Vice-President and the longest serving Kenyan VP ever, hold a candle to the kind of influence Uhuru has over the President’s final months in office. What’s more, the DPM conducts himself with regard to these two figures, who have also declared their Presidential ambitions, as if they were surplus to the requirements of his own spectacular bid to succeed Kibaki.

    Uhuru’s hour of most extreme need is grim indeed. It is unfolding under the supervision of the Mediator of the Kenyan peace process, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who is also the peacemaker of the ongoing implosion of Syria and the worldwide icon of the 21st Century’s paradigm of the responsibility to protect, the global village good-neighbourhood impulse to intervene in internal conflicts. Annan is currently engaged in staring down one of the world’s last would-be totalitarian dictators, President Bashar Hafez al-Assad, son of the late Hafez al-Assad.

    Being on Annan’s agenda, as Uhuru most definitely is, in a process that is being overseen and evaluated by a team of African Eminent Persons that includes Graca Machel, whose companion Nelson Mandela named Jomo Kenyatta as one of his earliest role models during his first visit to Kenya after his release from 27 years of incarceration in February 1990, is being in very hot soup internationally indeed – until further notice.

    There was a time, perhaps up to as recently as 15 years ago, when the widow of Jomo Kenyatta and the companion of Nelson Mandela could have met privately and decided to rescue Jomo’s first-born son with Ngina from a process such as the ongoing ICC process, acting far behind closed doors. But the world has changed so much that many such a power-brokering pact has become the stuff of exposure by investigative journalism, adversarial politicking and Internet blogging long before they bore the desired fruit.

    The Responsibility-to-Protect Factor

    The responsibility to protect (abbreviated in two ways as RtoP and R2P) was developed in 2005, the year, in Kenya, of the first ever national referendum, on a new constitution, and a time when Uhuru and Ruto were on the same page, politically speaking, leading the No vote against Kibaki’s leadership of the Yes vote. The R2P is a still emergent and developing United Nations initiative. The R2P’s overriding principle is that sovereignty is not so much a privilege as a responsibility. R2P is dedicated to preventing, halting and punishing what it categorizes as Mass Atrocity Crimes – that is, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

    The R2P’s three pillars comprise the recognition that states have the responsibility to protect their populations from Mass Atrocity Crimes; the international community has the override responsibility of protecting populations whose states are unable to protect them or attack their own populations (as in the cases of Assad Jnr’s Syria and Gaddafi’s Libya); and intervention, when all other measures, for instance sanctions, fail, including military intervention (as in the case of Libya).

    Kenya is nowhere near the extreme cases of Libya and Syria and has not approached failed-state status even in the immediate aftermaths of its two greatest crises of the post-Independence era, the August 1, 1982 coup attempt against the then four-year-old Daniel arap Moi regime (which ruthlessly crushed the coup and lasted another 20 years) and the PEV of December-January 2007-08 directed against President Kibaki’s disputed re-election (the chief disputant was soon absorbed into the Executive and Kibaki is ruling to the end of his two-term stint). Kibaki and his Uhuru-compliant key handlers have seized on this subtle fact to strenuously resist the notion that the ICC has jurisdiction in the Kenya cases.

    Raila was in the mix in both crises, 25 years apart, as a key ideological supporter of the 1982 putsch (for which the Moi regime made him pay with nine years of on-again-off-again detention without trial) and as the main disputant of Kibaki’s re-election in 2007. Uhuru and Ruto and their key handlers and supporters could barely believe their ears when ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo fingered them as “bearing the greatest responsibility” for the PEV on December 15, 2010. As far as they were concerned, the PEV’s theme music was the mantra “No Raila, No Peace!”

    During the confirmation of charges hearings at The Hague, Uhuru told the ICC’s Pretrial Chamber II that the PM bears “political responsibility” for some of the PEV’s worst atrocities. From where the DPM’s and Ruto’s supporters stand, the ICC appears to not want to hear, much less consider, any such thing.

    So, what makes Uhuru tick? What fuel is he running on as he plays the role of the last major power-broker of the Kibaki era, for he is clearly not running on empty? Uhuru’s state of mind and deepest conviction must be based on something formulated very much like Professor Makau Mutua of the State University of New York’s Buffalo Law School and Chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission’s view when he recently observed that: “. . . Mr. Kenyatta is completely innocent of crimes against humanity. He hasn’t been tried, or convicted, by the International Criminal Court. In fact, the ICC may never try, let alone convict, him. If, and when, he’s tried, the International Criminal Court prosecutor will have to ‘prove beyond reasonable doubt’ that Mr. Kenyatta is guilty. We are a long way from there”.

    Prof. Mutua is no political friend of the DPM’s or Ruto’s. But that long way he talks of is fraught with pitfalls for both Uhuru and Ruto, and, come what may, they will one day look back on this period of their lives as perhaps the most trying.

    The Ruto Factor

    If Uhuru occupies an amazing place towards the end of the Kibaki Administration, then Ruto’s niche is also most intriguing. Ruto depends on Uhuru mainly for preferential access to the Presidency and the inner sanctums of the GEMA elite. Otherwise he is a power-brokering phenomenon in his own right, despite operating from the parliamentary backbench, as was clearly demonstrated by the meeting of Rift Valley Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) political, religious and cultural leaders on Tuesday this week at the St. Paul’s Cathedral Pastoral Centre, Eldoret, a gathering of 3,000 participants.

    Ruto has the most extraordinary hold over one of the largest vote blocs of any political operative bar Raila’s iron grip on Luo Nyanza. And, like Raila, he makes it look effortless, which is unlike the case with Uhuru, who appears to work extra hard to get Central Kenya to line up behind him to a man and a woman and to require wind assistance from the Presidency while at it. Where Limuru II emerged with the declaration to the effect that it would collect two million signatures, the Kamatusa leaders emerged from their own conference to announce that they would seek three million signatures to petition the ICC to avoid giving the impression that the Court is involved in any process of elimination of top candidates where the next Presidential poll in Kenya is concerned.

    Before the Kamatusa leadership met, a number of Ruto’s supporters had come out specifically to deny that their gathering would be a show of force designed to put Limuru II in the shade by engaging in one-upmanship, for instance demonstrating Ruto’s much more comfortable grip on his region than Uhuru’s. The one million more votes’ gambit over the more populous Mt. Kenya region’s two million would seem to suggest otherwise and to be a pointer to more divergence and differentiation in store in the near future.

    What the GEMA and Kamatusa declarations portend is still unclear, with some of Uhuru and Ruto’s most implacable enemies actually accusing them of laying the ground for a belated defiance of the ICC process while other sections of the political sector agree with them to the hilt.

    And then there are those who dismiss the content of whatever Uhuru and Ruto get up to in their roles as powerbrokers extraordinaire in the final phase of the Kibaki Presidency. And they are not necessarily political rivals – about a fortnight ago in Nairobi, German Ambassador Margit Hellwig-Boette appeared to speak for those who hold this perspective, telling a press conference that the most pressing agenda on Kenya’s political plate bar none is the full rolling out of the new Constitution and the creation of devolved government, making the counties run effectively. Everything else, she heavily implied, is a distraction from this mainstream unfinished business.

  • A Political Trial at the ICC? Why, of Course!
    Posted: 19/04/2012 17:10

    Imagine Nick Clegg is to stand trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against

    humanity. I appreciate some Huffington Post readers might see such a case as perfectly reasonable, but also imagine for a moment that the witnesses on which the case rests have been sourced and then coached by members of the Conservative Party. Imagine also the Chief Prosecutor of the case is Jeremy Kyle, a TV judge famous for dishing out on-air justice to the amusement of the masses. Does this all seem reasonable?

    Well, this case is actually taking place, but the man on trial is not our Nick but Uhuru Kenyatta, deputy prime minister of Kenya. For the Conservatives in this real-life parable, read the Orange Democratic Movement, the party of the current Kenyan premier Raila Odinga, a man who shares power with Kenyatta in a coalition government.

    And our media-friendly ringmaster is Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a man who, before being appointed ICC chief prosecutor was the finger-wagging star of a ludicrous show on Argentinian television called “La Corte del Pueblo”, or The People’s Court.

    Ocampo, who has counted footballer Diego Maradona among his clients, has been in the news of late because of the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga, a Congolese warlord. Yet this has been his only completed case since being handed the hallowed ICC post nine years ago – an abysmal record.

    Because of his failure, his publicity instincts have kicked in – up to a point. His recent call for the arrest of Joseph Kony (a Ugandan warlord whose Lord’s Resistance Army has been in decline for years) has helped publicly deflect most criticism of his methods. But the conclusion of the Lubanga case has exposed his office as running witness-sourcing and evidence-gathering operations that would not be admissible in a kangaroo court, let alone for a body expected to deliver the highest levels of international justice.

    At the Lubanga trial, Britain’s Justice Sir Adrian Fulford tore into Ocampo: decrying his preference for gathering witness statements for the prosecution by remote control; for using local intermediaries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to source witness statements subsequently co-drafted by the ICC; and for coaching witnesses prior to their appearance at trial.

    Fulford threw out many of Ocampo’s witness statements, warning that they were at best deeply flawed, due to the seemingly coercive methods through which they were sourced, and at worst the statements of perjurers. He also warned these intermediaries and even people working within Ocampo’s office they may be prosecuted for their actions.

    For his part, the ICC’s chief prosecutor has defended the gathering of evidence by proxy, saying (not unreasonably) that since the DRC is too dangerous for ICC officials to visit, the process had to be done locally.

    This may be the case in the badlands of the Congo, but Ocampo has employed precisely the same methods in gathering evidence for the Kenyatta case in Nairobi.

    Is Kenya similarly dangerous? Prince William thought not, when he chose to propose to the now

    Duchess of Cambridge on Kenya’s rolling grasslands. Or ask the Prada-clad armies of Chelsea and Cheshire who flock to the country every year in search of safari, wilderness, and their inner selves. Compare this with the dense jungle and dawn patrols of Congo, a country where tourism is only for the stout of heart, or the generally deranged.

    There is simply no personal, practical or legal reason why Ocampo and his inner circle could not have gathered witness statements directly, on the ground, in Kenya.

    Instead they used intermediaries – such as a local charity branded the “Kenya Human Rights

    Commission” and another organisation named the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights who were particularly helpful when it came to the witnesses. One of its Commissioners a Mr Omar Hassan it is alleged handily unearthed some of the main witness for the ICC’s prosecution. (One such witness, incidentally, has proven himself to be utterly unreliable, having changed his statement on no fewer than four occasions, including attempting once to retract his statement completely).

    Hassan’s good work has not gone unnoticed. He has since been appointed vice chairman of the Friends of Raila, an organisation working to elect Odinga to the Presidency in upcoming elections.

    Surely, you would think a witness who has changed his statement on multiple occasions, having been assisted by an intermediary whose intentions were so palpably political, should be dismissed by any reasonable provincial court, let alone the ICC.

    Yet the answer to that question would currently seem to be a resounding “No”. There is another player

    left to introduce in this twisting little tale: none other than our very own Foreign Office.

    Our boys over there, who have spent the past decade seeking to rewrite history from the wrong side of the fence, are chipping in the funding for the witness protection scheme for the Kenyan case. Millions of pounds of taxpayer money have been lavished on the ICC case by the Foreign Office. Britons are paying for the ICC’s chief witness to live a life of pleasant anonymity in the United States.

    The Foreign Office also seems to rather like Odinga, whose supporters have been so helpful sourcing witnesses. We have rolled out the red carpet for him on three separate official visits to Britain. Since 2007 he has met David Cameron, Gordon Brown and Prince Charles.

    Compare that to the number of official visits to the UK afforded to Mwai Kibaki, president of Kenya since 2002: none. We must like Odinga an awful lot.

    So what happens next? Many observers are muttering that the Kenyatta case may collapse given the way the evidence has been gathered. Ocampo’s disastrous tenure at the ICC ends in June, after which he will presumably return to Argentina to preside over more televisual gavel-bashing. Justice Fulford, considered by the international legal profession to be a class act, is meanwhile expected to return to Britain, to preside – or so it is rumoured – over Chris Huhne’s speeding trial.

    To borrow the old American political saying, one is left with the distinct impression that the Foreign Office has left us carrying a dead chicken around town. Britain has officially, and highly politically, opted to support the incumbent premier of an African state in an election he is unlikely to win. Our boys in the Foreign Office have also tied us to a case that even the ICC, it would appear, doesn’t believe in, thanks to the highly controversial methods of its chief prosecutor.

    Perhaps the Kenyan Foreign Office will retaliate and call for a trial of Nick Clegg and fund the witness protection scheme while members of the Conservative Party gather evidence against him. Jeremy Kyle could even preside. Don’t bet against it.

    Elliot Wilson is a British investigative journalist who writes for The Spectator, The Observer and other international publications

  • Extra-Judicial Executions lest we forget why Prof. Phillip Alston came to Kenya »
    Finance Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta has a duty to stop the payments that he exposed as fraudulent: It is time to admit failure of the fiduciary duty by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Joseph Kinyua, who is the Accounting Officer and custodian of Kenyan tax payer’s money.

    Feb 27th, 2009 by Mars Group Kenya

    Today, the 27th of February 2009, Joseph Kinyua, the Permanent Secretary in the Treasury and Accounting Officer at the Ministry of Finance knows that the Government has not cancelled the Irrevocable Promissory Notes on the Midland Finance deal.He is aware that no money was ever received by the Government of Kenya by his own admission to justify repayments. Kenya has had an opportunity to prove this Fraud by cooperating with the UK’s Serious Fraud Office, where they have identified Anglo Leasing beneficiaries, including the Midland deal.

    The PWC report has concurred with the findings of Kenya’s Controller and Auditor General that the Government of Kenya has never received money from Midland Finance and Securities Ltd and that the Government of Kenya does not Know who Midland Finance and Securities Ltd is.

    So, who did the Government of Kenya enter into this deal with? Who did the Attorney General, Amos Wako confirm was Midland Finance and Securities Ltd? How did Amos Wako confirm that money had been delivered to the Government of Kenya as stated in his legal Opinion? Wako in his legal opinion says “In my opinion the Credit has been fully authorized and signed and delivered on behalf of the buyer and is legally binding upon the buyer in accordance with its terms.”

    In Light of Mr. Kinyua’s admission and the commitment by the Attorney General, it is clear that we need the intervention and assistance of the International Community, and in particular the immediate cooperation with the UK’s Serious Fraud Office.

    The truth, Mr. Kinyua, will set you free!

    The Midland Deal:

    On 29th May 2003, less than 150 days after Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as President of the Republic of Kenya, and after his famous pledge that Corruption would cease to be a way of life in Kenya, “Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya and I call upon all those members of my government and public officers accustomed to corrupt practice to know and clearly understand that there will be no sacred cows under my government.” Mwai Kibaki 30 Dec 2002 his Government entered into contracts with “Ghosts” for fictitious credit loans to Kenya. The supply contracts are also fictitious. The Midland deal is one of 18 such scams.

    The Administration Police Telecommunications Network (2003):

    Midland Finance and Securities Limited, ostensibly of Geneva Switzerland, non-existent according to the Controller and Auditor General is the contracted financier in this agreement. It allegedly lent the Government of Kenya Euros 49.65 million (Ksh 4.4 billion). Even though no money was advanced to Kenya, the Government of Kenya issued to Midland Finance and Securities Limited, (36 Thirty Six) Irrevocable Promissory Notes Promissory Notes No. GOK/OP/ APTCN/01 to GOK/OP/APTCN/036. These 36 Irrevocable Promissory Notes were issued on May 29th 2003 and fell/fall due for payment in the following order.

    PROMISSORY NOTES ISSUED BY GOK ON 29TH MAY 2003

    TO MIDLAND FINANCE & SECURITIES LIMITED

    Promissory Note Date of Issue Date of Maturity Amount( Euros)

    1. GOK/OP/APTCN/01 29th May 2003 29th October 2003 2,536,000

    2. GOK/OP/APTCN/02 29th May 2003 29th October 2003 779,854

    3. GOK/OP/APTCN/03 29th May 2003 28th February 2004 2,536,000

    4. GOK/OP/APTCN/04 29th May 2003 28th February 2004 730,543

    5. GOK/OP/APTCN/05 29th May 2003 29th June 2004 2,536,000

    6. GOK/OP/APTCN/06 29th May 2003 29th June 2004 681,936

    7. GOK/OP/APTCN/07 29th May 2003 29th October 2004 2,536,000

    8. GOK/OP/APTCN/08 29th May 2003 29th October 2004 649,884

    9. GOK/OP/APTCN/09 29th May 2003 28th February 2005 2,536,000

    10. GOK/OP/APTCN/10 29th May 2003 28th February 2005 601,629

    11. GOK/OP/APTCN/11 29th May 2003 29th June 2005 2,536,000

    12. GOK/OP/APTCN/12 29th May 2003 29th June 2005 549,500

    13. GOK/OP/APTCN/13 29th May 2003 29th October 2005 2,536,000

    14. GOK/OP/APTCN/14 29th May 2003 29th October 2005 519,914

    15. GOK/OP/APTCN/15 29th May 2003 28th February 2006 2,536,000

    16. GOK/OP/APTCN/16 29th May 2003 28th February 2006 472,716

    17. GOK/OP/APTCN/17 29th May 2003 29th June 2006 2,536,000

    18. GOK/OP/APTCN/18 29th May 2003 29th June 2006 422,700

    19. GOK/OP/APTCN/19 29th May 2003 29th October 2006 2,536,000

    20. GOK/OP/APTCN/20 29th May 2003 29th October 2006 389,944

    21. GOK/OP/APTCN/21 29th May 2003 28th February 2007 2,536,000

    22. GOK/OP/APTCN/22 29th May 2003 28th February 2007 343,803

    23. GOK/OP/APTCN/23 29th May 2003 29th June 2007 2,536,000

    24. GOK/OP/APTCN/24 29th May 2003 29th June 2007 295,900

    25. GOK/OP/APTCN/25 29th May 2003 29th October 2007 2,536,000

    26. GOK/OP/APTCN/26 29th May 2003 29th October 2007 259,974

    27. GOK/OP/APTCN/27 29th May 2003 28th February 2008 2,536,000

    28. GOK/OP/APTCN/28 29th May 2003 28th February 2008 214,889

    29. GOK/OP/APTCN/29 29th May 2003 29th June 2008 2,536,000

    30. GOK/OP/APTCN/30 29th May 2003 29th June 2008 170,509

    31. GOK/OP/APTCN/31 29th May 2003 29th October 2008 2,536,000

    32. GOK/OP/APTCN/32 29th May 2003 29th October 2008 130,004

    33. GOK/OP/APTCN/33 29th May 2003 28th February 2009 2,536,000

    34. GOK/OP/APTCN/34 29th May 2003 28th February 2009 85,976

    35. GOK/OP/APTCN/35 29th May 2003 29th June 2009 2,538,000

    36. GOK/OP/APTCN/36 29th May 2003 29th June 2009 42,300

    The Irrevocable Promissory Notes were supported by a legal opinion dated 17th June 2003 from the Attorney General, Amos Wako, who states that each Promissory Note is valid, binding and enforceable as hereunder

    Legal Opinion of the Attorney-General of Kenya

    1. As Attorney-General and Principal Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Kenya, I am requested to give an opinion to the effect that the Supplies Credit Financial Agreement for Nationwide Dedicated Digital Multi channel Security Systems Telecommunications Network has been duly authorized or ratified by and signed and delivered on behalf of the Republic of Kenya and is legally binding according to its terms.

    2. I have considered such documents including laws as I have deemed necessary for the purpose of the opinion expressed herein and the following in particular: –

    (a) A document described as the Supplies Credit Financial Agreement for Nationwide Dedicated Digital Multi channel Security Systems Telecommunications Network dated 29th May 2003 made between the Government of the Republic of Kenya -(the Buyer’) and Midland Finance and Securities Limited (the Seller) in respect of Credit amounting to EUROS 49,650,000 (FORTY-NINE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EUROS).

    (b) A document described as a Contract Agreement for Nationwide Dedicated Digital Multi channel Security Systems Telecommunications Network.

    (C) Promissory Notes No. GOK/OP/APTCN/01 to GOK/OP/APTCN/036

    (d) The External Loans and Credits Act Chapter 422 of the Laws of Kenya

    (e) The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya

    3. In my opinion the Credit has been fully authorized and signed and delivered on behalf of the buyer and is legally binding upon the buyer in accordance with its terms.

    4. I set out in the paragraphs following the reasons by reference to which I have formed the opinion herein.

    The External Loans and Credits -Act Chapter 422 of the Laws of Kenya empowers the Buyer under agreements or other written instruments, to borrow or obtain sums, in

    Currencies other than Kenyan currency from any other person or government, upon such terms and conditions as to interest, repayment or otherwise and in such manner as the Minister responsible for Finance may think fit.

    The Act further provides that all sums so obtained shall be expended only on purposes for which provision is made in the estimates of expenditure approved by Parliament and that no such goods or services shall be purchased on credit under the Act except such as are required for purposes for which provision is made as aforesaid.

    The Act further provides that the Minister or any person specially authorized by him in writing in that behalf may execute such agreements or instruments as may be required in connection with the Act.

    5. The Government is thus empowered to obtain Credit without prior approval of Parliament, the only statutory procedure involving Parliament being that the money obtained be expended only on purposes for which provision is made in the estimates of Expenditure approved by Parliament.

    6. The Agreement was signed for and on behalf of the Buyer by MR. JOSEPH MBUI MAGARI, PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE as authorized
    by HON.DAVID MWIRARIA the Minister in charge of Finance in the Government of the Buyer.

    7. By virtue of Section 99 of the Constitution of Kenya, all revenues or other moneys raised or received for purposes of the Government of Kenya are paid into and form the Consolidated Fund from which no money can be withdrawn except as may be authorized by the Constitution or by an Act of Parliament (including the Appropriation Act) or by a vote on account passed by the National Assembly under Section 101 of the Constitution.

    .

    8. In my opinion therefore: –

    (a) The BUYER has the power to enter into this AGREEMENT and has taken all necessary actions which are required for the execution, delivery and performance of the AGREEMENT,

    (b) The Buyer has duly obtained all approval consents and authorisations and has duly effected any other declarations filings or registration with any Government authority or agency which are required or appropriate in connection with the execution delivery and performance within the Republic of Kenya.

    9. As at the date of this opinion all the statutory provisions quoted herein are ill force and effect as part of the Laws of Kenya.

    GIVEN THIS 17th DAY OF JUNE 2003

    S. AMOS WAKO, EGH, EBS, SC, MP

    ATTORNEY-GENERAL
    Amos Wako: Incompetent or Part of the Fraud?

    Amos Wako, Kenya’s Attorney General of 19 years, has issued several of these legal opinions. Illegally binding Kenyans to pay Ghosts. But even more strange is that these Ghosts have now sued the Attorney General in our courts in Kenya. And they have obtained orders prohibiting KACC from investigate them. No one in Government thinks that part of proving our case of Fraud against these ghosts would be to arrest them, since they are obviously known. How else did they challenge Kenya’s Attorney General and win?. The question must now be asked, What is Amos Wako’s Role in Anglo Leasing? Why is Amos Wako not cooperating with the UK’s Serious Fraud Office?

    Money for Nothing

    On The Administration Police Telecommunications Network (2003) contract Mr. Kimunya said to Parliament, on May 2nd 2007 that the project was worth Ksh 4.423 billion, and further, that this project had never started and was still the subject of protracted issues. Mr. Kimunya told Parliament that no promissory notes were issued against this project and that there was no refund against the said project because no payments had been made by treasury. This is untrue.

    The same debt is recorded by the Controller and Auditor General as including payments (as of June 30th 2005) of Ksh 613,500,529.60 being the principal and Ksh 74,225,411.90 being interest. In total the Government has paid Ksh 687,725,491.50 for a project that never started. It is not true that no payments were made.

    Corroborating the Controller and Auditor General is the fact that the debt is recorded in the external public debt register with amount repaid on the so-called loan as of June 30th 2005 being Ksh 613,500,530 (a difference of 40 Kenya cents!). Note, Globotel Incorporated, the contractor and the financier, Midland Finance and Securities are said by the Controller and Auditor General to be non-existent.

    By the end of June 2006, the people of Kenya were stated to owe Midland Finance and Securities Limited Ksh 3.185 billion. Kenya is committed to pay Euros 2.5 million every three months until June 29th 2009.

    The Minister of Finance, Amos Kimunya misled Parliament and to prove that Maoka Maore MP tabled copies of the 36 Irrevocable Promissory Notes that had been issued to Midland Finance and Securities Limited. Shocked, Mr. Kimunya retorted that the notes Maoka Maore had just tabled were copies of the Cancelled Irrevocable Promissory Notes that were in his safe at the Treasury.
    What is P.S Kinuya’s Role?

    During a meeting in may 2007 at the Treasury ,called by the Permanent Secretary for Finance, Joseph Kinyua to discuss public concern about the Anglo Leasing, invited representatives of civil society requested to see the Anglo Leasing irrevocable promissory notes that Finance Minister Amos Kimunya had brandished at a press conference. They could not have been more stunned when Mr. Kinyua told them that the Irrevocable Promissory Notes which Amos Kimunya the Minister for Finance had told Parliament were in his safe were actually in the custody of the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission. The line from Treasury was that KACC was still investigating the notes and they are evidence which must be kept safe. KACC was quick to deny that they had the Promissory Notes. Did Kinyua tell the truth? This also begs the question, why did Mr. Kimunya tell a press conference and Parliament that the notes are kept in a safe at Treasury? Who should Kenyans believe, between the former Minister for Finance, Amos Kimunya and his accounting officer, the Permanent Secretary for Finance , Joseph Kinyua?

    The Problem at the Treasury:

    But more seriously, it shines the spotlight on the role of the Treasury in grand corruption and how it has in successive scandals avoided accountability to other institutions and acted in an opaque manner.

    One problem Kenya has to urgently deal with is that Treasury is not accountable to Parliament and kept the contracting of the bogus loans, underpinning the Anglo Leasing scandal, shielded from legislative scrutiny in breach of the External Loans and Credits Act which requires Parliament to be informed of such debt by the Minister of Finance. To date, for example, the detailed separate audits of the 18 security related contracts known as Anglo Leasing worth Ksh 56.33 billion, have never been tabled in Parliament.

    But it is not just Parliament that has been kept in the dark. The Central Bank of Kenya has been side-stepped by the Treasury for decades as it borrows recklessly especially since the mid 1980s. During the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry, it became clear that tens of billions of shillings were spirited out of the country as a result of Kamlesh Pattni’s various export compensation and foreign exchange trading schemes during the early 1990s. Concerned that institutional loopholes might still exist in 2004, the Commission of Inquiry requested the Governor of Kenya’s Central Bank, Andrew Mullei, to provide information about the CBK’s procedures in handling GOK money. The May 11, 2004 letter is illuminating in its comments on foreign payments and the National Debt Office. As of that date the CBK was processing over US$550 million (Ksh 43 billion) annually in external payments on behalf of the GOK with a large proportion being debt service payments.

    Section 31 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act states that the CBK shall administer any payment agreements entered into by Kenya, and the Bank shall be consulted by the Government in negotiating any payments agreement. Nevertheless in practice, the CBK has been kept out of the loop. Indeed in 2004, the CBK was lobbying for amendments to the External Loans and Credit Act to compel the Government to consult the CBK in all external loans borrowing. The amendment has never been enacted.

    So, the situation in 2009 remains as it was in 2004. Although the Permanent Secretary for Finance, Mr. Joseph Kinyua, said that he issued a circular abolishing the use of promissory notes and to stop commercial credit agreements of the Anglo Leasing type, the Government does not have to consult with the CBK before it borrows money abroad. In fact the Government is not obliged to give full disclosure of external payment agreements it requires the CBK to administer. As regards external commercial public debt, the Central Bank is legally bound to pay without protest so long as the instructions given to the Bank by the Government are proper and there are sufficient funds to honour the transaction without querying the underlying transactions.

    This is what happened during the entire Anglo Leasing series of payments of commitment fees, principal repayments and interest servicing from 1997 to date.

    Even more frightening was the admission by the PS for Finance and other senior Treasury officials to civil society representatives that there are false entries in the country’s national external debt register. These were apparently inserted between 2001 and 2004 and cover the Anglo Leasing type 18 security related contracts. It would appear that despite having cleaned the external public debt register in 2001, after hiring Lazard Brothers the Government has in just 4 years loaded the external public debt register (and wananchi) with close to 1 billion dollars worth of fictitious credit and debts.

    Unfortunately these debts are secured by irrevocable promissory notes and binding contracts, that make it extremely difficult for the Government Of Kenya to avoid making payments to what it has called ghosts. Even though the Controller and Auditor General found that not a shilling in credit was ever provided by these ghosts to justify issuing promissory notes.

    Price Water House Coopers Contracted to Audit Kenya’s Controller and Auditor General

    Negotiations were the true reason behind the hiring of Price Water House Coopers for up to US$ 1.372 million (Ksh96 million) to conduct forensic audits on the 18 contracts, even after the Controller and Auditor General completed the same task in 2006.

    A close reading of the very first page of the description of services in the PWC contract shows that PWC was hired to look at the evidence held by the Government of Kenya in respect of 10 contracts entered into between 2002 and 2004, and to render expert advice to the Government. It then says this expert advice may be used as a basis for renegotiating or terminating the contracts.

    The GOK hoped that the PWC report would provide it with a tenable negotiating position vis-à-vis suppliers and financiers who have sued or are threatening to sue the GOK, a fact admitted to civil society representatives this past week by the Permanent Secretary for Finance, Mr. Joseph Kinyua. Such negotiations actually pre-date the hiring of PWC in December of 2006, and prompted the Attorney General Amos Wako to issue a public statement in October 2006 denying that he had engaged Freshfields, the London solicitors, to negotiate with Nedermar Technologies BVI, Ciara Systems and Universal Satspace, which have brought legal proceedings against the Government of Kenya related to 3 of the Anglo Leasing type contracts (respectively Project Nexus, Project Flagstaff and the VSAT network for the Postal Corporation of Kenya) Collectively these three contracts were worth over Ksh 8.2 billion.

    In the DEBT management report dated may 2008, Treasury has reported that after all the PWC audit findings were consistent with the Controller and Auditor General’s earlier findings namely that,

    The projects were overpriced
    Government funds were being used to implement the projects leading to reverse financing whereby the Government was paying interest on its own funds
    There were violations in Public Expenditure and budgeting Laws
    There was evidence of Corruption which will form a basis for further investigations by KACC
    Promissory notes were issued in some contracts and that in cases where Promissory Notes were issued, it has been argued that the Government is exposed and may be required to honour the promissory notes in the future. However, the Government position is that there is no exposure due to the following:-
    The Government has claims against the creditors to whom the Promissory notes were issued. None of these creditors has presented the notes to the Government of Kenya even those that have fallen due. Kenya Anti – Corruption Commission has been investigating these creditors and it is unlikely they can present the Promissory notes for PaymentIf the Promissory Notes were discounted to third parties, there is potential Risk, the Government circulated a caveat Emptor on 17TH December warning third parties not to discount the Promissory Notes since they are subject to investigations for fraud. It was Circulated through SWIFT to all banks world Wide, advertised in media and posted in the Government website..(Note here: Kenya Anti – Corruption Commission has been prohibited by the High Court of Kenya from Investigating the Midland Deal after Midland sued the Attorney General in Kenya)

    The Story of the Caveat Emptor:

    Six days to the General election on December 21st 2007, Mr. Kimunya and Mr. Kinyua (as the Accounting Officer, treasury) issued an caveat emptor for the promissory notes in a local daily.

    Today, the same Ministry has taken out half page Adverts in the Nation and Standard newspapers, suggesting that Mars Group Kenya is unpatriotic, peddling falsehoods, and supporting the Anglo Leasing Crooks. Here are the Mars Group “falsehoods” Amos kimunya spent the entire year 2007 misleading Kenyans about the status of Anglo leasing type contracts and Irrevocable Promissory notes and now in 2009, the PS Kinyua, is wasting tax payers money paying for advertisements that say nothing in response to the sad fact that his ministry has illegally bound Kenyans to pay for a Loan he admits was never advanced and which is a Fraud for which none of his collegues in the Government of Kenya have been punished.

    Treasury stands accused of pathetic stewardship of our public resources which threatens to cost this country Ksh 56 billion at the very least and kshs 112 Billion for the double rip off. If the debt register contains false entries, Kenyans have no way of knowing how much they owe to external creditors and on what terms. In effect the Permanent Secretary has disclosed that there is a multi billion shilling hole in our books comprising what are obviously unconscionable debts. What are the implications of such a hole in the budgeting process which the same Treasury is undertaking? What, if any, provisions are being made, and what is the basis for making provisions, for repayment of foreign loans which are fictitious to put it mildly. In any democracy this would be enough to cause the wholesale resignation or sacking of the top brass at the Ministry of Finance!

    Parliament must as a matter of urgency challenge the Treasury and the Minister for Finance to make a definitive statement on the status and legitimacy of the External Public Debt as matter of urgent national importance.

    Without transparency in this matter of national debts, there will be little point in continuing to maintain the fiction, that the government of Kenya has the capacity or will to unravel this shameful system failure and corruption scandal. Kenyans must stop the abuse of borrowing powers by Treasury.

    Kenyans are in Luck: Finance Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta, the former Chair of the Parliamentary Accounts Committee that investigated Anglo Leasing is now in charge.

    The opposite of Impunity is accountability. Kenya needs public officers of Integrity. PS Kinyua, and the Attorney General have reached their sell by date. They have no such integrity. It is time for Kenyans to call it for what it is. It is necessary to get rid of them so that we can at the first instance stop losing money, secondly prosecute them and third recover our stolen funds. They are obstacles to Justice and together with others have caused Kenyans to be impoverished and generations to pay for their crimes, economic and against humanity.

    What wonderful luck has befallen Kenya. Uhuru Kenyatta is now Minister for Finance. Uhuru Kenyatta investigated Anglo Leasing in his capacity as chair of The Parliamentary Accounts Committee and tabled his report in Parliament in 2006.

    It is now over1068 days ( almost 3 years) Since Uhuru Kenyatta and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee gave the Government of Kenya 60 Days to respond to its report on the 56.33 Billion Shillings Anglo Leasing Scandals. (28th March 2006).No one knows better than Uhuru Kenyatta, what the 18 Bogus Anglo Leasing deals are, Kenyans are lucky that the Minister For Finance Uhuru Kenyatta is finally in the executive and can put an end to these Anglo Leasing Payments.

    He can also investigate the curious role his Permanent Secretary has played in handling what should have been a straight forward issue by proactively protecting the interests of Kenyans by providing the courts with sworn evidence that contrary to the claim by Midland, no money was lent to Kenya and therefore the suit has no basis.

  • Completely tribal hogwash in my opinion

  • Waiting for a Bashir-style, fugitive Kenyan presidency

    By L. MUTHONI WANYEKI
    Posted Saturday, May 5 2012 at 16:38

    Last week, the East African Community leapt into the Kenyan fray.

    The 10th Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State went through their usual agenda items. Internal matters such as staffing were dispensed with. External matters were decided on — from progress on our Customs Union and common defence, to South Sudan’s membership application, territorial disputes become military hostilities between South Sudan and Sudan, and Somalia. Then, right at the end, an interesting little item on Kenya.

    The Summit gave the Council of Ministers one month to consider “extending [the East African Court of Justice’s] jurisdiction to cover… crimes against humanity.” At the end of May, another Extraordinary Summit will be held on that very matter.

    It is not that the decision was unexpected. The Summit referenced a resolution of the East African Legislative Assembly, held just previously, that called for amendment to the Treaty to give the EACJ “other” jurisdiction retroactively, with penalties, and the transfer of the Kenyan post-lection violence trials from the International Criminal Court to the EACJ.

    Hmmm…

    Let us start with motive. The EALA resolution was moved not by a Kenyan but a Ugandan. Its premise is worth pointing out — since the majority of Kenyans, who have consistently supported the ICC process, would no doubt disagree.

    The argument is that we wanted a local process (and that the Kenyan legislature’s current position against the ICC process is still a reflection of our own). We did want a local process. We worked for a Special Tribunal. It was the Kenyan legislature that thwarted this under the slogan: “Don’t be vague; go for the Hague.” It was only when the Hague set briskly to work that the Kenyan parliament reversed its decision. And the Kenyan executive decided that judicial reforms might not be such a bad idea.
    Judicial reforms are underway. But the only way that the four suspects will be tried here is if Kenya institutes credible investigations and prosecutions into the same crimes in respect of the same four suspects.

    The question that EALA should have asked itself — to avoid discrediting itself as complicit in the “shuttle diplomacy” effort — is why Kenya’s politicians denied us the Special Tribunal in the first place and then flip-flopped.

    EALA should also have asked itself what has prevented Kenya from instituting credible local proceedings against any suspect — a few badly investigated and badly prosecuted cases aside. It should have reviewed the government of Kenya’s own bizarre submission to the ICC on local prosecutions — compiling every criminal case filed at any single police station during the post-election violence whether or not the case had anything to do with the violence. It was a joke — or, at least, it would have been had there been no victims involved. Current mutterings by our Director of Public Prosecutions aside, local proceedings on the scale required are still far away. For EALA to comment that “justice delayed is justice denie” as though the delay has been created by the ICC, is outrageous.

    Then there’s the substance. Nobody would resent moves to make our sub-regional court stronger. Despite persistent problems of national enforcement of their decisions, we know they’ve added to the menu of justice options for all of us — at least vis a vis our states (since they concern state, not individual, behaviour). But criminal jurisdiction is a whole different ballgame. The EACJ would need investigative and prosecutorial capacity. It would have to support the defence if necessary. It would have to deal with witness protection.

    If it follows the ICC’s innovation, it would also have to support for victims’ participation and reparations.

    Let us assume that member states can and will contribute to financing the above (a big assumption). Let us consider how long it would take to put the above in place. Even with the highest levels of alacrity, we are not talking about a short-term project.
    Then, let us assume that’s done. Let us then consider trying the four Kenyan suspects. The EACJ’s new investigators would need time to do their work, with the new prosecutors directing the operation. Finally, the cases are before the judges. Would the suspects’ first line of defence not be retroactivity? That they are being charged with crimes that did not exist in the jurisdiction at the time they allegedly committed them? Or they’re tried, found guilty and sentenced. Would their argument not be, again, that the penalties imposed didn’t exist at the time they committed the crimes?

    The long story shortened is that extending jurisdiction is all well and good — although execution may cost more than our member states may be willing to pay and take more time than the EALA or the Summit may have considered. But the idea that such extension is in any way relevant to the four Kenyan suspects before the ICC is ridiculous.

    As is the idea of the ICC “transferring” the cases of those four suspects to the EACJ. What standing does the EAC have before the ICC to even make such a request?

    It is all very perplexing if taken at face value. But we are not talking about entirely unintelligent people — within the EALA or the Summit. We must therefore assume we are not meant to take it at face value — its meaning is to be found elsewhere. Somehow, this is to be played out politically, not legally. It is not yet clear how. But, having been through Kenya’s “shuttle diplomacy” last year and having watched African member states’ treatment of the fugitive and internationally wanted Sudanese president, we can take an educated guess. Is the ground being prepared for a Kenyan president who may also be a fugitive or wanted internationally?

    Thumbs down to the EALA. Thumbs down to the Summit.

    L. Muthoni Wanyeki is doing her graduate studies at L’Institut d’etudes politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris, France

  • Kenya needs another battle of Independence, The Economic disparity in that of the so- called urban and Ipad/laptop trotting urbanites and that of the rural side peasants is so wide that one can’t see or perceive each others lifestyle or predicaments. Both of them exist impervious of each other. We have young Muthaiga kids sporting their blue tooth enabled cell phones on one side of this chasm, while the IDPs and slum dwellers committing suicide because they cannot put food on the table. The unorganized workers, landless freedom fighters, while Uhuru and his clan are sitting on land the size of Nyanza province. When will the trickle down economy ever trickle to these people? Never.

    Providing basic human needs is the primary responsibility of the State. Health and Education are the two very basic needs and not servicing them is nothing short of criminal negligence of the Sovereign Democratic State. In terms of education in Kenya, the Government is doing great but in healthcare, nope. The medical malpractice galore, detaining patients for unpaid bills; and as many as 3 patients share a single bed in public hospitals, etc. But that’s not even the bigger question; I mean we should focus more on preventive healthcare yet up to this point I have not heard anyone insist on Kenyans doing physical medical checkup or even trying to ask harder question as to why our people are dying at the early age of 49 years. Now on this, it would be easy to blame Health ministers Anyang’ Nyong’o and Beth Mugo for their incompetence, but neither of the two clowns is running for higher office (the Presidency), plus they have the best medical coverage in the world paid for by Kenyan taxpayers.

    Extreme Economic Disparity such as that present in Kenya would never permit homogeneity. The Haves and the Have-nots will always exist and coexist. Yet the extreme profligacy of the few who can afford a 2500ksh lunch at Serena, while the majority subsisting on less then 100ksh a day, reeks of putrefied death of sensibilities. Uhuru Kenyatta has never addressed the widening poverty gap and I don’t expect him to, since he belongs to Muthaiga group. An Uhuru presidency will be nothing but a band aid solution to a deeply rooted cancer. You need surgical intervention to root out cancer. The ‘Band aid’ approach would only keep the wound festering. It is not going to be of any help and that’s why sensible Kenyans need to disembark from the Uhuru Political Vehicle.

    Here are some current ills for which Uhuru is directly responsible:

    1. He was the Finance Minister who paid large sums of money to KENREN scams that even Moi refused and dared the thieves to sue whenever they wanted. They did not but waited patiently until Kibaki had taken office before beginning to cash the cheques. Uhuru joined the ministry and found the money being paid out. He did not stop the HISTORICAL Corruption but instead went ahead to honor the payments and to increase the amounts paid out to Anglo Leasing thieves. He speeded up the payments so that the full amount will be paid out in the last month of Kibaki’s Presidency. ;

    Kibaki was also the minister for Finance in the 1970s when the KENREN scam was manufactured. He was the beneficiary. He could not have paid because Moi tied the whole thing in courts and would have continued until Kibaki moved in to State House and stopped the AG from any further defense, thus paving the way for repayment. Uhuru continued to pay! He had power to contest the payments, yet did not. Instead, he accelerated the payments so that instead of 2015, the final cheque will be cashed in December 2012 – What a Coincidence!! Yes, Kenya is bound to repay BUT because Kibaki decided NOT to contest a case that Kenya could easily win! Even at this late hour, there are ways to re-open the case and stop payments. No country is now obliged to pay corrupt deals and aid graft.

    2. Has Uhuru’s work at the Ministry of Finance been exemplary? Yes, and so flat is Rift Valley and Central province if only you overlook Mt Kenya, Longonot, the Rift Valley, Kerio Valley, hundreds of ridges and a million hills! How long ago was it since he presented a “computer Error” full budget to Parliament for passage? So who was right: Wetangula or Uhuru ? Who lost money from the sale/purchase of the Tokyo, Cairo and Brussels Embassy deals? How about the VW Passat Scandal? Didn’t he say he will repay the Education Thievery from the Taxpayers pockets without blushing? I mean, there have been so many scandals on Uhuru’s watch, the only people who can praise his tenure are his wife and any paid spin doctors! No ordinary person can come close to saying anything of the sort. It is testimony to the numbness that Kenyans now experience from being bombarded with corruption at high speed under Kibaki’s presidency, that they simply do not react anymore to the level of scandal that was in Uhuru’s ministry. Again, this is NOT historical. It is current.

    3. Land: Kenyatta sold ALL his pieces of land to the Kenyan State in 1978 before he died. Uhuru’s mom, Ngina Kenyatta, banked the money. As soon as Moi came to power, she took young Uhuru and his brother Muigai, to see Moi and complain that Mzee had rendered her sons “landless”. Moi gave her back all the land – which had anyway not been transferred to the State as earlier agreed. So she kept the vast pieces of land (located in Central, Rift Valley, Coast, Eastern, Nairobi and indeed every province) and then sold them sometime in 1992 to the same government. Again, the transfer was never done and instead the land was then transferred to Uhuru and his brother.

    DETAILS of the Kenyatta Family Inheritance are well known. Apart from court cases, thanks to the tussle over Peter Muigai’s estate, various public sources are available. Uhuru and Ngina’s pieces of land were separated from the wider Kenyatta Estate in 1978. It is common knowledge. Muigai, Kristina, Magana and Margaret etc., got their pieces.

    4. IDPs: Uhuru Kenyatta is the CHAIRMAN of the IDPs Settlement Committee. It recommends and approves what land to buy. Lands minister Orengo and his PS are on record complaining that Uhuru and his committee are not approving land (especially located in Central) to settle IDPs.

    In 2009, Uhuru sold one of the pieces in Rongai to himself as the minister for finance (another scandal). He set the price as the Seller and agreed to it as the Buyer and then made the payment as the Buyer before receiving it as the Seller. Of course it turned out he was not exactly selling all of it – just the piece earmarked for invasion by squatters. He kept most of it. The man is a pure genius! That aside, Uhuru is TODAY the Largest Landowner in the country! His behind-the-scenes maneuvers in Parliament to oppose the resettlement of IDPs in other parts of Kenya are attempts to ensure that his land remains his, despite the way he got it. Uhuru as president will ensure that the Constitutional clauses on land are dead and buried.

    Uhuru was therefore the seller and the buyer all in one. He abused his position to shield himself from land grabbing charges. By “selling” the land to the government for the resettlement of IDPs, he effectively offloaded a property that did not technically belong to him and which should have been taken back without compensation in line with the new Constitution. You have a trickster-land-grabber-profiteer all in one. Uhuru was obliged to declare a conflict of interest and should have transferred the entire approval and decision-making to another ministry and minister, who was likely not to act for or against what he would imagine Uhuru wanted.

    The IDPs Settlement Committee and Minister for Finance – are entities that have the greatest say over land purchase. OK let’s assume for argument’s sake that Orengo was in charge of buying the Gicheha Farm previously owned by Uhuru, his brother and their mother, how does the clear conflict of that engulfs Uhuru become Orengo’s headache?

    It is not Orengo’s duty to difine who in the cabinet has a conflict of interest. Uhuru as a man who seeks the highest office in the land should, like Caesar’s wife, be far beyond reproach. His actions such as selling land two hours before the new owner sells it to his ministry are just too dirty. The idea of a man who sits in the cabinet using tricks to peddle grabbed land and stash the proceeds away while frustrating the implementation of the new constitution to buy himself more time to sell more land to himself (and con the taxpayer) is simply shocking! He should have surrendered the land rather than use tricks to cash out.

    I am not diverting anything from Orengo. He may well buy land from Moi not knowing the bodies of all those Kyuks that went missing in the late 80s are buried in it. You can’t hang Orengo for the bones and leave Moi, can you?

    I am also not enthusiastic about Uhuru becoming President since we will have more of the same. He used to be a good leader when he was Leader of the Opposition (before Kibaki bribed him to abandon it). Since joining PNU to support Kibaki’s re-election in 2007, he has become a status quo fellow, who is more interested in advancing tribal hegemony than being a national leader. His early morning escapades with alcohol do not present him as a good role model for the youth of Kenya either. Some commentators her claim that Raila is not the savior, that he has been in politics for many years and has been in and out of government and so far, he has not convinced them that he is a development conscious person. There are claims that he is more interested in advancing his political ascendancy than doing anything to improve the lives of ordinary Kenyans. But what change do we expect from the Golden boy Uhuru? He has never contributed anything towards the liberation of Kenyans. He has no clue about the suffering of Kenyans, having inherited stolen wealth. I am shell-shocked to read a comment that he should not be held accountable for his wealth. What about the moral side of his wealth acquisition? Some ignorant commentators write that there was nothing wrong in Mzee Kenyatta’s grabbing of the huge tracts of land. I can bet you such comments are from the same Kikuyus who suffer most because Kenyatta took much of their land. Kenya being Kenya, Uhuru and his ilk has more stolen money to run a national presidential campaign.

    Let us remember that without Raila, Uhuru would have succeeded Moi. Without Raila the 2005 Wako draft would have passed, without Raila, Kibaki would not have shared power after stealing the elections and without Raila, Kibaki’s midnight appointments would have gone through, etc. You can criticize Raila but you cannot rubbish his contribution to the Reform movement. I think fair criticism begins with honesty and without that, it is just another Uhuru sycophant shouting-match politics with no end. Apart from the ongoing insults at political rallies, the elections will feature the Status quo gangs versus the Reformists – change gangs. Uhuruto will lead the status quo thugs and Raila will lead the reformists.

  • By Diana Kenyatta on Monday, 21 May 2012

    The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. The Kenyatta family has enjoyed good business while Kenyatta was finance minister. While him and Beth Mugo are in politics, their family interests are protected and they have bargaining clout.

    Kenyatta’s brother Muhoho was years ago appointed in to the Kenya Dairy Board, while there, they completely killed KCC and made Brookside the number one milk supplier in the country, no one complained about that conflict of interest.

    We all know why Kenyatta refused the proposed ammendments in the Finance bill to regulate banks and control interest rates. He was asked in parliament to declare his interest because Gwasi MP Mr Mbadi alledged a conflict of interest, Kenyatta refused to declare even though under standing order No.81 “A Member who wishes to speak to any matter in which the Member has a personal interest shall, first, declare that interest.” Uhuru Kenyatta refused to declare his interest and decided to instead support a motion for adjournment, his last contribution to date as he resigned as finance minister before the house reconvened and has failed to contribute to a single debate to date. The interest was the Kenyatta’s stake in Commercial Bank of Africa CBA Where Muhoho Uhuru’s brother sits on the board to protect the family interest. The Kenya Bankers Association against parliaments bid to regulate them, sat down with Kenyatta where strategies were discussed on how best to get MPs on board including giving them incentives in all sorts of forms including cash. Mr Kenyatta himself was awarded favours by banks to ensure the ammendments don’t see the light of day so when it was alleged that his successor on the finance docket dished out Kshs 50000 to MPs at a luncheon at the Panafric hotel, the stage had already been set, the Banks had won, no regulation and banks can do as they please.

    The other Muhoho Kenyatta, this one Uhuru’s uncle was CEO at Kenya Airports Authority when corruption was alleged he was protected and reappointed by Uhuru’s friend, the then minister of transport Chirau Makwere.

    How about the mineral mining business owned by Beth Mugo and Mama Ngina, when minerals were discovered in the Amboseli by two Americans, Beth and Mama Ngina worked together to get the Americans deported and they took over the business. Few companies would be allowed to mine in a National park, but it helps if you are a Kenyatta. There are many more business interests that the Kenyattas are involved in some involve other politicians, the Moi’s and hence Uhuru being Moi’s project in 2002, Moi knew Kenyatta would protect his business interests as the Kenyatta’s were themselves involved in various shady businesses.

    So by all means the blind will not see the crimes of the Kenyatta family, they will defend them no matter what. My business is not to tell you who to vote for, how you use this information is totally up to you. Whoever becomes the president, as long as they belong to the status quo, do not expect much, I don’t expect much from the Kenyatta’s they are astute business people who have used their opportunity to consolidate their business. As long as Kenyans continue to give them power, they will utilise it, i don’t balme them for that, I blame the foolish Kenyans who constantly put the Kenyattas on a peddle stool and worship them whilst remaining poor, so by all means let us prop Uhuru Kenyatta to President and when he finishes, his son can take over, let us maintain the status quo. We suffer because we choose to.

  • Kenyatta’s mistrust for Odinga that led to his detention
    Updated Tuesday, May 25 2010 at 07:00

    On October 25, 1969, President Jomo Kenyatta went to Kisumu to open the Russia Hospital (now New Nyanza General Hospital).

    On arrival at the venue of the function, the presidential convoy was met with shouts of Dume (the bull), Kenya People Union’s political symbol, from a group of hecklers.

    After the official opening of the hospital, the President gave a charged speech, attacking the hecklers and Jaramogi in particular.

    Kenyatta facing Jaramogi told him: “You are rich, while people of Nyanza are starving” to which Odinga retorted: “But we are hungry despite the Government’s promises”.

    Kenyatta replied: “You are hungry because you do not want to work. You have got people to expect free things. I, Kenyatta, am self sufficient at home.”

    The crowd then charged as the presidential motorcade left and police opened fire on the mob. A reported eleven people died in the fracas that ensued and several were injured.

    In his official speech at the opening of the hospital, Kenyatta’s tone was more of a political rally speech than an official government statement.

    “We came here to bless Nyanza because of what Kanu has done, not because of anything KPU hoped to gain. KPU is only engaged in dirty divisive words. I know that Odinga is my friend and he fought for my release, but he has been misled, and in turn continues to mislead people of this area.”

    Proscribed organisation

    As a final blow, Kenyatta hinted that he had something up his sleeve when he faced Odinga once again and said: “Jaramogi do not say later that I did not warn you publicly and I warn you once more that if I did not know you personally, I would have shown you that I do not indulge in child’s play. So you must stop this child’s play.”

    On October 27, 1969, Jaramogi and other KPU officials were arrested and taken to Kamiti Maximum Security Prison where they were detained under regulation 6(1) of the Public Security Act.

    Those arrested alongside Jaramogi according to the Kenya Gazette notice No 3476 were Odinge Odera, the writer of this book, among others.

    KPU became a proscribed organisation, with all its branches and sub-branches closed. Jaramogi was whisked away and kept incommunicado for his duration in political detention until March 28, 1971 when he was released.

    “I am very grateful indeed to the President for having ordered my release from detention and I hope he will be pleased to order the release of other detained brothers’.

    Asked what he did to occupy himself Jaramogi said he used some of the time in detention “meditating and planting trees”.

    His first engagement after release was a courtesy call on Chief Justice Kitili Mwendwa, the first black Kenyan to hold the position.

    Jaramogi’s son Raila, now Prime Minister, accompanied him to the Chief Justice’s office.

    Soon after Jaramogi’s return, an incident occurred in May 1971, which caused considerable tension in the country. Ten Kenyans were arrested and charged with “conspiring with others not before court to overthrow the Government of Kenya by unlawful means.

    Kanu and the Government planned a loyalty demonstration for June 27, 1971. Jaramogi joined the fray by appealing to Luos “living in Nairobi to participate fully in the loyalty demonstration”.

    As the going goes, “once a soldier always a soldier”, Jaramogi was in 1974 a typical example of a soldier who is always a one. When the Government announced elections were to be held later in the year, he did not hesitate to announce his candidature for the Bondo seat, then occupied by William Odongo Omamo.

    On August 8 1974, the President dissolved Parliament and announced October 14 as the date for elections and fixed the nomination day for August 24.

    Small communities

    However, when former KPU detainees went for nomination formalities at the Kanu headquarters, Kenyatta rejected their applications.

    Despite the assurance he was given by the Kanu headquarters when he was released in 1971, and despite Jaramogi’s exemplary effort in appealing to the Luos and small communities to participate in the loyalty demonstration of June 27, 1971, Kenyatta was still not comfortable with him.

    But later a channel of communication between the two was established. The two occasionally communicated remotely through James Kanyotu, the then Director of Intelligence. This went on until Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978.

    — Excerpts compiled by Stephen Makabila

  • WHY RUTO AND UHURU WILL NOT BE ON THE BALLOT PAPER
    May 25, 2012 by LONE FELIX

    “ It would therefore be true to say that the suspended judge Nancy Barasa was right in refusing to be searched by Kerubo as there is no obligation to respect that which is not legal. We could validly argue that when she pinched Kerubo’s nose and said “you should know people” she actually was defending herself from an illegal search and she actually meant “you should know the law”, But with this vacuum existent, the country suspended her from the office. What justification would be there for a country to say its legal-moral threshold is that when a deputy chief justice is suspected to have pinched a guard’s nose they are suspended but when a Deputy prime minister is accused of Murder, Rape and other inhumane acts they are allowed to seek the presidency.”

    In its morning bulletin on the Monday 22nd May 2012, Iranian Press TV ran an item: ICC suspect launches a Political Party. Well, the caption is entirely true. The Kenyan Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta is an ICC suspect and he had launched a political party. All I thought was, such a caption is undeserving of my country, but what I dreaded most is ICC suspect Sworn in as President.

    In August 2011, writing immediately after The ICC prosecutor revealed the Identity of the six Kenyans he was pursuing, Moses Kuria then PNU spokesperson alluded to there being no law that barred the suspects from seeking elective office. He alluded, largely to a legal axiom that one is innocent until proven guilty, and Kenyans facing trial in the ICC should be treated as such, even in regard to their political ambitions. In particular he referred the Country to Article 99 (3) which provides that a person is not disqualified under clause (2) unless all possibility of appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision has been exhausted.

    Before delving further into the law, it appears interesting that this article was not in the Harmonized Draft or any other previous drafts including the Wako Draft that was put to a referendum in 2005, and only appeared first after the politician led Naivasha Consensus building retreat. It is understood that the traditional trading occurred within the lodge having been initiated by those who dreaded an imminent prosecution.

    In justifying its inclusion, the Abdikadir led committee suggested that the intention was to curb the historically alive tendency of instigating prosecutions against political rivals to lock them out of the race. A former CEO Commissioner confirmed a struggle by the commission to expunge the article, but they were restrained so as to achieve the needed political will for the draft to be ratified. Well, this is not important as such as the article was sacredly ratified as part of the greater Constitution. The tough question which the country needs address itself to, is whether this vacuum in the law would allow the candidature of Ruto and Uhuru for President and Joshua Sang for Senator.

    The true legally and morally justifiable position is that the three are ineligible to contest for elective offices until they are vindicated by through a proper trial. The dismissal of their challenge on the Jurisdiction of the ICC yesterday further seals the fate of their candidature at least for the coming election.

    On a moral ground, leadership and the concept of a “good citizen” are inseparable. Good in our sense is a legal vindication that the character of the person seeking the office is worth. The question of leadership is an issue of public interest, which should at all instances be differentiated from public opinion. The laws of Kenya guard the collective interest of the country and this has sometimes gone against public opinion. The political game that was being played by slogans like “let the people decide” was basically invoking extra legal considerations after the suspects were aware that neither the law nor the facts were for them.

    The Construction of a Constitution would traditionally be guided by the nemo aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum perlegit a latin maxim that suggests that no one can understand a part, unless he has read the whole. To know the true position of the law, one would have to go beyond articles of convenience and regard the Constitution in entirety.

    The Kenya Constitution 2010 clearly outlines the chief principles that would guide its construction. Article 259, suggests among other things that the constitution must be interpreted in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles and contributes to good governance. Such a proposition is again found in Article 10. Clearly, a dual appearance of the same principle in the Kenyan Constitution is not a coincidence. It is an emphasis and any interpretation must objectively satisfy this criterion or else it would be a breach of the law.

    One of the arch purposes of this constitution is to establish a leadership that is not tainted. As such, it establishes several scenarios when it is unfit for a public officer to continue holding office. In Regard to the presidency, such would be found in Article 145 (1) which suggests that a president could be impeached where there are “serious” reasons for believing that a president has committed a crime under national or international law. The constitution equally provides mechanisms for impeachment, but shelving the procedure, the basic fact is that where there is reason to believe that a crime has been committed by a public office holder, the holder falls short of the glory of a public office. Emphasis here must be that the substance of the crime does not lie in the procedure, but in the fact of a “serious” indication that such a crime could have been committed.

    The Purpose of this clause is to emphasize that no one is above the law, and that a “criminal or a suspected criminal is unfit to hold the presidency” note the constitution uses the phrase “serious reasons for believing that a president has committed a crime” It does not refer to a conviction. Therefore in a hypothetical scenario, a person who a Kenya Human Rights Commission has implicated, who the Waki Commission has implicated, Who the NSIS instruments implicate, upon these implications, an ICC prosecutor commissions independent investigation and satisfies himself that crimes could have been committed, and this evidence is placed before a pre trial chamber which agrees that indeed there could have been a commission of crime, I am more inclined to aver that the constitutional threshold of serious would have been met, and as such, procedure notwithstanding, the president would have to vacate the office.

    Article 50 (2) a. of The Constitution which assures presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. There have therefore been calls that the three Kenyans ought be treated as such and allowed to contest. What these calls ignore is the fact that within the practice of the law, there arise several scenarios that waive the presumption of innocence and even shift the burden from the accuser to the accused. For instance, there is an implicit waiver of this presumption attached to the wording of the article 145 (1) when it fails to mention a conviction but only refers to “serious reasons to believe”. This construction is not an inconsistency as constitutional inconsistencies are apparent; in reality all provisions in the constitution serve the greater intention. Just as there is need to ensure sanctity in leadership, there is an equal need to protect a citizen from being ostracized by virtue of being under trial. Stretching this however, to the extent of justifying a candidacy of a suspect is an ultra-liberal and unjustifiably generous construction: an attempt to use the law to serve sectarian interest I would posit.

    A question that follows therefore is, if one is unfit to hold the presidency as per the constitution, can he vie for the presidency? Clearly, there is no provision in the constitution expressly touching on this matter. The reason for the silence is very clear; The Kenyan Constitution was not drafted for the candidature of Sang. It would therefore border an absurdity that such a vacuum could endorse a situation that ultimately creates an illegality. If an individual’s presidency would be a constitutional breach, there is no merit whatsoever to allow its possibility.

    Allowing that possibility is in itself a usurpation of the law; you cannot create a situation that would breach a law without being in breach of the law. It would be like the country, or the vetting commission is holding the constitution in contempt! The apparent lenience in the provisions, such as the aforementioned article 99 (3) was never intended to shield the accused from being locked out of a political race. We must be strictly aware of the fact that the drafters of the constitution were making a law for the country; they were never advocates of political interest or guardians of individual ambitions. However, the drafters had to reasonably curb a possibility where legal institutions could be used to lock out competition in politics. They therefore had to assure everyone a fair chance. If a situation arises, and it is apparent that a crime was orchestrated to lock someone out of a presidency, then the courts would liberally extent this provision to salvage the situation.

    It is important to regard our history when we look at the constitution. We were writing a law that would further our vision but equally suppress the noxious nature of past regimes. Such included use of judicial institutions as a field for vendetta and to suppress dissenting voices. It was there a justified measure that legal processes in regard to political offices be broadened for openness.

    There is no country that has ever legislated on everything, for instance, the law regulating Search of Persons in this country does not have provisions for private security persons to conduct personal searches. It would be legally correct therefore to say that the search on the person before being admitted to a building has no legal basis.

    It would therefore be true to say that the suspended judge Nancy Barasa was right in refusing to be searched by Kerubo as there is no obligation to respect that which is not legal. We could validly argue that when she pinched Kerubo’s nose and said “you should know people” she actually was defending herself from an illegal search and she actually meant “you should know the law”, But with this vacuum existent, the country suspended her from the office. What justification would be there for a country to say its legal-moral threshold is that when a deputy chief justice is suspected to have pinched a guard’s nose they are suspended but when a Deputy prime minister is accused of Murder, Rape and other inhumane acts they are allowed to seek the presidency.

    We have to be true to the unhindered realization of good governance. Uhuru, Ruto and Sang’s candidature are an invalidation of this quest. They must not vie for one reason; respect for the rule of law. If they are vindicated they will contest, and that would show their true commitment to respect the Constitution.

    And by the way, I have to start thinking of who to give my vote, it was meant for Ruto!

    http://lonefelix.wordpress.com/2012/05/25/why-ruto-and-uhuru-will-not-be-on-the-ballot-paper/

  • Will Kenya Vote for Impunity?
    By DAYO OLOPADE
    June 8, 2012, 9:30 am

    NAIROBI — Uhuru Kenyatta is a busy man. A son of Kenya’s first president is simultaneously deputy prime minister and a member of Parliament, and until recently was finance minister as well as the chairman of the long-ruling Kenya African National Union party (better known as KANU). He has also been indicted by the International Criminal Court.

    With three other heavyweight officials, Kenyatta is charged with crimes against humanity for funding and coordinating tribally motivated violence that killed 1,200 people in the days after Kenya’s disputed election in 2007. Preliminary hearings in the I.C.C. trials for the so-called Ocampo Four are expected to begin in September.

    Unbowed, Kenyatta is also running for president. Late last month at the conference center built by and named for his father, he started a new political party: The National Alliance (T.N.A.). Though the move was nominally the beginning of a collective project, one could be forgiven for confusing it with a de facto campaign launch. The rollout was ostentatious: musicians and pyrotechnics at simultaneous events in six Kenyan cities were estimated to cost at least $1.8 million. Massive billboards for T.N.A. now shade the streets of Nairobi, alongside ads for Dark and Lovely hair products or Brookside yogurt.

    “We seek to dispel the notion that parties are founded with the vision of getting to power,” Kenyatta said at the launch. “Any party that pursues an individualistic agenda and personality cults has no future in the Kenya of today.” It’s a noble sentiment, but his best hope for winning the 2013 presidential election — if not his court case — rests on the opposite logic.

    Kenyatta appears to know this. The creation of T.N.A. is his way of hitting the “reset” button. He is making a clean break with KANU, the party from which he was elected to Parliament and on whose ticket he ran and lost the presidency in 2002. Establishing T.N.A. is also a way of consolidating loyalties. To win in 2013, Kenyatta will need an alliance of politicians outside of his base in the center of the country and among fellow Kikuyu. The appeal of a new party allows him to emerge from the shadow of the departing president, Mwai Kibaki (also Kikuyu), and attract young and hungry politicians from other factions.

    In Kenya, politicians often switch parties based on expediency, and so now many parliamentarians are scratching their heads trying to get around the legal requirement that — gasp — politicians serve the parties from which they were elected.

    “Everyone who matters in this country is singing the T.N.A. song,” said Kareke Mbiuki, a KANU M.P. who plans to run on T.N.A.’s ticket in 2013’s national election.

    The launch of T.N.A. also gave Kenyatta a platform to reject the I.C.C.’s mandate to prosecute him. In a recent speech, he made a pointed reference to “sovereignty,” a popular argument against cooperating with the international court. The judicial system here is among the best in East Africa, but since local courts have balked at crossing Kenyatta and others suspected of involvement in the 2007 post-election violence, the I.C.C. stepped into the vacuum. Still, some Kenyans have proposed setting up a more local tribunal in neighboring Tanzania, grousing about the disproportionate number of I.C.C. charges leveled at Africans.

    Kenyatta is now deftly tapping that sentiment — a move that, incidentally, is perfectly legal. Though Kenya’s Constitution nominally honors I.C.C. decisions, it does not prohibit the accused from running for office. William Ruto, another M.P. and one of the Ocampo Four, is also in the race.

    Legal or not, though, there’s no way to paper over the potential bind in which both candidacies might place the country. The I.C.C. proceedings are sure to reveal some distasteful acts that may damage T.N.A.’s shrink-wrapped reputation. And should either candidate prevail in the election but not in The Hague, Kenya would be in the awkward position of having an elected president who is also a wanted criminal.

    That prospect may be tolerable to the political class here, which notably refused to extradite President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan, also wanted by the I.C.C., during a 2010 visit to Kenya. But the country’s political process — to say nothing of international justice — deserves better.

    ——————————————————————————–

    Dayo Olopade is a journalist covering global politics and development policy. She is writing a book about innovation in Africa.

  • we are dead in Kenya !!!!!!!!!!!!! We only live as foreigners in our one country while there are the owners of this country!!!!

  • God see us pliz!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

  • Bach Emmanuel

    Uhuru is to clean . Not corrupt and he is my role model . Hardworking person

  • Can the Kalenjins vote in Uhuru? Remember last year when Ruto met the Kalenjin professionals, he was told to his face that the Mt. Kenya route he was taking, he was taking it alone minus the Kalenjins. Also, Kenyans do not require another Kikuyu President. Elite Kenyans Know Uhuru is a Fool who was rejected by his Constituents in 1997, even with Moi’s backing. He is an emotional fool who bangs the table for very small matters. Uhuru is simply unsellable.

    If The Hague does not catch up with them (Uhuru and Ruto) before the voting date, and even if it does not, for us to imagine that a sitting President will be having a case to answer, even if he is innocent, is a big International joke.

  • just hate all those converting this blog into a space for an unthinking herd no wonder Koreans said we have primitive energy quote your sources before posting silly wishful thinking statements here!!!! do we have any History student here or its just some imbeciles telling stories gathered from their lazy folks!! talk of luo thrift molasses plant loss of money from pensioners also get to the National archives most files are open but you pass this great place along Moi avenue like its a Morgue shame on all posting what they cant tell the source!

  • kenyatta mwizi

    Why Kenyatta’s sunset years led to an orgy of official graft

    Saturday, May 12 2012 at 00:00 GMT+3

    The last four years of President Kenyatta’s life saw many Cabinet ministers and allies turn to exploiting the nation’s resources in a pattern that would be repeated under future regimes. In the second weekend of our serialisation of CHARLES HORNSBY’s book, we look at the looting in these turbulent years.

    By CHARLES HORNSBY

    Ten years into independence, Kenya was now a place of increasing corruption and inequality. Civil servants enthusiastically exploited the opportunity that the Ndegwa Report (1971) had given them to engage in business. The ‘action’ was now in resource extraction: poaching, charcoal and mining.

    With the support of senior Government figures, Kenya’s abundant wildlife was slaughtered for the export of ivory and skins to the Middle and Far East. In mid-1973, at least 500 elephants were killed legally each month.

    However, receipts in destinations such as Hong Kong suggested that at least 345 tonnes of ivory had been exported from Kenya in 1973, indicated the death of at least 15,000 elephants in a year, three times the official number.

    There were wide discrepancies between estimates of the number of elephants left, from 150,000 to only 40,000. Ten thousand rhinos were killed during 1973–9, 80 per cent of the remaining population. Sport hunting was still legal, but in 1973, Chief Game Warden John Mutinda finally withdrew all elephant-hunting licences. Western nations’ concern over poaching was rising, with television reports and articles devoted to Kenya’s problem and its causes in State corruption.

    There were high-profile arrests, including a Somali picked up with the tusks of 525 elephants in his baggage en route to Hong Kong.

    Ivory exports

    Eventually, Tourism Minister Juxon LM Shako banned ivory export by anyone except the Government in August 1974.

    However, exports continued.

    One problem was that the Kenyatta family itself was implicated in poaching and ivory exports. Margaret Kenyatta, Kenyatta’s daughter, was chairman of the United African Company, one of at least ten companies exporting ivory despite the ban. Ivory could earn Sh300 (US$36) per kilogramme, making one elephant worth thousands of dollars.

    Other valuable items included zebra pelts (5,000 of these animals were shot illegally within 320 miles of Nairobi in six months during 1975) and colobus monkey skins.

    In 1975, two men were found in possession of 26,000 colobus monkey skins (more than the total remaining population today).

    However, dealers could buy both police inaction and the needed documentation, of which there was an inexhaustible supply. The monkey skin owners were acquitted after they produced ‘valid’ permits.
    It was widely believed that much of the poaching that decimated the elephant and rhino populations was organised and carried out by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. An expatriate official identified both assistant ministers — one being JM Kariuki — as buying ivory direct from game department headquarters for export. There were later suggestions that officials, police sharpshooters and the Kenyatta family were involved in a vertically integrated poaching cartel.

    A Samburu MP alleged in Parliament that there were in fact very few poachers outside the ministry. In 1976, Parliament established a Select Committee to probe malpractices at the ministry, but nothing came of it in the face of State obstruction.

    In May 1977, sport hunting was banned. However, the loss of hunting revenue damaged the ability of the ministry to combat poaching.

    Bizarrely, Mau Mau veterans, denied most forms of recompense for their losses, had been allowed to poach since the 1960s, through the issue of ‘collectors’ permits’, which allowed them to carry as much ivory as they wished, under the polite fiction that it was of Mau Mau vintage. These permits were finally cancelled in 1977 under pressure from environmentalists. In the same year the African elephant was listed under Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

    Destruction of Kenya’s tree cover, soil erosion and changing rainfall patterns also became public issues. The felling of trees for land settlement and the production of charcoal were particular problems. Charcoal was now worth K£1,000 per tonne in the Middle East, and 80,000 tonnes a year was exported by 1975. Eventually, after dockworkers refused to load more ships, the Government was forced to introduce a total ban on charcoal exports, to replace the partial ban in force (which meant that only senior figures such as PCs could carry out the trade).

    Kenyatta’s fading grip made corruption both easier and safer. Civil servants’ freedom to conduct business allowed officials to reward themselves and to misuse State resources for private gain. Bribery was now required to obtain most licences, permits or quotas, particularly for foreigners. By 1975, the Government itself was inveighing against the collapse in civil service mores.

    The Ndegwa Report was widely blamed: “Overnight, Government offices became ‘official’ quarters for commercial transactions and heavy private deals. Government vehicles became means of private interests. Government ‘stamps’ and licenses became commercialised.”

    Massive corruption had finally crept, with devastating impact, into one of the most prestigious of civil services in Africa.

    Land grabbing

    Parastatals were particularly prone to abuse, especially the EAC’s organisations, as the victim was remote. For different reasons, the big urban councils were even more corrupt and incompetent than central government, since they were less internationally visible and accounting standards were lower; Mombasa Municipal Council was dissolved in 1977, while in the same year the first probes began into Nairobi City Council’s procurement practices.

    Land grabbing — the process of selling or giving State land to private individuals, to develop or sell — was becoming more common, though it was less politically charged than it was to become under Moi, when the supply of undeveloped land had run out. When Kenyatta’s nephew Muigai married Isaiah Mathenge’s daughter in 1976, for example, Kenyatta’s wedding present was a large tract of Government land. Such technically legal processes were supplemented illegally in most local lands offices, as cartels stole land, destroyed and forged documents, and sold the resulting plots on to others.

    In August 1975, the British Sunday Times ran a series of exposés of the alleged avarice of the Kenyatta family. It detailed how the family had forced the sale of the Inchcape trading group (which included the Ford vehicle franchise) to a consortium of family members, the price to be paid in instalments out of profits.
    It further exposed the family’s involvement in ivory exports, and the impossibility of collecting debts owed by the ‘royal family’, as they were now known. It also detailed how Kenyatta personally approved the purchase of large farms by his family, exempting them from review by land control boards. It listed the vast farms the family had acquired in the Rift Valley, including six farms owned by Kenyatta himself, a 26,000-acre farm owned by Mama Ngina in Kiambu, and her farm in Rongai next to Kenyatta’s own.
    (Several other vast properties were listed as belonging to President Kenyatta and his family.)

    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000058027&pageNo=1

  • When Kenyatta lost control of events in Government

    Sunday, 13 May 2012 14:15
    Written by CHARLES HORNSBY – Sunday Standard

    There was little change in President Kenyatta’s Cabinet after the General Election of October 1974. He kept Moi, Mbiyu Koinange, Julius Kiano, Mwai Kibaki, Jeremiah Nyagah, James Gichuru, Jackson Angaine, Isaac Omolo-Okero and Charles Njonjo in their jobs, the most stable ministerial team Kenya has ever seen. He appointed only five new ministers.

    He brought in Munyua Waiyaki, who had resigned in 1966 in sympathy with former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, to replace Njoroge Mungai as foreign minister. Daniel Mutinda replaced Eliud Mwendwa as the minister for Ukambani. Stanley Oloitipitip, Mathew Ogutu (replacing William Omamo) and Eliud Mwamunga were the other new arrivals.

    Kenyatta also appointed Kenya’s first female assistant minister, Dr Julia Ojiambo, predictably to Housing and Social Services. Geoffrey Kariithi remained permanent secretary in the Office of the President and secretary to the Cabinet, and more than half the permanent secretaries were Kikuyu.

    Tribal unions
    Amongst Kenyatta’s 12 nominations to Parliament were two representatives of Kenya’s increasingly influential ethnic or tribal unions: Njenga Karume, chairman of Gema, and Mulu Mutisya, leader of the New Akamba Union (NAU). Mutisya, an illiterate businessman and ex-detainee, had formed NAU in 1961, and used it to entrench his influence amongst the Kamba.

    He was to remain a nominated MP for the next 18 years. Njenga Karume, too, was a self-made businessman who wielded great influence in government and amongst the Kikuyu. Another ex-detainee, he had become one of the largest beer distributors in Kiambu.

    The unofficial opposition was finally excluded from the Government, as Kenyatta dropped re-elected assistant ministers JM Kariuki, Charles Rubia, Burudi Nabwera and Martin Shikuku. The pro-Odinga Luo also received little consideration.

    Omolo-Okero retained his ministerial position, and even Omamo, defeated in Bondo, was nominated to Parliament in 1975. Another opportunity to change direction had been lost.

    Although Kenyatta projected authority in public, he found it increasingly hard to lead the Government, yet there seemed little chance that anyone would take the reins of power gently from the old man’s hands. Despite recurrent blood clots and bouts of unconsciousness, Kenyatta declined to prepare for the inevitable.

    Secret session
    It was soon clear that the Government was going to have trouble controlling the National Assembly. When it reassembled on November 6, 1974, the uncontroversial Speaker Fred Mati was re-elected easily.

    However, to the Government’s horror, dissident Marie Jean Seroney was the sole candidate for the post of deputy speaker. Kenyatta summoned a secret session to try to delay the election; he failed, and immediately prorogued Parliament.

    There were rumours that Kenyatta had threatened Seroney with detention (and had also allocated him a farm), but the opposition was galvanised by recent corruption allegations, the election results and increased Western attention (including protests by the US Ambassador at the mistreatment of US citizens).

    Although Seroney was the focus of conflict, JM Kariuki remained the unofficial opposition’s leader, spearheading the fight against capitalism, corruption, the land deals with the United Kingdom, and the increasing wealth of the business, political and administrative elites.

    Personal enrichment
    Although many saw him as inheriting Bildad Kaggia’s role as a defender of socialism, collectivism and the Kikuyu underclass, Odinga was unequivocal: “Like Kenyatta, (JM) loved wealth and possessions.” Odinga suggested the Nyandarua MP had been quickly corrupted, and had used his connections and talents for personal enrichment. Kariuki was an unlikely popular martyr.

    In early 1975, the first bombs to strike independent Kenya exploded. In February, there were two blasts in central Nairobi, inside the Starlight nightclub and in a travel bureau near the Hilton hotel. The day after the second explosion, JM Kariuki revealed in Parliament that his car had been hit “by what seemed to be bullets”.

    There were rumours of a botched attempt on his life. They were followed by a more serious blast in a Nairobi bus on March 1, which killed 30 people. Despite a massive public outcry and a police manhunt, no arrests were made. For several days thereafter, the city lived in fear, destabilised by numerous telephone bomb hoaxes. Someone was creating a climate of fear.

    On March 2, 1975, the day after the OTC bus blast, security officials including General Service Unit commander Ben Gethi publicly accosted JM Kariuki outside the Hilton hotel. Various police officers, including European police reservist Patrick Shaw, had been following JM throughout the day. Gethi asked Kariuki to accompany the security officials into a convoy of cars and took him to an unknown destination.

    The next day, Maasai herdsmen discovered his tortured and mutilated corpse in the Ngong hills near Nairobi. The killers had burnt his face with acid to prevent identification of the body, as his fingerprints were gone. However, the acid had deterred scavengers, and his body was still identifiable.

    Nonetheless, police sent the corpse to the mortuary as an unknown victim.

    After Kariuki’s disappearance, there was a lull of five days while friends and family tried to discover his whereabouts. There were rumours that he had been detained. Finally, on March 7, Assistant Minister Justus ole Tipis admitted to the National Assembly that Kariuki was missing.

    The same day, Kenyatta, returning to Nairobi from a month-long stay in Nakuru, made a veiled speech that appealed for order, and warned “the Government would have no mercy on any individual or group that attempted to disrupt peace and harmony in Kenya”. Kenyatta knew what was to come.

    On Saturday March 8, the Daily Nation reported that Kariuki was in Zambia, although the news desk already had sworn statements that the corpse in the mortuary was his; editor-in-chief George Githii ordered a reluctant news desk to print this misinformation.

    Investigate killing
    On March 11, nine days after his abduction, Kariuki’s wife identified his body in the mortuary, after which armed GSU sealed off the building. At the same time, Moi was making a statement, reporting that Kariuki’s whereabouts were still unknown.

    On March 12, Police Commissioner Bernard Hinga finally confirmed that Kariuki was dead, killed by two bullet wounds. He claimed that the “partial decomposition” of the body had made identification impossible.

    Kariuki’s death also roused the National Assembly into open hostility. MPs immediately demanded an investigation into the murder. On March 14, Parliament appointed a Select Committee to investigate the killing.

  • Kisumu Molasses

    Charlie #130: You seem angry in your comment yet cannot pen your thoughts freely by quoting sources in the matter of the Kisumu Molasses Plant. KSB has a lot of room, so just sit and dig out from those Archives (that you are not utilizing), then write as much dirt on Raila Odinga as you can get. This thread is about Uhuru Kenyatta’s wealth and its origins. Those expressing themselves without citing sources are doing so within their legal rights of freedom of expression; courtesy of Osewe, the Blog owner and Moderator. Just for the records, the Molasses Plant saga has done rounds many times and when an Inquiry was commissioned by the first Kibaki Government to investigate its acquisition, it was found that there had been no wrongdoing. Part of the Report was published in the Standard in 2004.

    The former Commissioner of Lands, Sammy K. Mwaita, publicly confirmed that the land sale was legal. Here, below, are excepts from a report in The Standard (August 22, 2004). The report quotes Mr. Mwaita stating that allegations of impropriety were either based on ignorance or malice.

    Mwaita said the Molasses land would have cost at least Sh20 million at market rates. But the rates did not apply to Spectre because of the legal provision that land for development purposes is allocated at concessionary rate of 20 per cent of the market value.

    “Anything that generates employment or taxes for the government and is being initiated on government land gets concessions from the government,” Mwaita said. “The market rates apply when you are buying from a private individual. That is provided for in the Government Lands Act,” he says.

    “The government does not sell land to make a profit. It is not a profit making entity,” Mwaita explained, adding that it is for this reason the government insists that those allocated must develop it to justify the concession. “It is for that reason that the government does not allow individuals to get land from it and sell for profit because that abuses the logic of the concessions,” he explained.

    “If the Government is going to investigate Spectre over Molasses land, it must investigate the whole country. No factory I know of paid market rates on land. The 20 per cent rule applied to Kicomi, Raymonds, Thika Textiles, the refinery plant in Mombasa. Every factory in this country,” Mwaita added.

    He spoke to the Sunday Standard as controversy raged over the plant’s ownership, with the Odinga family fighting back with documents “to prove that the molasses plant was indeed on sale in 1996.”

    Roads and Public Works minister Raila Odinga, the public face of Spectre, also maintained that he should be rewarded rather than vilified over the project. Raila questioned the government’s authority over the Molasses Plant, saying it was never a state corporation.

    “We revived what had defeated the government. People had come with flames to cut the metals and sell them off cheaply. We saved it. That is not a person you call a thief. You are a candidate for a presidential award,” Raila told the Sunday Standard on telephone.

    On LEGAL PROCEDURES, Mwaita explained away the time delay for completing the deal as occasioned by legal procedures that had to be followed before the request could be accepted or rejected.

    “First the application must be received and acknowledged,” he said. “We then don’t make a decision until we get clear proposals on planning of the land which sets out land use as required by the Physical Planning Act of 1996.”

    Mwaita said the Part Development Plan (PDP) had to be submitted by the Provincial Physical Planner to the minister for Lands, which was done on May 5, 2001. According to Mwaita, the minister approved the PDP on May 30, which was followed by the other legal processes of valuation, the ascribing of the premium before the letters of allotment were issued on approved PDP and titled. (end of excerpt)

  • lazy bornes write like that. wake up and work hard like mzee. he said uhuru na kazi. your small god told you not yet uhuru and you waited for manna from heaven. you are still waiting. stop being envious and start contributing to nation building.

  • MUNGIKI WERE ON ITEERE LIST AT STATE HOUSE .
    Thursday, 21 June 2012 00:02 BY STAR TEAM

    Fresh details have emerged about contacts between PNU officials and alleged Mungiki members before the November 26, 2007 meeting with President Kibaki at State House. In January, Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere released a list of 33 ‘guests’ who visited State House on November 26.

    The alleged meeting is part of the ICC case against Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former Civil Service boss Francis Muthaura. Star investigations now indicate that at least two and possibly four guests on November 26 were in fact Mungiki members, even if their State House hosts did not realise it. State House has repeatedly denied that Mungiki members were at the meeting.

    The Mungiki attended as part of a lobby group named Operation Kibaki Again. Six youth groups attended the meeting. Mungiki members interviewed by the Star said that a top parastatal officer advised them to adopt a new name because they could not register as Mungiki when entering State House. Nairobi businessman Godfrey Machira also visited State House as part of the OKA delegation. ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said he was the link man between Mungiki and State House.

    The four OKA members who went to the State House meeting were Maina Kangethe alias Maina Diambo; Godwin Kamau, also known as Godwin Wangoe Kamau; Anthony Kamau, also known as Anthony Gikura Kamau; Amos Kamande were all representatives of OKA. Maina Diambo was the Nairobi coordinator for Mungiki and the acting leader of Mungiki while Maina Njenga was in jail. Amos Kamande was the Mungiki coordinator for Kayole.

    Maina Diambo was an executive committee member of OKA. He mysteriously disappeared in 2009, allegedly lured to his death by a top civil servant in the Office of the President. The top civil servant is not Francis Muthaura. At the State House meeting Godwin Kamau presented the OKA petition to President Kibaki demanding the release of Maina Njenga from prison; an end to extrajudicial killing; and that more youth be absorbed into the military.

    Machira was the link between OKA and State House. He was requested by top Party of National Unity officials to mobilise the youth to support Kibaki for a second term. Machira then recruited the four OKA members who visited State House and who were supposed to mobilise youths, hawkers, and musicians. Machira has since gone into hiding. “State House is a public property that is revered by many. There were 33 people representing eight groups who attended the meeting and none of them identified him or herself as Mungiki,” Iteere said in January.

    Iteere said the names of visitors to State House are vetted in advance. Machira met the OKA delegation on several occasions. On October 13, he met three Mungiki leaders at a bar in Nairobi’s River Road area. Mungiki, PNU representatives,a top PCEA clergyman and a top state corporation official reportedly met on October 19 and 25 at a high class Nairobi hotel. At that stage there was no question of violence or intimidation. They only discussed the possibility of Mungiki supporting President Kibaki. Estimates of Mungiki membership range from 200,000 to two million.

    It was agreed that Mungiki leader Maina Njenga be consulted before the sect declare their support for Kibaki. Mungiki also demanded the release of Njenga from prison. On November 7, Machira met Mungiki representatives in the same hotel and reported that the state had accepted to negotiate with Njenga who then serving a sentence at Naivasha prison for possession of a firearm and marijuana.

    On November 8, Mungiki representatives together with a government official went to Naivasha prison and Njenga agreed that the Mungiki should support PNU. On November 9, Mungiki leaders started campaigning for Kibaki in Central Province. The ICC judges prosecution alleged that the State house meeting was attended by then State House Comptroller Hyslop Ipu, Presidential Press Service head Isaya Kabira, presidential adviser Stanley Murage, Uhuru and Muthaura. “After hearing the Mungiki demands, the President addressed Mr. Muthaura telling him something to the effect of: “You have heard what the youth want, so now it is upon you,”” a prosecution witness claimed.

    The ICC evidence referred to three Mungiki members at the meeting including Maina Kang’ethe Diambo and two others whose names are redacted. Those who attended the State House meeting were classed in groups as Warembo Na Kibaki, Vijana na Kibaki, Kipya Youth Interparties, PNU Youth Alliance, Kanu Youth, Kawa, and OKA.

    On January 27 this year, Iteere released the names of 33 people who visited State House. They were Martha Wangare, Naisiae Karia, Beryl Oyier, Lydia Martha, Patrick Ngatia, Joseph Kioko, Sakaja Johnstone, Job Wamalwa, Andrew Wakahiu, Thomas Mbewa, Jonathan Katiku, Yvonne Khamati , Leon Ndubai; James Mathenge; Jack Wamboka, Evans Gor Semilango, Patrick Kokonya, George Nyongesa, Ken Orengo, Badi Ali, Kamau Mugo, James Munene, Nahashon Maina, Mary Githinji, Godfrey Machira, Godwin Kamau, Maina Kangethe, Anthony Kamau, Hosiah Mwangi, Amos Kamande, Nelson Githaiga, Mwende Mwinzi and Leeh Nyachae.

    A former Nairobi MP and a children’s rights activist were also at State House that day although their names are not on Iteere’s list, according to recent interviews by the Star.

  • Uhuru Kenyatta’s Political Double Trouble

    Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidential ambitions suffered double tragedy following the death of environment minister John Michuki and former defense minister
    Njenga Karume. The two were deeply involved in Uhuru’s presidential campaign strategy projecting him as the Kikuyu ethnic group flag bearer. Most pronounced on the matter was Michuki, who in 2010 called on the Kikuyu community to rally behind Uhuru in readiness for the 2012 presidential race to take over from President Mwai Kibaki.
    The minister implored members of the Kikuyu tribe, wherever they are, to support Uhuru as their leader and warned those in the community aspiring for the presidency that they would be publicly shamed politically if they did not toe the line.

    In Uhuru’s own Kiambu County, Karume was Kenyatta family’s staunchest supporter. He and Uhuru’s mother Mama Ngina Kenyatta and his uncle Ngengi Muigai, founded the Kenya Democratic Party (DP) in 1992 to purposely block Jaramogi Oginga Odinga from State House tenancy when it became obvious that the Forum for Restoration of
    Democracy (Ford), would rout the then ruling Kanu from power. Initially they asked former foreign minister Munyua Waiyaki to head DP but Waiyaki convinced Kibaki to take the leadership. Thereafter Njenga became the chief DP bank roller spending millions of his own money.

    In 2002, Karume dumped Kibaki and DP to join and support Uhuru’s presidential race on
    Kanu ticket against Kibaki. He even won back his Kiambaa seat, which he had lost to a Ford Asili candidate in 1997. His return to Kanu to support Uhuru reminded many of his post-independence affinity to Uhuru’s father Jomo Kenyatta, who facilitated the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (Gema) acquisition of huge tracts offormer colonial settlers farms in the Rift Valley. Indeed, Kenyatta transformed Karume from a charcoal burner to a multi-millionaire.

    It came as no surprise in 2008 that Uhuru and Karume teamed up to mobilize and finance
    reprisal and counter attacks against post election perpetrators, who were targeting the Kikuyu settlers and their businesses in the Rift Valley, using Mungiki. The two were also hefty beneficiaries of internally displaced persons (IDPs), resettlement program that saw them cash in billions of shillings after selling off some of their Rift Valley farms at what insiders describe as “hugely inflated prices”. Uhuru is no ordinary politician. He was literally born with a silver spoon in his mouth. Michuki’s move appears to have been a scheme intended to weed out the “low breed” Kikuyu presidential aspirants come 2012.

    To Kenyatta era beneficiaries, he is the right pedigree that can protect those who inherited and continue to enjoy the fruits of the British colonial government and exploit the Kenyan natural resources along with the masses. Michuki could not trust power in the hands of people like internal security minister George Saitoti, Narc-Kenya chair Martha Karua or planning assistant minister Peter Kenneth. Martha was quick to dismiss Michuki
    as a man who was still living in the dark days of Kanu dictatorship under Uhuru’s father
    Kenyatta and former dictator Daniel arap Moi.

    Kenneth said Kenya was under a new constitutional and political dispensation with no room for hand picking political leaders. Cynically, he added Kenyans, “however senile”, were free to express their opinions. Martha reminded Kenyans that Uhuru was the unsuccessful Nyayo project in 2002 and warned that if he was anybody’s project this time round, Kenyans “will have the last laugh”. Her views were shared by several other politicians from Central Kenya. Some thought that Michuki belonged to a fast dying political dinosaur species of despots. But some Kikuyu chauvinists in parliament, including Naivasha MP John Mututho and the then Kamukunji’s Simon Mbugua, supported Michuki. Mbugua was subsequently shown the door out of Parliament in a petion late 2011.

    Mututho’s position was understandable being the only Kanu MP in the Rift Valley. Even PNU ministers were divided over Michuki’s anointment of Uhuru. Energy minister and
    then PNU secretary general Kiraitu Murungi said the people of Gikuyu, Embu and Meru were not consulted and, in any case, they would not elect someone because he is one of them or a neighbour but voters will be interested in a person’s performance history. Nairobi metropolitan development minister Njeru Githae, said whereas it may be important for Kikuyu community to have a spokesman, it did not mean he was their presidential candidate.

    Githae was of the view that the fragmented political leadership within central Kenya would be a recipe for defeat by Raila Odinga’s ODM. Uhuru considers billionaire Saitoti his greatest threat for the populous central Kenya vote in the presidential race. The Party of National Unity (PNU) insiders say Uhuru is determined to shunt Saitoti out of the race by using Kanu loyalists to derail Saitoti. The departure of Energy Minister Murungi as PNU secretary general and formation of the Alliance Party of Kenya is seen as an elaborate plot to shunt Saitoti and derail Raila in favour of Uhuru. The same spirit is driving the so-called G7 group comprising Uhuru, William Ruto, Eugene Wamalwa
    all of whom want the presidency. Unfortunately for Saitoti, Uhuru has the resources. He inherited an endowment of multi-billion-shillings wealth in cash and assets, that transverse the Coast, Central and Rift Valley provinces, from his father and Kenya’s first president Kenyatta. The Kenyatta family continues to harvest billions of shillings in minerals and gemstones, sold in French jewelry stores, after exploitation from Taita Taveta districts, whose land is largely owned by the family at the expense of indigenous populations living there as squatters.

    They say leopards cannot change their spots and the young Kenyatta is what the Swahili
    would call mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka. He owes his presidential ambitions to his family tree and the key beneficiaries of his father’s regime excessive exploits – including
    Moi. Young as he may have been when his father started the Gatundu self-help hospital, he has done nothing to get the government, if not by his own benevolence, develop the dilapidated health centre into a modern medical facility. Gatundu South constituency is among the leaders in jigger population among school age children and poverty levels in the country. Jigger infestation is a direct result of poverty and lack of clean water supply – nothing else!

    Ichaweri, Uhuru’s rural homestead in Gatundu, is an island of plenty in the midst of barren poverty. Local neighbours were forced to sell their farms to create room for expansionist Kenyatta. The Ichaweri farm appears as if it was transplanted from colonial master’s Devonshire in the United Kingdom. Other Kenyatta family farms within Central Province run into thousands of acres in area, while those in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces sit on tens of square kilometers. Uhuru’s family and personal wealth runs into billions upon billions of shillings – may be a couple of trillions. He will never want and has never known the colour or shape of poverty except in photographs when Kenya appeals for famine relief. If multi-billionaire Uhuru can’t fight jiggers and poverty or initiate clean water supply, even through the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), in a small constituency of Gatundu South, what can he do for 40 million Kenyans – more than 65 per cent of them living in poverty, hunger and disease among other social maladies? Uhuru does not represent the face of the transformation that Kenyans and their country need. Besides, Kenyans should never encourage dynasties to avoid future blood shed.

    Uhuru put up a spirited presidential campaign machine in 2002, as former president Moi’s project, but lost to President Kibaki, who led the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Narc) to a resounding victory over Kanu. Although he dipped his hands on the immense family riches, Uhuru did not make any noticeable dent on its deep-seated treasure trove. Under normal circumstances he would be expected to use the extensive Kanu national network as party chairman. However, his command of the party has been diminishing since mid-2007 when Kanu decided not to sponsor a presidential candidate but instead supported Kibaki for a second term. The deputy premier has been doing battle with the Rift Valley politicians anxious to lay their hands on the party. Former dictator Moi’s son Gideon has been engineering a palace coup without success. Gideon has been
    scheming to run away with Kanu as a Rift Valley (read Kalenjin) party – a move fully supported by his father.

    However, Uhuru appears to have a firm grip on the national delegates, who endorsed him as chairman last time they met. But, Kanu saw the emergence of a splinter group led by former cabinet minister Nicholas Kipyatoo Biwott who has since bought his own political party. Uhuru’s strongest political base is his home district of greater Kiambu. When Moi hand-picked him as the presidential candidate, most Kiambu politicians stood by him including long time then DP patron Karume. Many of them now want him to join the proposed Alliance Party of Kenya. They say Uhuru cannot win as the Kanu head. With the demise of Michuki and Karume, Uhuru’s presidential bid has suffered a major blow.

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) trial, if it proceeds as many expect, will be the last nail into the coffin of his presidential hopes. Constitutional affairs and national coherence minister Mutula Kilonzo says Uhuru’s appeal before the ICC is based on the “jurisdiction of a dead duck in a dirty pond”. The proponents of Kiraitu’s proposed Alliance think if they front a single presidential candidate, it would beat ODM, in Raila’s favourite sports language football, 9-0. To them victory would only come if PNU chairman George Saitoti, ODM-Kenya-turned-Wiper Democratic Movement, chairman
    Kalonzo Musyoka, Kanu Chairman Uhuru, and Narc-Kenya chairman Martha Karua, (plus Wamalwa of New FORD-Kenya perhaps) agree on a single candidate. Otherwise with a divided PNU fraternity, victory in 2012 will most likely go to ODM, which is also going through tribulations especially in the Rift Valley and Western provinces. Saitoti has declared his name will be on the ballot come what may but has yet to launch his campaign officially. He also has a major task of rebranding himself and the PNU.

    http://kenyaconfidential.com/index.php/breaking-news/34-local/63-uhuru-kenyattas-political-double-tragedy?format=pdf

  • How Kenyatta’s inaction paved the way to official corruption and impunity
    Saturday, March 20 2010 at 21:00

    The Nation’s founding editor, Mr Michael Curtis, believed he had found the perfect successor to editor-in-chief Hillary Ng’weno in George Githii, Kenyatta’s press secretary.

    A small, nattily dressed man who usually wore a spotted bow tie (and often a gun under his immaculate business suit), Githii was to prove a courageous, wayward, devious, sometimes vindictive, often brilliant editor, who had no qualms about using the newspaper as his personal weapon on the political battlefield.

    During two turbulent spells at the helm, Githii probably inflicted more agony on his mentors than all the other editors put together. Curtis was not to know this, however, when he reported, “Very good news is that the President has agreed to release his Press Secretary to take over from Ng’weno”.

    Thus the former trainee with both the Standard and the Nation was hired at £2,500 per annum (car allowance £15 per month) as the Daily Nation’s fourth editor in six years. He promptly leapt into the fray.

    Public funds

    Official corruption and misuse of public funds had already begun to gnaw at the national fabric, but they were rarely referred to in public.
    Githii broke the taboo.

    When he discovered that Alderman Charles Rubia, Mayor of Nairobi, planned to have the City Council buy him a luxury Rolls-Royce limousine for his official duties, Githii launched a virulent campaign, including page-one editorials that demanded to know why the mayor couldn’t use his recently bought Humber Super Snipe and, what’s more, how come a certain £300-per-annum council clerk could be suddenly promoted to a £1,180-per-annum job?

    These were questions which excited ordinary Kenyans and the Nation’s sales soared. Kenyatta banned the car.

    With corruption by now inching its way onto the public agenda, the next item was altogether more serious. John Platter recalled in a note to the author: “A civic-minded (or disgruntled) former colonial civil servant who was at that time attached to the Maize Marketing Board telephoned me one day, sounding very furtive. We arranged to meet at the Thorn Tree café outside the New Stanley Hotel and he came with a heavy, thick folder which purported to prove that his chairman, Paul Ngei, was embezzling furiously.

    Ngei, a one-time detainee with Kenyatta, was a political heavyweight but he was a thorn in the side of the government and in particular of Charles Njonjo. Was this a set-up to get him or was he really purloining the country’s granary? I mulled over the papers for a few days, made a few calls, then took the story but not the papers or my source, to Githii, who could hardly contain his excitement.

    George relayed the information to State House, so he told me, and said he had permission to go after Ngei. I wrote the story, George wrote a thundering leader, there was fury from the Ngei camp and Kenyatta ordered a Commission of Inquiry. We trooped over and solemnly gave our evidence and it began to look like an open and shut case of corruption [especially when Kenyatta suspended Ngei from the Cabinet].”

    Quietly forgotten

    But in a way that Kenyans were to become familiar with, that is where it ended. Elections were coming and the value to Kanu of Ngei and his Kamba support was critical. The Commission was quietly forgotten.

    In one sense, Platter believes, this was fair: “Corruption was already rife, even in the higher quarters, and to single out Ngei would have been subjective targeting for political ends”. Platter’s footnote: “Soon after that, I encountered Njonjo and Ngei together at the sauna at the Norfolk Hotel. We laughed about it all as we sweated out the night before.”

    In retrospect, this early failure to act against corruption was a milestone on Kenya’s journey into venality at an official level.

    The difficulties of law enforcement and the inequalities between the races in colonial times had predisposed Kenyan society to securing advantage by favour and, as far back as 1907, Lord Delamere wrote, “Time after time I have heard a native say they have been stopped by an Indian policeman and when I asked them how they got away, they always said, ‘Oh, I gave him something’”.

    Nyeri speech

    The phrase came to resonate in the modern era when kitu kidogo (something small) became synonymous with a bribe.

    In a landmark Nyeri speech in 1952, Kenyatta said, “We despise bribery and corruption, those two words that the European repeatedly refers to. Bribery and corruption are prevalent in this country, but I am not surprised. As long as people are held down, corruption is sure to rise and the only answer to this is a policy of equality.”

    Unhappily, Kenyatta did not seem to despise bribery and corruption enough, nor did it disappear with the achievement of at least political equality.

    By ignoring the opportunity in Ngei’s case to demonstrate that even the most powerful of men are subject to the common law, Kenyatta paved the way to a shark-like feeding frenzy among men of power which eventually became endemic at all levels of society.

    Malcolm MacDonald, Kenya’s last Governor, first and last Governor-General, then first High Commissioner for Britain in Nairobi, was a fervent admirer of Kenyatta, but nine years after independence he wrote: “One of Kenyatta’s most serious errors is his tacit assent to the acquisitiveness of some of his ministers and civil servants. Soon after attaining power, they began to buy (sometimes with money gained by dubious means) large houses, farms, motor cars and other possessions. This development not only tainted his administration with a reputation for corruption, but also produced a wide economic division between governors and governed, haves and have-nots … it would have been more prudent as well as moral if Kenyatta had enforced on his colleagues and subordinates a stricter code of conduct, preventing them from becoming such a conspicuously privileged class.”

    Gatundu hospital

    That men and women close to Kenyatta enriched themselves handsomely during his 15-year reign is not in doubt. Kenyatta’s favourite charity was the Gatundu Self-Help Hospital in his own backyard. During the 1960s and 1970s, visitors of consequence, particularly businessmen, were expected to beat a path to State House and hand over the obligatory cheque for the Gatundu hospital.

    Hundreds of fund-raisers were staged on its behalf. A common joke was that it was a “self-help” project, because the Kenyatta courtiers helped themselves to the proceeds.

    Summing up the era was this much-repeated story: During an official tour upcountry, Kenyatta spotted a farm he fancied and instructed an aide to acquire it for him. Timidly, the man said that was impossible. Impossible! Was he not the President! Indeed, yes, but Mama Ngina (his wife) already had it.

    Certainly, it was in the post-Kenyatta years that corruption became systematised, with an exponential increase in land-grabbing and the amassing of vast personal wealth by politicians. But it can be argued that the conditions for the spread of corruption through a once-pristine civil service, signalling a national free-for-all, were set, with the best of intentions by the Ndegwa Commission in the Kenyatta era.

    Duncan Ndegwa, head of the Civil Service and for many years Governor of the Central Bank, chaired a year-long inquiry into Public Service Structure and Remuneration in 1971.

    It concluded that to maintain civil servants’ living standards and motivation at a time when many bright Kenyans were going into the better-paid private sector, they should be permitted to engage in business, provided their business was not similar to their work responsibilities – thus an official in the housing department should not be involved with a house-building company.

    This precaution was widely ignored; personal business soon took precedence over public duty and the “coat on the chair” made its appearance as a signal to colleagues: the bureaucrat would hang his coat over the back of his office chair and go off to attend to his private business.

    Said anti-corruption activist John Githongo in an interview: “The Ndegwa Commission legitimised something that had already started to happen and which led ministers and government people to use all manner of means to earn some money.

    For instance, civil servants arranged for the government to buy goods from their own companies. What it did was change the entire culture of Kenya so that these things were no longer wrong.

    It coincided with pressures on Asians who had decided to stay after independence. They had to pay off government godfathers for trading licences and work permits. All this turned civil servants into criminals ethically but people stopped asking them, “Where are you getting your money?”

    What helped to entrench corruption was Nairobi’s business expansion and the fact that many Kenyans, including ministers and senior civil servants, were offered directorships by companies under pressure from Africanisation.

    This new nexus legalised the dubious relationships which had already started to develop, and Kenya assumed the nature of an aggressively capitalist society. President Nyerere described Kenya as a dog-eat-dog society.

    The first huge tender fraud involved the £25 million Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in 1978 that expanded and largely replaced the Embakasi facility, which had been built by Mau Mau detainees. A high civil servant made so much money out of kickbacks that he was able to retire early in comfort.

    The money-earning techniques employed on the airport construction pointed the way to the massive and systematic corruption of later years.

    Karl Ziegler, who was a banker in Kenya between 1969 and 1980, said in an interview: “The Mister Ten Percents became Mister Twenty Percents. It was more than bribery, it was extortion, protection money. If negotiations on a project were not going well, somebody very high in government would pick up the phone and say, “The head of state thinks that your operation is very attractive and if you want to go on making the money you are making, then you look after Kanu, or whatever organisation might be named.”

    A Western diplomat who served in Kenya in the 1970s and then later in the 1980s said: “Whatever corruption there was in the earlier 70s did not have a distorting effect on the economy, it didn’t mean that bad projects or uneconomic projects were undertaken. By the time I went back in the 1980s, that was undoubtedly true.”

    Projects were built which had no economic rationale, simply because it was in the interests of a particular individual that they should be built and when they were built that their companies should get the benefit of the investment. In the 1980s, corruption was a major topic for diplomats and presented problems for any of us who were dealing with the commercial side.

    Githii’s first serious clash with the government came when he opposed the Preservation of Public Security Bill of 1966, which provided for detention without trial and other special measures under emergency powers granted to the President to combat threats to national security.

    Attorney-General Njonjo argued that the measures were temporary and subject to Parliament; they were needed to deal with external aggressors, arms smugglers, rumour-mongers and “people who meet in secret against whom no evidence can be found”.

    Very dangerous

    Only one member of the House of Representatives, G.J. Mbogo (Embu North) voted against the Bill, describing it as “very dangerous, South African-style legislation”, but a former Kanu official, the gadfly Martin Shikuku, objected that there was no limit to the period of detention.

    “Does the Attorney-General intend to detain people until they die?” he asked. Several members objected that the legislation would require yet another amendment to the new constitution, which was beginning to look patchy. Githii’s editorials went for the jugular.

    The Bill, he said, “provides for preventive detention, restriction and the compulsory movement of people; it seems to legalise censorship of ideas and information; it has provisions for the control of associations and societies. This is an issue of grave national importance [which] affects not only the liberty of this generation but also that of posterity.”

    Absolute power

    Then, in a reference which infuriated Njonjo, he said: “For these reasons, this newspaper does not flatter Mr Kenyatta or the government or the country by asserting that all these proposed powers are called for. An administration should not be allowed to have absolute power, there must be checks and balances.”

    As to promises that the powers would not be abused, Githii noted perceptively, “We may accept Mr Kenyatta’s assurances, but we should not presuppose the benevolence of those in power in, say, 30 years’ time.”

    Responding in Parliament, Mboya said, “I respect the Daily Nation and I respect the editor. But, on this occasion, I disagree and disagree wholeheartedly.

    “Reading the Nation, I got the impression that all the laws of Kenya were going to be suspended. Have we got to be told like a pack of schoolboys so we obey the wishes of the Nation?’” (In fact, Githii, who received Curtis’ strong support for his stand, had warned Mboya he was going to write the editorial and offered him space to reply.)

    Njonjo described Githii’s reference to not flattering Kenyatta as “the height of conceit” and warned, “if newspapers want to continue publishing in this country, it behoves them to be careful … this Bill is not a Preventive Detention Act, as the Nation would like to think. Kenya is not abandoning the rule of law, this is where the Nation has got it wrong. We used to complain that Europeans managing this newspaper were irresponsible. The editor of this newspaper today is an African.”

    Public condemnation apart, Githii was also subjected to private pressure. After his first editorial, he was summoned to State House and a meeting with Kenyatta and Njonjo. Kenyatta listened attentively to his arguments and simply warned him not to go “too far”.

    When he wrote a second editorial, Githii was telephoned by Police Commissioner Bernard Hinga, an old friend from his school days, who suggested that Githii had made his point and he would be wise not to carry the campaign any further.

    Although the government took no action against Githii, a few months later, the Nation’s foreign editor, John Dumoga, a feisty, diminutive Ghanaian, was given 24 hours to leave the country.

    Privately, Njonjo told Curtis that Dumoga had been criticising the government openly and the President would not tolerate that sort of thing.

    Perhaps more to the point, Dumoga was a close friend of Githii and a known opponent of the Public Security Bill – he had been a victim of similar legislation under Kwame Nkrumah – and his deportation was seen in Nation House as an unsubtle warning to the Editor-in-Chief.

    Privately, Curtis wrote, “Lively independent journalism is becoming harder and harder to achieve. Political control or influence over the Press is becoming more marked and the shadow of the Preventive Detention Act looms large over everyone”.

    Hindsight was to prove Githii’s fears wholly justified.

    By the time Kenyatta died in 1978, at least 26 people were being held in preventive detention and, though they were freed by President Moi, detention without trial came back into regular use under Moi himself.

    When Githii protested again, this time in an editorial in the Standard, he was fired the same day, and left journalism and Kenya, too. Whatever the protestations of Njonjo, it was clear that internal developments were the raison d’être of the Bill rather than any threat of external aggression.

    Earlier, a Kanu conference at Limuru had abolished the post of party vice-president held by Oginga Odinga which made him vice-president of Kenya, too.

    Eight vice-presidents representing the provinces were installed instead but Odinga was not nominated and, without a post of any sort, he resigned and formed an opposition party, the Kenya People’s Union.

    Joseph Murumbi succeeded him in government but resigned a few months later, and Moi became the new national Vice-President.

    The Limuru changes effectively removed Odinga from the race for the presidency, a result which those close to Kenyatta had long sought. Odinga was joined in the KPU by radicals such as Bildad Kaggia, Achieng Oneko and Tom Okello Odongo, and by trade unionists including Dennis Akumu and O.O. Mak’Anyengo. They promised to pursue “truly socialist policies to benefit the people”.

    Mboya swiftly crafted legislation providing that National Assembly members who crossed the floor must seek the voters’ mandate anew under their fresh colours, and with 30 seats thus made vacant, a “little General Election” was called.

    As the campaign got under way, Kenyatta pointedly declared: “I have today given my assent to the Public Security Act and will now deal very firmly with all trouble-makers”.

    When polling day came, the KPU was crushed by Kanu and only Odinga and seven of his colleagues were returned. Kaggia and Oneko were among the vanquished. It was not long before KPU adherents began filling the detention cells under the new legislation.

    All this excitement did nothing to hurt newspaper sales. The main focus of the circulation department was the Daily Nation.

    Coast edition

    For its first five years, the paper hovered between 15,000 and 18,000 sales per day as it sought to overcome anti-tabloid prejudice, but in 1966, a year of major news events, it broke through to 24,263. This was partly due to a resumption of the Coast edition when the Standard’s Mombasa Times folded.

    The Sunday Nation by then was already past 37,000 and the daily and weekly Taifas were selling 51,000. Staff were told that the company’s priority was to break even financially in 1968 and push the daily paper past the Standard’s maximum sales mark of around 34,000.

    These tasks took on formidable proportions in May 1967 when the African Investment Trust Ltd, a London-registered subsidiary of Roland (Tiny) Rowland’s huge conglomerate Lonrho, bought Consolidated Holdings Ltd, owner of the East African Standard, the Tanzania Standard and the Uganda Argus, for a reported £1 million.

    Kenyatta originally was unhappy about the deal because Lonrho’s sources of wealth were based in white-ruled Rhodesia, and he telephoned the Standard’s Charles Thetford. However, Kenyatta was persuaded that the investment Lonrho would bring to Kenya outweighed the political objections.

    Within two years, Lonrho had bought Motor Mart, becoming Kenya’s largest foreign investor, then expanded into tourism and hotels, including the Norfolk Hotel and the Mount Kenya Safari Club, food processing (Farmers’ Choice), real estate, ranching and plantations. Curtis noted, “I am not entirely happy about the prospects as far as we are concerned.

    Political influence

    ‘‘Lonrho is so enormously wealthy they will be far less reluctant than the present set-up has been to engage in extensive re-equipping, re-staffing etc.’’ Eric Marsden gave this view from inside the company: “Lonrho made a killing financially and they gained great political influence.

    They got prime property in the heart of Nairobi, a great coup. But the first thing they did was to close down the office in Standard Street and kick us all out to the Industrial Area. The talk about Lonrho was that Tiny Rowland said to Kenyatta, ‘‘The paper is yours to do what you like with, just say the word’’. I believe that’s true.”

    Udi Gecaga would later become Lonrho’s first African director and, as Chairman of Lonrho East Africa and a relative of Kenyatta, he would facilitate Rowland’s access to the head of state. When Kenyatta died, Rowland swiftly dropped Gecaga.

    Birth of a Nation is published by I.B. Tauris, 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU, and is available for purchase online and from leading bookstores.

    http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/883568/-/view/printVersion/-/pbxmfez/-/index.html

  • Samson Bosire

    How battle of the classes became tribal
    Saturday, 21 April 2012 10:26
    The Standard By WAINAINA NDUNG’U

    Few Kikuyu will admit to participating in the oathing in Gatundu in 1969, let alone disclose what they entailed.

    One elderly Nyeri resident who at first confessed to having taken one oath developed cold feet when asked about the details. Like the oathing done during the Mau Mau era, the Gatundu rituals were not always conducted with willing participants. And, like the oathing two decades earlier, they faced strong opposition from Christian groups within the community and soon came to an end.

    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a Kikuyu said: “I’m going to Gatundu for a cup of tea,” it often meant something else. Those seeking political or economic favour would marshal delegations to visit Gatundu and pledge their loyalty to the embattled President Kenyatta. There was talk that some of these delegations also took oaths to defend the ‘House of Mumbi’, the name given to the central Kenya community.

    Kenyatta’s biographer Jeremy Murray Brown wrote: “Ridges of Kikuyu-land seethed with activity as lorry-load after lorry load made its way to Gatundu to ‘have tea’ with the president.” Brown writes that the oathing quickly got out of hand. “Enthusiastic but crude sycophants targeted committed Christians, leading to a protest from the Church and a call for an end to the oathing from the president.”

    Simple oaths

    The simple oaths, which had many variations, often involved biting some bitter leaves dipped in animal blood or biting, chewing and swallowing a piece of goat meat and pledging loyalty to the government of the day. This tribal exercise came after close to a decade of ethnic power struggles that finally boiled over with the 1969 assassination of Cabinet minister and Kanu Secretary-General Tom Mboya.

    In the book, Church, State and Society in Kenya, Galia Sabar writes oathing ceremonies were imposed on the Kikuyu to foster unity and ensure Kenyatta and his ruling clique kept their grip on power. That grip had been badly shaken after the assassination of Mboya, a powerful Luo ally of the President, galvanised support for KPU, the Luo-dominated opposition party led by Oginga Odinga.

    The gunman was believed to be Nahashon Njenga Njoroge, a Kanu member put to the task by an unknown munene (big man).

    There has all long been talk Mboya was being groomed for bigger things. Many historians believe his killing was linked to his attempts – at Kenyatta’s request – to rid Kanu of corrupt politicians.

    Bitter mistrust

    Many of them were already envious of his high-profile role in fighting Odinga and the communist threat. The assassination divided not only the Luo and Kikuyu, but also the ‘House of Mumbi itself. A bitter mistrust developed between the Southern (Kiambu) and Northern Kikuyu (Nyeri) over who might be a credible central Kenya successor.

    Josiah Mwangi ‘JM’ Kariuki and to some extent Finance minister Mwai Kibaki were fancied in the north, while the south had the more powerful and ambitious pretenders to the throne, including Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, and Attorney General Charles Njonjo.

    Sabar writes, “As KPU’s vision of change took hold among sections of the population, existing conflicts within Kanu were sharpened; between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu… and between Kiambu leaders and the more socialist-inclined Nyeri and Murang’a Kikuyu, from whom most Mau Mau fighters had come and who continued to suffer under Kenyatta’s regime.”

    The frustrations included the 1964 refusal to register the Kenya Freedom Fighters Union. In February 1969, two other ex-freedom fighters’ unions – the Kenya War Council and Waliolete Uhuru Union – were banned as “dangerous to the good government of the Republic”.

    The ban was linked to the connection of the ex-freedom fighters and their three most prominent political sympathisers: Odinga, Achieng’ Aneko and Bildad Kaggia, who had formed KPU after acrimoniously exiting Kenyatta’s government in 1966.

    This relationship between KPU and the ex-freedom fighters arose from a shared view of how Kenya should have dealt with wealth distribution at Independence (see related story). The failure to recover land taken over by settlers or to redistribute wealth was an issue the land-starved ex-Mau Mau and the socialist-minded Kanu leaders agreed upon.

    It arose directly from a compromise made during the Lancaster House conferences of 1960, 1962 and 1963 by the Kenyatta/Mboya group, securing independence, but conceding the right to protect settlers’ property. Odinga opposed this deal at Lancaster, favouring wealth distribution. But he lost the battle to Mboya when the latter brought in a respected American jurist who proposed a solution others involved in the negotiations accepted.

    Odinga’s unhappiness with the deal was evident from the very early days after Kenya became independent.

    A Time magazine article from June 1965 read the situation thus: “Ever since Kenya became independent two years ago, Jomo Kenyatta’s rallying cry has been harambee (Swahili for “all pull together”). Most Kenyans have been quite happy to put aside their tribal and political rivalries and give pulling together a try. The notable exception: Oginga Odinga, 54, Vice-President of the nation.”

    The US magazine, whose writers may have held anti-communist biases, wrote of Odinga travelling around the country “heaping red-tinged scorn on Kenyatta’s ties with the West”.

    The VP went as far as to tell a rally in Nyanza that Kenyatta was taking instructions from the UK and US, prompting five party leaders to sign a petition demanding his resignation. Kenyatta bided his time then dropped the VP from a delegation to the British Commonwealth conference.

    Unnamed people

    He then gave a speech criticising unnamed people who he said wanted to trade Kenya’s colonial masters for new ones.

    “Some people deliberately try to exploit the colonial hangover for their own selfish purposes, or in order to serve some external force,” the President said. “We must reject such people publicly. It is naive to think that there is no danger of imperialism from the East. In world power politics, the East has as many designs on us as the West.

    This is why we reject Communism. To us, Communism is as bad as imperialism. What we want is Kenya nationalism. There is no place for leaders who hope to build a nation of slogans.”

    Nine months later, Odinga led a walkout from Kanu to the newly formed KPU. Kanu responded by amending Kenya’s constitution to force a ‘little general election’ in which KPU was only able to win parliamentary seats among the Luo in Nyanza province, whereas its candidates in then Kikuyu-dominated Central province were trounced. There followed three years of political harassment and detention of party leaders.

    The final act for KPU was the confrontation over Mboya’s death in 1969 at the New Nyanza General Hospital (now the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and Referral Hospital). Kenyatta and Odinga traded abuse at the opening of the Soviet-funded facility. As the president was leaving, his motorcade was stoned and at least a dozen people shot dead by the president’s bodyguards.

    Not long after, KPU was banned and Odinga detained for two years.

    Released in 1971, Odinga went into political limbo until Kenyatta’s death in 1978.

    The decade saw the ailing Kenyatta and others close to him continue to feed their greed for land at the expense of the poor, particularly the Northern Kikuyu most closely connected to the forest Mau Mau of the early 1950s. Odinga would later say Kenyatta had degenerated from a statesman to a simple land grabber. The statement would cost him his post as chairman of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, with Kenyatta’s successor promptly sacking him after angry reactions from then powerful Constitutional Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo and others.

    Then President Daniel Arap Moi would later place Jaramogi under house arrest for agitating for multi-partyism. He died on January 20, 1994 aged 83.

    Additional reporting by John

    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?id=2000056775&cid=259&story=How%20battle%20of%20the%20classes%20became%20tribal&articleID=2000056775

  • Here is Evidence of Abuse of Power by Uhuru Kenyatta = Corruption

    100 Councillors ‘Picked Illegally’ by Uhuru Kenyatta
    By KENNETH OGOSIA The Nation
    29 February 2008

    Local Government minister Uhuru Kenyatta nominated 100 councillors illegally, Electoral Commission of Kenya chairman Samuel Kivuitu said Thursday. Mr Kivuitu said in a letter to the minister that the 100 councillors’ qualifications were not vetted and their names were not forwarded by eligible parties.

    Mr Kivuitu wants 38 councillors whose names ought to have been gazetted nominated through the Kenya Gazette notice Friday. The 38 include Adopt-A-Light proprietor Esther Passaris (ODM), PNU treasurer Wilfred Mangara Apencha, DP deputy secretary-general Rachael Wanjiku Kamweru and ODM-K’s Mary Mbandi, who was in news last year for making disparaging remarks against First Lady Lucy Kibaki.

    He said that the nomination of councillors was done as per section 33 of the Constitution and section 26 sub-section 2 of the Local Government Act. Under section 39 sub-section 1 of the same Act, nominated councillors cannot exceed one third of the elected councillors in any given authority. The ECK is mandated to recommend nominations in accordance with section 33 (4) and (5) of the Constitution and section 26 (2), 28 (2A) and 46 (2A) of the Local Government Act.

    “Under the statutes, the ECK is empowered to apportion the vacancies amongst the contending political parties and inform them. The ECK checks the names forwarded by parties if the candidates are duly qualified and transmits the right names to the Local Government minister, Mr Kivuitu explained.

    Own candidates
    He continued: “The law does not permit the minister to substitute or remove the names given to him by ECK. The principle behind the procedure and system is to let parties nominate their own candidates. Mr Kivuitu said his office noted discrepancies in last week’s Kenya Gazette No 1276 of February 22 where names submitted by the commission had been substituted with others.

    The action was inadvertent and offended the law and must be corrected to reflect accurately the list of candidates the ECK gave the ministry. The nomination controversy between the ECK and Mr Kenyatta comes at a time when MPs are also up in arms against their party leaders for short-changing them in the process.

  • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/9373188/The-International-Criminal-Court-is-hurting-Africa.html

    The International Criminal Court is hurting Africa
    Britain’s support for the International Criminal Court is wrong and undermines its credibility in African countries, writes Courtenay Griffiths, QC

    3:20PM BST 03 Jul 2012

    Imagine the British Government appointed as minister for Africa a man close friends with a mercenary who attempted to overthrow an African President. Imagine this same minister was fully supportive of an international court that, during its nine-year history, had only prosecuted black Africans. Imagine that this court’s most high-profile case, against the deputy prime minister of Kenya, had been based solely on evidence from a single witness chosen by associates of his political opponent, the favourite of the British Government.

    This is not a Frederick Forsyth novel, but the dangerous reality of Britain’s foreign policy towards Kenya. Henry Bellingham, our Minister for Africa, is a close friend of Simon Mann, the mercenary who tried and failed to orchestrate a coup in Equatorial Guinea. Mr Bellingham has publicly supported the work of the International Criminal Court that has so far only tried black Africans, when, from Libya to Syria, there are many more victims who still await justice.

    But as I learnt during my time as chief defence counsel to Charles Taylor, the requirement of international justice is not the raison d’etre of the International Criminal Court at all. Instead, the court acts as a vehicle for its primarily European funders, of which the UK is one of the largest, to exert their power and influence, particularly in Africa.

    Some would argue it is reasonable for countries to exercise their power in foreign countries through legal means. If this is the case, it is surely sensible to support both the institutions and legal cases that might realise this goal. However, Britain’s support for the ICC, and in particular our country’s funding of the Kenya case, is seriously undermining its credibility and influence in Africa.

    The case against Uhuru Kenyatta, the deputy prime minister of Kenya, is of serious concern, not only because of the serious lack of evidence against him, but also because of the methods used to obtain this evidence. The ICC did not directly source witnesses for this case, nor has it done so in any other case heard before the court. Instead it outsourced evidence-gathering to local intermediaries. In the Kenya case, these intermediaries happened to be well known associates of Raila Odinga, the current prime minister of Kenya, and Mr Kenyatta’s long-term political opponent.

    This case, which revolves around a single witness sourced by those close to Mr Odinga, should set off alarm bells in the Foreign Office. Instead, the FCO has funded the witness protection scheme for the case and given its full support for the trial to proceed.

    Britain does not want Mr Kenyatta to be President of Kenya. It sees its interests as best served through the election of Mr Odinga in the forthcoming contest, a peculiar position given Odinga’s former support for East Germany and Cuba (his son is named Fidel Castro Odinga). The Western-educated Kenyatta appears a more obvious choice, had the British not been involved in the incarceration of his father.

    Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, was imprisoned by the colonial administration on charges of facilitating the Mau Mau rebellion against British rule. He was later released from prison following the discovery that his trial witnesses were from sources loyal to the British government.

    Fifty years after Kenyan independence from Britain, history is repeating itself. Uhuru Kenyatta is considered likely to win the presidential election scheduled for 2013, not Britain’s man Odinga.

    For Britain to maintain its influence in Kenya and therefore in Africa it needs to withdraw its support and funding of the Kenyatta case. The FCO can retreat with its honour still intact, while maintaining its support for international justice by calling for a review of the Kenya case – even for its end – if politically unbiased evidence does not materialise.

    Britain should encourage other countries that fund the ICC to pay for the witness protection scheme in its place. The parallels between the Jomo and Uhuru Kenyatta cases of funding politically biased witnesses are all too obvious. And Britain should make its impartiality towards the forthcoming Kenyan election explicit. This means inviting all credible Presidential candidates to the UK for discussions with officials at the FCO, not only Odinga, as has been the case for far too long.

    It may be possible for Britain to maintain its support for the ICC, despite the criticism that it is a means to exert power for its funders rather than to deliver international justice. But while Britain continues to undermine Kenya’s national sovereignty through intervening in its political sphere this will remain unlikely. There, as with other African countries, it is for their citizens to decide who rules them, not any foreign power. And Britain would do well to remember this; Uhuru in the Swahili language means “freedom”. If Kenyatta wins the election this may mean that Kenya finally frees itself 50 years after independence from the influence or obligation to its former colonial master.

    Courtenay Griffiths QC is a leading international expert in criminal law who acted as Chief Counsel to former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone

  • Fatou Bensouda tughtens cases against the Ocampo Four

    It is not the case that the ICC prosecutor “wants the judges to include new elements”; nor is it the case that she “wants the court to allow her to introduce many avenues”.

    First, it is not correct to state that the Bensouda wants the judges to allow her to add charges, change modes of liability, etc. What she has done is make two types of filings. One of these consists of “observations”, and “observations” alone of how individual criminal responsibility may be characterized. This has been done in both cases:

    Click to access doc1436787.pdf

    Click to access doc1436934.pdf

    These submissions are made in respect of a regulation that allows the judges to re-characterize the charges, modes of liability, etc. She is, in effect, telling the judges that this is something they may have to do; she is not asking that she herself be allowed to do so. The only specific requests in these filings, it is that the chamber give notice as to the possibility and to give notice that it may differ from the pre-trial chamber.

    The significant aspect of these filings is what, essentially, they ask the judges to consider: “ordering, soliciting or inducing” and “aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting”. For good measure, there is the catch-all “contributing in any other way”.

    It is important to note that any actual re-characterization by the chamber is likely happen only after all (or a very substantial portion) of the evidence had been presented.

    Second, a similar but more specific request for notice has been made in the Uhuru-Muthaura case:

    Click to access doc1436956.pdf

    The specifics here concern the characterization of penile amputation as “sexual violence”, rather than “inhumane act”, and the inclusion, somewhere of looting and destruction of property.

    The first is very significant in that criminal courts generally tend to view sexual violence as worse than other forms of violence and so punish it more severely. The second is something that the victims have been asking for for quite some time; Ocampo did not do anything about that, but Bensouda is trying. Sureta Chana has also repeated her requests in that regard:

    Click to access doc1426649.pdf

    So it seems highly likely that the chamber will consider doing something about it.

  • Githongo takes on UHURU and RUTO – ICC

    Wednesday July 18, 2012- Former Ethics and Governance Permanent Secretary John Githongo on Tuesday hailed words of praises to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for taming lords of impunity in Kenya.

    Speaking during an International Centre for Policy and Conflict Public Forum in Nairobi, Githongo said in the new spirit of the constitution Kenyans have hopes of electing accountable and credible leaders.

    “Previously only the poor faced the wrath of the law. But the ICC is confronting the elite. The elite have discovered that ICC cannot be bribed,” Githongo said.

    Githongo, who is a brilliant scholar, however regretted that the ICC Court has been politicised and tribalised in a typical Kenyan style as a way of undermining its work.

    He said the plan by the government of pushing for deferral is wastage of public money, since now the ICC court has the case permanently and cannot be transferred elsewhere.

    The former PS described as “old and bizarre”, the intentions by Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto of vying for presidency, saying they are not supposed to vie for any elective post in the country!

    The Kenyan DAILY POST

  • Civil society organizations want the High Court to state whether Uhuru and Ruto meet the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of leadership and integrity. The ruling is due on July 31.

    Chief Justice Willy Mutunga is on record as warning the Judiciary will stand firm and ensure leaders who fail to meet the threshold of integrity as set out in the Constitution are not allowed to run for public office.

    There are those who say that the integrity clause is purely inspirational but was never meant to have tooth. Some argue that only those who will spend more that six months are barred. If this is the case then Chapter Six was just used to flower the Constitution.

    Here are some excerpts from the Standard:

    Saying he would forever fight “in the trenches of reform”, Mutunga has dismissed claims by a section of lawyers, mps, and political leaders that Chapter Six of the Constitution on leadership and integrity stands suspended until a Bill is passed to implement it.

    The CJ has also promised to ensure that the courts uphold Chapter Six of the Constitution to weed out individuals who do not meet integrity and leadership standards.

    The CJ has been emphatic that the courts must be seen to uphold the spirit of the Constitution when it comes to interpreting Chapter Six, which he warned could still be used to vet those seeking leadership positions.

    On the other hand it is around the same time, April 10 tentatively, that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has planned the historical presidential run-off poll in the event there is no outright winner after the March 4 vote.

    The prosecution’s request for the staggered disclosure of witnesses and evidence, and given that the defence requires three months to prepare for trial are among the factors that influenced the judges’ decision on the trial dates.

    The run-off dilemma aside, the ICC suspects have to contend with the financial strain likely to emerge from running presidential campaigns while preparing for trials for international crimes.

    Between now and April 10, Uhuru and Ruto will have to split their time between political campaigns and preparing for their cases.

    That the prosecution intends to change the character of the charges against Uhuru, Ruto, and Muthaura to boost chances of conviction underlines the defence must fight even harder.
    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000061714&pageNo=2

    ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

    Article 27
    Irrelevance of official capacity
    1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

    2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.

    http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm

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  • THE MUTUNGA COURT AND THE KIBAKI SUCCESSION

    Saturday, 04 August 2012 00:03

    BY JOE ADAMA

    The far-reaching implications of an increasingly assertive Judiciary getting to decide whether Uhuru and Ruto are fit for the race for State House, given their confirmed charges at the ICC and the reform dynamics of the new constitution

    President Mwai Kibaki’s now serial humiliation by the Judiciary could well be little more than the warming up for the Mother of All Battles between the Executive and the new Judiciary – the Willy Mutunga Supreme Court. The new Judiciary has severely embarrassed the President in his final months in office, a period that is characterized as the lame-duck phase of presidencies around the world, including in the greatest democracy of them all, the United States of America. Judges Daniel Musinga, Mumbi Ngugi and Weldon Korir have all ruled against President Kibaki in a number of landmark judgments that have hacked away at State House’s previously sacrosanct powers of hiring and firing in the State and parastatal sectors.

    HUMBLE PIE & EGG-ON-FACE DIET

    On at least half-a-dozen times since January 2011, the Judiciary has fed the Presidency a diet of humble pie and egg-on-face such as no Executive in the East, Central and Horn-of-Africa regions has ever had to contemplate. Retired President Daniel arap Moi ruled Kenya for 24 years across five terms and never suffered what Kibaki, a two-termer, is going through. He must be whistling in awe at the unfolding scenario and telling himself something akin to “the times, they’re a-changin’ ”.

    And then, three weeks ago, the President of the Supreme Court of Kenya, Dr. Willy Mutunga, quietly announced that Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto, who stand accused of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) arising from the 2007-08 post-election violence (PEV), will be vetted by the Kenya Judiciary under the new Constitution as to whether they can run for President or not.

    Mutunga’s announcement was made at a three-day Judiciary transformation workshop in Mombasa on the same Saturday that Miguna Miguna was launching his sensationalist book on Prime Minister Raila Odinga in Nairobi, Peeling Back the Mask, Etc. Few Kenyans, including the elite of the media commentariat and punditocracy, paid Mutunga much attention. And yet his remarks are the hugely significant preface to the most titanic clash in the public domain between now and the presidential poll itself sometime in 2013.

    The ironies are keen indeed. Here was Mutunga, who joined the race for the Judiciary on the Prime Minister’s suggestion that he do so, speaking at the same time as Raila’s most ardent detractor on an issue of the most urgent national and public interest, but having his voice drowned out by the Miguna “Come Baby Come” circus. If the Mutunga Court is indeed going to be the jurisdiction of last resort on whether Uhuru and Ruto can join Raila and the rest of the field for the race to the post-Kibaki State House, then one of the most potent flashpoints in our clamorous, divisive and controversy-ridden politics is just around the corner. The transformation that is about to be wrought by the implications of this intervention goes far beyond the Judiciary and into the dynamics of the Mwai Kibaki transition, legacy and succession.

    BAD NEWS FOR UHURU & RUTO

    If the Miguna book was bad news for Raila and his political formation in the Coalition, the Mutunga announcement was far worse news for Uhuru and Ruto, Raila’s most implacable foes on the other side of the Coalition divide. Indeed, it must have frozen their slowly spreading grins at the PM’s discomfiture at Miguna’s hands into grimaces of the purest pain and consternation – and something bordering on primal fear. Suppose, for instance, Mutunga named Judges Musinga, Ngugi and Korir to a three-judge Bench to decide Uhuru and Ruto’s suitability as Presidential candidates, given their confirmed ICC cases? Loss of sleep in these candidates’ strategy rooms would surely be redefined.

    Said Mutunga: “We have two cases about Chapter Six which touch on integrity pending in court and Uhuru’s and Ruto’s is one and the other one is Mumo Matemu’s. The courts will interpret and give the parameters of the implementation of that chapter. That issue will be ventilated in those two cases and if people are not happy they will go to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court will have the final word on that issue.” This was a thunderclap of an announcement, but, like a seaquake that begins deep under the waves, its rumblings have yet to be detected by millions of Kenyans. However, when the import of Mutunga’s words makes landfall in the court of public opinion, they will hit like the proverbial Tsunami.

    Uhuru and Ruto, who head up the most ardent opposition to Raila’s third and most determined stab at the Presidency in a field in which the incumbent is not a contender, have already been cleared by the ICC itself to run for whatever elective office they wish, including President, despite their date at The Hague. The ICC even shifted the hearing of the cases to dates soon after the General Election scheduled for March 4, 2013, specifically in order not to be seen to be playing a role in the Kenyan poll’s outcome.

    The new Kenyan Judiciary has no such inhibitions. The head of an increasingly assertive and autonomous, even activist, Judiciary, who happens to be a former political detainee and a lifelong professional activist, has spoken on the Uhuru-Ruto factor. And what he has said has set the stage for the most complex lead-up to a General and Presidential Election in Kenyan history hitherto.

    The horror that is slowly dawning on Uhuru and Ruto and their respective strategists is the wild card of being weighed – and most likely found wanting – by a Judiciary headed by Mutunga. Kenya’s emergent Judiciary is the stuff that nightmares are made of as far as powerful and influential operatives of Uhuru and Ruto’s Kanu Old School origins and predilections are concerned. It is a reformist and activist Judiciary that is clearly out to make a point and have an impact in many ways that are unprecedented in Kenya. To be subjected to the tender loving care (TLC) of such a fast-evolving institution, a Bench that is no respecter of State House, is the last thing that the ICC Presidential candidate pair need just now.

    The implications of the Mutunga pronouncement are far-reaching and the historical ironies are acute. For one thing, this means that we will witness one of the fastest litigations in Kenyan jurisprudence in two cases of the most monumental significance. The hearings, appeals and final decisions must all take place long before March 4, 2013, so that they do not scuttle the Uhuru/Ruto Presidential campaigns in the very unlikely event that they get the Supreme Court green light the same way they got the ICC’s.

    FIVE KEY QUESTIONS

    Five key questions arise: During the interregnum of the hearings, appeal, final judgment cycle, what is their status as prospective candidates? Can they go on mounting vast campaigns around the country even as they appear in court to press their own cases? The sub judice rule is especially strict in the Kenyan judicial system and was not long ago actually controversially imposed by Judge Isaac Lenaola in a case touching on the ICC Two. All signs are that is likely to be re-imposed once the proceedings begin, severely complicating any emotive campaign speeches that touch on the matter, both for and against.

    At Mombasa, Mutunga observed: “My appeal to all Kenyans and leaders is that we depoliticize the ICC process and concentrate on holding free, fair, peaceful and democratic elections. We should let the law take its course for justice to be done for both the victims and the accused.” The second key question regards what impact a final judgment against the two, one which holds that the crimes they are accused of, among them mass rape, murder and deportation of persons, are too grave to be on the CVs of prospective Presidential candidates, would have on their cases at The Hague, scheduled for April 2013, the month following the General Election?

    Question Three: Long before that, what impacts would such a potentially explosive and unprecedented decision have on the ground in Kenya bang in the middle of the biggest and most expensive General Election campaigns of them all? What would Uhuru and Ruto, and their millions of supporters, do next and how would it affect the Prime Minister’s own campaign for State House? There is many an imponderable here at this distance in time – and no doubt some completely unforeseen scenarios.

    The plot thickens. Question Four: Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya was not designed only for Uhuru, Ruto and Matemu. The Mutunga Court will have a gigantic responsibility if more cases objecting to the integrity credentials of more General Election aspirants are brought before it in the few months remaining before Kenyans must vote and Kibaki must go home. Fast-tracking the cases of The Hague Two is all very well, but suppose 30 other cases are brought to the Judiciary seeking final judgment in the entire cycle of hearings, appeal and Supreme Court decision, what then?

    Question Five: What if the Kibaki State House leads a political defiance of the Supreme Court if it bars Uhuru and Ruto from the presidential race? After all, Kibaki has moved mountains, particularly on Uhuru’s behalf, since December 15, 2010, when the immediate former Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, first fingered the two and four others as “bearing the greatest responsibility” for the PEV.

    The President and his handlers resisted the ICC all the way to the UN Security Council, the African Union and the East African Community. Kibaki has bent over backwards and executed many another political-diplomatic acrobatic moves on behalf, first and foremost, of the son of Kenya’s Founding President, a man who was long his mentor and role model. Why should he relent before his own Supreme Court?

    The President has fundamentally disagreed with Attorney General Githu Muigai on a number of the defeats the Presidency has suffered at the hands of the resurgent Judiciary, including appealing, against the AG’s advice, against the decision to outlaw the deployment of 47 county commissioners. He has even circumvented the AG’s Chambers in this matter, bringing in a private practitioner to conduct the appeal.

    Kibaki’s response to a Supreme Court ruling barring Uhuru from being in the race to succeed him would most likely be massively controversial. And this would be the case even if his reaction were only to throw up his arms in despair and tell Kenya’s first First Family (Uhuru’s Mum, Mama Ngina Kenyatta, Jomo’s widow, is still alive and very much concerned about her first-born son’s plight), the Kikuyu community and all other Kenyans that he has done his best for the DPM and been frustrated at every turn, both at home and abroad.

    PAYBACK: ACTIVIST ELITE v MONEY ELITE?

    If a gigantic face-off clash between the outgoing Executive and the new Judiciary comes to pass Kenya could well descend into a pre-election constitutional crisis. And all eyes would be on the son of Kenya’s Founding Vice President, the Prime Minister, who would be expected to be the foremost beneficiary of a State House race that leaves Uhuru and Ruto out. There would be accusation and counteraccusation, amid the recrimination, which would doubtless include impassioned allegations that the PM is behind it all (not dissimilar to what was said about him by Uhuru, Ruto and their supporters regarding the ICC).

    A dangerous cleavage, one much more divisive than traditional ethnic politicking, would then almost certainly rear its head – the old narrative about reformists and conformists. It would certainly look like the political detainee elite of the Kanu era, led by the PM and the CJ, were locking the moneyed elite of the post-Independence era, as personified by Uhuru Kenyatta, out of contention in the matter of the leadership of the forthcoming Fourth Republic under the new Constitution. The narrative would look dangerously like it was payback time for the activist elite of the 1970s-90s arrayed against the Kenyatta and Moi factors.

    All these scenarios are in the works for the very near future indeed. What kind of repair they leave the country in, particularly the dimension of the Kibaki transition, legacy and succession, is the $64 million question. But one thing is for sure: Like it or not, at the centre of it all stands the Raila factor. Uhuru and Ruto would not go down quietly if the Mutunga Court bars them from the State House race. In fact, they would loudly announce Plans B that comprise nothing but the prevention, too, of Raila Odinga from the Presidency. Whether this would be the bravado of the frustrated would soon become clear at the polls themselves.

    What their apparently captive vote blocs would do in a scenario where the two were knocked out of contention remains unclear, but one factor is constant – the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin have never combined forces for General Election purposes, not even for national referenda. But someone, somewhere is bound to gain from the vacuum created by an Uhuru-Ruto absence. The question is who these candidates are and whether their gain, which, to judge by past voting patterns, cannot possibly be of both blocs in their entirety, or even merely their majority, is sufficient to rob Raila of victory. The next eight months in Kenya are going to see epochal decisions; we will truly be living history in the making.

    http://www.the-star.co.ke/weekend/siasa/88043-the-mutunga-court-and-the-kibaki-succession

  • The wealth was legaly got!

  • <zzLet them try this time and a third world war which people thought would emanate from Asia would definitely start in Kenya. We are tired of manipulation. The much the police will do is to kill as they did in the 2007, but will not kill all Kenyans to derail the Constitution making process? Let them dare, Kenyans are waiting for them with open hands first to deliver them to the Hague. The No group have already started scheming by watering the Integrity Bill. And we know they are sponsoring those bent to derail the election. GOD, where are you, Look at this schemers, wolf who are out to grab the leadership of this country ? Save us from this evils forces?

    z

  • FRANCIS LIVANZE OTUCHE

    Jacob in the bible worked for fourteen years to earn two wives but Kenyatta earned his wealth within five years. Is that legal acquisition of wealth? Uhuru and family should settle all PEV victims and ask for votes if he wants to lead this country. Otherwise we ‘ll be convinced that he wants to grab the remaining little from our country to make his family claim to be the richest family in Africa rendering the rest to be his slaves. They know the tricks of grabbing.

  • What has been Eugene Wamalwa’s role in the coalition government?

    If you want to know the real enemies of Kenya’s reforms, look no further than the ever-smiling (but conniving and devious) Eugene Wamalwa.

    Ever since his public extolling by the President’s son (Jimmy Kibaki) and close association with Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, this Mt. Kenya mafia poodle has been exposed as one of the greatest enemies of Kenya’s reforms; especially the new Constitution. The tricksters, led by propagandist Tony Gachoka, have been promoting this Uhuru Kenyatta side-kick as a viable future leader of Kenya while using him to systematically mutilate key reforms enshrined within our new Constitution..

    In the short period he replaced Mutula Kilonzo as Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister, Eugene Wamalwa will go down in history as having (based on a well researched audit report conducted by the Daily Nation – available in their digital edition of Tuesday August 14th, 2012):

    • Deleted 28 clauses from CIC version of Integrity Bill ( initially supported by Mutula Kilonzo).

    • Paved way for people with questionable integrity or serious ongoing criminal cases to vie for top public positions (Presidency, Senate, Governorship, MP, County Assembly)

    • Reversed strict Constitutional rules for vetting public officials

    • Eliminated the constitutionally-guaranteed public participation during public appointments

    • Removed the requirement for receipt of a “certificate of compliance” from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), NSIS, KRA (tax-collector), National Police Service, and Higher Education Loans Board for all seeking public office (as was contained in the CIC Bill, initially supported by Mutula Kilonzo).

    • Mutilated the requirement for severe punishment for leaders failing the integrity test while in office (changing it from total disbarment for 10 years and jail-time; to a mere slap with a fine of Sh 5 million)

    • Completely deleted the requirement for wealth declaration (in public) for all leaders aspiring for public offices. We shall now not know the net worth of all candidates vying for the Presidency, unlike modern democracies like the USA.

    • Eliminated the requirement for the EACC to institute inquiries related to unexplained income while in public office; something the new Constitution is quite clear about.

    • In a clear attempt to subvert cooperation with the ICC (on behalf of his paymaster Uhuru Kenyatta), Eugene Wamalwa has ridiculously introduced a clause that threatens public officials against cooperating with ‘foreign governments’. From Wamalwa’s team of drafters… “ A State officer shall not further the interests of a foreign government, organization, or individual, in a manner that may be detrimental to the security interests of Kenya”. This cunning and vague clause with undefined parameters is obviously a trap meant to threaten public officials against dealing with any foreign entities including the ICC and foreign embassies.

    • Removed the clause that would have barred (as required by the new Constitution) state and public officers to do business with their close relatives and friends using public funds. The original CIC Bill, taking cue from the new Constitution, specifically barred the use of government resources to award contracts to “State officer’s spouse, child, relative, friend, or any other person with direct or indirect pecuniary interest with the officer”. Wamalwa has lobbed this out on behalf of his Mt. Kenya mafia paymasters! Uhuru Kenyatta obviously wants public funds to continue profiting his businesses at CMC motors (supply of VW passats), Commercial Bank of Africa (high-interest-rate domestic loans to Treasury) or holding expensive public seminars at his various resorts and hotels. The new Constitution was threatening this until – ‘savior’ Eugene Wamalwa came to his rescue.

    • Wamalwa has also exempted future Cabinet Secretaries (Ministers) and County executive committee members from the clause requiring all appointed State officers to be politically neutral. To fully appreciate the significance of this particular anti-reform mutilation, one only needs to look at the personal and political relationship between Eugene Wamalwa himself and one Tony Gachoka. Eugene has appointed Tony Gachoka into a public office (paid by taxpayers) to specifically play dirty political games (on his and Uhuru’s behalf) targeting the Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Gachoka is an appointed senior state officer working in Wamalwa’s Ministry of Justice and paid by Kenyan taxpayers close to 1 million shillings per month. Tony Gachoka was hired by Uhuru and Wamalwa to dig up KNCHR records from the Justice Ministry archives in a desperate pursuit of the Prime Minister Raila Odinga. That is the genesis of this brouhaha about Gachoka and his botched trip to the Hague. It’s all silly politics at the expense of the Kenyan taxpayers. Uhuru and Wamalwa want to retain this clause of allowing state officials to continue playing politics while in public office, so they can continue targetting their political rivals in future. This is basically the vision of these anti-reform agents.

    • Wamalwa’s extracurricular and anti-reform activities (on behalf of Kenyatta) has extended beyond this Leadership and Integrity Bill. He has also pounced upon and watered-down at least 8 other Bills including the Petition to Parliament Bill; the Petition to County Assemblies Bill; the Assumption of Office of the President Bill; the National Intelligence Service Bill; the National Security Service Bill; the National Security Council Bill; the Kenya Defense Forces Bill and is currently in the process of mutilating the Campaign Financing Bill. From the above, it is clear that Wamalwa’s master, Uhuru Kenyatta is seriously angling to control all security and legislative apparatuses of the country. That’s besides reversing integrity requirements in public service to allow for continued corruption, electoral fraud, crimes against humanity, ineptitude, tribalism and other unethical business-as-usual ‘opportunities’ of the old order.

    It’s as if Eugene Wamalwa is customizing our brand new Constitution to fit the whims of one legally-besieged individual called Uhuru Kenyatta. Former Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo would have never allowed such devious and ominous developments to proceed right under his nose – no wonder they kicked him out of this crucial Ministry.

    To quote from the Daily Nation’s own audit report, “Eugene Wamalwa has engineered the watering-down of the Leadership and Bill to an extent it won’t serve the purpose envisaged in Chapter Six of the Constitution.” The Commission on Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) has in fact protested against Wamalwa’s mutilation of the Katiba through these transition Bills.

    I repeat for clarity, Eugene Wamalwa will go down in history as one of the first vultures hired to mutilate our brand new Constitution on behalf of the same retrogressive masters of impunity who’ve stifled Kenya’s growth for the last 50 years. Together with Attorney General Githu Muigai, Wamalwa has probably inflicted the most damage (yet) to the recently promulgated Constitution. The ethics and moral standards injected by the new Constitution have been dealt a serious blow by him.

    Casual observers would have thought Eugene Wamalwa’s would do better than Mutula Kilonzo when it comes to reforms. The plain truth however is – Wamalwa has proved to be a hopeless anti-reform agent working for Uhuru Kenyatta. His appointment at the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Ministry was specifically planned to effect successful mutilation of Katiba-anchoring Bills; most importantly, the Leadership and Integrity Bill. Wamalwa has gone further, as if on steroids, having already mutilated 8 other reform anchoring Bills. He has been unmasked as one of the country’s worst enemies.

    Of course Eugene Wamalwa is discombobulating the brand new Constitution on behalf of his master Uhuru Kenyatta. He is doing it through the transition bills that were meant to anchor the new Constitution. His Justice Ministry is responsible for originating several of these Bills. While manning the Ministry, Mutula Kilonzo was doing an excellent job – strictly obeying the new Constitution’s high standards. This was certainly depressing the impunity merchants who then decided to remove him (Mutula) from this sensitive docket. In his place came Eugene Wamalwa; and the mutilation of the new Constitution began in earnest.

    It is indeed terrible and disheartening going through the 28 clauses Eugene Wamalwa has specifically changed – which tear down the high ethical and moral standards set up by new Constitution. Even simple processes like vetting of public appointees which we have seen working wonderfully in the Judiciary – Eugene and Uhuru want them removed. They want to stop public participation in appointments. They have watered-down the vetting process. They want to give a free pass to questionable characters charged with serious criminal charges to run for any public office – yet what we have recently practiced is for those (public officials) charged in court stepping aside until clearance by the court.

    Whereas Mutula Kilonzo accurately read the new Constitution’s Chapter 6 – which sets a new and high standard for integrity (ethical and moral) for leaders – Eugene has reversed all that with the stroke of a pen. Eugene is ignoring the new Constitution’s requirements so as to give a free-pass to Uhuru Kenyatta to run for President…so the latter can appoint him running mate. That act in itself goes against the integrity chapter of the new Constitution. It is indeed pure corruption (illegal) trading a future appointment as running mate in exchange for drafting watered-down and unconstitutional Bills.

    If this was the U.S., Eugene Wamalwa would be subjected to a grand jury investigation by a special prosecutor; and likely be fired and charged with multiple felonies for corruption and abuse of office. But hey, this is Kenya, where anything goes as impunity reigns supreme. Most of the public don’t even know the intrigues going on at the Justice Ministry, leave alone do something about it. A minority that knows may just watch haplessly in despair. Only very few would act. I’m not a lawyer but have already contacted a few legal insiders in the civil society to explore whether a case can be brought against Eugene Wamalwa in court.

    As he deviously wears a broad smile, Eugene can meanwhile continue using his position (as Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister) to dismantle the Constitution on behalf of Uhuru Kenyatta, so as to earn a ticket for running mate. We shall see where it gets him. The duo are slowly but surely taking us back to the old constitutional order – right in front of our eyes. Na mta do? That’s likely their attitude. We shall see.

    We the people, can and should do something. It starts by pointing these issues out and informing the public; for example how devious a character like Eugene Wamalwa has become…actively mutilating the brand new Katiba just to fulfill his selfish quest to be Uhuru Kenyatta’s running mate. Filing cases is another option.

    These are the biggest challenges facing our nation – serious ongoing activities and threats against our brand new Katiba. These anti-reformers are even trying to use the vitriol from Miguna to disabuse the obvious notion that the next election is going to be a choice between electing a reformer as President, or a non-reformer. They don’t want it framed under such terms for obvious reasons. Meanwhile, they’re ginning up propaganda to paint everyone as dirty…to confuse and cloud the voters’ eyes.

    As they dismantle the new Katiba, they’re already conflating and obfuscating the clear lines between their anti-reformist activities on one hand; and calls for strict adherence to the new Constitution being made on another side. That’s what these impunity merchants are adept at – creating general confusion then arrogantly thumping their chests; hoping the largely gullible public won’t realize their surreptitious activities. How many people even knew Wamalwa was engineering such terrible things (outlined above)?

    If you ask an ordinary voter in Trans Nzoia what they think of Eugene Wamalwa, you’ll probably hear positive adjectives describing things like youth; reform; fresh; change; bright future and such; which are quite contrary to what he is actively doing to stifle those same voters (on behalf of Uhuru Kenyatta). Of course there can be no land reforms under any Kenyatta administration – but how many voters know this? Whether Eugene is Kenyatta’s running mate or not doesn’t change the fact that his backyard voters will be worse off under an anti-reformist government.

    Indeed Parliament has more than enough powers to stop Eugene Wamalwa’s antics on its tracks. On advice from CIC, Parliament’s Justice Committee and CIOC could even demand changes to these Bills so as to conform to the new Constitution. Moreover, MPs can vote down these watered-down Bills in the house floor. But then there’s what we call reality. The reality is that our MPs are basically guns for hire – ready to play for the highest bidder. There’s a band of MPs colloquially referred to as the Uhuruto mob in Parliament. They will easily provide swing numbers to pass through all these unconstitutional Bills which go against the spirit and letter of the new Constitution.

    Remember many of them were in the NO brigade – fiercely opposed to the new Constitution in the first place. These are some of the things that make implementation of the new Katiba quite problematic. We have many MPs supporting these Eugene/Kenyatta edicts; opposed to the new Constitution; and most that are specifically fearful that the new standards for integrity outlined in Chapter 6 may knock they themselves out. Bunge is therefore the last place to place any hope in reversing the damage currently being created by Eugene and Kenyatta.

    Regarding Tony Gachoka, yes, he is indeed a public employee in the Justice Ministry – employed under contract (like Miguna was in the PM’s office). He was employed by Eugene Wamalwa himself. Despite the Justice Ministry PS trying to distance himself (& his Ministry) from Gachoka, the latter is a consultant adviser to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs & National Cohesion – Eugene Wamalwa. He was assigned specific anti-Raila tasks. One of his first assignments involved going to one of the public agencies under the Ministry, the KNCHR. Letters had to be written, old files and records sought, in Gachoka’s bid to dig up KNCHR archives to see how he could implicate the Prime Minister in PEV. These must have been the instructions given to Gachoka from Eugene and Uhuru Kenyatta.

    That is how Gachoka ended up with an earlier (uncorroborated) version of the KNCHR report. He has tried to use that to now gin up political chicanery with the ICC judicial process. But neither the ICC nor the Dutch Embassy fell for his tricks. He was promptly denied a visa; essentially told to play his games in Kenya. He is now purportedly going to local Kenyan courts – to waste their precious time – a clear abuse of the court system (with these silly political games). All these at the expense of taxpayers! That’s how galling these impunity merchants operate; wasting state resources on a multitude of desperate anti-Raila projects.

    The Chairman of CIC has actually criticized Eugene Wamalwa’s antics – which have actually been fully endorsed by the Kibaki-Chaired Cabinet. The cabinet has largely agreed with these anti-reform measures; which is a sign of what is likely to happen in Parliament. Most in the cabinet are themselves ethically and morally challenged fellas themselves.

    I’m now informed that CIC Chair – Charles Nyachae – has promised to go to court to sue the cabinet for watering down the Constitutional requirements for integrity in the Leadership and Integrity Bill.

    If the Judiciary expeditiously deals with it – the Bills (or laws if already passed) may be deemed unconstitutional; automatically calling for their redrafting. I sense this is where we may be heading. Thank goodness for the reforming Judiciary – which is by the way under a new wave of attack by the restless anti-reformers.

    The public must put up pressure and support such suits by Nyachae and positive rulings by the Judiciary which is lately showing a consistent streak of independence. Charles Nyachae must be lauded for diligently putting these thugs on notice. The conspicuous silence by Kenya’s worst Attorney General, Githu Muigai, has also been noted. To Eugene Wamalwa – we shall remember your vigorous effort to take us back 50 years!

    Job

    http://jukwaa.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=general&action=display&thread=7273

  • the least we can do as kenyans is to make sure uhuru never gets to state house for it will be like father like son, he will just misappropriate more state resources, with this kind of info all i can say old habits die hard and uhuru must be drunk from impunity inherited doen fro his father and natured by his mother, no offence

  • ‘Project Uhuru’, Mungiki and the Kikuyu – Excerpt fom Charles Hornsby’s book – Kenya: A History Since Independence (1963-2011)
    May 14th, 2012 by Mars Group Kenya

    How Uhuru Kenyatta spent Sh 15 billion in the 2002 polls and the Mungiki link. With permission of the author, Mars Group Kenya brings you excerpts from historian Charles Hornsby’s latest book entitled – Kenya: A History Since Independence (1963-2011). Charles Hornsby has detailed the untold stories of Kenya’s leaders you must know as a citizen.

    ‘Project Uhuru’, Mungiki and the Kikuyu

    At this point in 2002, there were stirrings of resentment, but KANU’s grip remained strong. Politicians from all over the country declared themselves for Uhuru Kenyatta, despite the fact that many had not even met him until recently. The Standard and Kenya Times supported Uhuru’s candidacy, with some backing from the Nation as well. Television saw wall-to-wall coverage of him, replacing Moi as the lead in almost every KBC bulletin.

    An opinion poll in August now put Uhuru ahead of all the other candidates. As Uhuru toured Central Province and Nairobi in May–August 2002, he received a rapturous reception from ex-opposition supporters, now converted to support KANU by the lure of power for the Kikuyu. Without a clear opposition candidate, it appeared inevitable that KANU would win Central Province, and dozens of southern Kikuyu opposition leaders defected to KANU. Particularly galling for Kibaki was the defection of his old ally Karume in August. One Safina MP was given a Cabinet post in return for his defection. Meanwhile, Uhuru and KANU were preparing for the election. There were reports that Uhuru’s campaign budget was Ksh15 billion (US$200 million), to be raised from foreign donations, allies and the Kenyatta family fortune.

    The state machinery was reluctant, but there were signs that it was stirring into action in his support. Uhuru was receiving briefings from the intelligence services, while his security detail was seconded from the state. Behind the scenes, a team of Rift Valley leaders was coordinating his campaign, including Gideon Moi, Hosea Kiplagat, Ruto, Sunkuli, State House Comptroller John Lokorio and Biwott. There was now another link between KANU and the Kikuyu: a Kikuyu religious sect, known as Mungiki (‘the Multitude’, ‘the masses’ or ‘a united people’). Part traditionalist religion, part self-help group and part criminal mafia, it had emerged from the growing sense of alienation amongst poor Kikuyu.

    Mungiki espoused a return to animist religions and opposed women’s liberation, Western influences and Christianity. It also represented a revival of the Kikuyu ethnic nationalism that had underlain Mau Mau and which British victory and independence had delegitimised. During the 1990s, it had gained immense influence amongst poor young Kikuyu. The sect’s origins were in Laikipia in the 1980s, and many early members had been radicalised during the 1992–3 ethnic clashes, evicted from their lands like the squatters of the 1940s. It also drew strength from the poverty that KANU’s policies and structural adjustment seemed to have brought on the Kikuyu. Mungiki provided a social welfare organisation for the poorest of the poor, crusading against drunkenness, drug addiction and prostitution. It used oathing and religious techniques to build and retain loyalty.

    As a violent, Kikuyu-focused movement appealing to the marginalised and talking of revolutionary change, Mungiki raised echoes of Mau Mau. It was therefore a serious concern to the government, which outlawed the group in 2000, repressed its meetings and jailed its members. Despite this, the movement grew, centred in Kiambu, Nairobi, Laikipia and Nakuru, and was believed to have 2 million members by 2002. It was well organised and financially secure. Acting as a criminal mafia, Mungiki took over matatu routes during 2000–1, and operated mob justice in Kikuyu-dominated shantytowns.

    There was evidence of the sect’s involvement in drug dealing and murder. At some point, the movement also acquired wealthy Kikuyu allies, including incumbent MPs and even ministers. This reflected a common radical ethno-nationalism, but equally important was the desire of some politicians to use Mungiki to support their own agenda. In the run-up to the elections, there was a bizarre change of stance by KANU.

    In late 2000, Moi had made a secret deal with Mungiki, fearful of the security implications of the group’s alleged conversion to Islam, giving it more of a free hand. In 2001, KANU entered into a brief alliance with the outlawed sect, seeking Kikuyu youth support for Uhuru. After Mungiki leaders declared their support for Uhuru in March 2002, police harassment abated, despite the group’s killing of 23 people (most Luo) in a Nairobi slum in the same month. There was a remarkable rally on 21 August 2002 during which several thousand armed Mungiki members marched through Nairobi, under police protection, and the sect campaigned for Kenyatta in the 2002 elections. Several Mungiki officials were nominated as KANU parliamentary candidates, and they were supplied with army Land Rovers to help them campaign for Uhuru. It was not to last.

    The negative reactions to the association of the educated Uhuru with a Kikuyu-chauvinist mafia contributed to a sudden reversal of policy before the polls. Uhuru flatly disowned Mungiki on 6 October 2002 and its Chairman Maina Njenga, KANU’s candidate for Laikipia West, had his nomination revoked.

  • The Nation (Nairobi) 21 Aug 2002
    Mungiki Sect Demonstrate in Support Uhuru Kenyatta
    By Mugumo Munene

    The banned Mungiki sect yesterday staged a massive demonstration through Nairobi streets in support of Kanu presidential nomination hopeful Uhuru Kenyatta. Hundreds of members of the traditionalist group – some armed with machettes and clubs – marched through the city centre waving placards and singing in support of the Local Government Minister. Sniffing tobacco, wielding clubs, and waving pro-Uhuru banners and placards, the demonstrators interrupted business in the city as they headed for Uhuru Park. Some brandished swords, but their leader insisted they stood for peace. Sect chairman John Maina Njenga said: “No one will mobilise us to cause chaos. We are for peace and not on hire. We support Uhuru because he is beyond tribal politics.”

    Mungiki was proscribed with 17 other groups in March after its members were linked to the Kariobangi massacre in Nairobi, which left 23 people dead. Police commissioner Philemon Abong’o announced then that the 18 groups had been outlawed as they were a threat to security. But yesterday, plainclothes policemen and Intelligence officers freely mixed with the marchers. Police spokesman Peter Kimanthi said the demonstration was allowed to take place because its organisers had notified police as individuals and not as Mungiki members. He said it did not exist in government records. “Those people were allowed to demonstrate as Kenyans. As long as those who apply for permission fulfil all the requirements and don’t break the law, police have no reason to stop them.”

    Uniformed police monitored the march from a distance. At Parliament Road, Central divisional police boss Japheth Koome stood with a squad of uniformed anti-riot officers. Asked why the demonstrators carried weapons, Mr Njenga replied: “We could be attacked. We are just prepared in case of any eventualities, but as you have seen, we are not fighting anybody.” The march started at Kamukunji, snaked through the Gikomba open-air market, past Kariokor and into Ronald Ngala Street in the city centre. The chanting demonstrators then joined Haile Selassie Avenue, turned on to Harambee Avenue, passed by Jogoo House on to City Hall Way. They tried to enter Parliament Road but were blocked by police. Officers in riot gear stood between the group and the President’s Office, where President Moi had spent the morning working. Mr Koome asked the marchers to stay away from the mausoleum of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, where Kenya Army men were rehearsing for tomorrow’s memorial for the founding President.

    The sect’s national co-ordinator, Mr Ndura Waruinge, briefly argued with Mr Koome and insisted that his group was peaceful “and we should not be provoked”. They had come in all manner of transport – on buses, private cars, hand carts and donkey carts. Sect officials said that they had hired the vehicles with funds drawn from the sect’s account. Some of the placards and banners read Uhuru na Kazi, Uhuru for President, Mungiki for Peace and President Moi must be respected. At Uhuru Park, the sect members burst into traditional Kikuyu songs in praise of Kanu, Mr Kenyatta and President Moi. The first group to reach the park was led by Mr Waruinge, Mr Njenga and Kamukunji Kanu aspirant Simon Mbugua. It was later joined by another led by Nairobi Mayor Dick Waweru. Many of the sect members wore simple clothes and knitted caps in national flag colours. Mr Waweru was clad in a white suit emblazoned with Kanu’s symbol of a cockerel. At about 1 pm, the rally was briefly interrupted as the presidential motorcade passed by. It slowed down with presidential security on full alert, but did not stop. Mr Njenga said that there had been rumours that youths had been hired to disrupt the meeting. Mr Waweru said Nairobi residents were united to ensure that Mr Kenyatta succeeded President Moi.

  • Siame Katambalile

    Why is it that only the wealth of Africans is considered illegal is it impossible for an African to be rich.

  • When Kibaki’s people approached Mudavadi that he should quit ODM and run for president and that they would give him the kikuyu vote, they obviously convinced him that Uhuru was not going to run because of the ICC case. Kibaki handlers are still supporting Mudamba, and even telling him what to say when campaigning in Central province. The concept that a Kikuyu is not electable this round is not a creation of anti-Kikuyu forces, but something straight out of the Kenyan intelligence circles and which the Statehouse tends to have adopted.

    This means that the people who really do not want Uhuru to run are Kibaki’s advisors because they believe if Uhuru runs, the “status quoists” will lose this election to reformers. Raila wants Uhuru to run for the same reason that Kibaki does not want Uhuru to run. Raila also wants Uhuru and Ruto to run because if they do, Mudavadi will be left stranded, and all he needs to do is be on the run-off with Uhuru or Ruto and he is home free. Raila knows he is much better off in the run-off with any of the ICC indictees than he would be with Mudavadi.

    My point therefore is that Kibaki’s people are the ones who will benefit more if Uhuru is barred from running and not Raila. If the court ruling says that Uhuruto cannot ran, Kibaki’s people and Uhuruto will try to blame Raila, but the real culprits will be Kibaki’s. We also know that the people who really want something to happen to Miguna Miguna are not from Raila’s side, but Raila haters, because they are the ones who would benefit more.

    There is always a difference between a plan and what actually happens. Even if Uhuru does not run, Messi is in for a real surprise because Martha Karua has seen that Panya root that Messi is eyeing and is taking steps to close it. Martha is pretty much saying that if Uhuru is out, then the Kikuyu votes belong to her because Kiuks do not owe anybody nothing. Messi should not have left ODM; he is already running into road blocks.

  • If Uhuru was clever, he could have done what I call “Doing the right thing with the wrong thing”. It was wrong for Kenyatta to acquire that massive land (Rightfully or wrongfully). Uhuru would have distributed the land back to people who were displaced by the settlers. Their descendants are not lost and they can easily be traced. By doing this, Uhuru would have won the hearts of Kenyans far and wide.

    It was wrong for Kenyatta to acquire the massive land in the first place, but returning the land would have been doing the right thing with the wrong thing.

  • SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

    Decision on the Request for Disqualification of the Prosecutor in the
    Investigation against Mr David Nyekorach-Matsanga

    Date of the redacted version: 6 September 2012

    B. The Request for Disqualification

    18. The Request for Disqualification seeks the disqualification of the Prosecutor from investigating Mr Nyekorach-Matsanga.” At the time that the Request for Disqualification was registered on 1 June 2012, the Prosecutor of the Court was Mr Moreno-Ocampo, and the Request for Disqualification is based on Mr Moreno-Ocampo’s alleged direct and personal interest in investigating Mr Nyekorach-Matsanga.

    19. Mr Moreno-Ocampo’s term of office began on 16 June 2003 and, pursuant to article 42 (4) of the Statute, lasted for nine years. His term of office ended on 15 June 2012. With Mr Moreno-Ocampo having left office, the request to disqualify him has been rendered moot and must be dismissed as such.

    20. Given that the Request for Disqualification is dismissed as moot, the Appeals
    Chamber finds it unnecessary to consider the other remedies requested by Mr
    Nyekorach-Matsanga, all of which were aimed at facilitating the Appeals Chamber’s consideration of the merits of the Request for Disqualification.

    21. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber dismisses in limine the Request for Leave to Reply. Considering that the Request for Disqualification is moot, the Appeals
    Chamber sees no reason why it should grant leave to reply and thus to present further arguments to Mr Nyekorach-Matsanga. In addition, the Appeals Chamber notes and disapproves of the fact that Mr Nyekorach-Matsanga made substantive submissions in the Request for Leave to Reply instead of requesting leave by explaining why leave to reply should be granted to him and awaiting the Appeals Chamber’s decision on the request before making substantive submissions.

    Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.

    Judge Sang-Hyun Song
    Presiding Judge
    Dated this 6th day of September 2012
    At The Hague, The Netherlands

    Click to access doc1466376.pdf

  • The Road to Kenya’s ICC Trials:
    September 3, 2012: First joint prosecution/defence filing on agreed facts about non-contentious issues.

    October 16, 2012: Prosecution to file ex parte (Chamber and Victims and Witnesses Unit only) provisional list of witnesses to be relied on at trial and list of evidence.

    October 31, 2012: Prosecution report on joint instruction of experts.

    January 9, 2013: The prosecution is to provide its witness list, which should include a bullet-pointed summary of the main facts on which each witness is expected to testify, an indication of the estimated length of time required for each witness and the total time for the presentation of the prosecution case, in hours. The prosecution is also to file its list of evidence to be relied on at trial.

    January 9, 2013: Prosecution to have completed disclosure to the defence of all incriminatory material in the form of witness statements and any other material to be relied on at trial.

    January 9, 2013: Prosecution to file pre-trial brief explaining its case with reference to the evidence it intends to rely on at trial. The pre-trial brief should contain, for each count, a summary of the relevant evidence of each witness to be relied on at trial and all other evidence upon which the prosecution intends to rely, and shall clearly explain how the evidence relates to the charges.

    February 11, 2013: Prosecution disclosure to the defence of identities of witnesses in the ICCPP.

    February 14, 2013: Disclosure of the reports of any expert witness who will be called during the prosecution case.

    March 8, 2013: The prosecution and the defence teams for both accused are to liaise with a view to reaching agreement of facts as well as the authenticity of evidence.

    March 12, 2013: Prosecution disclosure to the defence of identities of non-ICCPP prosecution witnesses with security concerns who have been the subject of an application for delayed disclosure.

    April 10, 2013: Commencement of trial against in the case William Ruto and Joshua Sang

    April 10, 2013: Commencement of trial in the case against Uhuru Kenyatta and Francis Muthaura

    http://olivermathenge.wordpress.com/tag/uhuru-kenyatta/

  • In all seriousness, what qualifies Uhuru for presidency over Raila, Kalonzo, Mudavadi, or even Ruto? Someone tell me please. He has no national accomplishments and he has continued to feed off his father’s name. At least Raila has done something for himself, was detained by Moi for being against his dictatorship, etc. If he has failed or succeeded, it’s still up for debate. Jameni, what has Mr. TNA done? We must examine these self-acclaimed leaders now.

  • Uhuru Kenyatta does not pay tax on his salary as Deputy Prime Minister, MP or when he was a Cabinet Minister. Shows that he will not respect the Constitution if elected president.

  • UHURU TO SURRENDER THE CORRUPT AQUIRED WEALTH BACK TO KENYANS IF HE IS A TRUE PATRIOT.

  • http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/97153-mama-ngina-uhuru-sued-by-relative-over-land-grabbing

    Kenyatta kin sues Mama Ngina over ‘grabbed’ land .
    Monday, 08 October 2012 00:05 BY JILLO KADIDA

    Mama Ngina Kenyatta, the widow of founding father Jomo Kenyatta, and her son Uhuru Kenyatta have been sued by a relative over allegations of land grabbing.

    The only surviving brother of Mzee Kenyatta, Peter Muigai Ngengi, accuses Mama Ngina and Uhuru of wrongfully depriving him of his three and a half acres. The plot is at Ichaweri village in Gatundu, Kiambu County.

    Mama Ngina and Uhuru are yet to file a replying affidavit to the claims by Ngengi. In a petition filed at the High Court 34 years after the death of the former President, Ngengi alias Wakameme says that Kenyatta and his family took his land to satisfy their desire to expand their home to attain to the status of a presidential palace.

    However, their father (the father of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta) would always stop such ideas and sternly warned the former President against misusing his powers.

    Ngengi quotes in his suit papers what he said his father used to tell the President. “Na tondu unene ni uriaga mundu ta karubu (local brew) ndukanahatike muru wa thoguo (because power intoxicates like beer don’t you ever encroach upon your brother’s inheritance).”

    According to Ngengi, the former President took seriously the stern warning by their father and never moved anyone from his land. “All members of the family lived in joy and harmony in their portions of inheritance and neighbours applauded my father for his wisdom and love he had for his family,” Ngengi says.

    However, after their father died and even before his body was lowered into the grave, the beacons dividing Ngengi’s and Kenyatta’s land were allegedly uprooted at the order of the President.

    Ngengi says he protested against the action and declared that he would not give up his land. “I was ready to die and be buried with my father. I then went and put the beacons back to their rightful positions,” says Ngengi in his affidavit sworn in support of the case.

    At one point, he says, a presidential guard whom he identified as a Mr Gatundu came to him and pleaded with him to leave Kenyatta alone.

    Ngengi says shortly after the burial of their father Kenyatta ordered for removal of the beacons and his arrest. Ngengi says he was arrested and taken to Gatundu colonial prison as his house was demolished.

    He says he went through immense trauma sometimes without having enough food to eat. The President is said to have ordered later that Ngengi and his family be built a house in Mutomo on government land.

    Ngengi says he was moved together with his family to Munyu near Ndarugu River in the middle of the wilderness with no tent or permanent structure to call a home.

    He says he has nine children and several grandchildren many of whom have died of malnutrition. Ngengi equates his story to that of Naboth, Jezebel and Ahab in the Bible describing himself as the Naboth.

    The story is in the book of Kings chapter one verse 21 where Ahab the king wanted the vineyard at Jezreel belonging to Naboth. Naboth refused and Jezebel, the king’s wife, schemed to kill him for Ahab to get the vineyard.

    Ngengi says he continues to suffer and languish in poverty and believes the Kenyatta family threw him out of his land because of greed.

    He claims in the court papers that the Kenyatta family owns huge chunks of land in the country. Ngengi pleads with the court to give him justice before he dies so that his children will benefit. “I pray that before I close my eyes in death I will get help. Countrymen, I fought for independence. God gave it to us. As for me it meant persecution and torture. I thank God that am still breathing. When my last breath comes and my eyes are closed in death, just know this is the truth,” says Ngengi in his affidavit.

    Ngengi wants the court to make declarations that he is entitled to compensation by Uhuru and his mother for the dispossession. He also wants an order compelling the government to repossess the three and a half acres from Mama Ngina and Uhuru and give the land to him. Also sought is compensation from government for his wrongful detention of one year.

  • Here are the facts:

    1) Uhuru and Ruto are facing charges at the Hague for committing crimes against humanity.

    2) The charges have been confirmed by the ICC and the trials begin on April 10, 2013.

    3) There are no Immunities or waivers even for the defendants including if they are heads of state or government or hold the highest office in any jurisdiction.

    4) The new prosecutor has announced that the April 10, 2013 date, will not be changed to accomodate Kenya’s election schedule.

    5) The US has made it clear through its secretary of state that it will not do bussiness with a president of Kenya who is also a defendant at the ICC for committing crimes against humanity.

    6) Chapter six, of the new Katiba, has very stringent integrity requirements which is highly unlikely (subject to interpretation by the court) to allow a defendant at the Hague for crimes against humanit to hold public office.

    7) Uhuru and Ruto will not be available to serve if elected because of their appointment with the ICC court.

    8) Uhuru and Ruto are impeachable immediately upon swearing in for the presidency if elected.

  • Kenyatta and Ruto must stand trial – ICC
    Ekaterina Trendafilova
    23 January 2012

    Summary of decision on crimes against humanity charges laid against Kenyan politicians

    Summary of decision in the two Kenya cases

    Presentation for 23 January 2012 in Case 1 and Case 2

    Court Officer, please, call the two cases in the Kenya situation.

    Thank you, Court Officer.

    Good morning, to everyone who is joining us from in and around the Court and also to those joining us from the Republic of Kenya via the internet or otherwise.

    Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court composed of Judges Hans-Peter Kaul to my right, Cuno Tarfusser to my left and I – Ekaterina Trendafilova – the Presiding Judge of this Chamber, has decided to appear in Court this morning in order to present an oral summary of its decisions concerning the charges of the Prosecutor against:

    William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang in Case 1 and
    Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali in Case 2.
    Before presenting a summary of the Chamber’s findings, I would like to clarify that this is not a hearing or a Court session. The Prosecutor and the Defence teams are not present, the Legal Representatives of victims are also not in attendance, the Registrar and her colleagues are not here, and the Chamber’s legal officers are also absent from the courtroom.

    Rather, the Chamber is alive to its role in ensuring that both the public at large and interested Kenyans, are duly informed of the Chamber’s decisions regarding charges emanating from the violence, which engulfed the Republic of Kenya, after the announcement, on 30 December 2007, of the results of the presidential elections.

    In Case 1, the Prosecutor presented 6 counts charging the 3 Suspects with crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population and persecution.

    In Case 2, the Prosecutor presented 10 counts charging the other 3 Suspects with crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts and persecution.

    The Chamber is mindful of concerns regarding the precarious security situation in parts of the country. It is also attentive of its responsibility to maintain stability in Kenya, and to fulfill its duty vis-à-vis the protection of victims and witnesses.

    Thus, the Chamber considered it necessary to issue the two decisions on the charges of the Prosecutor on the same day and did so today before this appearance. The parties and participants were notified accordingly of the decisions.

    Now I will turn to the decisions of the Chamber issued today.

    After having thoroughly examined and analyzed individually and collectively all the evidence presented, the Chamber, by majority, decided to confirm the charges against four of the six suspects, as will be explained later in more detail.

    Judge Kaul appended a dissenting opinion in both cases. He maintains that the ICC is not competent because the crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Kenya during the post-election violence of 2007-2008 in his view were serious common crimes under Kenyan criminal law, but not crimes against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

    Before turning to the task at hand, namely the summary of the Chamber’s decisions, I would like to briefly recall some of the important procedural developments of the two cases. This will give a better idea of the work of the Court, of the parties and participants in the cases.

    Since 8 March 2011, when the Chamber issued its decisions on the summonses to appear, in the two cases, the Chamber has been continuously seized with a multitude of issues. Throughout the proceedings, the Chamber placed at the centre of its activities its duty to ensure the fair, expeditious and independent conduct of the entire process. The Chamber also gave substantial consideration to the protection of victims and witnesses and the various rights of the defence.

    On 7 and 8 April 2011, in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, the initial appearance hearings took place, during which the Chamber set the dates of the confirmation of charges hearing.

    This stage was followed by a series of judicial activities. In particular, the Chamber facilitated the participation of victims by issuing a number of decisions in this regard.

    In the first case, the Chamber received 394 victims applications for participation, amounting to 4,246 pages and admitted 327 victims as participants in the proceedings.

    In the second case, we received 249 applications for participation with the total of 2,864 pages and admitted 233 victims to participate.

    Moreover, for the purposes of ensuring the security of the victims and witnesses, the Chamber also took decisions on the Prosecutor’s proposals for redactions, which amounted to around 12,000 pages.

    Apart from that, the Chamber also issued two decisions on the Government of Kenya’s challenges to the admissibility of the cases, in which it ultimately found the cases to be admissible. The Chamber’s decisions were upheld on appeal.

    Furthermore, in readiness of the confirmation of charges hearings, the Chamber issued a number of decisions organizing and facilitating the disclosure of evidence between the Prosecutor and Defence. Together, the six Defence teams and the Prosecutor in both cases disclosed approximately 30,000 pages of evidence, for the purpose of the Chambers’ determination on the charges presented.

    On 1 September 2011, the confirmation of charges hearing in Case 1 commenced, as decided during the initial appearance, and lasted for 7 days.

    Similarly, as determined during the initial appearance of the Suspects in the second case, the confirmation of charges hearing in Case 2 started on 21 September 2011, , lasting for 12 days.

    Thus, since the start of the cases, the Chamber has received 4,905 filings, including their annexes, from the Prosecutor, the Defence teams, Victims representatives, amici curiae and the Registry. Including today’s decisions, the Chamber has issued 252 decisions, in both cases.

    This concludes the procedural background of the two cases to date.

    At this point and on behalf of the Chamber, I must explain that we are notpassing judgment on the guilt or innocence of the individuals. The Chamber is tasked by law only to evaluate the strength of the Prosecutor’s case at this pre-trial stage – that is to determine whether the Prosecutor presented enough evidence before the Chamber to confirm the charges. The standard required by the law, is that there are “substantial grounds to believe” that the crimes charged were committed, and that the Suspects were responsible for them.

    Summary of Decision in Case 1

    I will now turn to the merits of Case 1, the Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang. It concerns crimes committed in Turbo town, the greater Eldoret area, Kapsabet town and Nandi Hills from on or about 30 December 2007 until the end of January 2008. I would like to underline the following:

    As mentioned at the start, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Ruto, Mr. Kosgey and Mr. Sang, for crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer and persecution.

    Mr. Ruto and Mr. Kosgey were charged as indirect co-perpetrators, while Mr. Sang was charged as having contributed to the said crimes against humanity.

    I will first summarise the findings of the Chamber on the crimes, and then the findings as to the criminal responsibility.

    With respect to the crimes charged and based on the evidence placed before it, the Chamber found that the Prosecutor has established substantial grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer and persecution were committed. These crimes resulted in the death of hundreds, and the displacement of thousands of civilians from Turbo town, the greater Eldoret area, Kapsabet town and Nandi Hills.

    The Chamber also found that these crimes were committed as part of an attack directed against particular groups, namely, Kikuyu, Kamba and Kisii, due to their perceived political affiliation to the Party of National Unity.

    As to the criminal responsibility of Mr. Ruto and Mr. Sang, the Chamber found, on the basis of the evidence presented, that they are responsible for the charges levied against them.

    In particular, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Mr. Ruto as an indirect co- perpetrator with others, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, while it found that Mr. Sang contributed to the commission of said crimes against humanity, pursuant to article 25(3)(d)(i), to the extent specified in the written decision.

    However, in relation to Mr. Kosgey, the Chamber found that the Prosecutor’s evidence failed to satisfy the evidentiary threshold required. The Chamber was not persuaded by the evidence presented by the Prosecutor of Mr. Kosgey’s alleged role within the organization.

    In particular, the Prosecutor relied on one anonymous and insufficiently corroborated witness. Moreover, the Chamber determined that Mr. Kosgey suffered prejudice due to the redaction of certain dates related to a number of meetings that he allegedly attended, which proved to be essential for his defence and for the finding on his criminal responsibility.

    In light of these facts and the entire body of evidence relating to Mr. Kosgey’s criminal responsibility, the Chamber declined to confirm the charges against Mr. Kosgey.

    Summary of Decision in Case 2

    Turning now to Case 2, the Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali.

    As mentioned earlier, the Prosecutor charged Mr. Muthaura, Mr. Kenyatta and Mr. Ali with crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts and persecution.

    Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta were charged as indirect co-perpetrators, while Mr. Ali was charged as having contributed to the said alleged crimes against humanity.

    As to the crimes, the Chamber found, on the basis of a thorough review of the evidence individually and collectively, substantial grounds to believe that between 24 and 28 January 2008 there was an attack against the civilian residents of Nakuru and Naivasha perceived as supporters of the Orange Democratic Movement, in particular those belonging to the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin ethnic groups.

    The Chamber also found that the attack resulted in a large number of killings, displacement of thousands of people, rape, severe physical injuries and mental suffering.

    Thus, the evidence established substantial grounds to believe that the crimes of murder, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, other inhumane acts and persecution were committed.

    With respect to the criminal responsibility of Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta, the Chamber was satisfied that the evidence also established substantial grounds to believe that they are criminally responsible for the alleged crimes, as indirect co-perpetrators, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, having gained control over the Mungiki and directed them to commit the crimes.

    However, in relation to Mr. Ali, the Chamber found that the evidence presented does not provide substantial grounds to believe that the Kenya Police participated in the attack in or around Nakuru and Naivasha. Since Mr. Ali was charged with contributing to the crimes through the Kenya Police, the Chamber declined to confirm the charges against him.

    The Chamber will now outline the impact of its decisions on: (1) those against whom the charges have been confirmed; (2) on those against whom the charges have not been confirmed (namely, Mr. Kosgey and Mr. Ali); (3) as well as on the victims.

    As a result of the decisions issued today, Mr. Ruto, Mr. Sang, Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta are committed to trial. They will be tried before a different Chamber for the charges confirmed. To this end, one or more Trial Chambers will be established by the Presidency of the ICC.

    In this regard, the Chamber wishes to highlight that victims, who are already represented before this Chamber, may participate in the trial. Other victims will have the right and opportunity to apply to participate during the trial stage. Victims will have also the right to request reparations, should the accused persons be found guilty.

    The Chamber wishes to be unequivocal and state that Mr. Ruto, Mr. Sang, Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta are merely accused before this Court. The Chamber would like to emphasise, for the purposes of clarity, that the presumption of innocence remains fully intact.

    At trial, the Prosecutor will have the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to article 66 of the Statute. Furthermore, the decisions issued today by this Chamber do not affect the liberty of the accused, which remains undisturbed.

    This, however, absolutely depends on the accused’s adherence to the conditions contained in the summonses to appear, which continue to remain in full force. At this point, the Chamber recalls its previous warning to the Suspects that their continued liberty is subject to their non-engagement in incitement of violence or hate speech.

    As to Mr. Kosgey and Mr. Ali, the Chamber wishes to clarify that they are no longer Suspects before the Court. However, the Chamber recalls article 61(8) of the Rome Statute, according to which the Prosecutor may present additional evidence requesting confirmation of charges against Mr. Kosgey and Mr. Ali.

    We have now concluded the summary of the Chamber’s decisions in Case 1 and Case 2. At this juncture, the Chamber would like to express a few sentiments.

    Today and indeed throughout the proceedings in these cases, we have appeared in our official capacities as Judges of the International Criminal Court. Offices which task us with the sole purpose of achieving justice – justice for all – for victims but equally, justice for those who appeared before the Court. This is not rhetoric but a tangible goal we all genuinely strive for.

    In reaching our decisions we have reviewed all the evidence individually and collectively, regardless of its source, firmly guided by the provisions of the Court’s statutory documents. In the fulfillment of our judicial mandate, we have looked through impartial and independent lenses, in order to ascertain whether the requisite threshold in article 61 of the Statute, for confirmation of the charges has been reached.

    It is our utmost desire that the decisions issued by this Chamber today, bring peace to the people of the Republic of Kenya and prevent any sort of hostility. The decisions are the result of intensive and committed judicial work of the Chamber, conducted impartially, independently and conscientiously in the interests and in the service of justice.

    That concludes Pre-Trial Chamber II’s appearance this morning. Before we leave the courtroom, on behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank everyone who has been following this public appearance and especially the people of the Republic of Kenya.

    Source: International Criminal Court.

  • Click to access 10Oct2012ICCKeyNoteAddress.pdf

    The ICC: A response to African concerns – Fatou Bensouda
    Fatou Bensouda
    10 October 2012

    Key note address by court’s new prosecutor at Institute for Security Studies

    Key note address by Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Seminar Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, October 10 2012

    Setting the record straight: the ICC’s new Prosecutor responds to African concerns

    Reconciling the independent role of the ICC Prosecutor with conflict resolution initiatives

    Your Excellencies,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Thank you for being here today and thank you in particular to the Institute for Security Studies for so very kindly organising this important seminar.

    It is a great pleasure for me to talk to you to you on pressing issues relating to justice, peace and security from the perspective of the International Criminal Court, a unique institution of which I have the privilege to serve as Prosecutor since 15 June 2012.

    The mandate of the Prosecutor and how the work of the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor can contribute to the management of conflicts and the prevention of massive crimes has to be well understood.

    The fact that we are debating matters relating to peace and justice today shows how innovative an idea it is to have international criminal justice.

    60 years ago, in the Nuremberg Trials, those who committed massive crimes were for the first time held accountable by the the international community through a judicial process.

    Nuremberg was a landmark. However, the world was not ready to transform such a landmark into a lasting institution. In the end, the world would wait for almost half a century after Nuremberg, and would witness again two genocides – first in the Former Yugoslavia, and then in Rwanda – before the UN Security Council decided to create ad hoc international criminal tribunals, thereby connecting peace and international justice again.

    The ICTY and ICTR paved the way for the decision of the international community to establish a permanent criminal court in an effort to avoid a repetition of past experiences. A court built upon the lessons of decades when the world had failed to prevent massive crimes.

    With the Rome Statute the world created a permanent and independent judicial institution, complementary to national jurisdictions, designed to put an end to impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community and thereby contribute to the prevention of such atrocities, as a new component to the world’s efforts to achieve peace and security.

    The Rome Statute framework has created an opportunity to realize international justice by applying one standard to all its States Parties and the 2.3 billion people that are under its protection.

    The Rome Statute consolidates the new trend. The message of the Statute is clear: there shall be no impunity for anyone who commits massive crimes.

    Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    All States Parties to the Rome Statute commit to investigate, prosecute and prevent massive crimes when perpetrated within their own jurisdiction. 121 States today have accepted that should they fail in this primary responsibility, the ICC can independently decide to step in.

    Under the Rome Statute, States Parties also commit to cooperate with the Court whenever and wherever the Court decides to act. The Court can therefore rely on the cooperation of the police of all States Parties to implement its decisions. This is not just an abstraction.

    Let me highlight in particular the support the African continent, as the largest regional bloc of States Parties, has been giving to the Court from its inception, providing assistance to the Court at each step of its development: in showing confidence in the Court by referring situations of massive atrocities to the Office for investigation, in cooperating with the Office and facilitating the investigations, in pursuing and arresting individuals sought by the Court, in protecting witnesses, etc. African States, including Non States Parties, receive more than 50 per cent of the Office’s requests for cooperation. Over 70 per cent are met with a positive response.

    Largely thanks to this African support, the Court today is in motion, working for the millions of victims that are crying for our help.

    The Office of the Prosecutor has opened investigations in 7 situations. In these situations, we have opened 15 cases in relation to 29 persons. The Court has cast 1 verdict, and more are soon to follow. Additionally, the Office is engaged in preliminary examinations, in Honduras, the Republic of Korea, Afghanistan, Mali and Nigeria, where the Office is analyzing alleged crimes, and in Guinea, Colombia and Georgia, where the Office is assessing if genuine national proceedings are being carried out.

    These preliminary examinations, which are a legal prerequisite for opening any investigations, constitute a comprehensive process during which the Office independently and impartially considers whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the opening of an investigation.

    The Rome Statute is a unique innovation in that for the first time in history an international Prosecutor is given the mandate to independently open investigations in situations where crimes are committed. This is indeed unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals, or the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda where States or other political bodies selected the situations to investigate.

    The Prosecutor of the ICC must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation based on legal criteria provided by the Rome Statute, relating to jurisdiction, admissibility and the interest of justice. A Security Council referral or a request from a State Party does not bind the Prosecutor and is subject to the same legal criteria.

    The jurisdictional limitation is the main reason why the Office cannot investigate in Non States Parties such as Somalia, Israel or Syria. The lack of jurisdiction can only be repaired by a referral of the UN Security Council or through acceptance of jurisdiction by the State concerned, such as done by Côte d’Ivoire.

    The Statute also requires that the crimes reach a threshold of gravity. For instance, the Office conducted a preliminary examination of alleged crimes committed in Iraq by nationals of 25 States Parties involved in the military operation there. It found cases of willful killings and torture but they were not committed “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large‐scale commission”. So the Office could not open an investigation because the cases did not reach the gravity threshold established by the Statute. In addition, the States concerned were conducting domestic investigations and prosecutions, so on the basis of the complementary nature of the Court, the Office could not step in.

    This complementary nature of the Court is also not well understood. Simply put, the Court can not investigate if a State itself is investigating and prosecuting the same crimes. In all situations referred to the Court by States themselves (Uganda, DRC, Central African Republic,… ) the Office started investigating only after determining that there were no ongoing investigations. Even in situations referred to the Office by the UNSC (Sudan and Libya) or situations in which the Office opens investigations by his own motion (Kenya) the Office is obliged to first determine whether there are ongoing national proceedings before starting its own investigations.

    Finally, in accordance with the Statute, the Prosecutor should not proceed with an investigation or prosecution if it is not in the “interests of justice”. It would however be exceptional to decide that an investigation would not be in the interest of justice and the victims. I should stress here that the “interests of justice” must not be confused with the interests of peace and security, which falls within the mandate of other institutions, notably the UN Security Council and the African Union.

    The Court and the Office of the Prosecutor itself are not involved in political considerations. We have to respect our legal limits. The prospect of peace negotiations is therefore not a factor that forms part of the Office’s determination on the interests of justice.

    The international community has put in place some clear divisions of responsibility. The UN Security Council is in charge of peace and security. The ICC is doing justice.

    It is important to realize though, that it is only in the last ten years, following the entry into force of the Rome Statute that this independent and permanent criminal justice component has been added to the toolbox of international policy options available to international policy makers as they work to achieve peace and security. It therefore makes sense that the relationship between peace and justice is complex, with international criminal justice mechanisms at a relatively early stage in their evolution.

    As part of peace and security mandate, the UN Security Council has the option of referring situations to the Office of the Prosecutor for investigations, in particular concerning those States not Party to the Rome Statute where there are prima facie indications that widespread serious crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court are being committed.. By the same token, the Council also has the power under article 16 to request a temporary deferral of an investigation or prosecution undertaken by the Court.

    The reasons for which these powers may be exercised are clearly a matter for Security Council members themselves and are not issues with which the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor can or should be involved.

    Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

    There is no doubt that the world today is increasingly united by the conviction that no leader can be allowed to commit massive atrocities to gain or retain power. The responsibility to turn that conviction into reality, as in so many other areas of international life today, is shared.

    By joining the Rome Statute States turn this conviction into a legally binding commitment. In States Parties, the Rome Statute system foresees that in case of massive crimes there will be investigations and prosecutions carried out by the State authorities itself, or, in the absence thereof, by the ICC. There will be legal consequences and accountability for the crimes.

    However, in situations concerning Non States Parties, if the State takes no action, it is up to the Security Council to decide, on a case by case basis and without one particular standard, to refer the situation to ICC. To increase the prospects of changing behavior and preventing crimes or an escalation thereof, the Security Council could therefore warn States of the possibility of an ICC referral.

    Once the Security Council takes a political decision to refer a situation to the Prosecutor, the judicial process begins and all the necessary legal requirements must be fulfilled for the case to move forward. The Office of the Prosecutor will investigate according to the Statute and pursue cases wherever the evidence may lead. Judges will issue arrest warrants or summonses to appear if they are satisfied that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor meets the required legal threshold.. This judicial process can only be interrupted by a further decision of the Security Council acting under article 16 of the Statute.

    It should nonetheless be recalled that an article 16 deferral does not divest the Court of jurisdiction – the deferral only suspends the process for a renewable 12 month period. It is in this regard that, the Council would no doubt need to consider whether there has been a change of circumstances within the situation that would justify continued suspension of investigations and prosecutions or resuming them. A deferral is not an amnesty, nor an offer of immunity from prosecution – it buys time perhaps, but it does not buy a way out for alleged war criminals.

    In most situations before the Court, conflict management and often specific peace negotiations have been underway while the investigations and prosecutions are proceeding. The role of the ICC has never precluded or put an end to such processes. Rather, I would say, it has proved a spur to action, for example, as in the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), where ICC arrest warrants themselves have been widely acknowledged to have played an important role in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table in the Juba Peace Process in the first instance. This was despite initial fears by some – emphasised and exploited by the LRA leadership themselves – that if the indictments were not lifted, they could threaten the peace talks. At that time, my predecessor appropriately referred to this as blackmail.

    As the example of Joseph Kony shows, there can be obvious perverse side-effects from deferring judicial proceedings in the name of peace and security. Succumbing to pressure to restrain justice may send out a message to perpetrators that arrest warrants can be stayed if only they commit more crimes or threaten regional peace and security. Court proceedings or the possibility of Security Council deferrals should not be used by alleged war criminals as a tool to divide the international community.

    The mandate of the Office of the Prosecutor is to ensure accountability for those who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the most serious crimes. The policy of the Office is to pursue its independent mandate to investigate and prosecute those few most responsible, and to do so in a manner that respects the mandates of others and seeks to maximize the positive impact of the joint efforts of all. To preserve its impartiality, the Office cannot participate in peace initiatives, but it makes clear that any proposed solutions in peace talks have to be compatible with the Rome Statute. It will inform the political actors of its actions in advance, so they can factor the Court into their activities.

    The Office of the Prosecutor’s experience after 9 years, looking at various conflict resolution initiatives around the world, has reaffirmed my deep-seated belief that both peace and justice are necessary and integral elements in any sustainable route to lasting stability.

    By way of conclusion I would like to quote UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon speaking at the ICC Review Conference in 2010, who emphasised much the same point:

    “Perhaps the most contentious challenge you face is the balance between peace and justice. Yet frankly, I see it as a false choice. In today’s conflicts, civilians have become the chief victims. Women, children and the elderly are deliberately targeted. Armies or militias rape, maim, kill and devastate towns, villages, crops, cattle and water sources – all as a strategy of war. The more shocking the crime, the more effective it is as a weapon. Any victim would understandably yearn to stop such horrors, even at the cost of granting immunity to those who have wronged them. But this is a false peace. This is a truce at gunpoint, without dignity, justice or hope for a better future. (…) [T]he time has passed when we might speak of peace versus justice, or think of them as somehow opposed to each other. (…) We have no choice but to pursue them both, hand in hand. (…) Now, we have the ICC. Permanent, increasingly powerful, casting a long shadow. There is no going back. In this new age of accountability, those who commit the worst of human crimes will be held responsible. Whether they are rank‐and‐file foot soldiers or military commanders; whether they are lowly civil servants following orders, or top political leaders, they will be held accountable.”

    If perpetrators and potential perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are to be deterred from committing more crimes, a strong and consistent message is required from all quarters – whether from the Court, State Parties to the Rome Statue, Non States Parties, the African Union, the UN Security Council, or others – that peace and justice can work together and that the era of impunity is over.

    Looking ahead to my tenure as Prosecutor, I hope I may count on your support and assistance to end impunity for the crimes that have plagued our continent and elsewhere. Having been nominated and supported for this position by the AU, I consider myself to be an extension of the African fabric for ending impunity. Solely guided by the law and the cardinal principles of independence, impartiality and fairness, I will serve the victims of massive crimes in need of our support, wherever and whenever they cry for help. I stand ready to work with you and others in answering their call.

    I thank you for your attention.

    Issued by the ISS, October 10 2012

  • http://www.kenya-today.com/opinion/of-uhuru-kenyattas-presidency-and-threats-of-economic-sanctions

    …of Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency and threats of economic sanctions
    October 6, 2012
    BY: RASHID WANJALA

    The recent opinion poll by Ipsos Synovate shows Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta as the likely winner in a run-off.

    That means that an Uhuru presidency is a huge possibility, in the event the courts clear him to run for office.

    However, Uhuru has a case that is still pending at the International Criminal Court, in the Hague Netherlands. With this in mind, this article intends to break it down into what an Uhuru Presidency would mean for Kenya.

    Even though hon. William Ruto does not feature highly in the polls, he would also expose Kenya to a similar predicament, but given his opinion poll performance, his chances of clinching the presidency seem remote, at least for now.

    It is also important for us Kenyans to ponder about the implications of threats of sanctions by the United States of America. A few weeks ago, USA secretary of state Hillary Clinton while in Nairobi intimated that Washington could impose sanctions were any of the ICC suspects to be elected president.

    The USA sanctions will simultaneously be followed by other leading western countries and supra national organizations; European Commission, European Union member countries, Australia, Canada, Japan ,South Korea, World Bank, IMF and UN among others.

    Whether the imposition of sanctions would be a fair move is not important, the fact is that “uncle Sam” said it will happen.

    There’s not a time they threatened any country from Zimbabwe to Cuba to Iran to North Korea sanctions and it failed to happen. Iran is the latest country to be relegated to a basket case, only last week thousands of Iranians were on the streets protesting the harsh effects of the USA led sanctions.

    For this we like shouting back that “ooh! Kenya is a sovereign nation that should be left to chart her own course”. Fine! Let us also respect the US when it charts its own course! They have their country, and we have ours.

    Just as much as Kenya has its sovereignty which I would hope is respected, I also find it prudent to respect the US when it pursues its interest consistent with its desire to take the decision it considers the most “morally sound”. It’s their call, just like we have our call that we will exercise in the 2013 polls.

    Before I delve into the next part, and to avoid any contradiction, I wish to reiterate that The ICC suspects are innocent unless proven otherwise.

    Let us also be in agreement that Kenya is a sovereign nation that should be left to chart its political direction. So don’t fight me back with this line. It’s out of the question. Now find a more concrete way of responding to this.

    Also, it is my conviction that, whether Uhuru or Ruto are on the ballot is a non-issue, what is at stake- and this is what Kenyans need to be civic-educated on- are the consequences of what their presidencies would portend.

    Elections do have consequences. And I like citing The 1928 US election which paved way to Herbert Hoover- the 31st US president- and his presidency culminated in the well documented Great Depression era of the 1930s.

    Hoover’s went down as the most economically disastrous presidency in the 20th Century USA Presidential History.

    However, in the Kenyan case, and as we shall see later on in this article, we have the privilege of predictability- we can predict unlike the people that elected Herbert Hoover.

    It is within our power to change the course of our beloved nation’s future. We can choose the path to economic annihilation and obliteration or decide to play it safe with “anything but sanctions”.

    The March 2013 elections are about taking Kenya the Singapore way, or the Zimbambwe way.

    It’s about making sure that Kenya goes the South Korea way, and not the North Korea way.

    2013 presents Kenyans with a stark choice between a prosperous nation versus a failed state.

    The choices in the coming elections are stark, like day and night, it’s about Sanctions versus staying the course towards the Vision 2030.

    It’s your choice to ensure that the Vision 2030 dream doesn’t end up like the numerous receding policy mirages that have continued to dog this beloved country that the forbears bequeathed unto us.

    Because let’s face it, going by Clinton’s warning, take it or leave it, sanctions are effectively a horse in this 2013 race.

    And when sanctions are on the ballot, every Kenyan too gets on the ballot, because it becomes a matter of everyone for himself, God for us all- say after me- “I AM ON MY OWN”. Call me selfish, but if my fate is on the ballot- am not stupid- I would take a decision that saves me a calamity.

    That’s the horrible circumstance that Clinton’s pronouncement predisposes us to. But the truth is what it is, she said it, and from history, when they warn, it happens.

    If Clinton is to be believed, a vote for either Uhuru or Ruto would be a “vote for sanctions”.

    What I mean is that say UK makes it to the second round; it will be “Sanctions versus X” (the other person).

    The choice is yours. You can only blame yourself for making the wrong choice- the choice is very clear, like Obama calls it between day and night.

    With sanctions as one of the horses, March 2013 is about every Kenyan for himself, God for us all. And like I have said, you- every single Kenyan- will be on that ballot and I would recommend that you vote for yourself.

    We will be going into an exam room with a leakage- to sit for an exam whose answers we have seen beforehand.

    And I won’t give you the answer to this one, but between Sanctions versus Kingwa Kamencu, any time, I would pick the latter. It boils down to anybody but sanctions.

    Kenya’s US$ 65b is so tiny an economy, compared to like Iran’s which was $200b before sanctions, and in that case, Kenya cannot afford sanctions and as a consequence, it stands to be obliterated by a sanctioned presidency.

    The small size means that the wiggle room is so narrow, especially in view of what we saw happen to the economy during the stint of the Post Election violence.

    Very few generations in history, have gotten the opportunity to predict disastrous futures of their time with 100% certainty.

    Like Sunday comes after Saturday, and based on Clinton’s pronouncements, we can predict with accuracy that Sanctions induced calamity is a horse in this election.

    Truth be told that a Kenyatta or a Ruto presidency would be a disaster that is predictable but within our reach to mitigate.

    I chose to communicate this in very simple and easy to comprehend language- I can feel – it’s a very weighty calling; I want everyone to understand, with unambiguous clarity- don’t say I didn’t tell you.

    This is those articles you write as a matter of duty and love for your motherland. A nation where Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki, Dedan Kimathi did not die in vain.

    Dear compatriots, we are a nation at a crossroads, and it is within our reach to change the course of this nation’s history and destiny.

    But what really does it mean to be a nation under sanctions, which an Uhuru presidency portends?

    First, with countries hesitating to trade with Kenya in the event of sanctions- Coffee, Tea and Horticulture industries would literally collapse. Our trade with the EU, which accounts for 20% of Kenya’s total trade, would end.

    As a result, an Armageddon proportion of business collapse would ensue.

    Non-Performing Loans would stifle the banking sector, because, Agriculture which is the backbone of Kenya’s economy would be bleeding.

    Banks would literally collapse because most banks’ loans have farms and agricultural assets as collateral. Joblessness would intensify. Poverty would grind. Mortgage holders would lose homes. Retrenchments galore, worse than what we had in the 90s, would resurface. The consequences are vicious.

    Kenya would slide onto a great depression. Nyachae’s Economy in ICU analogy would be an understatement. Kenya’s pride and envy as the hub of East and Central Africa would be in jeopardy and in its place we would be a laughing stock of the region.

    With budget cuts, an Uhuru or Ruto presidency would reduce the KDF into a ragtag militia, mediocre to even a 4 man Navy Seal Team, because budget cuts would mean that the government would have to prioritize. Terrorists would flatten Nairobi.

    And like in North Korea- Kenyans would live on dog meat and barks of trees as delicacies to circumvent drought effects in the face of sanctions. Njeru Githae’s prescription of rats for dinner – you remember that- would become Kenya’s signature dish.

    My utmost hope and prayer is that out of mercy and compassion, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto should put the children, youth, the poor and the suffering of this country before self, and decide to suspend their presidential ambitions until they are cleared.

    Let’s face it; the moment has arrived for Ruto to not just don a cap whose 4 colors are a symbol of national pride- black, green, red and white – but to live and walk the patriotism that his cap represents.

    Uhuru on the other hand is a name that invokes the “trophy” after a long struggle by great Kenyans like Dedan Kimathi, Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, Bildad Kagia, Achieng Oneko and Jaramogi Odinga.

    These founders of our nation did not fight for “Uhuru” so their children would end up in bondage of sanctions.

    An Uhuru or Ruto presidency- if the sanctions will materialize- would actually be more punitive to the very youth and hustlers whose cause they purport to advance.

    I therefore solemnly urge you to join me in asking UK and WSR to seize this moment and save Kenya’s economy from imminent obliteration, which would be a certainty under their presidency.

    Take this to the bank; sanctions will be a horse in this election.

  • http://www.kenya-today.com/opinion/uhuru-the-squatters-landlord

    Uhuru the “Squatter’s Landlord”
    October 20, 2012

    In this 3 Part Series, I will deal with Uhuru’s Historical responsibilities that he needs to act on urgently if he is going to claim a place in Kenya’s political High Table

    When a slave was born during the Slave trade era they didn’t know any other home other than the land on which they were born. As such they ended up in generational bondage.

    In Kenya we have Kenyans who in their own country, have continued to be like slaves, continue to pass the baton of squatter hood from one generation to another.

    Uhuru the Squatter’s Landlord is the story of a man who is described by Forbes as the largest land owner in Kenya, land which his father is believed to have amassed through questionable and morally unjust means while he was in power.

    Unfortunately thousands are known to have been displaced in Central, Rift and Coast Provinces to create space for the land which Uhuru inherited, and on which thousands of squatters are known to inhabit.

    The next election I believe is going to feature “the Squatter’s Landlord vs X (the other horse)

    This is why. It is believed that UK owns land the size of Nyanza province while millions of Kenyans are squatters and landless, some on the very land which is reported to be his.

    As a man aspiring to run for office he must be willing to be scrutinized by the public, whom I have promised myself never to betray unlike Uhuru who fails to realize that there’s a reason why people fully take charge of their inheritance once they attain age of majority (18 years).

    This happens because at that age, they are adults who can make their own decisions, and can decline when they are old and intelligent enough to realize that it doesn’t make sense for a single individual aspiring to lead his countrymen to own land the size of Nyanza Province.

    Ever since he turned 18, it has now been 32 yrs and still counting- a period when Uhuru had sufficient time to demonstrate remorse, and own up to being a beneficiary of historical transgressions.

    He could have faced cameras and appeal to the disenfranchised millions who allegedly include his own uncle, to allow him more time as he prepares to let go of the hundreds of thousands of questionable acres in Rift Valley and Coast provinces.

    He could then go ahead and surrender that bad inheritance to the state for distribution to the landless. He is also currently reported to be involved in a court case in which his father disinherited his very own brother. For those who say I make things up, here’s the link http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-88646/kenyatta-kin-sues-mama-ngina-over-grabbed-land

    People say he just inherited and so should be left alone; I say no because inheritance too comes with responsibility. One that urges us to decline things that even though belong to us doesn’t make sense to belong to a single individual. That is what leadership- especially presidential- is all about? A responsibility that though not legal, is grounded in moral ethics.

    The utilitarian principle that one individual can be a source of happiness to the masses if they can give up just a little of their own happiness for the sake of the sad, disenfranchised many who have never known happiness- people struggling to eat a meal, or even clothe or drink water, people surviving on less than a dollar a day..

    And this is about helping such people regain the land which was taken from their forbears and which were it not for the historical injustices, they would otherwise have themselves inherited.

    Instead their inheritance was diverted to another individual who wants to be president. That is why he is accountable to them- in their disenfranchised millions.

    The emotive land question, was at the core of the 2007 post election violence, even the formation of Mombasa Republican Council (MRC-Pwani sio Kenya) is as a result of the alleged believe that indigenous coastal communities are victims of massive land displacements especially the prime locations.

    The on going political negotiations between Ruto and Uhuru are likely to be dominated by the land issue in Rift Valley, it complicates the envisioned political marriage as the masses especially in Rift Valley may not be ready to support the Uhuru presidency if called upon to do so.

    Jeremy Bentham in his A fragment of government argues that ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’”.

    Put another way, “Actions are right to the degree that they tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number”.

    In Bentham’s thinking therefore, Uhuru would be wrong because his delayed action on these historical injustices, is denying happiness to a large number of Kenyans- Millions of landless stand to own a quarter to half an acre each if he decides to do the right thing- relinquish some of his land to the disenfranchised millions, the paupers whom he intends to lead.

    Of what value are the thousands of acres of idle fertile-arable land for example in Taita Taveta district yet the area is home to thousands of landless people stricken by hunger perennially just because they have no land to cultivate.

    Uhuru claims in his TNA launch speech which plagiarizes heavily from Thomas Jefferson’s authored The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1776, without citing his source that “the pursuit of happiness is not a preserve of a privileged few…it is a birthright…” . Thomas Jefferson though, rose to become the third President of the US.

    Plagiarizing this is even funny because this is a document that is at the heart of American nationhood. Yet he claims to be an enemy of what America stands for. This is intellectual dishonesty.

    It is double standards, in his heart of hearts, he is like literally reciting the almost equivalent of America’s “loyalty pledge”, and unleashes a TNA launch in which he attempts to copy cat a DNC or RNC convention, but which he fails miserably to replicate, and then he turns around, and tells us that he yearns for a uniquely Kenyan republic, a sovereign nation- give us a break!

    He needs to first do what Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls “decolonizing his mind”, before he talks of decolonizing us. Be original, and stop copycatting the Europeans and Americans!

    I agree with him on his TNA launch plagiarized statement that “happiness is not a preserve of a privileged few”, but he ought not to just wax lyrical about what were serious pronouncements by the Founders of America, who actually were at war with the imperialist British- but to live and walk the spirit of those pronouncements, which are not just mere words, but are about a people who stood up to those who had sat on their backs for too long.

    Unless he claims that as a “squatter’s landlord“ he decided to plagiarize an author (Thomas Jefferson) who was a “slave landlord” himself but still hypocritically wrote and spoke against slave ownership. Then I would understand.

    For those of you who want to learn of this man who Uhuru the “Squatters Landlord” plagiarized, watch this video link http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXQYCTgBFQ0

    However in this case, the hustler’s and pauper’s lot in Kenya has to contend with a fellow citizen who for 32 years has not found it remorseful to continue holding onto a bad inheritance. He has ducked engaging in that debate instead.

    Thomas Jefferson is his ilk because he was hypocritical, a person who centuries later continues to be the embodiment of the American paradox right at its founding. Jefferson owned slaves, but admonished slavery in his public and written pronouncements.

    Just like Uhuru who plagiarized him, his public pronouncements were contradicting his real actions.

    However, if he wants to be president it has come a time when if it’s not from the heart, he doesn’t have to redistribute, but at least face the cameras and say why he should claim the tag of the hustler’s champion.

    That is why the G7 leaders would have a lot of explaining to do to their people if it’s Uhuru that they will support. He cannot burry his head in the sand and expect this serious matter to go away, but to face it head on.

    This is because until he deals with this it will continue to be his anathema.

  • Mutahi Ngunyi: Why the House of Mumbi Should Climb Down

    This is a letter to the ‘‘House of Mumbi’’, those of the GEMA community. I address you as the son of a ‘‘Mau Mau hustler’’.

    I have three thoughts from my late father. When I was a boy, he gave me stories about a guy called Gikuyu and his girl, Mumbi. The two founded the tribe. They had nine girls or something like that. No son. And they lived happily there after. But I had questions about this romantic relationship. As a boy, I asked my father, who married the nine girls?

    He kept quiet. Then I asked him; if they got children, who was their father? How was the tribe created? He got violent. In fact, he gave me a beating for asking questions ‘‘… without legs’’. But then later, I figured that may be he had no answer. Or may be there was a hidden secret in the tribe. I became curious. And so I began my boyish inquiry. If the only man in the tribe was Gikuyu, did he have children with his daughters?

    This thought was appalling beyond. My father would have killed me for thinking so. I had to settle on a more acceptable deduction. That is: If Gikuyu had nine daughters, their children must have been fathered by other tribes. That is the Maasai, Ndorobo, Luo, Luhya, and all. But even this, my father would not accept. I had to rest my case.

    Allow me now to interpret my boyish deductions. To reproduce your GEMA tribe, you have only two choices. One, you can choose the path of incest. This is the path of in-breeding and sin. Although shameful, it is the path you chose in 2007. And the results are obvious: Political incest can only produce mongoloids.

    This is what you have in the coalition government. The second choice is the one taken by Gikuyu and Mumbi. They sent their daughters to breed with others. This is how the tribe survived. Your survival, therefore, depends on others; the Maasai, Ndorobo, Luo, Luhya and all. And, on this, the alternatives are zero.

    My father’s second thought was given when I got circumcised. But not explicitly. He had a telephone at home; what you would call an antique today. As a way of controlling it, he locked it using a padlock from the government. He always carried the key. One day, he came home for lunch. He needed to call his boss badly.

    Unfortunately, he had forgotten the key at the office. The man was disparate. And from the ‘‘kindness’’ of our hearts, my brother Peter and I decided to help. We tapped the phone for him. He watched in amazement as we handed the receiver for him to talk to the boss. When he finished his call, he stared at us with a ‘‘kali sana’’ face.

    But instead of punishing us, he decided to remove the padlock for good. He knew we were smarter now. After all, we had just gotten circumcised. And this is how he gave us the second thought about the tribe. Explaining his frustration with the phone call, he told us that the Gikuyu had two categories of people; the ‘‘ahoi’’ and the ‘‘athomi’’. The ‘‘ahoi’’ were the poor.

    In rural areas they walk around without shoes, their feet all cracked up. And in urban areas, they are the ‘‘shamba boys’’, the drivers and the cooks. As a driver, he told us he was in the urban group of ‘‘ahoi’’. The ‘‘athomi’’ were the educated and propertied. They were also arrogant, insensitive and ruthless.

    This is why he needed to make the phone call; he had to drop their children somewhere. His point? The ‘‘athomi’’ did not think much of the ‘‘ahoi’’. They saw them as slaves of sorts. And this is how you must understand President Kibaki. Most of you follow him blindly. In fact, because you are in the ‘‘ahoi’’ group, he expects you to.

    Unfortunately, and together with the ‘‘athomi’’, he dragged you into a state of civil war. They used you. And since the ‘‘athomi’’ are untouchable, you bore the brunt of the violence. Where are your IDPs today? In the meantime, you think the presidency is yours. Zero. It belongs to the ‘‘athomi’’.

    Allow me to describe your position as ‘‘ahoi’’ using a story. A man set out on a journey through a thick forest full of thorns and rocks. Suddenly, an elephant appeared and gave him chase. He took off and went to hide in a well. To his horror, he saw a huge snake at the bottom of the well.

    He had to cling to a thorny creeper that was growing around it. Looking up, he saw two mice chewing the creeper he was hanging on. But just as he was contemplating his next move, he saw a bee hive next to his mouth. Occasional drops of honey were trickling from the hive. And this man tested the honey. He got confused.

    Although a kind man offered to help him out of his trouble, he refused. He wanted to be excused until he had enjoyed himself to the full. Not clever. Good people, you are behaving like this man. You have seen a bee hive dripping with honey.

    And although you are hanging on a thin creeper between an angry elephant and a snake, you don’t care. You want to enjoy the honey, the presidency. Unfortunately, the creeper will snap and you will have to deal with the snake at the bottom of the well. On this, the choice is yours.

    The third thought regards Mungiki. When my father joined Mau Mau, they called it a Mungiki-type movement. Yet it was a group of restless young people whose ‘‘wazees’’ had lost direction. I want to put it to you that you have no leadership. The ‘‘wazees’’ in your ranks have reached intellectual menopause. And in this state, they have exhibited unnecessary arrogance towards others.

    As a shareholder in your tribe, I submit that you need new leadership. A leadership that will cause you to climb down in the interest of the country. One that is not beholden to the ‘‘athomi’’ and one that will respect the other communities.

    mutahi@myself.com

  • LEST KALENJIN LEADERS FORGET!

    This is an urgent message to Kalenjin leaders and every one of us who is in dilemma regarding our political destiny in Kenya. Read the message and meditate upon it.
    When NARC government came to power in 2002, its first project was to diminish Kalenjin socio-economically and politically. We were discriminated against, demoted and fired from civil service and government parastatals, denied scholarships and vital government services, and simply forgotten in all matters regarding development projects. We were stigmatized and ostracized in our own country in a manner comparable only to colonial days.

    NARC government considered itself a government of national unity (GNU) yet in fact Kalenjin were targeted for persecution and subjugation whose impacts we are yet recovering from. If we were lazy cowards we would by now be in irredeemable economic ruins. Many Kalenjin were snared and fired, and I know a good number who chose to resign to escape shameful dismissal. GNU’s hate for Kalenjin was intense and brutal, and nowhere was it displayed in full force than during Mau eviction when police tasked with forcing people out gang raped girls and their mothers before their families! Kalenjin, should we forget these too soon?

    I want to remind you these lest you have forgotten:
    1. When Wazungu came to Kenya they acquired our ancestral land forcefully, and then forced us to work for them. We were rendered IDPs.We became laborers in tea plantations, wheat and corn farms, watchmen and cooks, and cowboys and shamba boys. We had no voice. When the country became independent we were overwhelmed by hope and enthusiasm. We expected to reacquire our ancestral land. We looked forward to better times.

    2. When Kenyatta became president he promised that every tribe in the country would manage their our land and domestic affairs uninterrupted by the central government. We danced and wined hoping that he would reverse the injustices that the Whites visited us regarding land ownership. Sadly, we were wrong! Check this:

    While we celebrated the independence, some key people in the government were working behind the scenes together with the British to re- grab the land. An elaborate scheme was hatched led by the former home guards from Central Kenya to buy land from the British and allocate it to themselves and their henchmen. They consolidated land in central province and displaced their own people into the Rift Valley. For example they transferred part of Rift Valley into Central Province and named it Nyandarua district.

    This was allocated only to Kikuyu. The Luos were also rewarded for supporting KANU, and 650,000 acres of Nandi Land was transferred to Luo Nyanza. Another 850,000 acres of Nandi and Koony land was hived off and annexed to Western Province to form part of Bungoma. Other thousands of acres were transferred from Kipsigis land to Kisii Nyanza (from Keroka to Chebilat). This was a shock to the Kalenjin community because Kenyatta negated his earlier promise of 1962 that ownership and development of land would remain in the hands of

    (I) Ogiek, Kipsigis and Nandi
    The destruction of forests was started during this period. The GEMA community cleared the forests in Narok district between Enengetia-Enabelbel. This was a thick forested area which was part of the larger Mau. Ole Ntimama who was a councilor in Narok at that time tried to oppose the settlement of GEMA in Narok, but the then Rift Valley PC Mr. Mathenge ordered his arrest. The then Dc Narok Mr. Julius Kobia was express orders to eliminate (kill) any Maasai morans who opposed the settlement of GEMA in that area.
    During the same period, the Nandi wanted to buy land in Tinderet, their ancestral land, but were denied. Mr. Mathenge frustrated them, and were arrested together with their leader, the then MP Hon Seroney.

    Another bitter example of how the Kalenjin was denied their land right involved the Rhonda Farm in Nakuru. The Kalenjin Enterprise had bought the land, but PC Mathenge engineered its grabbing and was later subdivided among the GEMA members called Mwarigi. No money was refunded to the Kalenjin enterprises.

    During this time the Kalenjin negotiated to buy NGATA FARM LTD led by Kibowen Arap Komen who paid Kshs 4million, but they were denied to buy the entire farm by PC Mathenge. He gave part of the land to GEMA people.

    In 1974 Hon Eric Kibet arap Koras Bomet and Mzee Jonah Arap Cheptoo negotiated to buy MAKUTANO FARM from Mr. PEARCSON (Maji Mazuri), but the DC Baringo Mr. A N N Ndoro ordered the arrest of the two who were locked up at Eldama Ravine. The land was later sold to GEMA people IGURE, hence IGURE FARM. Other areas included a farm in lower Subukia, Olmomoi. After the Kalenjin had bought the land, they moved in only for them to be arrested together with the initiates (TARUSIEK) who were still recovering. They were brought to Nakuru court and ordered to be jailed. Their money was never refunded.

    As if this was not enough in 1970 Mzee Kenyatta came to Nakuru, Mob area (originally kuresoi land of the kipsigis and Ogiek before British invasion) and distributed 17 former white settler farms to GEMA people who gave their tribal name, thereby erasing its true origin. The 17 farms were namely:
    1. Kiambereria
    2. Kiambu
    3. Ngema
    4. Moto
    5. Nyakinyua
    6. Kererekamia
    7. Kamwaura
    8. Poron
    9. Mushorwe
    10. Kapkimani
    11. Kathirika
    12. Kimkasa
    13. Sitoito
    14. Tamnyota
    15. Mutukanio
    16. Matunda
    17. Marwa

    On 10th March 1977, PC Mathenge used the Ngoroko Squad to burn down houses belonging to ogiek and kipsigis in Tinet area. Whoever was arrested was fined ksh. 800. Their cattle was confiscated and sold for kshs 20 per cow and kshs 2 per sheep or goat. Many people were shot and killed. One Mzee (Arap Mosonik, the father of Arap Too) was burned alive in his house.

    (ii) Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia
    In the 1970s Jomo Kenyatta gave out the following farms in Trans Nzoia to GEMA instead of the local people the Kony and Sengwer and the Pokots:

    1. Kiambu Farm
    2. Monyaka Farm
    3. Aruba Farm
    4. Makutano
    5. Makunga
    6. Mucharage
    7. Kitwamba

    In Uasin Gishu farms were too allocated to GEMA instead of to the Nandi.
    These were:
    1. Kiambaa
    2. Kimumu
    3. Timboroa( the forest was destroyed in the name of shamba system)

    The Moi Era
    Mzee Moi followed Kenyatta. Indeed he created the Slogan FUATA NYAYO. He truly followed Kenyatta’s footsteps and further complicated the Land problem. Just as Kenyatta rewarded his henchmen, so did Moi. He excised part of the forests and allocated it to some GEMA people who were his henchmen including some of his own politically correct Kalenjin. Most of these were done in the name of resettling squatters and the land less. The following Forests were excised off by both Moi and Kenyatta:

    1. Mau Forest –East.
    2. Mwisho wa Lami,
    3. Njoro,
    4. Mob,
    5. Kibunja
    6. Mau Forest –West.
    1. Sururu,
    2. Likia,
    3. Teret,
    4. Nessuit,
    5. Ngongongeri,
    6. Marishoni,
    7. Ndoinet,
    8. Saina,
    9. Kiptagich Ext,
    10.Tinet,
    11. Bararget,
    12. Kapsitai,
    13. Elburgon

    (For more detailed information refer to: Chemaswet, P. (n.d).The land Question in Kenya. Noraf lecture series (101)

    The foregoing historical land injustices have been the reason for frequent clashes between Kikuyus and Kalenjin in Rift Valley. Why have our leadership remained mute regarding this?! I believe that if this issue is honestly addressed and people are reconciled, we shall never hear of any more land clashes.

    Current alliances and counter-alliances –
    Social media and newspapers are busy bombarding us with news and gossip about alliances between parties as 2013 general election is drawing near. While all parties are negotiating for possible alliances, URP in particular has attracted attention of many Kalenjin in the country and diaspora. The party literally has been approached by all parties for the purpose of making an alliance with it ahead of the general election. Per se, there is nothing wrong about URP forming an alliance with another party as a formula for success having in mind that as of now no one presidential candidate has 50% plus 1% to be able to win next year. However, the way URP is conducting its negotiation is beginning to raise serious concerns as below:

    1. Being the fastest growing party in the voter rich region of RV, the leaders the party tasked with negotiating a deal with other parties seem to have concluded discussions without consulting party members. If this is true, the party is most likely to face rebellion. The party is herding us to join an alliance that seems not have the community’s interests. Research show that an overwhelming majority of Kalenjin are questioning an alliance that is used to cement leaders’ friendship rather than addressing issues affecting us as a people. If this issue is not handled carefully, it has the potential to divide us and destroy political careers of most leaders in the community.

    2. Being strong in the area that has witnessed serious historical land injustices, the party must demand that any party that will enter into partnership with should address land issues as a way of resolving injustices in question so that we may not witness clashes again in Rift Valley.
    3. The party should reach an agreement where the government must be shared by both parties 50-50, and the MoU should be done in such a way that no partner will violate it.

    4. The Kalenjin who were victimized and fired during NARC government should be rehired or compensated.

  • what about someone working harder to be rich rather than being jealous of others wealth

  • Revealed: Uhuru Kenyatta’s grand strategy of controlling the presidency
    October 27, 2012

    BY: Rashid Wanjala

    Kibaki’s preferred successor Uhuru Kenyatta was recently sarcastically described by Makau Mutua as a man who has come of age.

    He continued to poke holes into Uhuru’s claim of youth, because he is old now unlike 2002. At 51, Mutua claims the dude cannot claim the mantra of youth, never- he is now officially an old man who has evolved into Kenya’s most polarizing figure, highly unlikely to unify the nation.

    However, for the many intellectually challenged TNA enthusiasts on Facebook, the article appeared like an endorsement of UK as a Muthamaki who has literally come of age and was shared widely- to them it was ok for a leader to be described as the Muthamaki , they truly believed he embodied.

    The celebration was not long before TNA Propagandist and phony intellectual Jasper Mbiuki who happens to be an intellectual dwarf compared to the SUNY Distinguished Professor and Dean at the University Of New York Buffalo Law School, was soon to discover- after a week of reading it over and over- the sarcasm of the article which was well embedded into the article, after which he issued a poorly researched and unconvincing rebuttal.

    Of contention was that UK, as he is popularly known has been lording over the Central Kenya leaders as though they had become his subjects- “like a Muthamaki”.

    As the son of the first President who ruled with an iron fist is described by Makau Mutua as ““Kamwana Prince” of the Mt. Kenya region”- a euphemism that confirms that he is in the eyes of many including the Diaspora where Makau lives- a “Prince” that only controls the 1997 DP stronghold.

    Recently there have been defections of mainly Central Kenya leaders like Rachel Sahebesh, Kabando wa Kabando, Maina Kamanda and a few from other parts of the country keen on exploiting Kenyatta’s bad inheritance fortune.

    The other defectors from other parts of Kenya are the desperate ones like Jebii Kilimo who could not win a party delegates election in a regional party election, many defectors cannot compete in their parties, they hope to get direct nomination on TNA ticket.

    The TNA supremo has come of age and he has grown to be exactly like the leader who introduced and mentored him into politics.

    Do you remember when Kanu gave people Ugali in the 90s and thus engineering defectors? That behavior is back and is being executed a by retired President Moi’s clone.

    That explains why as you will see later on in an upcoming part, that Moi was very smart in choosing a successor.

    He chose a “political clone” of his, someone who behaves and engineers defections exactly like him.

    He psycho analyzed UK and saw him as the man with that type of trait. The man who would fuata Nyayo, and that he is doing expeditiously.

    A leader who would bring back the culture of personality cult. a dictatorial renaissance of De-facto Kanu one party republic.

    Theocracy a work in progress

    TNA is nothing but Jogoo party re-incarnate. That explains why Maragwa MP Elias Mbau and other Mt Kenya MPs sacrilegiously swore their allegiance to Uhuru while holding the Holy Bible- The Christian Book of God.

    Imenti Central Member of Parliament sensationally claimed in parliament this year that he was accosted by local mercenaries who forced him to kneel while facing the direction of Mt Kenya and proclaim Swahili words “Uhuru Tuko Pamoja”

    I am Muslim, but regardless of your religion that is sacrilegious. It’s huge even if you are Hindu.

    The person Uhuru entrusted with that task of the oathing ceremony was obviously his surrogate and confidant Jamleck Kamau- (Kigumo MP Nairobi Metropolitan Minister and Muranga County TNA Supremo and Uhuru’s powerbroker) who commissioned it. http://www.ajabuafrica.com/Politics-Central%20MPs%20pledge%20to%20support%20Uhuru.html

    Uhuru’s political profile is a confirmation of the curse of politics, where a 3-button donning Central Kenya leader who joined politics looking like a soft, “bonhomie” has slowly been reduced to the mediocrity of a cult leader, no different from Ngonya wa Gakonya of the famed Thai Thathaiya Thai cult. I agree with Makau Mutua that, “the kamwana Muthamaki has come of age”.

    Uhuru despite claiming to be Christian never admonished these sacrilegious and abominable oathing ceremonies

    That explains why I believe that UK is intent on establishing a Theocracy like that of Iran. Whereas the Iranian one is Islamist, the Kenyan one is grounded in an anti-west, anti- ICC doctrine, read ICCist doctrine.

    However Ruto- let’s give it to him, is a staunch Christian, and was a Christian Union leader at the University of Nairobi.

    It is therefore highly unlikely that he will compromise his Christian faith and buy the ICCist doctrine, and would most likely decline the offer of becoming the cult’s collegiate leader read Deputy Leader with Jamleck Kamau as the leader of doctrinal implementation.

    TNA which is undoubtedly expected to be the other horse has unfortunately inherited the DP curse, of failing miserably to curve itself a niche as a national party.

    That’s not a healthy position for a party to find itself in, because it took DP two election losses, until Raila Odinga came to their rescue in their third through the famed Kibaki Tosha declaration.

    Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2013 strategy seems to be anchored in consolidating the DP segment of PNU, then intimidating various leaders from non-DP regions into supporting him. The intimidation includes cajoling, blackmail, arm-twisting and defector bribery.

    Sponsoring of special purpose vehicles or projects like POA, UDF, and New Ford-K are part of the plan intended to split the ODM 2007 6/8 province vote with the hope that he will replicate the PNU vote of 2007.

    Good luck with that because unlike Uhuru, Kibaki was a semblance of kind of national leader, who even though he lost in 6/8 provinces, he got 40%, 30% etc in other parts of the country. This time it’s different as ODM is poised to win 70% in such areas.

    Politburo to be headed by the supreme leader

    Alternatively, UK is also considering to- in the event that he is blocked from running – to force whoever wants TNA support to defect to TNA as a precondition, a party that he controls and single handedly finances.

    He would then set up a five (5) member Uhuru- led Communist style/Chinese type of Politburo. Uhuru with his immense wealth would ensure all the five members are user friendly, effectively controlling the party and the puppet president.

    That way, the ruling party machinery would be in his control. He would be in control of party nominations meaning, he would give direct nominations to his preferred candidates at all levels.

    With party instruments firmly under his control, he would continue to puppeteer such a president at will. The president would reign but Uhuru would rule.

    TNA would in such a scenario amend its constitution, adopt the South African National Congress Model that saw Mbeki fired by the then party Leader Jacob Zuma.

    Under such an arrangement, Eugene Wamalwa, Kalooser Musyoka or Macharia Mudavadi the likely puppet candidates would rule at the behest of head of Politburo- the Hon. Kenyatta

    The TNA Politburo will a hybrid of the Chinse Communisty Party politburo and the Supreme Ruling Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran; it will be headed by Uhuru Kenyatta, a position which would enable him ratify all government decisions and can recall the President at will!.

    That means that Kenya would for the first time have the equivalent of an “Ayatollah” as the Supreme Leader. The anti-American and anti-European rants by Uhuru a few weeks ago are part of that wider plan.

    With oil discovery, the cabal of powerful men sympathetic to TNA believes that it would be the best way take charge of all oil fields without accountability to anyone, hence the attractiveness of a Supreme Leader model of an “Ayatollah”.

    Reliable sources also tell me that as a pilot project, Njeru Githae, the Finance Minister is just a puppet minister, a robo-signer of documents, that Uhuru even though he resigned still takes all decisions at the ministry, but which are communicated by the “Rats for Dinner” enthusiast.

    That is why despite change of guard at the ministry, the Uhuru policy of diverting money meant for resettling Mau evictees to other sectors has continued long after he left the ministry.

    The Njeru Githae appointment to the treasury docket was just a pilot project, which they think has been successful at hoodwinking unsuspecting Kenyans, and now the entire strategy is about to be rolled out to the entire government in 2013 the event that UK is blocked from running.

    Ayatollah Uhuru?

    Kenya is headed to being like Iran, where you won’t know who is in charge, because there will be a Supreme Leader – something akin to Ayatollah Khemenei who is known to veto the decisions made by president Ahmadinejad.

    The puppet president would be forced to rescind any decisions unfriendly to the Uhuru led Supreme Council/politburo out of fear of being recalled by the TNA party organs.

    Unconstitutional but remember the party organs would have the power to recall him. Plus a way of changing the constitution to harmonize it with such an evil plan is also being considered, and this is believed to have featured highly at the much publicized Uhuru- Ruto meetings last week.

    In the event that the courts prevent the duo from running, Ruto is slated for Deputy to the “Ayatollah” in the Supreme Council of TNA if he is goaded into defecting or a larger party where URP would be a corporate member is formed- most likely the Mbas which recently declared Uhuru the driver.

    Uhuru’s evil plan is attractive to Ruto because it offers Ruto a fall-back position as a Deputy “Ayatollah” or Deputy Head of the Politburo in the event he is barred from being part of any ticket, as President or Veep!

    Such a TNA/URP coalition or merger would throw its weight behind a user friendly candidate like Musalia, Kalooser or Eugene or even Peter Kenneth, whom they would ram down the throats of Kenyans.

    The Supreme Council with Waititu as the leader of its Militant affairs, and Jamleck Kamau as the Head of the Doctrine Implementation and Indoctrination of the faithful would have the de-facto powers to veto and blackmail a sitting popularly president in a highly unlikely TNA/URP government.

    “I believe”, “Party of Believers” etc rings a bell? Christians, Muslims, Hindus et el , don’t relinquish your faiths to believe in a human being who wants to create an aura of a deity around himself, whose slogans and evil designs are intent on installing himself as an “Ayatollah”.

    I urge my fellow Kenyans to watch vigilantly as the evil plan unfolds. Reject a Theocracy, and embrace a Democracy the way we know it. The way it’s practiced in civilized democracies. We cannot afford to re-invent the wheel, let’s focus on development!

    Reject a Russian style Vodka President and elect a People’s President. A vodka President who like Gorbachev would be drunken when serious government decisions are on the table- like responding to a terrorist attack.

    Add sanctions possibility and Kenya would be Theocratical disaster, a mongerel, fundamentally unrecognizable.

  • UHURU Kenyatta and William RUTO are lying to Kenyans about ICC
    9 November 2012

    By Ndung’u Wainaina

    International Criminal Court (ICC) was not a political concern until December 15, 2010 when the Court Prosecutor named six suspects. Before that naming, the question of political persecution was never raised by anyone. The crimes that are subject of the trial occurred five years ago, which was five years away from general elections. Therefore, it is mischievous, preposterous and feebly late in the day for anyone to tie ICC process with an election.

    Such a negative genius of trying to circumvent the law, judicial process and distort facts cannot find any purchase from any reasonable and rationale person in anywhere in the world part from Kenya. The confirmed four indictees facing international crimes, particularly Uhuru and Ruto are desperately trying to convert individual criminal proceedings into a political referendum. This is nefarious and impossible, as their criminal charges and trials are not framed as political referendum question.

    Uhuru and Ruto belonged to the old conservative order that never believed in the rule of law and accountability. Therefore, ICC to them is hindrance and major obstacle to their continued enjoyment of privilege, accruing benefits of political power and impunity. The two realized the futility/folly of individually confronting ICC. Therefore, the only strategy was to capture and manipulate their respective ethnic backyard to make it appear as if it is the ethnic groups under trial.

    They cleverly designed a strategy of selling and casting ICC as a tool targeting to persecute Kikuyu and Kalenjin and eliminate them from political system. Yet the facts and legal standpoints are very clear. Instead of addressing themselves to answering to the charges, they rehabilitated the old KANU strategy of condemning those calling for change and accountability. Just like their political father Moi, they chose the path of sidestepping the dealing with criminal issues before them and casting it out as an internationally instigated affront against the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. This is abhorrent and absurd on part of the two and their handlers.

    If Uhuru and Ruto not been facing criminal charges at the ICC and running for presidency, they would not be seeking presidency based on ICC or on behalf of their respective ethnic groups they are now working very hard to convince being threatened by ICC.

    A very small clique around presidency has always deliberately and erroneously given an impression that the community from where the president originates are the sole major beneficiary. This is far from the truth. Add to the fact that the constitution has completely dismantled chieftaincy and cronyism associated with presidency, the facts becomes clear that presidency will no longer afford freebees for cotoire of loyalists and court jesters.

    Uhuru and Ruto are therefore opportunistically using ICC to deploy the old tested strategy of manipulating ethnic groups and making a personal criminal responsibility into an ethno-political agenda.

    The strategy being employed by Uhuru and Ruto amounts to ousting and politicizing the entire administration of criminal justice and the rule of law. The post-election violence victims are increasingly becoming desperate, despond and disillusioned, which is part of the objective of the two. Were Uhuru and Ruto to come closer to presidency (thanks to this devious and evil manipulation) the greatest losers would be the victims.

    Further, this political and ethnic manipulation poses a gravest danger to the constitution, political stability and socio-economic investments. It would usher undisguised anarchy and official lawless-state.

    By Ndung’u Wainaina

  • Why Uhuru Can’t be Elected President

    Blamuel Njururi
    Nairobi – Nov 1. Kenya goes to the polls in March next year in a contest that has attracted a field of dozen presidential aspirants amid international concern over two of them indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

    The son of the late Kenya’s President Jomo Kenyatta, Uhuru Kenyatta and parliamentary member, William Ruto are among four Kenyans facing charges before The Hague based ICC for their involvement in 2008 post-election violence that claimed 1,500 lives, rendered 650,000 internally displaced persons and caused millions of dollars in economic losses.

    Both the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan have warned that the election of either Uhuru or Ruto to the presidency will not augur well for Kenya internationally. Both aspirants have claimed that Kenyan voters are best placed to decide their next president. Indeed they say they will turn the election into a referendum against the ICC indictment. Can Uhuru be elected Kenya’s 4th president?

    Uhuru Kenyatta is undoubtedly the richest presidential aspirant. Last year he was named Kenya’s richest man by Forbes magazine’s “Africa’s richest” list. Uhuru makes the list at number 25 with an estimated wealth valued at $500 million. He did not dispute the report.

    Forbes says of Uhuru; “He owns at least 500,000 acres of prime land spread across the country. The land was acquired by his father in the 1960s and 1970s when the British colonial government and the World Bank funded a settlement transfer fund scheme that enabled government officials and wealthy Kenyans to acquire land from the British at very low prices.”

    Uhuru and his family also own Brookside Dairies, Kenya’s largest dairy company, as well as stakes in popular television station K24 and a commercial bank in Nairobi, among other commercial interests. That disclosure is just a tip of the iceberg in so far as the Kenyatta family wealth goes. It is in millions of dollars and straddles the continents of Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas.

    But can all that wealth or political acumen, if any, take Uhuru to State House come March 2012 General Election? Political pundits think it will not be a walk in the park for Uhuru based on the following reasons.

    The Hague International Crime Court Case

    When Uhuru’s case was confirmed by the ICC judges he started the dreaded journey as an international criminal suspect facing crimes against humanity. The case is the single most important obstacle between him and State House. Some political activists have filed a case in the High Court seeking to bar him and ICC co-accused William Ruto from the presidential race on account of integrity issues over The Hague case.

    The Attorney General Githu Muigai has gone to the Supreme Court to seek clarification on whether one is free to run for an elective office as a constitutional right on one hand, and on the other hand be disqualified by the same constitution on the basis of integrity.

    Article 38(3)(c) of the constitution says; “Every adult citizen has a right, without unreasonable restrictions, to be a candidate for public office, or office within a political party of which the citizen is a member and, if elected to hold office.”

    However, that provision is countered by Article 10 which binds all state officers to national values and principles of governance which include “national unity, rule of law, social justice, equality, good governance, integrity and accountability”.

    The constitution places another huddle on Uhuru’s way even if elected president in clause 143 (4) that states, “The immunity of the President under this Article shall not extend to a crime for which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and which prohibits such immunity.

    That means even if elected president Uhuru will not be off the ICC hook. The ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda amply exemplified the issue in her first trip to Kenya since taking office last week saying under the ICC treaty, there is no immunity for any suspect.

    The Kikuyu factor

    In the Kibaki succession battle, Uhuru starts at a major disadvantage because of the emotive ethnic politics surrounding the Presidency. He is a Kikuyu. Some politicians strongly feel and say that the Kikuyu have occupied the top seat for 25 years and the Kalenjins for 24 years and it is time for another tribe to take up the State House tenancy.

    Kikuyu youth rebellion against the tribal outfit Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (Gema) demonstrated by Limuru 3, means central Kenya and the Kikuyu vote will be difficult to hold as a block. Even if they voted as a block, they won’t force Uhuru into State House.

    Other presidential candidates like Musalia Mudavadi a Luyha, Raila Odinga a Luo, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka a Kamba and Charity Ngilu also a Kamba, will deal serious blows on the central Kenya voters’ block and leave a seriously dented ramshackle. Other central Kenya candidate like Martha Karua and Peter Kenneth will also get a portion of the cake however hard Uhuru’s TNA tries to protect it.

    Indeed, all the major tribes in Kenya, Kikuyu, Luyha, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba intend to have their candidate on the presidential ballot. Uhuru thinks he can win in the first round by enlisting Ruto and his Kalenjin votes. It is difficult to comprehend how Kenyans would accept a president elected by only two communities (which they cannot) out of 42 tribes. In any case the County-demarcated Central Kenya and the Rift Valley cannot give Uhuru 50-plus one of the registered voters and 25 counties as required by the constitution.

    That is where the much touted Raila’s “two-horse race” comes in handy. Raila wants to turn the race between him and Uhuru into an ethnic referendum against a third Kikuyu presidency. The ODM question will be simple – should another Kikuyu take over from Kibaki. Other tribes will not vote for Uhuru in a run off whether he faces Mudavadi, Raila or Kalonzo.

    Raila’s plot was inadvertently unveiled last weekend during a meeting with Kalenjin elders who literally declared war on the Kikuyu presidency by asking Ruto to gang up with the ODM boss and describing Uhuru as selfish for seeking a third Kikuyu presidency. To them Raila should team up with Ruto, be president for five years then be succeeded by Ruto. The ODM presidential aspirant did not condemn the Kalenjin elders for such open ethnic hatred but purported to apologize to them for not appointing their son deputy Prime Minister.

    Kenyatta Family Wealth

    Forbes reported Uhuru as worth $500 million (over Ksh 40 billion) on his 50th birthday last year portraying him as the richest person in Kenya. This will work against him as the presidential campaign gathers momentum. State House and the Presidency in Kenya is viewed as the epitome of wealth generation. Uhuru’s father was there and accumulated immense wealth. Why give his son another opportunity to enrich himself even more?

    Having assets valued at Ksh 40 billion and having other assets generating income for one are two different things but Uhuru lives in the two worlds. Uhuru’s land assets, especially in the controversial Taita-Taveta, generate millions of shillings every day in mineral wealth. His multiple commercial investments in tourism, banking and insurance industries are another source of daily income in millions of shillings – not thousands.

    Would Uhuru have enough time to serve the country or he would be chasing more wealth? Former dictator Daniel arap Moi, who plunged then young Kenyatta into politics, left a trail of crippling poverty over the 24 years he spent accumulating ill-gotten wealth. During Uhuru’s tenure as finance minister, the shilling depreciated to its worst possible rate in Kenya history to exchange at a record high of Ksh 107. That is gross fiscal mismanagement.

    Land ownership

    The Kenyatta family is reputed to own land equivalent to the size of entire Nyanza Province. This is sad when landlessness bites deep even in central Kenya. Worse, thousands of IDPs created by the violence for which he is before the ICC, have been living in desolate camps since 2008. His family is now a major beneficially of land bought by the government to resettle the IDPs at exorbitant prices. He has been part of a government that seems to care more about a bloated cabinet, international travel, conspicuous consumption and wealth accumulation.

    To most of the IDPs and millions of Kenyans living in abject poverty, Uhuru does not care for them. Once the campaign hots up and land issues plus grabbed wealth that he inherited are raised, Kenyan voters will dread another draconian leader lording over them.

    The election comes at an opportune time when the Mau Mau veterans and their descendants who did not benefit from the struggle that benefitted the undeserving grabbers are fighting the British government for compensation. Some vocal voices against Kenyatta’s land grabbing have been progressively silenced through detention and murder. Grabbed land provided the means to wealth that created the Kenya ruling and business elite. sThat is what Uhuru presidency intends to protect.

    The Kenya government has spent millions of shillings in taxpayers’ cash hopping around the world in shuttle diplomacy seeking the UN Security Council intervention to defer the ICC cases before Uhuru and his co-accused but not a cent to seek support the case against the British for the atrocities Kenyans suffered during the 1952-1960 emergency. The Kenya government has never cared to compensate the Mau Mau fighters in the face of the British arrogance.

    The real reason the Kenya government stands aloof over the matter is because the Kenyatta government shared the money, given by the British government to resettle those displaced by the Mau Mau insurgence, amongst cabinet and top civil servants to acquire White settler farms and businesses. That explains the ownership of huge tracts of land in the former White Highlands by Kenyatta era ministers, permanent secretaries and military generals. They also own extensive coastline beach plots and businesses. In other words, they own Kenya. This election may be Uhuru’s payback time.

    Uhuru’s Development Record and Leadership Acumen

    Uhuru is now a political leader for close to 15 years. He has been a cabinet minister in both Moi and Kibaki governments. Kenyans have the right to demand his performance record nationally and in his Gatundu backyard.

    Gatundu South constituency is among areas leading in jigger population among school age children and poverty levels in the country. Jigger infestation is a direct result of poverty and lack of clean water supply – nothing else!

    Ichaweri, Uhuru’s rural homestead in Gatundu, where he says he will return to farm when he loses the election next year, was a 5-acre piece when Kenyatta acquired it in 1962. Today it is a sprawling huge island of plenty in the midst of barren poverty. Local neighbours were forcefully evicted or coerced to sell their farms to create room for expansionist Kenyatta. The Kenyatta era Gatundu self-help hospital is a shell compared to a modern facility like Mama Lucy Kibaki hospital in Dandora in Embakasi constituency.

    If multi-billionaire Uhuru can’t fight simple jigger infestation and attendant poverty or initiate clean water supply, even though the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), in a small constituency of Gatundu South, what can he do for 40 million Kenyans – with more than 65 per cent of them living in abject poverty, hunger and disease among other social maladies?

    Uhuru does not represent the face of the transformation that Kenyans and their country need. Besides, Kenyans should never encourage dynasties to avoid future bloodshed.

    He also has served as Deputy Prime Minister and minister of finance. During his time as minister of finance, the shilling depreciated to its worst possible rate to exchange at a record high of Ksh 107 to the dollar. The young Kenyatta took over the ministry of finance when the shilling was exchanging at the Ksh 70 to the dollar, ten times more than when his father died and Moi took over at Ksh 7.

    He never explained the massive plunge by the shilling although it is obvious it was good for those in tourism industry and banking sector – both of which Uhuru has extensive interest.

    By Blamuel Njururi The Associated News Network – November 2, 2012
    http://associated-news-network.com/2012/11/kenya-why-uhuru-cant-be-elected-president/

  • From ‘Project’ Uhuru to a comedy of errors, and the not-so-comic ICC trial

    Eldest son of founding President Kenyatta walks the tight-rope that some fear is coiling fast into a noose that could strangle Kenya future diplomacy.

    When Uhuru Kenyatta visited Maralal town in North-Eastern Province five years ago, he went to his father’s old house, now a museum, and wrote in the visitors’ book: “Conceived in this house in the year 1961. A pleasure to be back using my own (sic) two feet”

    This conscious act of retracing his footsteps reasserted the unconscious fact about Uhuru’s life: his personal story is foisted on Kenya’s political narrative and the complex legacy from his father, the founding President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta.

    Maralal, where Uhuru’s life begins, represents the colonial oppression of the Kapenguria Six, and immortalises the six nationalists who were jailed there by British authorities in 1952 on largely trumped-up charges.

    Nearly 60 years on, Uhuru’s pending cases at the International Criminal Court are seen as a re-enactment of his father’s tribulations. The father prevailed, the story goes, and emerged to lead the nation. Uhuru’s supporters believe he will similarly prevail to lead Kenya after next year’s General Election.

    Jomo Kenyatta looms large in Uhuru’s life—34 years after his death. That analysis is mirrored in Uhuru’s website, uhuru.co.ke. Out of the dozen images published online, nearly half depict Uhuru with his famous father—from Uhuru’s infantry to his father’s State funeral.

    That is as it should be, for no child can extricate itself from its roots. But things are far more complex for Uhuru: the legacy that his father bequeathed this country is also Uhuru’s personal burden. And Uhuru’s personal wealth from his father is usually seen as a dispossession of others.

    Forbes magazine ranks Uhuru the richest man in Kenya on account of the massive land holdings, estimated at more than 500,000 acres that he stands to inherit. That’s besides other business interests from real estate to banking to dairy farming, whose net worth is estimated at about Sh50billion.

    “The land was acquired by his father in the 1960s and 1970s when the British colonial government and the World Bank funded a settlement transfer fund scheme that enabled Government officials and wealthy Kenyans to acquire land from the British at very low prices,” Forbes writes.

    Land remains the core grievance in pockets of conflict scattered across Kenya, and Jomo Kenyatta is often blamed for the mess. In 1980, while speaking in Mombasa, the doyen of opposition politics in Kenya, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, called Kenyatta a “land grabber.”

    In some parts of the vast Taita Taveta, individuals like the Kenyattas and former MP Basil Criticos owned tracts that covered entire constituencies, and locals there were virtual tenants, rather than constituents.

    The severity of the problem is underpinned by the fact that land is a core issue under Agenda Four of the National Accord—now being handled by the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission—plus an amalgam of other historical injustices.

    That would obviously complicate Uhuru’s situation were he to ascend to State House. How can he be expected to promote land policy review when the stakes are so high for him?

    Writing in the Daily Nation last December, former Subukia MP Koigi wa Wamwere sneered: “Looking at the presidential hopefuls, I see inheritors of stolen land and beneficiaries of recent graft masquerading as liberators. The more they have eaten, we are told, the safer we are with them.”

    But history is not the only thing weighing down on Uhuru. He has no public service record to write home about, save for the brief interlude in 1979 when he reportedly served as a Kenya Commercial Bank teller at Kipande Branch, according to his timeline on uhuru.co.ke. His next public appointment came 20 years later, when he chaired the Kenya Tourist Board in 1999.

    Uhuru’s foray into politics was in 1997 when he vied for Gatundu South parliamentary seat and lost. He was nominated to Parliament in 2001 and made Local Government Minister by Daniel arap Moi, who later propped him as his preferred successor in 2002 polls, in which Uhuru was trounced by Mwai Kibaki.

    While public service is not the only yardstick for leadership, it is curious for someone to aspire for the highest office in the land, yet manifest little or no footprints in service of the public.

    Also, Uhuru is yet to overcome the stigma of being Moi’s “project” that was imposed on the people for purposes of preserving the old order.

    Uhuru’s brief tenure in the Cabinet has not been without event. His stint as Finance Minister was blighted by what he confessed as “typographical errors” in Budget Bill that overshot the supplementary budget by over Sh9b. He was cleared of wrongdoing by the Joint Finance and Budgetary Committee on the issue.

    Uhuru was similarly criticised for refunding to the British government some Sh100m that they demanded following mismanagement of the Free Primary Education, before the matter could be fully investigated and a mechanism put in place to guarantee a full refund from the culprits.

    “I have worked very hard to get to where I am,” Uhuru told Citizen TV recently, to discount claims that he is privileged. On his massive family wealth, he used the metaphor of housing to demonstrate his future intentions: “I may have a house but I’m committed to ensure that I have many other similar houses around me in order to ensure my house survives through the survival of everybody else’s.”

    But that is he survives the integrity test pending in court on account of his ICC trial, and which some fear could complicate Kenya’s future diplomatic policy.
    http://mavulture.com/uhuru-kenyatta/

  • KISUMU MOLASSES FACTORY: HOW DID THE ODINGAS GET IT?
    Saturday, August 18, 2012 – 00:00 — BY SARAH ELDERKIN

    ON February 16, 1990, the body of foreign affairs minister Dr Robert Ouko – who had been missing for four days following a trip with then President Daniel arap Moi to the USA – was found, mutilated and burnt, in a thicket near Got Alila hill, four kilometres from his Koru home, in Nyanza.

    Ouko’s death was announced to the nation by Moi, who expressed his “profound sorrow”. A couple of days earlier, Moi had also announced his “sadness and grave concern” at his minister’s unexplained disappearance. He said he had directed that the state machinery be deployed to trace Ouko’s whereabouts, and that his “top personnel” were applying “maximum effort” towards this end.

    It was too late. As he spoke, Ouko was already lying murdered. Seven months later, on October 1, 1990, Moi appointed a commission of inquiry into Ouko’s death. This went on very well for months – until the day Scotland Yard detective John Troon, who was investigating the case, named Nicholas Biwott, then MP for Kerio South, as one of his two main suspects. Biwott at the time enjoyed a status in the inner circle around Moi that had long rendered him immune from criticism, despite the fact that he was widely disliked and feared.

    Moi acted swiftly to close down the commission of inquiry before any evidence against Biwott could be heard. Biwott’s problems had begun when a witness, then director of medical services Prof Joseph Oliech, told the commissioners that the Scotland Yard detectives had asked him whether Ouko had made any enemies because of the stalled molasses plant in Kisumu.

    The molasses plant, then properly called the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation Ltd, had been inaugurated in 1977 and abandoned five years later, one of the costliest failures in Kenya’s industrial history. The original proposal for the plant’s establishment had come from Nitin Madhvani, of the influential Madhvani family, investors in Kenya, Uganda and elsewhere, particularly in the sugar industry, of which molasses is a by-product.

    It was to be a joint venture with the government to produce power alcohol. Despite the fact that the Madhvani group had been involved in a previous joint venture with the government that had failed to get off the ground (the Kenya Fibre Corporation, based in Nanyuki) and had cost the Treasury huge sums, the new company was set up and capitalised at shs. 170 million, of which the government, as 51 per cent majority shareholder, contributed shs. 86.7 million. In 1977, this was a huge sum of money.

    The project was initially dealt with by three ministries – the ministry of finance under Mwai Kibaki and later under Prof George Saitoti, the ministry for commerce and industry under Eliud Mwamunga, and the ministry of foreign affairs under Dr Munyua Waiyaki. The plant’s main planned function was to produce power alcohol, that is, an energy fuel, out of waste from the sugar production process.

    The ministry of energy, under which the project eventually fell, was created by Moi in 1979, and Biwott was given the portfolio in 1983. By 1981, the government had guaranteed shs.600 million in loans for the failing molasses project and was being asked to guarantee another US$24 million. Lenders were pressing for repayment and contractors and suppliers had stopped work for lack of funds. In 1982, government estimates showed the country would lose shs.135 million a year for the next ten years if the project went ahead. At that point, the plant was all but abandoned, and in 1983 it was placed in receivership.

    Some people, however, including Ouko, minister for industry at the time, believed the project was still viable, and Ouko had appealed to the government and been instructed to find investors for the project. He had subsequently brought investors from Italy to see the plant and they had said it was possible to revive it.

    But a row over the molasses plant had been simmering for some time. Avon Ltd managing director Eric Onyango, giving evidence at the Ouko commission of inquiry, said Ouko had told him there were those among his Cabinet colleagues who favoured a different set of investors who would pay them “kickbacks”. Competition had become intense.

    Ouko had told other friends who later gave evidence that there were powerful forces in the Cabinet opposed to his determination to expose corruption. Onyango said Ouko had told him that the level of corruption in the Cabinet was “not only alarming but unbelievable”.

    Another witness said he would reveal the names of Ouko’s enemies if he were granted police protection. Biwott, informed, under the inquiry’s rules, of possible adverse mention of himself, brought in a team of three lawyers.

    Moi was quick to see that big trouble might be brewing and he promptly announced a new commission of inquiry – into the molasses plant. Attorney-general Amos Wako was on hand as usual to deny that there was anything remarkable in this timing, and to say that the two commissions would operate independently.

    Soon afterwards, the witness who had asked for police protection, James K’Oyoo, who had been a political aide to Ouko, was recalled to the stand. Deputy public prosecutor Bernard Chunga applied for K’Oyoo’s evidence to be given in secret, describing it as “possibly alarming”, but the witness responded that he would not ask for protection as long as his testimony could be given in public. When he took the stand, K’Oyoo said Ouko had mentioned threats to his life over the molasses plant.

    A report in the New York Times, meanwhile, said the newspaper had obtained a copy of a US high court injunction blocking Citibank New York from recovering dollar funds equal to shs.400 million in loans to Biwott’s companies. Shs.320 million of this was reported as secured by letters of credit in a Swiss bank account owned by Biwott. The New York Times quoted New York officials who warned that high levels of corruption in Kenya could endanger future US aid.

    A letter from the head of BAK, the Italian group favoured by Ouko regarding the revival of the molasses plant, to a legal firm in Nairobi said Kenya’s reputation in international business circles had been marred by corruption, and it cited the Turkwel Gorge hydroelectric dam and the Noolturesh (Kajiado-Machakos) water pipeline project.

    Chillingly, a memorandum from the same group of companies indicated that, in the days immediately before he died, Ouko had been preparing a report on the high-level corruption that was hindering the revival of the molasses plant. The writer of the memorandum said, “I spoke with him last on Saturday, February 10, when … he told me he was staying in Kisumu to finish his report for HE [President Moi]….”

    Three days after this conversation about the report Ouko was preparing on the molasses plant, Ouko was dead. When Detective John Troon finally took the stand, he told the commissioners he had repeatedly tried to interview Biwott, without success, and also that he had been stopped from proceeding with his investigations, particularly regarding the questioning of senior government officials.

    Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund’s quarterly report stated that half the funds deposited in foreign bank accounts owned by Kenyans had been deposited in the past five years alone. On November 18, 1991, Troon named Biwott as one of two principal suspects in Ouko’s murder and recommended full investigation of the corruption allegations against him. Troon said he was certain Ouko had been murdered because of his anti-corruption stance.

    The following day, Moi relieved Biwott of his ministerial post “with immediate effect”, then abruptly disbanded the Ouko commission of inquiry, instead directing the Kenya police commissioner to “proceed with due diligence and speed” in investigating Ouko’s death. Sceptics abounded, especially as the Ouko commissioners themselves had requested an adjournment because of harassment by the Special Branch (forerunner to the NSIS), including a brutal arrest of Ouko family lawyer George Oraro, “clearly calculated to undermine the continuance of these proceedings”, they said.

    Moi’s action was also interesting from another point of view: it came days before Kenya was to meet its increasingly reluctant donors in Paris. The issue of the billions stashed away abroad by corrupt political leaders was expected to feature prominently on the agenda, including the hundreds of millions of shillings held by Biwott in Swiss bank accounts.

    With Ouko’s death, the whole idea of reviving the Kisumu molasses plant was abandoned, and the physical structure of the plant fell into disrepair – a rusting skeleton standing at the edge of the Kisumu-Busia road, a colossal monument to government mismanagement and wasted public funds.

    It was apparently not until five years later that it was deemed safe to raise once again the issue of the molasses plant – and “all moveable assets” of the plant were advertised for sale on July 10, 1995. Raila Odinga, like Ouko, believed the plant had a future, and he protested officially at the intention to dispose of the assets of the company piecemeal.

    The sale did not proceed, but on March 8 of the following year, 1996, an advertisement again appeared in the Daily Nation newspaper, this time offering “For sale by public auction: All assets of Kisumu Molasses Factory”. The auction was to be conducted at the plant on April 15, 1996.

    Among the conditions of sale was “(b) IMPORTANT: First consideration will be taken for offer to purchase the whole plant in total [writer’s emphasis]. Thereafter consideration for purchase of large combination of units and finally consideration of single item purchases.” The would-be purchaser of the “whole plant or large items” was required to pay 25 per cent of the purchase price by banker’s cheque at the fall of the hammer, and the balance within 30 days.

    The auction did not actually take place until June 3, on which day, Mr Odinga was present. Representing Spectre International Ltd, he bid shs.570 million for the “whole plant”. This turned out to be the highest bid and it was accepted by the auctioneers on behalf of the receiver and the plant’s debenture holders, Kenya Commerical Bank (KCB). A token deposit was paid in two cheques totalling shs.2million, with the balance of the 25 per cent to be paid upon official acceptance of the bid by the receiver and debenture holders.

    M N Kanyi, of auctioneers Panama Rovers, wrote to Mr Odinga the following day and again two days later, on June 6, 1996, confirming that the bid had been accepted. Kanyi returned the two cheques lodged and requested payment of the full 25 per cent, which amounted to shs.142,500,00, not later than June 14, with the balance to be paid by July 15, 1996.

    The letter of June 6 included, however, a major caveat. While the advertised lot had described “the whole plant in total” (writer’s emphasis) Kanyi now stated in his opening paragraph that the shs.570 million purchase price “covers all the assets of the company, which, as stressed prior to the auction, exclude land”.

    The Daily Nation advertisement had made no mention of this and Spectre’s board was taken aback by Kanyi’s remarks. It was difficult to see how a factory could be purchased sitting on thin air and it had naturally been assumed that the 240 acres of land on which the factory stood was part of the “whole plant in total” advertised for sale.

    Spectre instructed its lawyers, Lumumba & Ojwang, to write to the auctioneers, which they did on June 7, pointing out that it was clear from correspondence and a previous High Court case (no. 2433 of 1995) relating to the plant that both seller and buyer understood the land to be an integral part of the offer, and that the subsequent exclusion of the land constituted a “drastic turn of events”. Said Lumumba & Ojwang, “Our clients have no intention of relocating the plant elsewhere,” and they were therefore seeking confirmation that the auction sale included the land .

    Panama Rovers replied, saying that the Daily Nation advertisement had advised potential purchasers that it was their obligation to “ascertain the state of the assets”. While this would appear to refer to the condition of the assets, and not to be a new meaning for the words “whole plant in total” (a double emphasis of the entirety of the goods), Panama asserted that joint receiver JK Muiruri, of Bellhouse Mwangi Ernst & Young, and the auctioneer had explained before the auction that the lot included plant and machinery but not land. The receiver also wrote to Spectre, emphasising that the land was not part of the sale.

    On June 13, 1996, Mr Odinga wrote to the receiver saying that discussions about the land had been initiated with the government and “the matter is in the process of being resolved”. He asked for an extension of the time within which to pay the deposit.

    In a congruent letter to Panama from Lumumba & Ojwang, the lawyers noted that Spectre had been given the impression that the land was part of the package. Indeed, a change in the wording of the sale notice from the “all moveable assets” advertised on July 10, 1995, to “all assets of Kisumu Molasses Factory” and the “whole plant in total” on March 8, 1996, was significant and supported this impression, said Lumumba & Ojwang, who again asked for confirmation of the inclusion of the land.

    The receiver replied to Mr Odinga the following day, June 14, 1996, granting the extension of the time within which the deposit had to be paid, with the price in full to be paid by December 16 that year. Panama replied to Lumumba & Ojwang confirming that the land was not part of the sale and advising that they would enter into no further correspondence on this issue.

    The situation was apparently deadlocked, and Spectre, apparently in disbelief, wrote once more to the receiver, on July 27, for reconfirmation of the land issue, which was subsequently received in a letter from the receiver dated July 29, 1996.

    The receiver expected the shs.142,500,000 deposit on September 16, 1996. Instead, on that date, Spectre International filed suit against the receiver, stating neglect to confirm prior to the sale that the land was not included, and seeking (a) a declaration that the sale of “all assets” included the land, (b) an injunction restraining the receiver from disposing of any of the assets of the factory and (c) costs.

    At the hearing of the injunction suit (HCCC 2324 of 1996), counsel for Spectre International Ltd cited the Collins English Dictionary with regard to the meaning of ‘plant’, the first meaning being: “The land, buildings and equipment used in carrying on an industrial, business or other undertaking or service.”

    Counsel also cited a report on the “progress, problems and prospects” of the venture, dated 15 years earlier, which had been prepared for the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation Ltd by the law firm of Schnader, Harrizon, Segal & Lewis, of Philadelphia and Washington, USA. In the provisional balance sheet of June 30, 1982, under the heading ‘Capital work in progress’, appeared the items “Land and site development, buildings, and plant and equipment”. Lumumba contended that this reference showed that the land was among the assets of the molasses company.

    The application was vigorously opposed by lawyer Lee Muthoga. After lengthy legal arguments, Mr Justice AG Ringera, presiding, opined that, because the land had not been expressly itemised as an asset in the Daily Nation advertisement, Spectre had not established a prima facie case.

    Because Spectre had withheld the deposit pending resolution of the case, Ringera also refused to grant an injunction against the receiver’s disposal of the factory’s assets. But he granted the interlocutory injunction assigning costs to the receiver, on grounds that the molasses factory was “in its death throes”, was being liquidated and was therefore unable to pay any damages.

    In the absence of the land on which the factory stood, Spectre withdrew from its proposed purchase of the plant. The receiver then wrote to the second-highest bidder, Equip Agencies, which by this time had also decided to steer well clear of this white elephant/hot potato. Presumably most investors would be reluctant to spend huge sums of money on a derelict, non-functioning factory standing on land over which they had no control.

    And so the molasses plant stood, forlorn and unwanted and deteriorating by the day, for another three years – until the receiver decided to have another go at disposing of this towering government problem. On February 12, 1999, he wrote to those who had been the top four bidders in 1996 to ask them if they were still interested. Spectre wrote back, saying it was still interested but it wanted to confirm the present-day value, as well as the thorny issue of the status of the land.

    Spectre inspected the site and found the plant buildings in very poor condition. Time and weather had taken their toll, as had vandals. Now an even greater investment would be required to revive the factory. But Spectre wrote to Bellhouse Mwangi Ernst & Young on February 18, 1999, making an offer of shs. 120 million, 10 per cent to be paid on acceptance and the balance within 120 days. “We are in negotiation with the government over the land issues,” said Spectre’s letter.

    On June 9, 1999, receiver Muiruri wrote to Spectre accepting its offer of shs.120 million. Spectre had been outbid by shs.15 million by another bidder but successfully argued its case that it planned to develop the factory in accordance with the government’s original aims, and not simply to cannibalise the moveable assets, as the other bidder had planned. To make things crystal clear, Muiruri noted in his letter that the shs. 120 million was for the “moveable assets and not of shares or of any running business”.

    The land was not mentioned at all but Spectre was already pursuing its own negotiations in this regard. On April 7, 1999, Spectre general manager Israel Agina had written to Moi requesting the allocation for industrial development of the parcel of land on which the molasses factory stood. Agina noted that the land had already formerly been allocated to the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation but that the allocation had not been completed.

    What he said was true. The land had already been allocated to the molasses plant by the government, which had itself compulsorily acquired the land in 1976 for precisely that purpose. The land was previously communal land, and shs.2 million had been paid to the local community, which had ceded the land at this price only on the promise that the community would benefit from employment at the plant. The community had not otherwise been adequately compensated.

    The government, having thus acquired the land, had in 1982 issued a letter of allotment to the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation, which had paid the stand premium of shs.2.4 million to the government. All that remained was for the title to be issued, but this had not been done by the time the factory went into receivership in 1983.

    And as an interesting aside, on October 29, 1983, the Municipality of Kisumu had written to the KCB, the debenture holder for the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation, demanding land rates for the plot, unpaid since 1978. The letter contained the sentence “As you are aware, the Corporation owns 240 acres of land on which it started its operations [writer’s emphasis].”

    In his letter to Moi, Agina said the land remained an obstacle to the conclusion of Spectre’s desired purchase of the plant, while the factory’s existing assets were deteriorating rapidly. “We hope,” said Agina, “to convert the idle facility into a socio-economic complex.”

    That hope became a reality. More than two years after Spectre was offered the company, the sale agreement was finally drawn up mid-2001. In September of that year, government letters of allotment granted a total of 114.8 hectares of land for 99 years for total fees of shs. 3,699,750, which were paid by Spectre International on October 11, 2001.

    The land could be used for horticultural, industrial, residential and educational purposes, including the growing of such crops as citrus, tomatoes, onions and cabbages, and for a school and a health clinic.

    All title certification, registration, search, new register, attestation, inspection, copying, survey, rent, stand premium, stamp duty, land adjudication and other fees were likewise paid by Spectre four days later, on October 15, 2001. The sale agreement was signed.

    As usual, however, the transfer of title was not effected until nearly two years later. This eventually occurred in 2003 (under the Narc government), by which time Spectre had also paid the commissioner of lands all the rent arrears relating to the land for the 20 years 1982 to 2003. Spectre then set about the huge task of rehabilitating the plant – appraising the work with professional valuers and beginning to seek expert scientific advice on appropriate crop-growing and methods of ethanol production.

    It also began the search for investment partners. Eventually, Energem would take a 55 per cent controlling share, and the Kisumu Development Trust (with directors the late Joab Omino, former Rarieda MP George Ngure Odeny and current chairman John Otega) would hold five per cent on behalf of local people who had come together to raise shs.1.8m towards the project. Spectre would retain the remaining 40 per cent.

    The rehabilitation project resulted in the commissioning of the plant in 2004. The yeast plant was completed in 2006 and the factory now produces industrial ethanol for blending with liquid (bio-fuels), potable alcohol for beverages and chemical industries, carbon dioxide, bio and organic fertiliser, and yeast.

    At the height of the factory’s operations, a daily output of 60,000 litres was achieved, but the current precarious state of the sugar industry has affected this. Nevertheless, the company employs directly some 500 people and indirectly another 200. At the height of its operations, it remitted an average of shs.1.2 billion to the exchequer each year. It also exports to the Comesa countries.

    The owners of the Kisumu Molasses Factory have a strong sense of corporate social responsibility and the factory has partnered with local schools to build laboratories and boreholes, and to provide electricity and clean drinking water. The company conducts a free medical camp every three months, bringing in doctors and buying medication, all of which is provided free of charge to the 6,000-plus local residents treated. It is also helping in efforts to control and eradicate water-borne diseases in the area.

    So, from a derelict, rusting, useless hulk to a fully functioning industry bringing benefits to local residents through employment, education and health, and when in full operation contributing more than a billion shillings annually to the Treasury, the Kisumu Molasses Factory has been a huge success story.

    Unfortunately, huge success stories can lead to terrible jealousy, as Ouko’s case also so sadly demonstrated. A Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land was appointed by President Mwai Kibaki on July 4, 2003. It presented its report, commonly known as the ‘Ndung’u Report’, to Kibaki in June 2004.

    The main part of the report listed many ways in which directors of public corporations with large public land holdings had misused their positions to make these organisations – for which they had a duty of care and a responsibility to the public – fail, so that the assets could be sold off cheaply for private gain.

    The commission found that such state corporations’ land was illegally allocated “in total disregard of the law and public interest”. It said no justification for the allocation of such land could be found in any of the records, and that subsequently “the lands so allocated were then sold by the allottees to other state corporations for colossal amounts of money far in excess of the prevailing market value of the land. This way, many individuals were unjustly enriched at great expense of the people of Kenya.”

    The report went on to detail how “the loss of corporation land was triggered by the actions of the Commissioner of Lands”, whose office would engage in some “specially designed correspondences” prior to wrongly granting title to individuals or their third-party proxies

    “The corporation management would wake up to a rude fact that their land had been acquired and title issued thereto without their knowledge,” said the report, adding that another ploy was the illegal allocation of state corporation land after “irregular surrenders” of that land.

    “The allottees would sell the land so illegally acquired,” said the report, so that “in a space of say three months, a civil servant, a politician, a political operative, etc, would transform from an ordinary Kenyan, financially struggling like many others, into a multi-millionaire. Thanks to the rampant illegal allocation and sale of state corporation land.”

    The report cited Kenya Railways, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd, Kenya Airports Authority and Kenya Industrial Estates as among many state corporations that “lost huge chunks of their land in these circumstances”.

    None of this remotely applies to the Kisumu Molasses Factory. But despite this, the allocation to Spectre International Ltd of land on which the molasses plant stands is also mentioned in the report, which concluded that the “direct allocation of alienated government land to the company by the commissioner of lands was illegal”.

    This conclusion would appear to be in direct contradiction of the facts, as detailed above, which are that:

    • The land on which the molasses factory stands was acquired compulsorily by the government for the purpose of building the molasses plant.

    • The land was already allocated to the molasses plant in 1982, though the transfer had been only partly completed by the time the Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation Ltd went into receivership in 1983.

    • The land was properly allocated a second time, this time to Spectre International, in 2001.

    • Spectre paid 20 years’ rent arrears and all the necessary government fees for the land.

    • The land has been used for the economic realisation of the original objectives of the government, of the investors and of the local community.

    • It was government land, and government is not in the business of selling land. Government merely allocates land for industrial and other development. This is a normal procedure and it is precisely the procedure that was properly followed in the case of the Kisumu Molasses Factory.

    As in no other case investigated by the Ndung’u Commission, the land on which the Kisumu Molasses Factory stands has been used for the purposes stated. A company with growing success has been established on it, which has been of immense benefit to the country via the returns the plant remits to the Treasury every year, and to the local population through jobs, education and health care.

    And its success is down to the determination of one man, Raila Odinga. Let no one tell you otherwise, for whoever does so is not telling you the truth. Many have tried to say that Mr Odinga took money for the plant from local people and converted it to his own use. This is totally false and naked propaganda. The shs.1.8 million raised by the local community is safe, in the form of the five per cent shares held by the Kisumu Development Trust. The contributors will begin to see returns on their investment when the Kisumu Molasses Factory becomes a company publicly quoted on the stock exchange.

    Before any company can go public, it is required to have made a profit for two consecutive years. Spectre had huge commitments, loans and other expenses to meet in the course of the massively expensive task of reviving the molasses plant. But the company eventually began to show a profit and it was intended that it would be listed last year, 2011.

    Unfortunately, the major shareholder, Energem, then went bankrupt. This led to the need for restructuring of the company profile and a search for another strategic partner. This was found, but the sugar industry problems in turn have meant that the plant’s output has not yet been steady enough to qualify for stock exchange listing. It is hoped that this might happen next year.

    In the meantime, the silence from anyone whose interests are being safeguarded by the Kisumu Development Trust is deafening. All the noise that is heard comes only from other people – people who have a direct interest in political propaganda. The company’s doors remain open to anyone who might for any reason feel aggrieved, and the fact that Kisumu Development Trust chairman John Otega is the company’s human resources manager makes this all the easier.

    So that is the story – and all the receipts, correspondence and certificates of allocation relating to the purchase of the Kisumu Molasses Factory and the land on which it stands are available for inspection. Land generally remains a very interesting and potent issue – and now that we are on the subject, what about all those other cases in the Ndung’u Report, cases that involve billions lost in public funds, massive issues that absolutely dwarf the Kisumu Molasses Factory – where no issue exists at all?

    Is anyone going to start talking about those? As for the Ouko murder, I am not sure what happened to the Kenya Police and the presidential directive that they “proceed with due diligence and speed” in their investigations. Some day, perhaps.

    The writer is a freelance journalist.
    http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-89621/kisumu-molasses-factory-how-did-odingas-get-it

  • This what many people dont know. Thank you for making us understand this

  • Is it true that kenyatta’s land is equivalet 2 coast province?

  • The grave Implications of the Uhuru and Ruto presidency
    Saturday, November 10, 2012 – 00:00 — BY NDUNGU WAINAINA

    The Mumo Matemu’s case ruling settled the question of integrity or suitability to hold public office. For purposes of the integrity test in the constitution, the judges said, “There is no requirement that the behaviour, attribute or conduct in question has to rise to the threshold of criminality”.

    This statement is profound and affirms centrality of the core national values and principles enshrined in Article 10 of the constitution.

    The integrity threshold is not just about Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. It touches on any person or individual aspiring to hold public office either elective or appointive.

    The constitutional revolution that Kenyans ushered set very high standards, dawning a new era for Kenya. However, attempts are desperately being made by the old order that has historically benefited from unfair policies and laws to socio-politically exclude the rest of the country and revert to a criminal state.

    This small clique that cut across political divide want to keep disenfranchising the masses. It is vehemently rejecting change. It was never part of the Constitutional reform movement.

    It was deeply in bed with tyranny and despotic past regimes that dehumanized Kenyans. I want to be candid that Uhuru and Ruto and a whole bunch of old diehard Kanu members currently hypocritically projecting themselves as champions of New Kenya are a face of rejuvenating the old order.

    They detest exposure of their horrendous past record. They can never guarantee and deliver human security and rule of law, sustainable human development and equal economic opportunities for all, and inclusive participation and human rights.

    They are vigorously supported by a group of conservative lawyers and inner sanctum of power revolving around security and civil service apparatus that has enjoyed unfettered powers and privilege.

    The entire approach to post-election accountability has exposed their old methods of deploying ethnic political mobilisation and manipulation devoid of deep policy and ideological positions.

    They are determined to retain status quo of inequalities, socially exclusive economic policies and vagrant human rights violations. They hate rule of law, constitutionalism and effective institutional values and democratic practice.

    Uhuru and Ruto have shown the common features of the African club of leaders who treat sovereignty of people with contempt and construe holding position of leadership as an entitlement rather than service to the people.

    They have little regard for publicly promulgated laws and institutional values. Further, the capture of the state to them means owning unlimited machinery to accumulate wealth while millions of ordinary people wallow in poverty and misery.

    The constitution is a threat to their unadulterated privileges and entitlements. Notably, respect for the rule of law is fundamental to the achievement of the democratic transformations envisaged by the constitution.

    Truth be told, the International Criminal Court has offered them the best fair, transparent and open judicial process. They have been treated with the highest degree of fairness.

    Nevertheless, because they do not believe in accountability, their trademark is ethnic manipulation and casting themselves as ‘victims of persecutions’ to win sympathy and protection.

    The judicial process accorded them full due process of law. They had chances of hearing the cases made against them, rebutting the charges and then calling witnesses in a process that was telecast live locally and internationally.

    This was an open court system where even the findings of their appeals on admissibility was heard and determined. In the end, the court found them with a case to answer.

    The nature of charges confirmed against them are some of the gravest offences known to humanity. Kenya, having ratified the Rome statute in 2005 and domesticating it in 2008 under International Crimes Act, made ICC a court of last resort.

    Therefore, whenever the government of Kenya is either unwilling or unable to proceed with trials of international crimes committed within its territory, then ICC becomes its last resort.

    As far as 2007/08 post-election violence cases are concerned, the government has been very evasive and non-committal in prosecuting the lower and middle perpetrators of these crimes.

    This is the critical moment to call this old order vigorously trying to reincarnate and sustain a criminal system a bluff. We have to objectively and soberly understand the real impact and implication of lawbreakers becoming law and policy makers.

    This is not just at the presidency level but also across the board. Deliberately fuelled ethnic emotions and choreographed elite and their surrogate propaganda are irrelevant. We need to thoroughly and critically think of the future of Kenya.

    Currently, Kenya is facing bigger socio-economic challenges that demand concentration. The country has a skyrocketing debt of Sh1.6 trillion and close to 56 per cent of the population is unable to meet their daily needs.

    We have to adequately address the citizens’ concern of freedom from want, fear and human dignity. It is therefore overdue for Kenyans to avert their overriding sense of nationhood and appreciate the issues at stake here.

    For a start, the magnitude of international isolation and the attendant of socio-economic ramifications should guide informed reasoning and decisions on eligibility of indictees of criminal or civil legal proceedings internationally or locally to hold public office.

    There is imminent threat of loss of all the economic gains that has been witnessed in the recent past. Institutions like the United Nations Environmental Programme (Unep) and Habitat will have no option but to close down and relocate.

    This is because there is a direct nexus that exists between economic prosperity and foreign diplomatic relation. A case in point is the relocation of Africa Development Bank headquarters from Abidjan to its temporary office in Tunis when sanctions against Ivory Coast were issued.

    With an increasingly service-oriented economy and having been ranked amongst the worst unfriendly countries in doing business, can Kenya afford to have the UN headquarters and other agencies leave Nairobi when President Kibaki himself has spent millions campaigning for its upgrading?

    It is clear that some countries and important international organisations will not do business with international criminal indictees.

    The United States, European Union, Canada, Norway and Japan easily come to mind. These are countries that matter in the current flow of international commercial trade.

    Japan and Germany, two countries that have experienced sanctions because of international atrocities, would fathom a Kenya with an indictee as a President.

    China heavily relies on these trading countries for foreign direct investment in its country. In that respect alone, they cannot be mildly compared to South Sudan or Tanzania who are aid-reliant.

    Further, China, as experience has shown with developed countries, is concerned more with wealth and resource extraction and not local investment.

    The economic and humanitarian implications are troubling including huge funding for crucial social services. Can Kenya afford this?

    Kenyans have to establish a clear balance between their notions of individual rights and the bigger picture of public interest.

    It is disingenuous to pretend that in a civilized Kenya, there cannot be legitimate limitations to individual rights. This is a matter for everyone whose future depends on a stable democratic rule of law.

    Unlike the political class and educated elite, ordinary people have no means to flee the country once the walls of sanctions cave in.

    Some people have unwisely argued that disqualifying Uhuru and Ruto from elections would be tantamount to ‘selling Kenya’s sovereignty’.

    They are certainly entitled to that viewpoint, but the reality is that Kenya is a member of a globalised international community thus denying the role of international partners in Kenya’s progress is unhelpful.

    The traditional notions of Kenya’s sovereignty that emphasized geographical borders crumpled with the end of the cold war.

    The increasingly integrated global economic and financial environment leaves no space for triviality where electing a personality for Presidency has inherent national and international consequences.

    It is therefore pragmatic to accept that based on the current state-of-play, Kenya can ill-afford an Uhuru or Ruto Presidency.

    Apart from clear national values enshrined in the Constitution, the consequential exposure of the country to financial and commercial exclusion makes that prospect truly grim.

    Moreover, it is not true that Kenya is so deficient of leadership that we collectively resort to international criminal suspects.

    The arrogance and indifference with which Ruto alluded to running the country remotely from The Hague is something Kenyans must deeply reflect on.

    The far-reaching implications of electing a President with confirmed criminal or civil charges and who fail the integrity threshold that cannot be overlooked include:

    First, what would be the consequence to the nascent rule of law and constitutionalism that the country is desperately trying to re-build?

    Investments, both local and international, are dependent on political certainty and predictability. If the country or a county is led by a person with crimes or civil charges hanging over his/her head, what confidence does an investor have that law and judicial decisions on commercial or trade dispute will be respected?

    What is the point of enacting the Constitution and enabling national laws that reflect will of the people and then oust them?

    What sense of ‘servitude’ makes people applaud when the Deputy Chief Justice, members of judiciary and other constitutional offices are disqualified from public office based on unresolved integrity questions and conduct yet imagine it should not be applied to the presidency or other elective posts?

    Have we reduced ourselves to the level of allowing ethnic bigotry overshadow the strength and guaranteed progress in our diversity?

    Secondly, how would indictees of crimes against humanity expect to run and manage national security system with credibility and reputation?

    As Commander-in-Chief and titular head of the security system, what message do you send about Kenya when the President is arraigned in an International Criminal Court?

    With unresolved criminal issues and arrest warrants against the President or members of his cabinet, how do you expect the police officers to behave? Will they arrest the President or acquiesce to lawlessness that only promotes culture of impunity in Kenya?

    Thirdly, judicial integrity and independence will suffer irreparable damage. There is open concern in Kenya about the historical Judiciary’s reluctance to ‘fry the big fish’.

    Partly, this is what took us to the International Criminal Court. Yet, under Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, there are embers of hope and faith that this may be changing.

    Nobody is naïve enough to believe the Chief Justice will succeed on this alone. Yet, if we were to have Uhuru or Ruto as President, the constitutional judicial authority and independence would be wiped out. If the President can afford to ignore judicial summons, why not Wanjiku?

    Fourthly,Kenyan courts have already issued a warrant of arrest on Sudan President Omar el Bashir, an international fugitive wanted by International criminal Court for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

    Khartoum responded so violently to Kenya. What would be the real effect of removing judges from office through a vetting process yet the President as the head of state has never respected or disregarded a judicial process?

    Can judges in the courts talk about fidelity to the law when the President is a judicial fugitive? Would it not be naïve to think that the rest shall just be all right and all systems shall run efficiently as long as the President can remain on other issues, which are, non-crimes related?

    Finally, the public service in Kenya runs on a certain principle of bureaucracy. The law and respect for high standards of professional ethics and integrity guide the state bureaucracy while performing public duty.

    It is expected to service the public with utmost objective of non-political system, run efficiently and impartially in service delivery.

    Nevertheless, it relies heavily on the ability of the President to lead the way forward in the rule of law. How shall such a President influence the official bureaucracy if he is not the best example of how to respect the law?

    Granted, it rings hollow and naïve to politically and continently argue politically that Kenyans will decide whom to be the next President.

    Only failed and pariah states can further such an illogical argument. Electing a President is not a zombie play game. The President is the face of the country.

    Kenyans have to drop ecstasy of the moment and sober up. Governments have a way of working and relating with foreign countries and institutions.

    A country with extremely vulnerable economy and suffering from high socio-political, economic and ethnic tensions invest heavily in its long-term national interests.

    As a regional hub, Kenya must lead by example and attract the best talent to do business with. This is in a bid to meet the ever-expanding restless educated youth and maximize its strategic position as an entry point to the region.

    This will not be possible under a President who is an international crimes indictee like Uhuru and Ruto. Courting such characters to even do politics with is catastrophic!

    In a continent with the highest number of failed states, the reverse is unimaginable. Further, the President should bring dignity to the office and inspire confidence among the people, public institutions and international relations.

    The justifications provided for in the Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto candidacy amount to national referendum on repealing the Constitution and its overthrow.

    Writer is Executive Director, International Center for Policy and Conflict

  • ‘Mother’ of the nation who led plunder of beloved motherland
    Added by Vulture Hunter on 2012-11-19

    Mama Ngina’s dignified presence as she makes her annual pilgrimage to the mausoleum every August where her departed husband and founding President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta lies, evokes power and mystery.

    Usually resplendent in colourful African fabrics and matching headgear, Mama Ngina cultivates the image of loss and courage, the epitome of pain and sacrifice.

    This mystique, however, is only a facade. The real Mama Ngina is a powerful business operator whose aggressive pursuit of money at the height of Kenyatta’s power saw her rise to become the richest woman in Africa.

    She was followed by Isabel Dos Santos (Angola) Hajila Bola Shangaya (Nigeria), Folorunso Alakija (Nigeria), Wendy Appleblaum (South Africa), Wendy Auckerman (South Africa), Briget Radebe (South Africa), Sharon Wapnick (South Africa), Elisabeth Bradly (South Africa) and Irene Charnley (Mauritius).

    That may not be surprising, for wealth runs in the family, with her son Uhuru Kenyatta ranked by Forbes magazine as the richest man in Kenya, and 23rd on the continent, on account of the enormous land holding that he stands to inherit.

    Mama Ngina’s claim to fame in the 1970s, however, is unique. Multiple but reliable media outlets in the 1970s alleged her enormous wealth as stemming from poaching and smuggling that almost wiped out elephants and Columbus monkeys from the face of Kenya.

    Charles Hornsby in his book, Kenya: A History Since Independence (1963-2011), explains how well connected cartels smuggled game trophies to Asian countries to mint millions. The ivory and skins recovered from the butchered animals were then smuggled into Hong Kong and Japan and China where there was an insatiable demand for trophies.

    Hornsby estimates that by mid-1973, a minimum of 500 elephants were killed legally each month, out of which 345 tonnes of ivory was documented to have been exported. At least 15,000 elephants were killed each year, while 10,000 rhinos were shot dead between 1973 and 1979.

    So widespread was the poaching menace in Kenya that John A Hoyt, in his book, Animals in Peril, suggested that around this period, 90 percent of Kenya’s elephant population was decimated, reducing the number from 167,000 to 16,000 in 1989.

    Hoyt’s research indicated that senior government officials, especially close members of the Kenyatta family, were involved in the poaching while government vehicles were used to ferry the game trophies from the wildlife sanctuaries to depots for international market.

    The author singled out Mama Ngina for the butcher of the wildlife, suggesting that although she did not personally pull the trigger or unleash a poisoned arrow on elephants, she was the matron of illegal ivory poachers.

    Mama Ngina, together with Kenyatta’s daughter from an earlier marriage, Margaret Wambui, who served as Nairobi’s first female African mayor, got away with the plunder of wildlife, in spite of the constant grumbling in Parliament.

    According to Hornsby, the Kenyatta family was implicated in both poaching and ivory exports. Margaret was chairman of the United African Company, one of the 10 companies exporting ivory despite a ban that was in force.

    At the time, a kg of ivory sold at $36 (Sh300), meaning one dead elephant was worth thousands of dollars. Zebra’s too were not spared as 5,000 were shot illegally within 320 miles of Nairobi in six months during 1975.

    Columbus monkeys too were killed for their beautiful skin. Indeed, two men were arrested in 1975 in possession of 26,000 skins of Columbus monkeys but were subsequently released after producing ‘valid’ permits.

    Although then Tourism minister Juxon Shako banned poaching of animals for trophies, dealers easily bribed the police. Most of the poaching, ironically, was executed by Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife personnel, who later sold the trophies to dealers. Hornsby quotes an expatriate official who allegedly identified two assistant ministers – including then Nyandarua MP JM Kariuki – buying ivory direct from Game department headquarters for export.

    This was going on in 1973, when sport hunting was outlawed by then Chief Game Warden John Mutinda, who withdrew all elephant-hunting licences.

    Immediately after the 1974 elections, the Kenyatta family was linked to illegal ivory trade, which was earning Mama Ngina and other close relatives $10 million (about Sh800 million) a year, as the country’s 120,000 elephants were killed at an annual rate of 20,000!

    There is speculation that Mzee Kenyatta’s involvement in illegal ivory trade contributed to the murder of JM in 1975 as he was also involved in this trade.

    The New Scientist magazine alleged that Kenyatta was personally involved in the trade as well as his wife, as was his nephew Ngengi Muigai, then Attorney General Charles Njonjo and former minister Paul Ngei. JM was vocal after joining a conservationist lobby led by hotelier, Jack Block, who was pestering Kenyatta to stop the illegal trade.

    Kenyatta-era minister and ally Bruce Mackenzie, who was later exposed as a British spy, would later tell the British High Commission that Mbiyu Koinange, one of the racketeers and a close Kenyatta ally, was involved in the murder of JM in 1975.

    In August 1975, the London-based Sunday Times exposed the alleged greed of the Kenyatta family in a series of articles that detailed its involvement in ivory exports, and the impossibility of collecting debts owed by the first family. It also detailed how Kenyatta personally approved the purchase of large farms by his family, exempting them from review by land control boards.

    The newspaper identified some farms the family had acquired in the Rift Valley, including six farms owned by Kenyatta himself, a 26,000-acre farm owned by Mama Ngina in Kiambu, and her farm in Rongai next to Kenyatta’s own.

    According to the Sunday Times Mama Ngina had been buying land at the Coast where she built two hotels, while Mzee Kenyatta built Leopard Beach Hotel for himself, which was registered in a Swiss company’s name.

    The newspaper revealed that, in 1972, Mombasa Municipal Council had waived all rates on properties owned by the president and his family, and had listed 11 more properties in the area. The paper also described how the family operated through overseas frontmen such as George Criticos and Asian lawyers and accountants.

    The family reportedly had interests in international casinos. In 1967, a company for Italian investors linked to the Mafia established the Nairobi International Casino, with Fred Kubai and later Peter Muigai Kenyatta and James Gichuru as shareholders.

    The Sunday Times revealed that while Kenyatta’s name did not appear on the registration papers, he owned the site and the building, and received a third of its profits.

    Kenyatta’s niece and current Health Minister Beth Mugo, meanwhile, allegedly became involved in gemstone business and obtained the right to sell gems to foreigners at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.

    Even after JM’s death, poaching went on unabated, motivating the Wilmington Star News March 2, 1977 issue to warn that the world’s last wildlife herds in Kenya were facing extinction.

    According to the newspaper, poachers were organised and used bows and poisoned arrows, poisoned darts, muzzle loaders and machine guns while enjoying protection from the highest authority.

    In the preceding six months prior to the publication of the story, 235 rhinos and 20 leopards had been killed while the overall elephant population had dwindled from 36,000 to 20,000.

    When Ngina and the First family could not cope with the national and international condemnation any more, they issued a five-page statement through the Kenya News Agency to dismiss the poaching allegations.

    The lengthy report dismissed as false allegations that Ngina was involved in poaching, terming the accusations as blackmail and scandal, further dismissing the figures of dwindled elephant stocks as “guesswork.”

    The devastation occasioned by the poachers in the 1970s is such that some parts of the country like Mutomo in Ukambani have dense forests without a single wild animal, while locals bemoan the loss of their heritage to greedy wheeler dealers.
    http://mavulture.com/mother-of-the-nation-who-led-plunder-of-beloved-motherland/

  • Hague-Bound Uhuru Kenyatta Struck off the Forbes list of Africa’s 40 Richest

    A quarter of the tycoons who were featured on last year’s inaugural FORBES list of the 40 Richest Africans failed to make it back this year.

    The reasons vary. For one, we’ve had access to new information, as in the case of Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya’s first president. Kenyatta is an heir to one of Kenya’s largest land holdings. Between him and his family, they own over 500,000 acres of Kenyan land easily worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

    But here’s the problem: The Kenyatta family is a very large one and it’s not certain at the moment that Uhuru, who aims to become president during the country’s elections next year, is the principal custodian of these assets. Hence, he’s been dropped off the list.

    http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2012/11/20/africas-40-richest-the-dropoffs/

  • a majority of Kikuyus adores the bravado that Uhuru has demonstrated since the day he commandeered the mboys to Naivasha to repel and expel adui. However, the same bravado did put him in a very hard place but the majority of his supporters including himself tend to think the impending Hague issue is a joke. Am not sure what will happen there but I do know for sure that having your name mentioned together with genocide warriors like Al Bashir, Kabila, Taylor and Milosevic is nothing worth celebrating whether you are acquitted or not. I personally hate his abrasiveness and feeling of entitlement. What happened to humility from leaders asking for votes in a humble manner? Uhuru is demanding votes and calling those who don’t join his bandwagon as traitors. But whether i or others like him or hate him, he will be getting at least 95% of Gema votes and he knows it….that’s why his head keeps growing big. Ruto on the other hand seems to be a little humble but am pretty sure going to the Hague can humble anybody….just ask Muthaura.

  • Reading the Tea Leaves on the Kenyan Elections: Patterns of Violence and Political Alliances

    By David W. Throup

    Nov 16, 2012

    Kenya’s national elections in March 2013 will signal the end of the coalition government that has been in power since April 2008 and will take place within a political structure fundamentally transformed by the passage in 2010 of a new constitution. But Kenyans’ hopes that the elections will herald a new political dispensation are likely to be frustrated. The political calculations of the two presidential frontrunners—Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta—and their three main challengers—Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto, and Kalonzo Musyoka—represent the triumph of the old politics, based on neo-patrimonialism, clientage, and ethnic particularism. The March 2013 presidential election will more likely signal a “last Hurrah” of the old order than usher in the new Kenya so hoped for by civil society and the advocates of constitutional reform. The political spectrum is even more fragmented than in 2007, and the old system of ethnic “big men” still dominates the political scene, especially outside Nairobi, although, even there ethnic political calculations are likely to predominate. Indeed, Nairobi, Nakuru District, and Coast Province are potential centers of ethnic violence, especially if the presidential contest goes to a second round. Four months before the general election, Kenya looks even more divided and susceptible to outbreaks of violence than it did in 2007.

    Patterns of Potential Violence

    Civil society in Kenya and outside observers fear that violence in 2013 may well be worse than in the aftermath of the December 2007 elections. They are concentrating on the areas that were most affected during the last election, particularly in the environs of Eldoret in the northern region of the Rift Valley Province. This may prove a mistake. The kaleidoscope of Kenyan politics has moved on, and new alliances have formed. Among the most important is that between former adversaries First Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and William Ruto, a Kalenjin, both of whom have been indicted by the International Criminal Court. Mr. Ruto reigns supreme in the northern Rift. As a result, the Kikuyu in the northern Rift districts of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia are confident that he will minimize violence in this area, just as in 2002, when Ruto was Kenyatta’s campaign manager in his first bid for the presidency. Moreover, many Kikuyu moved out of the region after 2008—the 2009 census showed them forming only 10 percent of the population—although some have returned from the displacement camps.

    The potential for violence next year seems highest in four areas. A first potential hotspot is in Nakuru County in central Rift Province. Kikuyu and Kalenjin leaders there have been unable to reach agreement on the division of the political spoils. The Kikuyu, who formed 57 percent of the area’s residents in 2009, are intent on the governorship, the Senate seat, and seven of the nine lower house constituencies, a demand that is totally unacceptable to local Kalenjin leaders. If the Kalenjin community’s demands are not met, the potential for violence is high in Nakuru town and in the two neighboring Mau escarpment constituencies (Molo, which is 70 percent Kikuyu and 30 percent Kalenjin, and Kuresoi, where the proportions are reversed) and in Rongai in the northern portion of Nakuru County, where the two communities are fairly evenly balanced.

    A second potential hotspot is in Kenya’s main urban areas. Of particular concern are the poorer quarters of Nairobi, which were badly hit last time and will potentially be another center of clashes. Many of Nairobi’s slum areas have already become ethnically segregated, and many residents, anticipating violence, are planning to return to their rural homes during the election.

    The remaining two centers of potential violence are new and are focused less on national-level politics and the contest between Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta than on local parliamentary and county politics.

    A third potential risk area is in Kenya’s northern reaches. The recent violence between the Pokomo and the Orma in the Tana River area in Coast Province demonstrates the destabilizing effect that drought—as well as an influx of small arms and al Shabaab influence from Somalia—has wrought on northern pastoralist areas along the Ethiopian and Somali borders. These incidents are not directly connected to national politics, but local candidates are using them to entrench their ethnic support. The Tana River violence, although technically occurring within Coast Province, signals potential problems throughout the semi-arid north. Al Shabaab attacks on police posts, chiefs, churches, and bars in this vast area are killing as many as 10 people per week, according to Kenyan press accounts. Conflict between the different communities over water and grazing grounds is a serious problem, especially since both sides are now armed with AK-47s rather than spears and pangas. Local politicians from the different ethnic communities will very likely politicize these divisions as the election approaches.

    The final potential center of violence is in Mombasa in southern Coast Province, particularly in Kwale and Kilifi counties. This region is a tinderbox with its own political logic, driven essentially by conflict between the indigenous Mijikenda ethnic communities and “up-country” immigrants (mainly Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luo). Up-country residents dominate not only many of the higher paid jobs but all forms of formal sector employment, and up-country “big men” own the hotels along the coast and the large-scale sisal plantations, which the local Mijikenda squatters claim were illegally taken from them. Landless, poorly educated, and frequently unemployed Mijikenda youths may well support the call of the Mombasa Republic Council, an armed militia group, for secession. Their grievances are compounded by the fact that many of them are Muslims. The Muslim community believes that its members are treated as second-class citizens in a Christian, up-country-dominated Kenya, and their grievances have been compounded by Kenya’s subsidiary role in the “war on terror.” These Coast problems have little to do with national-level politics, but the Mombasa Republic Council and al Shabaab may well seize on the heightened tensions of the election period to launch attacks and to excite violence against up-country residents.

    The National Contest: Shifting Alliances

    On the national level, two broad political groupings have emerged, centered around Prime Minister Raila Odinga and the First Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta.

    The last year has not been kind to Raila Odinga. Twelve months ago, he was the front-runner in Kenya’s presidential election stakes with the possibility of triumphing in the first round. Today, accused by his former policy adviser of corruption, nepotism, and even of orchestrating postelection ethnic violence in the central Rift Valley in early 2008, and having lost the support of Musalia Mudavadi, his erstwhile vice presidential running mate, Odinga’s campaign is in trouble. This is not to say that he will not become Kenya’s next president. In many ways, he remains the most likely individual to succeed Mwai Kibaki in State House. But his support had declined over the last 12 months.

    Odinga’s advantage lies in the fractured and uninspired opposition. Uhuru Kenyatta, his main opponent, the son of the country’s first president, and currently the first deputy prime minister, has failed to gain much traction outside his own Kikuyu community and the neighboring Embu and Meru. Recent opinion polls by the National Democratic Institute and Gallup suggest that the election is close and that if only registered voters are counted, the contest narrows even further with Odinga leading Kenyatta by 27.6 percent to 24.2 percent. Kenyatta has abandoned the old ruling party KANU for the newly launched TNA (The National Alliance), distancing himself from the era of former president Daniel arap Moi. He has hired a firm of British election consultants at the cost of $16 million, but he has not yet categorically announced that he will indeed be a candidate.

    Kenyatta’s advisers remain divided. The older cohort of wealthy Kikuyu business leaders, mainly in their 60s and 70s, suspect that a third Kikuyu president cannot be elected and that other ethnic communities must be given a chance to hold the presidency. Jomo Kenyatta (Uhuru’s father) and current President Mwai Kibaki—both Kikuyu—have held power for 25 of the 49 years since independence in 1963. Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, ruled for the other 24. Now is the time, many assert, for a Luo (Odinga), a Luhya (Second Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi), or a Kamba (Vice President Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka) to take the reins. Kenyatta, they caution, might be unelectable, incapable of drawing voters beyond his Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru bailiwick on the slopes of Mount Kenya. This so-called GEMA or Mount Kenya coalition comprises about 30 percent of Kenya’s population and, even given a high differential turnout for the region’s favorite son, is unlikely to comprise more than 35 percent of the total vote.

    The Kikuyu old guard has not thrown its support and financial backing behind Kenyatta, and its members are exploring other ways to undermine Odinga. Some are supporting Raphael Tuju, a Luo advertising executive and former cabinet minister, in the hope that he will attract votes away from Odinga, but so far Tuju has gained little traction. Most are waiting to see whether Kenyatta decides to run, but some are convinced that he is unelectable and that a vote for Uhuru is in reality a vote for Raila. If Kenyatta stands for election, he is almost certain to come second in the first round on March 4 and to go forward into a second-round runoff a month later. But Odinga is almost certain to win a second round, with 60 percent of the vote to Kenyatta’s 40 percent. The bulk of supporters of the minor candidates—who should win at least 30 percent between them in the first round—are likely to split two-to-one in favor of Odinga in the second round. Even if Kenyatta were ahead on March 4, which is improbable, he would almost certainly lose the second contest. A number of prominent Kikuyu are attempting to persuade Kenyatta to stand down and to throw his support behind Mudavadi, his vice presidential running-mate in the 2002 election.

    A year ago, Musalia Mudavadi was a firm ally of Raila Odinga, who helped him resurrect his political career after the debacle of 2002. Going forward, he may prove a formidable challenger. The Abaluhya, Mudavadi’s ethnic community, are the country’s second-largest ethnic group, with some 19 percent of the population. But as a merger of 14 sub-ethnicities that came together only in the 1930s, they have historically been fragmented. The Bukusu, from the northern Bungoma District in Western Province and Trans Nzoia in Rift Valley Province, are the largest sub-group, making up some 40 percent of the Abaluhya community. The Bukusu have always been inclined to go their own way and have little love for Mudavadi, a Maragoli from Vihiga in the south. Most Bukusu favor Eugene Wamalwa. If Kenyatta remains in the contest, then Mudavadi and Wamalwa will probably split the Abaluhya vote. But if Kenyatta were to withdraw, the whole community would likely rally round Mudavadi in order to propel him into the presidency. Most Mount Kenya (GEMA) voters would probably accept Mudavadi as the next best thing to Kenyatta. A former foreign minister and minister of finance in the 1990s, he is considered competent if not very charismatic, and he has the additional advantage of being acceptable to former president arap Moi and his sons, who are now in control of KANU. Thus, competing on his own against Kenyatta, Mudavadi has little support—gaining only 7.4 percent in the Gallup opinion poll. But as Kenyatta’s preferred candidate, he would run close to Odinga and could even win, attracting voters who would never cast their ballots in favor of Kenyatta.

    The Kikuyu old guard insists that if Kenyatta is serious about protecting Kikuyu economic interests and preventing Odinga with his redistributionist policies capturing State House, then he had better withdraw and throw his support behind Mudavadi. A number of younger Kikuyu businessmen, mainly in their 30s and 40s—that is, members of Kenyatta’s own age cohort—take a different view. They insist that he must contest the election and must adopt any means to win—including ethnic oathing (pledging allegiance to the Kikuyu candidate) and ballot stuffing. In fact, oathing of rural Kikuyus started eight months ago. This hardline faction is led by Kenyatta’s younger brother, Muhoho, the managing director of Brookside Dairies and a host of other enterprises.

    Muhoho Kenyatta and the inner circle around his brother seem to believe that oathing and appealing to Kikuyu chauvinism—tactics that have been highly effective in the past—will still work today. But Kenya has changed. The middle class is far more numerous and independently wealthy, and civil society, despite its decline in recent years, remains far more influential and organized than in the 1960s and 1970s. The tactics of the 1960s will no longer work. It is interesting to note that the Kenyatta campaign has clearly lost the support of Maina Njenga and the original leadership of the Mungiki movement. Mungiki is many different things. In part it is a Kikuyu-based organized crime movement, but it remains true to its founding as a revivalist Kikuyu religious group, eschewing the corruption and materialism of the modern world, with appeals to githaka na wiathi (land and morality), defending the traditional moral economy of precapitalist society, which an earlier generation of Kikuyu have-nots, the Mau Mau, had sought to protect in the 1950s. The Kenyatta family, which acquired large swathes of land during Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency, is deemed to have deserted these principles and to be unworthy of support.

    As a result, Njenga and his new political movement, MKenya-Supreme, has formed an alliance with Odinga’s ODM. Consequently, the ODM branch in Murang’a, in the Kikuyu heartland, endorsed the MKenya-Supreme candidate in by-elections in the Murang’a constituency of Kangema—the former seat of Kikuyu hardliner John Michuki; and conversely, MKenya-Supreme supported ODM in former security minister George Saitoti’s ex-seat in Kajiado North, immediately to the south of Nairobi. Mungiki chairman Njenga has also brought Odinga into contact with the widows of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi and murdered radical politician J.M. Kariuki, both considered Kikuyu luminaries. The prime minister opened a new hospital in Kariuki’s memory and promised that the government would establish a museum to commemorate the fight of the two men and other Kikuyu radicals for independence. Njenga, along with one of Kariuki’s daughters who works for the ODM Secretariat, travelled with Odinga through Nyandarua District. The district—Njenga’s home region—in colonial times was part of the White Highlands, the European farming zone, and landless Kikuyu were only settled there in the 1960s. The infrastructure remains underdeveloped, the transport of goods to market remains difficult, and local residents feel neglected, despite the fact that the current political boss of the district is Cabinet Minister Amos Kimunya, the partner of President Kibaki’s daughter.

    Although Prime Minister Odinga was greeted by vast crowds in Njenga’s home base in Nyandarua, it remains uncertain how much support Mungiki can actually deliver from the Kikuyu rural poor to the Luo leader. The September 2012 by-elections in Kangema, Kajiado North, and Ndhiwa in Nyanza Province, and for a considerable number of local government positions throughout the country, in fact, suggested that Mungiki was unable to deliver the Kikuyu poor to an anti-Kenyatta ticket. Kenyatta’s new party—The National Alliance—swept to victory in both Kangema and Kajiado North, and it even made surprising inroads in the local government elections in the Luo heartland in Nyanza, coming second in every contested ward (although the ODM candidate captured 88 percent of the parliamentary vote in Ndhiwa in the Luo heartlands). On the basis of these results, one might conclude that Kenyatta’s colorful, high-tech campaign, backed by lots of money, is having more success at diverting Luo youths from Odinga, than the prime minister is having in detaching Kikuyu youths from Kenyatta. Odinga’s courtship of Njenga, the Mungiki “chairman,” may backfire, since Mungiki’s criminal activities have clearly alienated more poor Kikuyu than the group has attracted in both Kangema and Kajiado North.

    As noted, Odinga has been seriously wounded by the defection of Mudavadi and the weakening of his position in Western Province and in the capital, where there are large numbers of Abaluhya voters. In his Luo-Nyanza bastion, he will almost certainly win 90 to 95 percent of the vote, and he seems set to win at least 30 to 40 percent of the vote everywhere else apart from the Mount Kenya region. None of the other candidates has this broad-based support. Most of them, including Kalenjin leader William Ruto and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka of the Kamba, are essentially mono-ethnic candidates, whose appeal does not carry beyond the confines of their own ethnic constituencies. Ruto, according to Gallup, currently commands the support of 14.0 percent of registered voters, while Musyoka has 10.4 percent. Former cabinet minister Martha Karua and Assistant Minister Peter Kenneth, two Kikuyu challengers, are both widely respected. Karua’s performance in debates and at question time in the National Assembly, relayed on Bunge TV and other television channels, has gained her wide respect far beyond the confines of Kikuyuland, despite her reputation as a Kibaki hardliner during the 2008 postelection violence. Many acknowledge that she is the only candidate who would shake things up—the Margaret Thatcher of Kenya—but few are willing to vote for “a divorced woman who wears trousers,” and the Gallup poll gives her the support of only 4.9 percent of registered voters, while Peter Kenneth is favored by 1.9 percent.

    Broadly, this cast of political characters signals that the March 2013 presidential election will be very much a campaign governed by the old political rules. This is also likely to be true of the elections for Parliament, the Senate, and the new county governors. There will be considerable change in the composition of Parliament, as roughly two-thirds of the members have lost their seats at every Kenyan election since 1969, but one must doubt if this will mean the infusion of new ideas and a more policy-driven agenda. Patronage-driven, ethnic-based politics continues to dominate virtually all facets of political life. The new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has lost much of its credibility in the last year and is undermined by factional divisions and allegations of corruption over the allocation of contracts. It will face the challenge in March 2013 of organizing six simultaneous but different elections—for president, the lower House, the Senate, for women’s representatives (and for youth and disabled voters), for county governors, and the local county assemblies. This is a quite unprecedented task for which the previous parliamentary and local government by-elections have provided little preparation. The new executive and legislature, moreover, will have to function according to the new constitution and a new set of political and legislative rules for which they both seem ill-prepared. There will be squabbles over the powers of the president and the legislature, between the center and the new counties, and especially over the formulation and control of the budget. Fiscal controls and macroeconomic management may well disintegrate. The elections of March-April 2013, whether they are marred by violence or not, seem set to be only the beginning of an extremely difficult period for Kenyans.

    Civil society is attempting to tackle these issues, although it commands less credibility than previously, as its pro-ODM stance in the 2007–2008 election alienated pro-PNU supporters who make up half the nation. The influence of the international community has also diminished as aid has declined and Chinese influence has increased. Time, nevertheless, is working against the old political order, and there is hope that the elections in 2018 or 2023 will usher in an era of reform, as a younger, better-educated cohort replaces the old guard. Quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy may mitigate some of the worst election excesses, but the political establishment on both sides of the Kenyatta-Odinga divide will not take well to preaching. The United States must adopt a more careful and nuanced style. Kenyans will probably muddle through the 2013 presidential election. The vast majority do not want to see a repetition of the ethnic violence of 2008, but those with nothing to lose—unemployed youths in Nairobi, al Shabaab in the semiarid North, and the Mombasa Republican Council and advocates of secession in Mombasa and its hinterland—may be less constrained. The international community, moreover, needs to think more seriously about what will happen after March-April 2013, when Kenyans begin to realize the enormous challenges of implementing their new, hard-won, constitution.

    David W. Throup is a senior associate with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
    http://csis.org/publication/reading-tea-leaves-kenyan-elections-patterns-violence-and-political-alliances

  • Kenyans must think hard before casting ballots in March
    By MAKAU MUTUA
    Posted Saturday, December 29 2012

    Jubilee presidential nominee Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta doesn’t live in a cave. Jomo’s son is one of the most urbane Kenyans. He was educated at an elite college in the United States.

    He’s reputed to have vast business interests in many places.

    But Mama Ngina’s son has fallen out with the West. No credible country in the West — and elsewhere — wants him elected to State House. That’s because he’s been indicted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

    But Mr Kenyatta believes he can only beat the ICC rap if he’s elected president. Which begs the question — what will it cost Kenyans if Mr Kenyatta becomes president?

    Let’s get some facts straight. Kenya is a strategic state in Africa. It’s the economic and security anchor of East Africa.

    But it’s also a fragile state in transition. That’s why powerful states are keenly interested in Kenya. They will be damned if they let it fall into the wrong hands.

    Kenya’s elite — and its middle class — are culturally Eurocentric. Its economy, diplomacy and philosophical outlook have umbilical tethers to the West.

    Let’s not cheat ourselves — Kenya would likely fail as a modern state without the West. That’s because it’s still a neo-colony.

    It could reinvent itself by “looking East” but that would take decades, and may be for naught. No country in Africa has successfully made that transition.

    This reality may be odious to many Kenyans but, as they say, “it’s what it is”. Kenya’s sovereignty is necessarily limited. This is what voters must seriously ponder as they go into the March 2013 elections.

    Mr Kenyatta and his partner, Eldoret North MP William Ruto, are playing the “nationalist card” to get elected.

    This is their pitch — we shouldn’t let “wazungu” [the West] tell us who to elect. To do so, they argue, is to surrender our independence.

    Fair enough. Except that both gentlemen are facing the most heinous crimes known to man. It’s like a suspected wife-batterer telling his victim not to call the police because they’ll violate the home as the “man’s castle”. Not very persuasive.

    Sir Winston Churchill once said that the “best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter”. Voters are gullible, and can be misled.

    That’s why it behoves the entire nation to engage in a sober conversation that’s more than five minutes long. This is especially true when the nation is staring down the barrel of a gun.

    We were there after the 2007 elections. We danced on the precipice, and almost went over the goddamned cliff. We should heed a wise saying — once bitten twice shy.

    Don’t listen to ulterior emotive arguments about sovereignty. Coming from Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto, that’s nothing but a ploy for their personal survival. It’s nothing to do with Kenya.

    This is what my crystal ball tells me should Kenyans elect the Kenyatta-Ruto duo: Kenya’s international image will change overnight — like flipping a switch.

    The country will be twinned with Sudan and every reference will be to Mr Kenyatta’s and Mr Ruto’s indictment by the ICC. That will be the world’s reference on Kenya.

    This is gargantuan — we will have lost the public relations war even before we open our mouth. We will be shunned and ridiculed internationally. People will say we are ruled by warlords.

    Senior officials

    Mr Kenyatta, Mr Ruto and senior officials won’t be allowed to travel abroad. Kenya will die diplomatically. We will become a pariah nation — isolated. We’ll become the butt of jokes in the world.

    But even worse, our economy — which is externally-oriented — will come under severe sanctions. Mr Kenyatta even alluded to this when he blamed the “devil” and “dark forces” who asked him to step down for Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi.

    He was right. Methinks Kenya’s coffee, tea, minerals, flowers, and other valuable exports will be banned.

    Investors and foreign banks will flee, and local ones won’t be allowed to transact with their counterparts abroad. Kenyans in the diaspora may be prevented from making remittances. International hotel chains may shutter. Foreign airlines will desert Kenya and tourists may dry up. Kenyans related to government officials won’t be allowed to either travel, or study abroad.

    It could get worse. Foreign aid, the United Nations, and World Bank largesse could be pulled. Diplomatic missions are likely to get out of Nairobi.

    The clear beneficiaries here will be Uganda and Tanzania. Their economies will grow, while Kenya’s stagnates, and possibly collapses. Super-inflation will grip Kenya — like Zimbabwe — and render the shilling worthless. Life savings will evaporate.

    Very soon, essential commodities will become scarce — and expensive. There will be mass layoffs. Unemployment will skyrocket. Crime will increase, as it does when economies tank. Corruption, which is terrible now, will become a way of life. There will be no incentive for growing cash crops. Farming will die.

    Kenyans are likely to be exposed to poverty levels never before seen. Social unrest usually follows such economic contractions. The State responds by becoming more repressive. The leaders develop a “laager mentality” and live in a bubble of their own, uninformed by reality.

    Innocent citizens become the enemies of the republic. This is how a republic of fear is constructed.

    Hear me out — this is how every failed state has evolved. Look no further than some of our neighbours. That’s why Kenyans must think hard before they cast their ballots in March.

  • Try as some Kikuyus may, the constant lies and attempts to re-write history will not whitewash the truth. When its all said and done, it is Uhuru who is facing criminal charges at ICC not RAO. I know this pains such revisionists but it is the plain truth. It was Uhuru and Ruto who sent murderous goons to kill maim and rape their fellow Kenyans. The whole world is seeing the evidence now. Meanwhile any evidence you have against RAO exists only in your fantasies. People look increasingly clownish when they post propaganda with no proof hoping that if they repeat a lie many times, people will soon believe it and ICC will coming calling for RAO. Sorry it aint happening.

    There was a time when the government could marshall its forces to eliminate opponents and bombard the country with propaganda. So when Oginga Odinga challenged Kenyatta to stop grabbing land, he was expelled from KANU which he founded, removed as VP and convinced all Kenyans that Odinga was public enemny number one. Young kenyans growing up in the 80s and early 90s were convinced that Oginga Odinga was a true enemy of the state who wanted to destabilize the country. Kenyans have woken up to such propaganda. It is only in central province where a large segment of people are still brainwashed into thinking that RAO is the enemy of all kikuyus. Some enlightened people know better. See Maina Kiai.

    When Pio Gama Pinto asked Kenyatta to stop grabbing land, he was killed by Kenyatta’s goons. He was shot right in front of his six year old daughter.

    Tom Mboya, JM Kariuki died because they wanted to stop wanton corruption. Even Ronald Ngala met a mysterious death. The official line from Kenyatta’s government was that his driver was stung by bees and lost control of the car.

    Now after Kenyatta orphaned many children by killing their fathers, Uhuru is has taken over from where his father left and only taken to much worse levels.

    1300 Kenyans died because of Uhuru and Ruto’s goons. Kenyans should be worried sick at the prospect of these two becoming President and VP.

    Ruto in particular should scare you sick. The man will be VP only a step away from the presidency. Which means that if Uhuru kenyatta is convicted but Ruto gets away on a technicality, Ruto will be president. After 24 years of Moi, Kenyans should ask themselves if they want Ruto as President.

  • Bensouda says she has new evidence
    Wednesday, January 16, 2013 – 00:00 — BY OLIVER MATHENGE

    ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda says that she has gathered additional evidence sufficient to prove that Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former Cabinet Secretary Francis Muthaura supplied guns and police uniforms to attackers in Naivasha.

    Bensouda has thus given notice to the court that she now wants to have the allegation re-inserted in the charge sheet that she filed last week.

    The Trial Chamber V judges had specifically ordered her to remove the “factual underlying allegation that 6 victims were killed by gunshots” contained in the first murder count for Naivasha.

    The judges said that the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected that particular allegation because of insufficient evidence that Uhuru and Muthaura supplied guns and police uniforms.

    “The Chamber is thus of the view that the prosecution should not include the allegation that gunshots were the cause of some of the alleged killings in Naivasha,” the judges said.

    Bensouda now says that she has obtained additional evidence to “substantiate this factual allegation” since the confirmation hearing in September 2011

    “Accordingly, the Prosecution intends to apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber to include this allegation within the Murder Count 1. If the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms this, the Prosecution will seek leave of the Trial Chamber to re-insert the charge. We are alerting the Chamber of this possibility so that the Defence is properly put on notice of it,” Bensouda advised the judges yesterday.

    She added that she may also seek to lead the evidence during trial because it demonstrates the intent and plan of the perpetrators.

    Bensouda’s predecessor Luis Moreno-Ocampo had alleged that Muthaura and Uhuru secured police uniforms and guns which they distributed to attackers in Naivasha.

    However the Pre-Trial judges said that this allegation was challenged by the prosecution’s own witness.

    The judges further said that that the police shot people dead in Naivasha and not Mungiki and pro-PNU youths.

    Bensouda has now told the trial judges that she has 11 audio files with conversations in Kikuyu whose translation and transcription are in progress and will be disclosed when complete.

    She says that the prosecution has provided a brief explanation of their content to the defence who she says have agreed to accommodate this request.

    The prosecutor also asked the Trial Chamber to reject an application by Eldoret North MP William Ruto and Joshua Sang to appeal against the court decision that to allow the prosecution to meet its witnesses up to 24 hours before trial.

    Bensouda told the judges yesterday that the issues do not qualify for appeal since they are “mere disagreements” and therefore should not be allowed.

    “Contrary to the Defence submissions, the Defence was heard on this matter. On 4 September 2012 it provided submissions responding to the Prosecution’s request of pre-testimony witness meetings,” Bensouda told the judges.

    She added that Ruto and Sang are not obliged to take and disclose witness statements because they are planning to appeal.

    Uhuru, Muthaura, Ruto and Sang are to face trial at the ICC from April 10 and 11 for crimes against humanity during the post-election violence. Ruto and Sang are accused of organising attacks against PNU supporters in the Rift Valley while Uhuru and Muthaura are accused of organising revenge attacks targeting ODM supporters.

  • UhuRuto don't pay taxes

    At the height of the controversy over MPs non-payment of taxes, some leaders including Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, presidential candidate Peter Kenneth among others agreed to pay their taxes thereby winning wide public acclaim.

    Sheikh Ahmed Ramadhan of the Nubian Rights Forum told the standard that KRA S Odhiambo warned that should IEBC fail to take action on the politicians in line with the petition, they would go to court to have it enforced to boost integrity standards demanded by the Constitution.

    The petition wants 209 MPs out of the total 222, including cabinet Ministers, to be barred from the March general elections if they don’t clear their tax arrears soonest.

    Among the big names who have allegedly not cleared up their taxes include Ministers:

    Sally Kosgey,
    Chris Obure,
    Anyang’ Nyong’o,
    Ababu Namwamba,
    Wycliffe Oparanya,
    William Ruto,
    Paul Otuoma,
    Uhuru Kenyatta,
    Yusuf Haji,
    Mohammed Kuti,
    Samuel Poghisio,
    Katoo olee Mitito,
    Charity Ngilu,
    Chirau Ali Mwakwere,
    Soita Shitanda,
    William Ole Ntimama,
    Otieno Kajwang,
    Mutula Kilonzo,
    Dalmas Otieno,
    Esther Murugi,
    Sam Ongeri,
    Robinson Githae,
    Mohammed Elmi,
    James Orengo,
    Henry Kosgey,
    Naomi Shabaan,
    Moses Wetangula and
    Fred Gumo among others.

    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000075539&story_title=Kenya-Uhuru,-ex-MPs-may-not-contest-over-taxes

  • Click to access 197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf

    Kenya’s 2013 Elections
    Africa Report N°197
    17 Jan 2013

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Kenya’s elections this year should turn the page on the bloodshed of five years ago, but the risk of political violence is still unacceptably high. A new constitution, fresh election commission and reformed judiciary should help. But the vote, now set for 4 March 2013, will still be a high-stakes competition for power, both nationally and in 47 new counties. Forthcoming trials before the International Criminal Court (ICC) of four Kenyans for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence look set to shape the campaign. The potential for local violence is especially high. Politicians must stop ignoring rules, exploiting grievances and stoking divisions through ethnic campaigning. The country’s institutions face fierce pressure but must take bold action to curb them. Business and religious leaders and civil society should demand a free and fair vote. So too should regional and wider international partners, who must also make clear that those who jeopardise the stability of the country and region by using or inciting violence will be held to account.

    Many reforms were initiated to address the flawed 2007 polls and subsequent violence. A new constitution, passed in a peaceful referendum in August 2010, aims to fortify democracy and temper zero-sum competition for the presidency by checking executive power. New voting rules require the president to win more than half the votes and enjoy wider geographic support. Power is being devolved to 47 counties, each of which will elect a governor, senator and local assembly. Despite recent mishaps, the new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) still enjoys public trust. Judicial reform, including the appointment of a respected new chief justice, also augurs well for a more robust response to electoral fraud and disputes.

    The new institutions, however, have their work cut out. The ICC proceedings are influencing political alliances and the campaign. The four individuals facing trial deny the charges and maintain their innocence. While the cases aim to erode impunity long enjoyed by political elites and may deter bloodshed, they raise the stakes enormously. The two most powerful of the accused, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, look set to contest the elections on a single ticket (Kenyatta for president, Ruto for deputy president). Both have politicised the ICC cases, deepening ethnic polarisation, and have accused Prime Minister Raila Odinga, their strongest opponent, of conspiring with foreigners against them.

    The Kenyatta-Ruto alliance would be a strong ticket. Aware that Kenyans want an end to impunity, both have pledged to comply with the ICC, even if they win. Yet, regardless of the outcome of their cases, a president facing lengthy trial before the ICC could potentially have extremely damaging implications for reform and foreign relations, which Kenyatta’s backers should ponder carefully. For the moment, their eligibility to run for office remains in doubt; a case challenging their compliance with new constitutional requirements for public officials’ integrity is with a high court and may find its way by appeal to the Supreme Court. Were the courts to find Kenyatta and Ruto ineligible after the closing date for submitting nomination papers on 30 January, their supporters would be unable to choose alternative candidates, which might lead to strong protests and even spark conflict. Dealing as it does with a highly charged political issue, whichever way it goes, the final decision is likely to be contentious. If possible, the date of any decision should be announced in advance so the security agencies and others can prepare accordingly.

    Other signs are also troubling. Political parties and politicians flout new rules unchecked. The IEBC’s bungled procurement of voter registration kits reduced the confidence it previously enjoyed and suggests it may struggle to resist enormous pressure as the vote approaches. The late start to registration has cut all fat from the electoral timeline, and any flaws will heighten tension. The IEBC must work transparently with parties and other stakeholders to clarify and regularly review the timeline, so as to avoid any further – and highly-charged – delays.

    Voter education will be crucial. It is the first general election under the 2010 constitution, with new rules that are considerably more complex than previous polls (each voter will cast six ballots). Limiting confusion and misunderstandings could help reduce disputes and election-related conflict. It is also vital that the IEBC provide sufficient access and information to citizen observers and other civil society groups. They must be able to plan their deployment properly and enjoy full access to every part of the election process, especially the tallying of results. Such groups can also be useful allies in bolstering commissioners’ ability to resist political interference.

    Insecurity too poses a huge challenge. Despite the reforms, many structural conflict drivers – continuing reliance on ethnicity, competition for land and resources, resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs), and poverty and youth unemployment – underlying the 2007-2008 violence remain unresolved and may be cynically used by politicians to whip up support. Many of those who fled the turmoil remain displaced. Land disputes feed local tension. Youth unemployment is still very high and, together with poverty and inequality, means a steady flow of recruits for criminal groups and militias that can be mobilised to intimidate opponents and their supporters or protest results, as they have in the past. Attacks blamed on the extremist Al-Shabaab movement and clashes over land can cloak political violence. Meanwhile, police reform has lagged and the security forces look ill-prepared to secure the polls. An experienced inspector general of police, David Kimaiyo, has been appointed, but the delay in his selection means little time remains for significant security reform. Multi-agency security planning, which has also lagged, must be completed and implemented.

    Ethnic campaigning and horse-trading as alliances formed – by Kenyatta and Ruto but also other leading politicians – have deepened divides. How the supporters of either of the two main tickets, those of Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta and former cabinet minister Ruto running and of Prime Minister Odinga and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka respectively, would respond to losing a close vote it perceives as flawed, or even to early signs it is falling behind, is unclear. International partners, including regional neighbours whose economies rely on a peaceful transition, should monitor any signs of interference or violence and weigh in quickly to deter it. Devolution, for all its benefits, introduces new conflict dynamics, as competition between groups for power and resources controlled at county level becomes fiercer.

    All these challenges are surmountable, especially given the remarkable determination of most to avoid a repeat of 2007-2008. But they require concerted action by Kenya’s institutions and their allies, and – most important – clear signals to leaders who are seen to be prioritising the pursuit of power. The people deserve better. To put the horror of five years ago behind them, they deserve the chance to vote without fear and elect leaders committed to reform and ready to serve society as a whole rather than the narrow interests of its elites.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    To President Kibaki and the government of Kenya:

    1. Press all candidates to commit publicly to respect election rules, campaign peacefully and contest the results through legal, non-violent means.

    2. Continue to urge the national and all provincial security committees to complete security planning, identify vulnerable counties and deploy accordingly.

    3. Support the IEBC proposed Joint Risk Assessment and Response Centre for sharing information and coordinating operations among national and local security organisations and committees, as well as civil society groups.

    To Kenya’s political parties and coalitions:

    4. Commit publicly, and together, to respect rules, campaign peacefully, avoid hate speech and divisive mobilisation and pursue any petitions or other election grievances only through legal channels.

    5. Recruit party agents early and work with international partners to ensure they understand their role and follow the rules in the polling centres.

    To Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto:

    6. Provide the public with a clear, detailed account of how you would propose to govern while also conducting your defences before the ICC, taking into account the time required and the demands of appearing in person in court on a different continent.

    To the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and acting registrar of political parties:

    7. Improve outreach and communication with stakeholders, including political parties, candidates, the media and, in particular, civil society, with which a strong alliance is especially important to resist political pressure; and provide citizen observer groups the information they need in a timely manner.

    8. Press for all candidates at national and county level and political parties to adhere stringently to the Code of Conduct enacted as part of the 2011 Elections Act.

    9. Keep tight focus on operational planning, especially on vote counting and tallying of results, including for the likely presidential run-off; and make results for both rounds publicly available and disaggregated by polling stream to allow for their verification by citizen observers and party agents.

    10. Take action, in coordination with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, against political parties and candidates that violate rules, campaign divisively or use hate speech.

    To Kenya’s business and religious leaders and other influential citizens, including the media:

    11. Denounce publicly hate speech and ethnic chauvinism and use actively their resources for civic and voter education.

    12. Consider carefully the implications for Kenya of a president facing trial before the ICC.

    To Kenyan civil society groups:

    13. Form ad hoc umbrella committees to capitalise on each organisation’s expertise and avoid duplication, in order to find a collective voice and increase their influence; continue preparations to monitor the campaign and vote, use parallel vote tabulation responsibly and work with and support the IEBC if it is performing well.

    To regional leaders, especially the governments of the East African Community:

    14. Send unambiguous public and private messages against political interference with the elections and especially against the use of or incitement to violence.

    15. Support the efforts of the joint East African Community election observation team, as well as of other observation missions.

    To Kenya’s other regional and wider international partners, especially the African Union, U.S., European Union and its member states, UN and International Financial Institutions:

    16. Send unambiguous public and private messages that politicians must not meddle with the IEBC or the judiciary and that political violence will be sanctioned, including, if appropriate, by adopting travel bans or asset freezes.

    17. Ensure all regional and wider international observation missions deploy early, to as many counties as possible, and cooperate to align their statements and avoid duplication.

    Nairobi/Brussels, 17 January 2013

  • Kennedy odiwuor

    Uhuru’s state of wealth is quite horrific,pathetic and heartbreaking.Why then,does he wants to be president again?

  • Uhuru Kenyatta land dilemma
  • Koigi Wamwere: Uhuru not qualified for top seat

    Mr Uhuru Kenyatta has also declared his intention to vie for presidency in 2013. As expected, his loyalists are beating drums for him.

    But what qualifies him to lead Kenya?

    One needs to do something patriotic to deserve leadership. What has Uhuru done for Kenya to deserve leading it?

    When Moi tyrannised Kenya, Uhuru, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto and others like them did nothing. Does this qualify Uhuru or Kalonzo for that matter, to lead Kenya?

    Without a history of patriotic service, what special quality does Uhuru have? As far as I know, Uhuru has no intellectual superiority over Kenyans.

    So, does Uhuru have a special vision that can liberate us from poverty? With his family’s empire built upon land it acquired when Kenyatta, his father, was president, Uhuru has never said he will return some of that land to the landless to blunt the pangs of their hunger.

    Instead of living up to his name Uhuru, whenever he talks, I hear him pontificating against freedom. On matters of humanity, Uhuru’s heart seems as hard as a stone. Still, his supporters have reasons for wanting him to lead Kenya.

    To begin with, he is a special Kikuyu whom all Kikuyus will support once he offers himself for election. And elections being a game of numbers, Uhuru thinks, support by a block vote of the populous Kikuyu qualifies him not just to vie, but to be the president of Kenya.

    The other day on TV, I saw a lady called Wambui anoint Uhuru to succeed President Mwai Kibaki. She alluded to him as her husband – muthuri wakwa.

    And of course, Kibaki’s support is assumed to be that of all Kikuyus, despite his failure to protect many of its members from post-election violence, and whose thousands of youth continue to suffer extrajudicial executions under his watch.

    WITH MORE MONEY THAN MOST, Uhuru is a front runner for presidency in our politics. Sired by Mzee Kenyatta, many also believe Uhuru was born a leader. But fire does not always beget fire. It also begets ashes. Though Solomon was a great leader, his son Rehoboam became an unspeakable tyrant.

    Other Kenyan women are also giving birth to sons. I don’t see Kibaki-Uhuru project selling more successfully than the Moi-Uhuru project.

    Uhuru also has great hope for presidency because of his unfolding alliance with Mr Ruto, who may deliver a block Rift Valley vote to him.

    For Uhuru and his community in Rift Valley however, doing an alliance with a majimboist like Ruto is like returning their finger where it has been bitten more than once.

    Against their best interests, the aristocracy of Central Province might also anoint Uhuru as their ethnic chief. For this very reason, the rest of the country will most likely reject him as president of Kenya.

    Only a Kikuyu who will put Kenya before Central Province, nation before tribe, is likely to lead Kenya again.

    In seeking the presidency, Uhuru might sell himself as a protector of properties of ethnic elites who own, but not as distributor of national wealth to the poor who own nothing.

    Uhuru believes he qualifies for presidency because he is young like Obama, and will mesmerise the youth who will embrace anything that is young and glitters.

    Uhuru’s father led Kenya because he fought and suffered for her. Uhuru must do likewise.

    Mr Wamwere is chair of Chama cha Mwananchi.
    http://kenyapolitical.blogspot.se/2009/03/koigi-wamwere-uhuru-not-qualified-for.html

  • According to history, there has always seemed to be this erroneous perception that the entire Kikuyu community were against the Luo ascendancy to the Presidency. This is because a lie was orchestrated to make it look like when the British Colonialists imprisoned the Kikuyus in detention camps the Luos took over their wives. That was the hidden agenda behind the Kikuyu elites’ campaign. They even went further and used circumcision as a symbol. That was used to discourage the Kikuyus from supporting a Luo candidacy to the presidency.

    Ironically, the campaign was orchestrated by the colonial apologists (home guards) who remained behind after the Mau Mau and their sympathizers were detained. The deception continues even today albeit for other reasons than the original one. However, the big fall-out came about when the two giants- Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga differed after Kenyatta’s ascendancy to the Presidency.

    While it is true that land and tribalism became the most sensitive issue, it seems like without Odinga, Kenyatta would not have become Kenya’s first President. Could it be that the Kikuyu elite of the time knew something about Kenyatta and had rejected him? However, by putting him in prison the colonialists gave him the status of a revolutionary leader. But, was he?

    As the colonialists elevated Kenyatta to international recognition it is imperative to note that Kenyatta had spent almost fifteen years in Britain and had even married Edna Clarke, one of their own, thus making him their son-in-law.

    Meanwhile, Odinga on the other hand is the one who in turn elevated Kenyatta to the status of undisputed nationalist leader more so by coining the slogan ‘No Kenyatta, No Freedom’. What has ostensibly been ignored is that as Kenyatta was doubted, Odinga should also have been doubted. Did Odinga see a chance for ascending to the Presidency given Kenyatta’s advanced age? History seems to have repeated itself when during the 2002 General Elections, his son Raila played the same game with Kibaki. The begging question is what did the elder Odinga see in Kenyatta?

    Odinga brought the personality issue into Kenya’s leadership by insisting that the only person then qualified to lead Kenya was Kenyatta. A lot of people including a big number of Kikuyus trusted Jaramogi and because of his spirited campaign on behalf of him, many regarded Kenyatta as a demi god and when he took over power it turned out to be true.

    Suffice to say that maybe if Odinga or any other leader among the nationalists had taken power the Kenyan Presidency might have had less sensitivity. However, when Kenyatta took over power and surrounded himself with Kikuyu elites (home guards), elites from other ethnic communities saw this as tribalism which also turned out to be true.

  • POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS IF UHURU KENYATTA OR WILLIAM RUTO IS ELECTED PRESIDENT
    Part 2: The Domestic Level
    1. The Oath of Office

    Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the President-elect assumes office by taking and subscribing the oath or affirmation of allegiance, and the oath or affirmation for the execution of the functions of office, as prescribed in the Constitution. Further, article 74, which deals with ethics and integrity, provides that a state officer, who include the president and deputy president, before assuming a State office, shall take and subscribe the oath or affirmation of office. Kenya’s elections take place on 4th March 2013 and if there is no person qualified to be declared a winner a runoff will be held between the first two candidates. The runoff is currently scheduled to take place on or about 10th April, 2013, the same time that trials for Kenyatta and Ruto commence at The Hague. If there is no winner in the first round and a runoff is necessary, and if the two or one of them is elected as president or deputy president, during such a runoff, this will lead to difficult choices for the country.

    On the one hand a person cannot assume office as president or deputy president before subscribing to an oath of office and on the other hand they will not be in Kenya at that time to take such an oath. The choices will be:

    a) To absent themselves from trial so as to take an oath of office;
    b) To attend their trial and keep the country waiting for when they will next be available to take their oaths of office, and therefore assume office.

    It follows that the act of setting up a government following the elections will also be delayed as the two cannot legally appoint the government until they are president. After a highly difficult set of elections, Kenya may remain leaderless if its president has to abandon the election process midway and go to The Hague for trial. Alternatively, the president defying the ICC will remain in the country to take the oath of office. It is unlikely that he will thereafter submit to trial before the International Criminal Court.

    2. On Executive Authority

    The Constitution provides that the President that the president and the deputy president constitute the executive authority of the government. In practice the executive authority is exercised through the cabinet which is made of the President, Deputy President and cabinet secretaries. By tradition the cabinet meets once every week and provides overall leadership to the entire government. If either Kenyatta or Ruto is elected president or deputy president, he will be forced to be permanently absent from meetings of the cabinet while attending trial at The Hague. This is undesirable and would lead to a situation where the heart of the government will operate without leadership and direction.

    3. On the armed forces

    The President is the Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces. A commander-in-chief is the person exercising supreme command authority of a nation’s military forces. Currently, Kenya’s military is involved in the war against al Shabaab in Somalia. Also, as a result of the vastly deteriorated security situation within Kenya, the military is, for the first time in the history of the country, involved in law enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities within Kenya. As part of this there is an on-going security operation led by the military following the attack in Baragoi, Turkana, which led to the massacre of more than 40 police
    officers. Also, the military is involved in the pacification of Garissa following the influx of al Shabaab elements who have been responsible for the killing of more than 4 soldiers in isolated terrorist attacks. It is fair to say that the situation in relation to the fight against al Shabaab is highly dynamic and although there is increased pacification of lawless Somalia, there is increasing evidence that threats by al Shabaab are increasingly being staged on Kenyan soil, either in Garissa, or within the city of Nairobi. Since the prevailing security situation remains fluid, it would be desirable that the Commander-in–Chief remains personally engaged in the management of what may happen. Secondly, it is simply inconceivable and highly offensive to military honour, that the commander-in-chief is a person facing prosecution in a court of law. Thirdly, the president is at the heart of the national security architecture. At the lowest level, the security apparatus is the district security committee made of security operatives at that level. At the highest level is the Cabinet Security Committee, which is chaired by the Vice President and includes the minister for internal security, the minister for defence, the minister for justice and constitutional affairs, the minister for finance, the minister for foreign affairs, and the head of the public service. The Committee directly advises the president on security matters in the country, and takes overall responsibility for the wellbeing of the country. As part of this, only the president, with the approval of the National Assembly, can declare a state of emergency. Also, only the president can declare a war. The power to declare a state of emergency or war is an extension of the president’s role as the commander in chief. This is why the president is at the centre of the national security information. If the president or the deputy president is to go to The Hague for trial, this will have direct and profound effects on the security situation in the country, as both of them have direct roles in this regard.

    4. On Diplomatic Relations

    The president is at the heart of diplomatic relations. According to universal diplomatic practice, ambassadors, high commissioners, and other representatives of foreign governments are not authorized to represent their governments before the host government’s foreign ministry until their credentials have been formally presented in person and have been accepted by the host government’s head of state. A diplomat whose credentials are accepted is regarded to have been accredited to the host government and is considered an officer of the host government as well as his own.

    This protocol has been codified in the Constitution which provides that the president “receives diplomatic and consular representatives.” In practice, when foreign diplomats arrive in Kenya, they remain inactive and cannot meet with any representatives of the Kenya government, until they have presented their credentials to the president. If the president or the deputy president has to be away for trial, there will be profound and direct effects on diplomatic practice as has been practiced until now.

    5. On the President’s role in the legislative process

    The President assents to all bills enacted by parliament before these become law. In 2011, the President assented to 34 bills which thereby became law. In 2012, the president has so far assented to 31 bills. It is expected that as Kenya implements the Constitution, Parliament will remain busy in enacting the necessary legislation to give effect to the Constitution. After the elections in 2013, Parliament will have two chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate, in place of the one chamber that has existed until now. Since each of the houses can originate legislation, the legislative agenda may become even busier. Further, as the passing of legislation will involve two houses, rather than one, as has been the case until now, the legislative processes will become longer and more bureaucratic. Presidential assent to bills must be done within 14 days and these must be published within 7 days thereafter. The Constitution confers on the President a veto power over bills enacted by Parliament. Where the president declines to assent to a bill, he must refer it back to Parliament explaining the reasons that led to the refusal to assent. Parliament can override the President’s objections if the Bill, as originally passed, receives the support of 2/3 of the members of the National Assembly, and, in case it has implications on devolution, 2/3 of the members of the Senate.

    The power to veto bills is a check on legislative excesses. During his term in office President Mwai Kibaki has exercised this power thrice: in 2009 he queried aspects of the Fiscal Management Act the bill which had been sponsored in Parliament by a private member. As a result of the president’s interventions, the bill was altered, after which he signed it into law. In 2012 the President refused to assent to the Finance Bill 2012 in which Members of Parliament had awarded themselves a generous severance pay of Sh.9.3 million each. Earlier in 2012 the President refused to assent to the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2012 because the bill proposed to amend the Political Parties Act 2011, to allow for continued party hopping by Members of parliament. The President observed that the matter of the consequences of defecting from political parties or changing allegiance between parties was already the subject of court petitions further noting that matters which are before the Court should not be the subject of legislation by the National
    Assembly. It will require an engaged president to support the realization of the provisions of the Constitution as regards the legislative process. This is partly because the timelines for assent and publication of legislation are tight and also because a disengaged president exposes the country to parliamentary tyranny as he cannot exercise the veto power effectively. As the country continues to implement the new Constitution, heavy reliance will continue to be placed on an efficient legislative process. An absentee president will not add to such efficiency. Also, the fact that the country will have a second chamber of the legislature, creating a new experience in the legislative process makes it more compelling for the president to be fully engaged in this process.

    6. On the President’s other Relationships with Parliament

    Under the Constitution, the president will no longer be a Member of Parliament. However, the President still has other relationships with Parliament outside of the legislative process. The President is required to make an address at the opening of every newly elected Parliament, and at least once a year thereafter. This is the constitutional mechanism that will enable the president to communicate to brief parliament as to his policy intentions and overall leadership direction. As things stand, there is a danger that if elected as president, Kenyatta or Ruto will not make even the maiden address as he will already be away on trial. Thereafter, the president will remain disconnected with Parliament and there will be a policy and leadership gap resulting from this.

    7. On Cabinet Meetings

    The president chairs cabinet meetings. Cabinet meets once every week. This represents an intensive work programme. In addition, cabinet has several sub-committees of itself which are advisory to the entire cabinet and to the president. Since the president is at the centre of cabinet affairs, it is unthinkable how cabinet would operate when faced with a long absence of the president from the country.

    8. On the devolved Government

    The President is directly involved in the management of the devolved governments. The president may suspend a county government in an emergency arising out of internal conflict or war; or in any other exceptional circumstances. A county government can only be suspended if an independent commission of inquiry has investigated allegations against the county government, and the President is satisfied that the allegations are justified and the Senate has authorized the suspension.

    Such suspension lasts for only 90 days, and thereafter, there must be elections to constitute a new county government. The Intergovernmental Relations Act puts the president at the centre of the relations between the national and country governments. It establishes the National and County Government Co-ordinating Summit as the apex body for intergovernmental relations. The Summit comprises the President, or in the absence of the President, the Deputy President, as the chair, and the governors of the forty-seven counties. The Summit promotes co-operation between the national and county governments and gives policy direction to other coordinating levels such as the Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee and the sectoral working groups or committees. Devolution of power, which has led to the creation of 47 counties and their governments, is by far the most ambitious set of provisions in the new Constitution.

    9. On the nomination, appointment and removal of Constitution office holders

    Under the former Constitution, the appointment of persons to fill most of the important constitution office holders was the sole preserve of the President. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, makes the appointment of these constitution office holders a collaborative exercise between the president and other organs of the state, including Parliament and the Judicial Service Commission. For example, the President appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the approval of the National Assembly. Also the Constitution expands the category of offices the filling of which is the subject of this collaborative approach. For example the appointment members of all the independent Commissions established under the Constitution involves this special procedure of appointment. Further, the Constitution also makes the removal from office of certain persons that have been appointed to these offices the subject of collaboration between the president and other organs. For example, the National Assembly may, by resolution, require the president to remove a cabinet secretary from office. The removal process is subject to investigation by, and the recommendation of, a committee of the National Assembly. An absentee president will be forced to helplessly follow from outside the country, lengthy removal proceedings as they go on in Kenya.

    The very nature of the appointment and removal process, therefore, requires significant and direct engagement on the part of the president. For example, the Independent Office Holders Act, 2010, passed to provide a roadmap for the appointment of the Controller of Budget and the Auditor General, puts the president at the centre of the appointment process by requiring him to commence the appointment process within 7 days after the occurrence of a vacancy in these offices. The president thereafter nominates a candidate for appointment and the National Assembly may reject such a candidate in which case the president is required to name a fresh candidate from among those that had been interviewed. This is demonstrably a very involved process. A long absence out of the country for any reason would have an effect on the capacity to collaborate in the filing of these positions. Also, the removal process involves the personal judgment of the president, who must make the decision that a particular removal is called for. It would be difficult for a disengaged president to make this decision. Secondly, as vacancies arise all the time, it is not possible to plan around the president’s absence on how these are to be managed.

    10. On the administration of Justice

    The post-election violence gave rise to horrendous crimes the bulk of which have unfortunately remained unpunished. While the ICC trial are intended to bring justice in relation to persons regarded as bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the post-election violence, it is to be expected that national processes will seek accountability against other persons alleged to have committed crimes during the violence. This is based on the fact that the ICC is a court of last resort and prosecutes only when national processes have failed or are unable to do so. The Kenya government is current following several prongs, including a task force appointed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, that suggest a commitment to prosecute these crimes. It would be incongruent for Kenya to pursue national prosecutions against crimes of the post-election violence with the president and deputy president also undergoing trial abroad. There would be no confidence that the president and deputy president can provide full political support for prosecutions in which they are also part of the accused group.

    Another prong that the country has been following in the search for justice is the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission whose mandate, deliberately covers the period of the post-election violence. After more than three years of work, the Commission is currently writing its report which is expected to be released in 2013. Persons facing charges for post-election violence crimes would not be ideally placed to offer ultimate leadership on the implementation of the report.

    Part 3: The International Level
    1. International Relations

    Kenya strives to be an upright member of the international community and has joined several multilateral arrangements such as the East African Community, the African Union, and the United Nations. If ICC suspects became president, this will exert strains in the existing foreign relations at several levels. It has been suggested that if the two fail to attend their trial, they will be restricted to travelling only within certain countries in Africa and will be unable to travel outside of the continent for fear of arrest. This assertion is based on the experiences of Sudanese president, Omar el Bashir, against whom the ICC has issued two arrest warrants and who has had to curtail travel to a few countries for fear of arrest. The assertion is only partially correct. It is correct in stating that Kenyatta and Ruto will be unable to travel outside of Africa but incorrect in assuming that they can travel to any African country: in July 2012, the AU summit scheduled to be held in Malawi had to be moved to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia after President Joyce Banda made it clear that her country was unable to host President Bashir as to do so would have violated Malawi’s obligation as a member of the ICC, to arrest the President if he should travel to the country. Malawi was not the first African country to refuse to host President Bashir for the same reason: South Africa and Botswana have made it clear that should Bashir be found on their soil, he would be arrested and handed over to the ICC. Also, Uganda has twice failed to assure Bashir of his safety from arrest leading to a decision by him not to travel to Uganda. The fact that Uganda takes seriously her responsibilities under the Rome statute is potentially problematic for Kenya than any other country. First, the two are contiguous and have very strong economic ties. Second, as both belong to the East African Community and IGAD, it would bring unimaginable difficulties in the two organizations if the relationship between Kenya and Uganda was to become dysfunctional as a result of the cases facing its top leaders. On its part, the United Nations has a policy not to relate with persons facing charges for international crimes. An opinion issued in 2006 by the UN legal advisor on “Peace and Justice in Post-Conflict Societies—The UN Position” states as follows:

    Contacts between UN representatives and person indicted by international criminal jurisdictions holding positions of authority in their respective countries should be Contacts between UN representatives and person indicted by international criminal jurisdictions holding positions of authority in their respective countries should be limited to what is strictly required for carrying out UN mandated activities. The presence of any UN representatives in any ceremonial or similar occasion with such individuals should be avoided. When contacts are absolutely necessary, an attempt should be made to interact with non-indicted individuals of the same group or party. Some western countries have also taken strong individual positions regarding interactions with persons facing charges like those that Kenyatta and Ruto do. These positions will affect Kenya’s relationship with those countries if either Kenyatta or Ruto becomes president. For example, on 4th August 2011 US President Barack Obama signed a proclamation giving power to the Secretary of State to prevent the entry into the US of persons who participate in serious human rights and humanitarian law and related violations The proclamation suspends entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of “any alien who planned, ordered, assisted, aided and abetted, committed or otherwise participated in, including through command responsibility, war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of human rights, or who attempted or conspired to do so”. While the US has not actually put measures to implement this proclamation in relation to Kenyatta and Ruto, this will almost certainly happen if the two defy the ICC whether or not any of them is elected president. Some European countries have adopted a similar approach which will severely limit the movement of Kenyatta and Ruto if elected president.

    http://www.katibainstitute.org/22-resources/298-report-on-the-implications-of-a-kenyatta-ruto-presidency-in-kenya

  • Kenyatta land grabber
  • kikuyu land grabbers

    Top officials bypassed Mzee to acquire land at the Coast
    By JOHN KAMAU
    Posted Thursday, November 12 2009 at 22:00

    In the land business, opportunities knock but once. As President Kenyatta advanced in age, Coast PC Eliud Mahihu became the king of prized beach plot allocation and sales.

    Perhaps in a bid to persuade the President to sign the applications that were piling up unattended, Mr Mahihu instructed the provincial surveyor to allocate 9.056 acres for Mzee Kenyatta in Nyali, adjacent to plot LR 2457, in October, 1976.

    A month earlier, a meeting between Mr Mahihu, Commissioner of Lands J.R. Njenga, Public Service chief Geoffrey Kareithi and Lands PS J.G. Kibe had taken place on Tuesday, September 21, 1976, at Harambee House. That was two weeks before — records show — Mr Mahihu signed beach plot approvals belonging to the President’s wife, Mama Ngina.

    Meeting telling

    The agenda for the meeting was telling. It was listed as to “consider the administration of beach plots as there has been a delay in dealing with beach transactions as H.E. the President is not in a position to give his consent.” There is hardly information on why Mr Kenyatta was “not in a position to give consent”, but it probably was linked to his age.

    It was Mr Njenga who was asked to write suggestions on how to administrate these beach plots and he gave his report marked “Secret” on September 24.

    The report was a scheme to circumvent President Kenyatta’s signature in the allocation of some beach plots. The four civil servants-cum wealthy businessmen wanted to propose to the President to exempt some beach plot transfers from getting his approval, especially those involving agricultural and trust land.

    They also wanted certain sales considered by a committee “properly constituted and chaired by the provincial commissioner” — Mr Mahihu. Mr Njenga admitted that such a committee would not have any legal backing but added: “We however have District Plot Allocation Committees which consider the allocation of plots in various urban areas… I have issued letters of allotment on the strength of their recommendations…”

    It is not clear whether Mr Mahihu and Mr Njenga decided to give the Kenyatta family a beach plot to secure his audience, but records show that two weeks after the Harambee House meeting, Mr Mahihu sent copies duly signed by Mama Ngina Kenyatta to Mr Njenga for a beach plot title.

    He informed his four colleagues on the developments. Mr Njenga, as per his letter dated October 25, appears not to have got any feedback on his suggestions but Mr Mahihu went ahead to instruct the provincial surveyor to carve out 9.056 acres for Mr Kenyatta in Nyali adjacent to plot LR 2457.

    The plot was authenticated on November 2, and numbered MN/1/2459. A deed plan number 100900 was forwarded to Mr Njenga.

    Later, Mr Mahihu — even as he was scouting for land for the President — wrote to Mr Njenga and agreed with his proposals: “I am preparing other proposals as I told you which I would like to put for his Excellency the President for approval and signature…” He copied this letter to G.K. Kareithi.

    Part of the proposals that he managed to get to Mr Kenyatta were his personal acquisition, through Mumi & Co Ltd of seven acres in Mombasa “between Malindi Road, public beach track and Colodene track” and a further three acres where he wanted to “develop cottages or hotel or flats”.

    Kenyatta approved the sale and acquisition on February 8, 1977.

    One letter from AG Charles Njonjo displays the rush to acquire property: “Dear PC,” he writes with his green pen, “You must know Mr Ndibo. He is anxious to buy this land quietly. Please help him by getting Mzee to sign the enclosed document. The sooner the better otherwise (minister Paul) Ngei will produce other buyers and confuse the issue”, wrote Mr Njonjo in the letter dated April 22, 1977.

    Whoever Mr Ndibo was is not clear but the PC wrote back on May 23 saying that “Mr Ndibo was brought down to see Mzee by the Eastern PC, … Mr Koinange and the matter has been solved.”

    Mr Njonjo replied with yet another form seeking Mr Mahihu’s signature: “This is the other form I forgot to enclose with the other for you to deal with as agreed between the three of us… Geithia Andu mucii (greetings to the family)”. The “three of us” were no doubt, Njenga Mahihu and Njonjo and the greeting made it personal.
    Mr Njonjo would also vouch for his friends to get approvals especially Mrs Bland “who looks after the house which I’m building at Diani.”

    At times confusion was apparent and in haste to approve beach plots, a parcel that had been approved for Mbiyu Koinange was later approved for Mr Jeremiah Nyagah, triggering an exchange of letters.

    By the time he died, Mzee had created a new class of propertied civil servants and close allies at the beach. This was from where Moi was to pick the mantle and announced that he would follow Kenyatta’s footsteps.
    http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/685756/-/uony0q/-/index.html

  • kikuyu land grabbers

    Scramble for beach plots deepens squatter crisis

    JOHN KAMAU reveals how the political elite disinherited millions of residents of their land, planting the seeds of discord that Coast Province is still grappling with.

    Business Daily Thursday November 12, 2009

    Seven years after Independence, President Kenyatta issued a quiet decree on acquisition of beach plots and what came to be known as second-row plots.

    Only Eliud Mahihu, the then Coast Provincial Commissioner, would identify and recommend those who qualified to acquire such plots. And as was expected, nearly all his nominees were highly placed members of the political class and a few well connected businessmen.

    Having very few of their own in the right offices, the coastal communities largely missed out on the ensuing scramble for beach plots that are now worth millions of shillings. Coast Province bears the dubious distinction of having the largest number of squatters in Kenya — an anomaly that did not begin with the Kenyatta government but was only deepened by it. How the current mechanisms, set up under the National Accord, will navigate this explosive subject at the coast remains to be seen. What is clear from the records is that the independence elite disinherited millions of coast residents of land that was potentially theirs, planting the seeds of discord that the province is still grappling with to date.

    Under Mahihu’s watch, old friends, senior civil servants, shrewd businessmen and farmers who had made millions out of good global coffee prices pitched tent at the coast to acquire beach plots. From the mansions they would later build on the plots, this newly rich group dreamed of a place from where they could watch the clear horizon of the sea and, perhaps, retire in their sunset days — rich as Croesus. The script was simple. The most important instruments that potential buyers needed were Mahihu’s consent backed by Kenyatta’s signature. We can now reveal how Mahihu used his position to feather his own nest — building a multi-million empire that made him one of the richest people in independent Kenya (see separate story).

    The hundreds of letters that Mahihu received in the thick of the scramble for beach plots make an interesting reading. The hitherto unseen but declassified government records show how powerful individuals, the majority of them from outside Coast Province, elbowed their way into owning the beach plots. At the peak of the scramble, Kenya’s economy was robust, firing at an annual growth rate of 8.3 per cent between 1969 and 1973 when Kenyatta issued the beach plot decree. Kenyatta’s order was also communicated to the Commissioner of Lands, J.A. O’Loughlin, and Geoffrey Kariithi, the permanent secretary in the Office of the President; Attorney General Charles Njonjo, and to Mr N.S. Kungu, the PS Ministry of Lands and Settlement.

    The records show that the directive was clearly communicated to anyone appointed to a senior position in the Lands ministry. “I find it extremely clear on the issues involved,” said Kungu, for instance, in a letter to Mahihu dated February 15, 1972. The letter was in response to an earlier one by the PC communicating the Kenyatta decree to the newly appointed PS. O’Loughlin, who had been retained as one of the expatriate civil servants, faced a tough time handling the gang around President Kenyatta whose thirst for land appeared to have no end.

    In one of his letters dated December 31, 1971, O’Loughlin informed one applicant for the beach plots that his case would be referred to a “higher authority”. “As you are aware, all applications for approval to sales of beach plots and second row plots are now being considered very closely where the purchaser is a non-African,” he wrote. What O’Loughlin did not reveal was that — from then on — he was to merely act as a rubber stamp for decisions Mahihu made on the beach plots. Kenyatta’s reasons for issuing the decree are contained in a letter Mahihu wrote to one of the largest real estate agents in Malindi, T. E. Allfree. In the letter, the PC said the move aimed to “bring out the imbalance of beach ownership in Kenya’s water. I am aware that certain individuals have been talking ill of everything in Malindi recently. I am also aware that these intended buyers have also been telling people in Malindi that they should not care about the local administration and that they would get their land any way, whether the administration agrees or not.”

    Clear message
    That letter was meant to send a clear message to real estate agents that no transaction would go on at the beach without Mahihu’s signature. It was a like-it or lump-it situation. Mr Allfree had submitted 24 applications to Mahihu in a letter dated December 21, 1971. He had unsuccessfully tried to book an appointment with Mahihu. “I telephoned your secretary yesterday to enquire what time it would be convenient for you to see me, but your secretary stated that you were too busy to see me…,” he said.

    Perhaps to show Mr Allfree the calibre of people who he should target for the beach plot sales, Mahihu wrote back on January 18, 1972 and recommended sale of one acre plot to Cabinet minister Paul Ngei, the sale of Mrs Tailby’s estate in Malindi with buildings and shops to Mr Ronald Ngala; some 80 acres of undeveloped land to a Mr John Njenga Mwangi, and a Lamu sea front plot to Mr A. Madhubuti, a former Lamu East MP. A month later, Mr Mahihu wrote to the registrar of titles in Mombasa, G.G. Ndoria, asking him to “keep a record of beach plots that are being sold… so that Africans… could be informed of these plots and their localities to enable them deal directly with the sellers.”

    Click to access SeedsIV.pdf

  • kikuyu land grabbers

    Karume uses private firms in battle for prime land
    John Kamau – November 12, 2009 Business Daily

    In the political court, Njenga Karume had emerged as a powerful leader of the Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association (Gema)— an investment outfit whose political might was felt in the Kenyatta regime. But besides leading Gema, Mr Karume was also an investor of note having built a large beer distribution network in Central Province and Nairobi.

    His firm, Karume Investments Limited, was one of the early beneficiaries of the beach plots that were on offer. In December 1972, the firm applied to buy 9.46 acres of land in Malindi owned by Richard Corfe and Peter Kelly. He listed the directors of the company as himself and Mrs Wariara Njenga Karume and indicated that he wanted to subdivide it into small plots. He also owned 6.19 acres in plot 480 in Nyali which he, on December 1972, transferred to Karume Investments. But not everyone who purchased the said land was listed. Some of the applications that Mahihu approved simply listed “Kenya Citizen” as the applicant.

    Act in concert
    Though he was known to act in concert with Karume, it was not until December 1973 that Mwai Kibaki applied for the purchase of a property worth Sh210,000 in Nyali Estate.
    In the same month, Mahihu “forwarded” — meaning he did not approve — the sale of 0.5 hectares in Kikambala to Munyua Waiyaki, then deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. Waiyaki was never in Kenyatta’s inner circle, having been sympathetic to some officials of the proscribed Kenya People’s Union (KPU) of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The sympathy was partly because of his opposition to Tom Mboya’s domination of Nairobi politics. When Jonathan Njenga took over as Commissioner in May 1975, one of the first letters he got from Mahihu was an advise on how to handle beach plots.

    “Please note that when the application is endorsed as “forwarded” it does not imply that I have recommended the application and only the application duly endorsed with ‘Recommended’ is to be considered for the plot applied for. That is all Njenga needed to know regarding the allocation of beach plots.

  • Mama Ngina mwizi

    Mama Ngina Kenyatta in court battle over land

    Updated Thursday, February 21 2013 at 10:16 GMT+3

    By PATRICK KIBET

    Former First Lady Mama Ngina Kenyatta wants a case challenging her ownership of two prime plots in Nakuru Central Business District dismissed by the High Court in Nakuru.

    Mama Ngina filed an application seeking to dismiss the case brought by a Nakuru businessman Dr Isack Kirubi on grounds that it did not disclose the cause of action against her.

    She also said Dr Kirubi in his own evidence did not at any time exclusively own the properties subject to the court case. Mama Ngina added that it would be a violation of her rights for the case to proceed to full hearing without the petitioner justifying the reason for suing her.

    FORCIBLY TAKEN

    Kirubi had filed a constitutional petition in 2010 alleging infringement of his rights to own property after claiming the prime plot was forcibly taken by Government in 1974. He contended that the then Commissioner of Lands James Aloysius O’Loughlin in May 7, 1974, conspired with the late Jomo Kenyatta to forcibly take the land.

    Kirubi wants the High Court to declare the acquisition null and void and the land reverted to him.

    In sworn affidavits before Justice Anyara Emukule, Kirubi said he was at all times the registered allotee of the disputed land in Nakuru.

    He adds that actions by Mama Ngina in collusion with the Commissioner of Lands were in breach and violation of his rights to protection from deprivation of property as provided by the Constitution. Kirubi also availed documents showing a loan he obtained with the intention of using the money in developing the disputed parcels of land. He claims he was paid the compensation by Government in 1974 through his bank accounts.

  • If these is true then kenya will be attempting to elect a thlef to state house. Too sad to discuss.

  • If this is true then kenya will be attempting to elect a seniour thief to state house. Too sad to discuss.

  • kikuyu land grabbers

    How civil servants schemed for beach plots
    Business Daily November 13, 2009

    In this final piece, JOHN KAMAU reveals how powerful
    public officials colluded to circumvent President
    Kenyatta’s reluctance to allocate more land at the Coast

    Interesting schemes by the political elite marked Kenyatta’s last
    days in power. One such stratagem aimed at unlocking the logjam that the old man had created in the beach plots acquisition channel. He had suddenly become reluctant to approve any more applications for land, a development
    that worried PC Eliud Mahihu who also took it as his responsibility to find a way round the problem. Mahihu’s solution was simple. He ordered the provincial surveyor to carve out an additional 9.056 acres in Nyali in favour of the president. The deal was aimed at softening the president’s heart and getting him to start signing the papers once again. Two months earlier on September 21, Mahihu had met the Commissioner of Lands Mr Njenga, PS in the Office of the President Geoffrey Kariithi and Lands PS J.G. Kibe at Harambee House. The agenda of the meeting was telling. It was to “consider the administration of beach plots as there has been a delay in dealing with them because H.E. the President is not in a position to give his consent.”

    It is not clear why Kenyatta was not in a position to approve the applications. The meeting asked Mr Njenga to come up with suggestions on the administration of beach plots. He filed a report marked Secret on September 24. The report shows how the four civil servants schemed to circumvent Kenyatta’s signature in the allocation of some beach plots. Their intention was to propose to the president to exempt some of the beach plot transfers from getting his approval, especially those involving agricultural and trust land. They also wanted sales by non citizens, citizens of non-African origin and by citizens of African origin to citizens of African origin to be considered by a committee “properly constituted and to be chaired by the Provincial Commissioner”. Njenga admitted that such a Committee would not have any legal backing but added: “We however have District Plot Allocation Committees which consider allocation of plots in various urban areas….I have issued letters of allotment on the strength of their recommendations…” Under that scheme, Kenyatta would be left with the role of vetting only sales to non-citizens and citizens of non-African origin.

    It is not clear whether Mahihu and Njenga decided to give the Kenyatta family a beach plot to secure his indulgence but records show that two weeks after the Harambee House meeting, Mahihu sent copies duly signed by Mama Ngina Kenyatta to Njenga for a beach plot title. He informed his four colleagues on the developments thus: “As discussed and agreed I presented the certificate
    of title and I was requested to get the bit which she (meaning Mama Ngina) has a beach surveyed and as soon as it has been completed I make full details at which we shall be able to demand the money for the other certificate,” wrote Mahihu to Njenga. Njenga appears not to have got any feedback on his suggestions but Mahihu went ahead to instruct the Provincial surveyor to carve out some 9.056 acres for Kenyatta in Nyali. “The Provincial Commissioner informed me that the title deed was required urgently, and I hope he has contacted you over the issue,” wrote A.K. Njuki on behalf of the director of surveys. Later, Mahihu — even as he was scouting for land for Kenyatta — wrote to Njenga and agreed with his proposals. He also told him: “I am preparing other proposals as I told you which I would like to put to his Excellency the President for approval and signature. If the Map (of the beach areas is ready, please let me know so that we can have a joint trip to try our luck.” He copied this letter to G.K. Kariithi. The transactions he managed to get to Kenyatta included his personal acquisition, through Mumi & Co Limited, of 7 acres in Mombasa “between Malindi Road, public beach track and Coraldene track” and an additional 3 acres at the same location.

    Kenyatta approved the sale and acquisition on February 8, 1977. Mahihu was happy to get the approval and quickly wrote to Njenga as he forwarded copies of consent revealing why he was worried that Kenyatta was not approving beach plots. “I also enclose drawings submitted by the Survey Department, which we
    also discussed on the plot near Bamburi behind Coraldene Hotel and has also been allocated to me by H.E. the President. I also enclose some drawings provided by Physical Planning Department as requested by you dealing with the plots in Lamu that were the subject of our earlier discussion. I would be grateful if you let me have the necessary approvals. Finally, I attach some sketch drawings showing plot No 1309 Kisauni, consent which I had forwarded to you earlier.”

    Mahihu managed to get Kenyatta’s approval of Rift Valley PC, Isaiah Mwai Mathenge’s application. Mr Mathenge’s company Dunia Investments bought a 320 acre plot, together with all the buildings and improvements in Shimoni, Mombasa from Shamshudin Damani at a price of Sh175,000. At other times it required the intervention of powerful figures to get even Mahihu to sign the applications. One letter from Charles Njonjo displays the rush to acquire properties. “Dear PC,” he writes with his green pen, “You must know Mr Ndibo. He is anxious to buy this land quietly. Please help him by getting Mzee to sign the enclosed document. The soonest the better, otherwise Ngei will produce other buyers and confuse the issue,” wrote Njonjo in the letter dated April 22, 1977.

    Whoever Mr Ndibo was is not clear but Mahihu wrote back on May 23 saying that “Mr Ndibo was brought down to see Mzee by the Eastern Provincial Commissioner, Mr Koinange and the matter has been resolved.” Njonjo replied with yet another form seeking Mahihu’s signature: “This is the other form I forgot to enclose with the other for you to deal with as agreed between the three of us…Geithia Andu mucii (say hi to the family)”. The three of us was no doubt, Njenga, Mahihu and Njonjo and the greeting made such a transaction personal.
    Njonjo would also vouch for his friends to get approvals especially Mrs Bland “who looks after the house which I am building at Diani.”

    At times confusion was apparent and in the haste that characterized the beach plots approvals, land that had been allocated to Mbiyu Koinange was later given to Jeremiah Nyagah triggering an exchange of letters. By the time he died, Kenyatta had created a new class of propertied civil servants and close allies at the beach. Moi picked the mantle from there and announced that he would follow in Kenyatta’s footsteps.

  • Kenyatta land grabber

    Ngoliba: The place where Kenyatta dumped squatters

    John Kamau Pambazuka News

    2011-03-10

    Some 33 kilometers along the Thika-Garissa highway, a small and sleepy shopping centre sticks out like a sore thumb. Apart from the lone signboard that signals to visitors that they have now entered Ngoliba, there is nothing else to suggest how this sun-baked shopping centre – actually a row of Indian-styled Dukas – came into being.

    A peep down into the rocky valley, where farmers grow mangoes, reveals very little economic activity. The grass thatched houses, which are mud-walled at best and falling apart at worst, show that the Ngoliba Settlement Scheme, as originally mooted in 1964, collapsed a long time ago. Residents have to rely on relief aid.

    The Thika River, which was to have provided water to irrigate the scheme, has turned to a stream. Its banks show small plots of vegetables for domestic use.

    New archival documents now shed light into how Ngoliba was used as a dumping ground for squatters who lived and wanted to purchase a farm next to former president Jomo Kenyatta’s farm in Kasarani.

    They were not only forced to sell all livestock – since settlement scheme policy did not allow livestock to go with them – but were also supposed to plant sisal. When the global sisal industry collapsed in the 1970s, Ngoliba collapsed. Today, it stands out as yet another showcase of the misuse of power, might and money.

    In August 1964 when Sasini Tea and Coffee Estates decided to donate some 8,000 acres of their land to accommodate squatters, little did they know that it would spark a political row.

    Documents now show that government officials were constantly embarrassed by the presence of squatters on Block’s Farm next to Mama Ngina’s farm in Kasarani (Mama Ngina was Kenyatta’s wife and the first lady). This forced the commissioner of squatters, Zachariah Shimechero, a former police officer, to order their relocation to the 8,000 acre Ngoliba farm, the farm that had earlier been earmarked for a separate group of squatters.

    A secret letter written by Mr Shimechero to the permanent secretary of lands and settlement tells him: ‘You may or may not be aware that Block’s Farm is adjacent to Mama Ngina’s farm and Mzee is normally bothered by the presence of 200 squatter families next to his farm…’

    One of the conditions given by Sasini when they donated the land was that squatters were to be accommodated in Ngoliba ‘on condition that they base their economy on sisal’.

    But it appears that there were no funds available and a way had to be found to use the British funds from the Million Acre Scheme kitty for this purpose. This was an anomaly since Ngoliba was outside the Million Acre Scheme that covered only the White Highland areas.

    Ngoliba was outside the scope of the funding but since it was involved in settling squatters who could embarrass Kenyatta, Geofrey Kariithi, who later became a powerful figure in the Kenyatta government, wrote to the first permanent secretary of the new ministry of cooperatives asking him to get money.

    Actually, it was then not clear what ministry was to handle the 8,000 acres that had been donated.

    ‘I still maintain that we are not funded for schemes like this and the under-secretary is fully aware of this position and until the government agrees on the overall question of schemes outside former Scheduled Area (white highlands) there is little that we can do,’ wrote the director of settlements on 22 September 1966.

    What perhaps he didn’t know was that Kenyatta had a personal interest in Ngoliba. Even as officials planned on how to settle the 200 people, Kenyatta added a new twist when he demanded that two people he had selected should be given 10 acres each.

    The names were given to Jackson Angaine, the lands and settlement minister, who filed them and wrote a small note dated 11 November 1966: ‘The President insists that his two people must be allocated 10 acres each and Mr Shimechero (commissioner of squatters) is not willing.’

    Shimechero had told the permanent secretary that: ‘It will be very bad for the overall morale if we are to allocate them with 10 acres when everybody is getting five acres and also when they have not contributed to the communal work carried out by the others.’

    When the matter was brought to Kenyatta’s attention by Angaine he was ordered to issue them with a title-deed immediately. The others waited for a two-year period with temporary occupation licenses.

    The two special cases were of Njau Gakinya and Gacheru Gatere.

    Actually, Kenyatta visited Ngoliba on 26 November 1966, perhaps to make sure that his two settlers had found a place among the 200 who had been relocated from Block’s Farm. But it was not clear why the two had received Kenyatta’s personal attention.

    Ngoliba, from the start, was a bay of confusion. In the confusion, farmers were issued with occupation licenses without paying the stamp duty – and it later became a big row within the ministry of lands on how to collect the money.

    But it was the dispatch of 200 squatters who were living next to Kenyatta’s farm in Kasarani that brought a huge political row and annoyed Kamba politicians. It was sparked by local MP Gideon Mutiso. The MP was a few years later charged with treason.

    On the day the final group was to be taken to Ngoliba on 31 January 1968, Kenyatta happened to be in Eastern Province and the move was postponed.

    It was at this time that assistant minister Gideon Mutiso learnt about the exercise and wrote a protest note to lands and settlement minister, Jackson Angaine.

    ‘I am sure you are no doubt aware that 200 squatters were recently moved from Block’s Estates near Nairobi, all of them of the Kikuyu tribe and were settled at the above scheme, along with some other squatters within the area,’ said the letter, dated 15 February.

    ‘This means that those people who originally belonged to Ngoliba and who wasted a lot of their energy in clearing bush, putting up houses, and schools will now be moved to a complete new area,’ wrote the MP, who feared that the move could spark a tribal conflict.

    Ngoliba was threatening to explode and Angaine wrote a small note dated 3 March to his permanent secretary saying: ‘I am not going to allow politicians to play with my staff. Mr Mutiso is out of date and needs just a slight adjustment to bring him up to date.’

    Apparently, the commissioner of squatters had decided to dump the 200 squatters, who had indicated interest in buying Block’s Farm in Yatta.

    Perhaps to minimise skirmishes, Ngoliba was shifted from Yatta to Juja constituency that was to be represented by Kenyatta’s eldest son, Peter Muigai.

    Today, Ngoliba has turned out to be a ghost settlement with hardly any economic activity. The sisal industry that was meant to support its inhabitants hit rock bottom in 1970s after global prices slumped.

    Anytime you hit the Garrissa Road, watch out for Ngoliba; for here is a settlement that is dead in the water.

    BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

  • Kenyatta land grabber

    Kenyatta’s plot to settle Kikuyus in Tanzania
    Business Daily November 9, 2009

    JOHN KAMAU reveals a scheme by the founding president of the nation to send hundreds of landless Kikuyu to a settlement scheme in Tanzania to tackle land problem

    Jomo Kenyatta had planned a secret mission to settle excess Kikuyus in Tanzania, as one of the answers to the squatter problem in Kenya, we can now reveal. Information now available shows that an attempt to offload hundreds of Kikuyus into tsetse fly-infested Mpanda Settlement Scheme in Rukwa region of Tanzania failed after a number of listed families refused to go and those that had already gone returned. Mpanda was supposed to be part of the early solution to tackle the incessant land problem in the Rift Valley and temper competing interests. Documents indicate that the first meeting to deliberate the Mpanda Scheme proposal was held on June 26, 1963, some 25 days after Kenyatta was sworn in as Prime Minister.

    Although, the Business Daily has not traced the original agreement between the Kenya government and Tanzania (then Tanganyika), we have managed to obtain original secret letters written by a government official on the subject, now archived in a file titled Mpanda – land policy. It is not clear who floated the proposal although it is known that former Tanzania President Julius Nyerere’s government was in 1960s offering refugees from neighbouring countries free land and integrating them into local populations in his bid to build a formidable Ujamaa system.

    Today, Mpanda is a long forgotten experiment that is not talked about as it involved the transfer of an unknown number of families to another country in order to deny them claim to land in the white highlands. In a letter dated July 15, 1963 and addressed to all permanent secretaries, the PS Ministry of Home affairs, R E Wainright, says that “the project to send more Kikuyu families (to Mpanda) has been discussed with the prime minister who has indicated his warm support for the proposal. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could take charge of the project for this season and organise the sending of the largest number of families that you can within the finance available.” Kenya was to pay the Julius Nyerere’a government some 30 pounds for each family and had already set aside a budget of 6,000 pounds for the exercise.

    Penalised
    It is not clear how the landless families were to be selected although the National Archives has a complete file of all the targeted families, members of their households and correspondence relating to the departure to Mpanda, which later became a settlement village for Burundi refugees who now occupy Katumba and Mishamo areas of Mpanda. The families selected to go to Mpanda were to leave on September 14, 1963 and had been housed in a farm coded Nakuru Transit Farm in the Rift Valley. But the families felt they were being punished for allegedly being ex Mau Mau freedom fighters and began to protest. Documents show that they sent a delegation to the lands and settlement ministry PS N S Carey Jones questioning why they could not be accommodated on Kenya settlement schemes. Writing to the home affairs PS after that meeting, Mr Carey-Jones said he hoped that the squatters would not be compelled to go. “But I do not think that Mpanda Scheme will be a success if people are forced to go, and an opportunity of doing some good to the people will be lost if it gets a bad name. I would suggest that this needs action on the political front, and that your minister (Jackson Angaine) or a representative of the Kikuyu should visit Mpanda, and if satisfied, explain the position to the people and try to persuade them to go”. One of the problems that Carey-Jones noted was that Kikuyu felt they “were being penalised, not privileged, in being offered settlement at
    Mpanda and this is another point I think should be corrected on the political front.”

    In one of the protest letters sent to Angaine by the farmers they said that the District Commisioner “should be informed that he has no right to use Mpanda as dumping ground for undesirable people in this country. We should consider
    Mpanda issue after Uhuru and not before,” says the letter in part. They also wrote a separate letter to Kenyatta saying they “do not want to leave the country in exchange for any other.” By August 25, 1963, the Civil Secretary Rift Valley, J A Wolf admitted in a letter that it would not be easy to get Kikuyus to settle in Tanzania. By then only four families had volunteered to leave Uasin Gishu and none from Nakuru whereas the scheme had targeted at least 100 families before the onset of September rains. Government officials had suggested two methods to overcome the resistance: “If one of the senior ministers were to try to encourage Kikuyu to volunteer and if such encouragement were disseminated by the minister for information, at least some of the opposition might be overcome,” wrote Mr Wolf, who was coordinating the exercise.

    His other suggestion was that if overcoming opposition via propaganda failed, it will be hard to get the families depart for Tanzania “without exerting some form of pressure.” Mr Wolf had decided to get some desperate Kikuyu who had been dumped at Bahati Farm to be the first set of volunteers. “The conditions on which this farm was started were, as you know, purely temporary accommodation for displaced labourers and their families who had nowhere else to go….I have therefore instructed the regional Government agent, Nakuru to offer places at the
    Mpanda Scheme to all inmates of the transit farm and to go one step further by telling those who have been already six months on the transit farms that if they do not accept the offer of a plot in Mpanda they will have to leave the farm.” But when the order was made the squatters said they would not leave for Mpanda and would not leave the Bahati Farm. The plot also failed because there was a row between senior government officials on which ministry should coordinate the exercise and by September 11, 1963 Mr Wolf finally wrote a letter to the ministry of Home Affairs asking them to call of the resettlement of Kikuyus in Mpanda.
    “I might have been able to … had your minister agreed to my putting pressure on some of the inmates of the transit farm at Bahati to volunteer but as … he does not agree to my taking such course…will you please … inform the Tanganyika government that we are unable to take advantage of their offer of land.

  • Desperate To Win, Jubilee Hoodwinks Squatters with Empty Promise of Land
    By: Kenya Today

    February 15, 2013

    As March 4th approaches, the level of desperation of the handlers of the Jubilee Alliance Presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta’s keeps rising up a notch by the second. There are allegations of “cooked”opinion polls, empty promises of land to squatters and at times openly playing victim (of the ICC trials) to attract sympathy of mostly the Mt Kenya Voters.

    Hon. Beth Mugo, Minister for Public Health and Sanitation, a prominent member of the Kenyatta family is accused of hoodwinking squatters in Taveta with empty promise of land in exchange for votes.

    Hon. Mugo together with her husband Rtd. Ambassador Nicholas M Mugo are said to own thousands of acres of idle land in Taita Taveta where they mainly conduct mineral exploration under their flagship company Beth International Aqua Mines Ltd.

    Out of desperation to win Taveta votes for her first cousin and Jubilee presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, Hon Mugo offered to donate 4000 acres of the more than 72,000 acres of the Kenyatta family land in Taita Taveta County.

    Local leaders in Taveta dismissed Hon Mugo’s offer as just hot air terming it a campaign gimmick, the Kenyatta family made similar offer in 2002 and the promise never came to fruition. Lawyer Stephen Odiago, who is vying for the Taveta parliamentary, termed the offer as a ploy to hoodwink locals to support the Jubilee presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta.

    “It is not true that Kenyatta family has donated land. It has always been an unfulfilled promise since 2002. The matter has been dangled for quite some time that the family will donate land,” the Mombasa-based lawyer said.

    Former Taveta MP Jackson Mwalulu said he had never seen the said land. “I heard about the intention to donate land to the community but there has never been any implementation. I have never seen the land,” he said in an interview.

    “The Kenyatta family can successfully sue half of the Taveta population for trespass”, said Shaban Mcharo an accountant based in Voi.

    Immediate former Challa-Njukini civic leader Nehamiah Mutua called a bluff on Mugo’s promise. “The minister should speak the truth. The Kenyatta family is reluctant to donate land to the squatters,” Cllr Mutua was quoted.

    Hon Mugo’s alleged empty promise of land to the landless in exchange for votes confirms CORD summit member Moses Wetangula’s allegations that part of the illegally acquired estate of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta is being used to buy political loyalty thus impacting negatively the democratic process.

    It has been reported elsewhere by unverifiable sources though widely known to the public that Kenyatta’s land may be little or more than 500,000 acres.

    The parcel of lands includes; 10,000 acres Gichea Farm in Gatundu, 5, 000 acres in Thika, 9,000 acres in Kasarani Mwiki, 5, 000-acres Muthaita Farm, 24, 000 acres in Taveta,50, 000 acres in Taita, 29, 000 acres in Kahawa Sukari along the Nairobi—Thika highway stretching all the way to Kilimambogo Hills in Ukambani.
    Others include; 10, 000-acres ranch in Naivasha, 52,000-acres farm in Nakuru, 20,000-acres one, also known as Gichea Farm, 10,000 acres in Rumuruti, 40,000 acres in Endebes in the Rift Valley Province and Brookside Farm, Green Lee Estate,Njagu Farm in Juja, a quarry in Dandora in Nairobi “just to mention but a few.”

  • Cankers within the State – Poaching and Growing Corruption: Excerpt from Charles Hornsby’s book – Kenya: A History Since Independence (1963-2011)

    Kenya was now a place of increasing corruption and inequality. Civil servants enthusiastically exploited the opportunity that the (Duncan) Ndegwa Report had given them to engage in business. The Kikuyu-dominated wabenzi (Mercedes-Benz people) prospered, protected by the state and unrestrained by Parliament. The ‘action’ was now in resource extraction: poaching, charcoal and mining.

    Poaching

    The 1970s were the worst period of poaching in Kenya’s history. With the support of senior government figures, Kenya’s abundant wildlife was slaughtered for the export of ivory and skins to the Middle and Far East. In mid-1973, at least 500 elephants were killed legally each month. However, receipts in destinations such as Hong Kong suggested that at least 345 tonnes of ivory had been exported from Kenya in 1973, indicated the death of at least 15,000 elephants in a year, three times the official number. There were wide discrepancies between estimates of the number of elephants left, from 150,000 to only 40,000. Ten thousand rhinos were killed during 1973–9, 80 per cent of the remaining population.

    Sport hunting was still legal, but in 1973, Chief Game Warden John Mutinda finally withdrew all elephant-hunting licences. Western concern over poaching was rising, with television reports and articles devoted to Kenya’s problem and its causes in state corruption. There were high-profile arrests, including a Somali picked up with the tusks of 525 elephants in his baggage en route to Hong Kong. Eventually, Tourism Minister Juxon Shako had banned ivory export by anyone except the government in August 1974. However, exports continued.

    One problem was that the Kenyatta family itself was implicated in both poaching and ivory exports. Margaret Kenyatta, Kenyatta’s daughter, was chairman of the United African Company, one of at least 10 companies exporting ivory despite the ban. Ivory could earn Ksh300 (US$36) per kilogram, making one elephant worth thousands of dollars. Other valuable items included zebra pelts (5,000 of these animals were shot illegally within 320 miles of Nairobi in six months during 1975) and colobus monkey skins. In 1975, two men were found in possession of 26,000 colobus monkey skins (more than the total remaining population today).

    However, dealers could buy both police inaction and the needed documentation, of which there was an inexhaustible supply. The monkey skin owners were acquitted after they produced ‘valid’ permits. It was widely believed that much of the poaching that decimated the elephant and rhino populations was organised and carried out by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. An expatriate official identified both assistant ministers – one being J. M. Kariuki – as buying ivory direct from game department headquarters for export.

    There were later suggestions that officials, police sharpshooters and the Kenyatta family were involved in a vertically integrated poaching cartel. A Samburu MP alleged in Parliament that there were in fact very few poachers outside the ministry. In 1976, Parliament established a Select Committee to probe malpractices at the ministry, but nothing came of it in the face of state obstruction. In May 1977, all sport hunting was banned. However, the loss of hunting revenue further damaged the ability of the ministry to combat poaching.

    Bizarrely, Mau Mau veterans, denied most forms of recompense for their losses, had been allowed to poach since the 1960s, through the issue of ‘collectors’ permits’, which allowed them to carry as much ivory as they wished, under the polite fiction that it was of Mau Mau vintage. These permits were finally cancelled in 1977 under pressure from environmentalists.

    In the same year the African elephant was listed under Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

    Destruction of Kenya’s tree cover, soil erosion and changing rainfall patterns also became public issues. The felling of trees for land settlement and the production of charcoal were particular problems. Charcoal was now worth K£1,000 per tonne in the Middle East, and 80,000 tonnes a year was exported by 1975. Eventually, after dockworkers refused to load more ships, the government was forced to introduce a total ban on charcoal exports, to replace the partial ban in force (which meant that only senior figures such as PCs could carry out the trade).

    Growing Corruption

    Kenyatta’s fading grip made corruption both easier and safer. Civil servants’ freedom to conduct business allowed officials to reward themselves and to misuse state resources for private gain. Bribery was now required to obtain most licences, permits or quotas, particularly for foreigners. By 1975, the government itself was inveighing against the collapse in civil service mores.

    The Ndegwa Report was widely blamed: Overnight, Government offices became ‘official’ quarters for commercial transactions and heavy private deals. Government vehicles became means of private interests. Government ‘stamps’ and licenses became commercialised…Massive corruption had finally crept with devastating impact into one of the most prestigious of Civil Services in Africa. Parastatals were particularly prone to abuse, especially the East African Community’s organisations, as the victim was remote.

    For different reasons, the big urban councils were even more corrupt and incompetent than central government, since they were less internationally visible and accounting standards were lower; Mombasa Municipal Council was dissolved in 1977, while in the same year the first probes began into Nairobi City Council’s procurement practices. Land grabbing – the process of selling or giving state land to private individuals, to develop or sell – was becoming more common, though it was less politically charged than it was to become under Moi, when the supply of undeveloped land had run out.

    When Kenyatta’s nephew Muigai married Isaiah Mathenge’s daughter in 1976, for example, Kenyatta’s wedding present was a large tract of government land. Such technically legal processes were supplemented illegally in most local lands offices, as cartels stole land, destroyed and forged documents, and sold the resulting plots on to others. In August 1975, the British Sunday Times ran a series of exposés of the avarice of the Kenyatta family. It detailed how the family had forced the sale of the Inchcape trading group (which included the Ford vehicle franchise) to a consortium including Udi Gecaga, Muigai and Kenyatta’s son Peter Muigai Kenyatta, the price to be paid in instalments out of profits.

    The article included an excellent display of the Kenyatta family, and further exposed the family’s involvement in ivory exports, and the impossibility of collecting debts owed by the ‘royal family’, as they were now known. It also detailed how Kenyatta personally approved the purchase of large farms by his family, exempting them from review by land control boards. It listed the vast farms the family had acquired in the Rift Valley, including six farms owned by Kenyatta himself, a 26,000-acre farm owned by Mama Ngina in Kiambu, and her farm in Rongai next to Kenyatta’s own.

    The Sunday Times described how Mama Ngina had been buying land on the coast that was used to build two hotels, while Kenyatta himself built Leopard Beach Hotel, which was registered in a Swiss company’s name. It revealed that in 1972, Mombasa Municipal Council had waived all rates on properties owned by the president and his family, and had listed 11 more properties in the area. The paper also described how the family operated through overseas frontmen such as George Criticos and Asian lawyers and accountants. The international casinos were also of interest. In 1967, a company for Italian investors linked to the Mafia had established the Nairobi International Casino, with Fred Kubai and later Peter Muigai Kenyatta and James Gichuru as shareholders. In 1973, it faced competition from another casino on the outskirts of Nairobi. The Sunday Times revealed that while Kenyatta’s name did not appear on the registration papers, he owned the site and the building, and received a third of its profits.

    Kenyatta’s niece Beth Mugo, meanwhile, had become involved in the gemstone business, and had obtained the right to sell gems to foreigners at Nairobi airport. Just as the Kenyatta family was becoming rich, so those close to Mzee also demonstrated their power. The Sunday Times named Coast PC Mahihu as owningthe Bahari Beach Hotel and Rift Valley PC Mathenge as owning the Coral Beach Hotel. Eliud Wamae part-owned the Kenya Beach and the Ngong Hills hotels. John Michuki and Mugo, meanwhile, were involved with a German hotel group.

    The backbench put up a determined but futile fight against this trend. In May 1975, in its post-Kariuki murder peak of independence, the Assembly defeated government opposition to establish a third anti-corruption Select Committee; Martin Shikuku became its chairman, and for the first time in Kenya’s history, all its members – including minister Omolo-Okero – declared their wealth. However, the government soon undermined it, and on 24 June, Parliament killed the committee it had established only weeks before. Parliament could no more control the elite’s depredations than could the government itself.

    The Public Accounts Committee continued to castigate ministries for overspending against budgets, with the figure rising to US$13 million in 1974–5. Ministries were criticised for failing to recover loans, bypassing tender procedures, misusing grants, uneconomic investments and poor accounting. Although lip service was paid to efficiency, the political will for root and branch reform was missing. The churches too complained at the growing ‘get rich quick’ culture and the damaging effects of corruption and nepotism, but the elite were beyond moral censure. Patronage and nepotism were increasingly the way business was done. If you did not know someone, then business would be very difficult. It was common for politicians to ensure that allies, friends, relatives and people from the same ethnic group and sub-group as themselves received jobs or contracts, which would provide them with income and in turn buttress the politician’s career.

    Indeed, it was almost essential that this happened: if everyone else was doing the same thing, failing to do so would disadvantage your community and weaken your finances and electoral viability. Ministers also prioritised government projects to assist their own constituencies or districts. It was common for water projects to be sited in the constituency of the water minister, roads in the district of the public works minister and so on. Kenyatta permitted this, as it stabilised and channelled conflict and patronage, and left him and the central bureaucracy as arbiters of who would gain and lose.

  • The Kenyan election frontrunner who’s wanted in The Hague and running for the presidency

    Kenyans will vote next week with the scars of 2008’s post-election violence still raw. Yet the frontrunner now is accused of orchestrating the brutality – and he may only be running to keep himself out of jail.

    Daniel Howden Nyeri
    Friday 01 March 2013

    When The National Alliance opened its headquarters last year there was much talk of an Obama-style campaign and a grassroots youth movement.

    The headquarters of the party-political vehicle that Kenya’s richest man, Uhuru Kenyatta, hopes will propel him to the presidency would be the nerve centre of a truly national campaign, its organisers boasted.

    With 48 hours until polls open in Kenya, all that remains at Promiso House, in Nairobi’s rundown Eastlands areas, is a dusty warehouse with a giant banner that reads “I believe”. There are no phone banks, just piles of red TNA hats – robust, well-stitched ones for VIPs and cheap, flimsy ones for “the people”, a campaign worker explains.

    As East Africa’s biggest economy braces for its first general election since the nightmarish events of early 2008, the veils have fallen to reveal a campaign in which the elite has treated ordinary voters with a complacency bordering on contempt. Five years ago a botched attempt by the incumbent President, Mwai Kibaki, to steal the election was taken as a cue to release a premeditated wave of violence. Kenya’s political barons marshalled armies drawn from the young and unemployed in their respective communities and set them against each other with guns and machetes. The killing was allowed to continue until events on the ground had given various politicians the seat they wanted at the negotiating table for a power-sharing government. Part of the internationally brokered peace deal that emerged called for those “most responsible” for orchestrating the violence to be tried at a tribunal in Kenya or at the International Criminal Court at The Hague. In the capital’s slums, the lakeside city of Kisumu and the towns of the Rift Valley, some 1,300 people died and hundreds of thousands lost their homes.

    Tabita Nyambura was one of the unlucky ones. A smallholder from Kenya’s largest tribe, the Kikuyu, she eked out a living on the outskirts of Eldoret, a town on the northern escarpment of the Great Rift Valley that is famous for its long-distance runners. When the backlash began after President Kibaki, also a Kikuyu, was accused of stealing the vote, it was people like Mrs Nyambura who bore the brunt. She fled for her life when her home was burned down by youths from the Kalenjin community, another of Kenya’s larger tribes. For more than four years the 42-year-old and her children survived in an overcrowded camp hundreds of miles away.

    Since last August she has been trying to build a new home on scrubland outside Nyeri in the Kikuyu heartlands. After years of delays and complaints of corruption the government has given about 1,500 families small plots, some timber and an iron roof. She still has plastic sheeting for walls and has tried to cheer up the bleak interior with colourful election posters. There is no electricity yet, the nearest water is a couple of kilometres away, and shops are even farther afield.

    “When we arrived it was just savannah, there was nothing here,” she says. But Mrs Nyambura refuses to complain. She has planted maize, is rearing chickens and says she is happy to be delivered to a safe place.

    While the Nyamburas were still sitting in the squalor of the camp the ICC charged four ringleaders in the post-election violence, including the Kalenjin politician William Ruto and the man who is now seen as the leader of her community, Uhuru Kenyatta. Despite the indictment from The Hague accusing them of marshalling their tribes against each other, the son of the country’s founding president, Jomo Kenyatta, and his supposed enemy, Mr Ruto, formed an alliance dubbed the “coalition of the accused”. Amid the struggle for survival faced by the two-thirds of Kenyans who earn just $2 a day, a long memory is a luxury few can afford. Mrs Nyambura has dutifully changed her view of Mr Ruto now he is the running mate of her community’s big man. “It’s changed because they have come together to bring peace,” she says.

    On the plains of her new, nameless village, motorbikes ply the dirt furrows flying red TNA flags and even the donkeys have party fliers stuck to their foreheads. But not everyone has forgiven and forgotten.

    Yussuf Morevi has an angry scar on his Adam’s apple where three Kalenjin men tried to cut his throat with a machete. Mr Ruto is a “bad man” and while “we can give him the vice presidency” he will never be allowed the top job, he says. Most voters recognise that the tribal alliances cobbled together for Monday’s vote are marriages of convenience based on arithmetic, not ideology. There are no great policy divides, says political commentator Murithi Mutiga: “It’s an ethnic census as much as an election.” The poll’s urgency comes from the fact that it is Raila Odinga’s last chance for the presidency and the threat of the ICC makes it a “life and death battle” for Mr Kenyatta.

    The quietly spoken Mr Kenyatta was a reluctant heir to the political power that came with the $500m fortune he inherited – rated by Forbes as Kenya’s largest. He has none of the common touch of his rival Raila Odinga, Kenya’s Prime Minister and de facto leader of the Luo community, from which Barack Obama’s father hailed. Despite months of practice, the 52-year-old appears awkward and exhausted at the frenzied rallies he flies into in his helicopter. After thanking “hardworking voters” in English he switches to Gikuyu and begins to attack Mr Odinga as a “kimundu”, or “monster” in his native language.

    Close friends say that it was only the 50-year sentence the ICC handed down to former president of Liberia Charles Taylor last year that stirred him into action. “We tried to persuade him that he could beat the ICC case and run next time,” says a family friend who asked not to be named. “After that he didn’t trust anyone to protect him.”

    Jack Kanyingi, a well-to-do stockbroker in Nyeri who admits that he “hates politics”, says that Kenya’s tribalism started with the fathers of Monday’s main contenders – Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga – who were rivals after independence 50 years ago. Elections are “bad for business”, he complains and “if there were no ethnic politics we would go far”. But like so many other Kenyans, when the polls open he will be hoping for a peaceful outcome and voting for the man from his own community.
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-kenyan-election-frontrunner-whos-wanted-in-the-hague-and-running-for-the-presidency-8517431.html

  • be 4 real u guys…Uhuru came in the lime-light in 1990, sahi ndio mumeona shamba zake..poor peasant!

  • Kevin, you sore complainant.Blame Forbes who exposed UK.Had he not fallen for Moi’s lure to join politics,he could have been a quiet powerful businessman riding on stolen wealth.But his sense of entitlement drove him to the extent of sponsoring revenge killings za Luos and Kalenjins in the name of helping kuyks in 2008.Issue za shamba za Onyato have been under radar since the 60s when he stole bigtime from kyuks and Coasterians. Stop defending theft.Whether inherited by UK, it is still stolen wealth.The late Pio Gama Pinto and Jaramogi talked about Jomo’s landgrabbing already then. KNow your history and know that Uhunye is waiting for a long jail term at ICC despite propaganda that his case will collapse. It will be payback for his father’s murderous, thuggery regime.Mama Ngina UK’s mama ni mwizi and his cousin Beth Mugo too.Ask Wadavida huko pwani.Get real!

  • Uhuru Kenyatta Has No Moral Authority To Solve Kenya’s Land Problems

    Monday, February 4, 2013 – 00:00 — BY NGUNJIRI WAMBUGU

    Some time late last year I met an intense young man called Elijah Mburu. Elijah comes from Kiambu county and he and some other colleagues of his ‘rika’ (age group) had just launched a lobby group called the Kenya National Land Accord Movement (KNLAM.

    They had come up with a petition to Uhuru Kenyatta and they were out to collect one million signatures to petition Uhuru to allocate land to squatters and IDPs, especially in Kiambu, Taveta and parts of Rift Valley.

    Today KNLAM has collected 215,000 signatures from Kiambu in addition to signatures from other parts of the country. On January 13, Elijah and his group accused Uhuru in the press of neglecting Kiambu residents.They said he is a custodian of chunks of land formerly owned by these residents.

    They also mobilised Kiambu residents living in colonial villages to petition the Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Lands minister James Orengo to address their resettlement plans before they leave office.

    Raila has taken up Elijah’s cause and is now challenging any Kenyan with large tracts of land to give up some of it for the sake of poor Kenyans who are squatters and IDPs. Uhuru is livid.

    His family is reputed to own land the size of a province in a country where the average Kenyan can barely afford a plot of land to bury his dead.

    On October 1, 2004 the Standard’s lead story was on how the Kenyatta family is reputed to own 24,000 acres in Taveta, 50,000 acres in Taita, 29,000 acres in Kahawa Sukari, 10,000 acres in Gatundu, 5,000 acres in Thika, 9,000 acres in Kasarani, and 10,000 acres in Naivasha.

    The newspaper also quoted another 52,000 acres in Nakuru, 20,000 acres in Bahati, 10,000 acres in Rumuruti, and 40,000 acres in Endebbes.

    There was also mention of 100 acres in Karen and 1,000 acres in Dagorreti. The paper explained that this land was acquired during the 15-year reign of Uhuru’s father, Jomo Kenyatta.

    Ironically, Uhuru claims his greatest political support from Kiambu, a county with at least eight colonial-era villages — Kamuguga, Karecheni, Kiambaa, Kihara, Karura, Ichaweri and Kirathimo — that were established by the colonial government as concentration camps for Mau Mau sympathisers.

    However, the thousands of young men who inhabit these villages are the ones behind the Kenya National Land Accord, and they insist Uhuru must restore their grandfathers’ lands back to them before they can vote him into any position.

    Elijah insists Uhuru must redeem himself of these historical injustices before running for President. Uhuru knows it is not illegal to own even the reputed 500,000 acres of land.

    He also knows that unlike in western countries, it is not illegal to own every sea-front at the Coast and keep it away from poor members of the public who might want to enjoy God’s gift of beaches.

    This is why he challenges Raila to produce evidence of illegality in their family property. Uhuru cannot be accused of land grabbing. As he himself admitted recently whatever happened under his parents is no concern of his.

    However, the fact is that Uhuru is who he is today because of historical land injustices. These are the basis of the economic wealth he enjoys; and this economic wealth is the foundation of his political power today.

    Uhuru must not assume that the millions of Kenyans who were disenfranchised in the process of his family acquiring their wealth have forgotten what happened.

    As he challenges Raila to produce evidence showing that the land the Kenyattas own was acquired illegally, he needs to realise that millions of Kenyans do not need such evidence.

    We know how the land was acquired, whatever the legal documents might say. He also must accept that Kenyans understand that there is no way powerful individuals with such a history, and who still own large tracts of un-utilised land, can be trusted to solve Kenya’s perennial land problems.

    As Wetang’ula said, one really cannot expect a monkey to officiate over the eradication of forests! Raila has a point. Thousands of the Kenyan middle-class are struggling to pay bank loans so as to own a plot of land.

    Millions of Kenyans continue to live as squatters across the country, purely because the land ownership system has been compromised.

    Every internal conflict since independence, including the Baragoi masscare, Tana killings and the 2007-08 post-election violence, are related to land disputes.

    How then can Kenyans who have suffered land alienation, whether they are from Central Kenya, Rift Valley, the Coast or Nairobi not agree with Raila when he says that a product of Kenya’s historical land injustices cannot be expected to solve such injustices?

    In fact is it not morally repugnant for someone associated with such history to purport to have the solution to the inequalities in land ownership?

    Ngunjiri Wambugu is the director of political affairs at the Raila Odinga presidential campaign secretariat.

  • Guys dont just believe this nonsense – people are really out to spoil the name of the Kenyattas. If your ancestral land is in Western, Nyanza – what is your beef with Kenyattas land? its not your ancestral land – that is land that belongs to the GEMA communities. Pray to God, and go and buy your own land – why are you coveting your brothers property?

  • Wake up kikuyu dreamer

    Group asks PM to break up Kiambu colonial villages
    Monday, January 14, 2013 – 00:00 — BY NJENGA GICHEHA

    Raila Odinga and Lands Minister James Orengo to address their resettlement plans before they leave office.

    Speaking to the press yesterday, Kamuguga Village Welfare Group chairman Stephen Kinuthia and The National Land accord Movement chairman Elijah Mburu blamed their predicament on president Daniel Moi’s and Jomo Kenyatta’s regime.

    They said these two allowed tycoons and politicians to grab massive tracks of land leaving very little land to villagers which made some become squatters to fight in the villages.

    “We have been living in deplorable conditions in these colonial villages which were started in the early 1950’s. We ask the PM and Orengo to visit Kiambu and address these land issues,” said Kinuthia.

    Mburu on the other hand said Central Kenya especially Kiambu and by Rift Valley provinces are areas where the first seeds of land grabbing were sown by the colonial government.

    He challenged deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta to dismantle the remaining colonial villages in Kiambu saying that this is his home turf. He accused Uhuru of neglecting residents saying that he is a custodian of chunks of land which were formerly owned by residents.

    “We call upon Uhuru to get rid of these villages where former freedom fighters were thrown into by post colonial leadership in Central Kenya. Uhuru must redeem himself of these historical injustices,” said Mburu.

  • Njuguna Andrew

    If you go to Njiru to buy building stones, there lies a large chunk of land belonging to the Kenyattas where quarying is done. For evey lorry load of anything from that land, you part with 1000 shillings. Who gave them that land? The entire Embakasi area is being sold on their behalf. How can one family collect over 300,000 shillings per day out of no sweat whereas their clansmen are dying in the diaspora. Uhuru allegedly hired the IDPs to fight for their stolen wealth; defending greed.

  • Njuguna Andrew

    The land question and displacement in Kenya

    Internal displacement is a recurring theme in Kenya’s recent history. During the colonial period, British land policy favoured (white) settler agriculture, entailing
    the dispossession of many indigenous communities’ land (mainly the Kalenjin, Maasai and Kikuyu) across the Rift Valley and Nyanza, Western and Central provinces – the so-called White Highlands. This process was legalised with the implementation of an individual freehold title registration system at the expense of customary mechanisms of land tenure.

    The land grievances colonial dispossession gave rise to were aggravated by Jomo Kenyatta’s independent government. Kenyatta maintained the system of freehold land titles and did not question how the land had been acquired. To compensate the displaced, the government began a series of resettlement schemes based on a market system, which was biased towards those with the financial means to acquire land.8 Meanwhile, corruption and ethnic politics supported patronage networks and favoured certain communities, particularly the Kikuyu, who settled in the fertile areas of the Rift Valley, at the expense of others, such as the Luo, the Maasai and the Kalenjin.

    These land tensions were further exacerbated by Kenyatta’s successor as president, Daniel arap Moi. In response to the political threat posed by the advent of multiparty politics in the 1990s, Moi (a Kalenjin) sought to portray the opposition as Kikuyuled, and multiparty politics as an exclusionary ethnic project to control land.9 This entailed evoking majimboism, a type of federalism that promotes provincial autonomy based on ethnicity. To recover ‘stolen’ land, Kikuyu were evicted from the areas they had settled in the Rift Valley and western Kenya.

    Associated clashes throughout the 1990s left thousands dead and over 350,000 displaced, allowing Moi to gerrymander elections in 1992 and 1997. Rampant land-grabbing further undermined customary mechanisms of land governance, while growing hardship among the majority poor and rapid population growth increased pressure on the country’s arable land. The displacement crisis following the 2007 elections is thus not an anomaly; rather, it is part of a sequence of recurrent displacement stemming from unresolved and politically aggravated land grievances, in a context of population growth, poor governance and socio-economic insecurity. Simply focusing on facilitating the return of people displaced in the current crisis, in the absence of efforts to address the underlying structural causes, risks creating the conditions for further rounds of violence and fresh displacement.

    Click to access 2263.pdf

  • We Should Not Close Our Eyes To Injustices
    Wednesday, March 13, 2013 – 00:00 — BY PHEROZE NOWROJEE

    In the midst of the voting, the tally, and a long-awaited result, an important book, of great relevance to our elections and the next five years, was published last week. It is The Struggle For Freedom and Justice : The Life and Times of the Freedom Fighter and Politician Bildad Kaggia by Bildad Kaggia, Wiegert de Leeuw and M. Kaggia (Nairobi, Transafrica, 2013).

    Bildad Kaggia is one of the prime architects of today’s changing Kenya. The period of his active politics spanned the period from 1945 with the end of the Second World War and its effect on the independence movements in Kenya to 1975 in post-Independence Kenya.

    In between, Kaggia was involved in the Kenya African Study Union, the Kenya African Union , trade unions, the Central Committee of Mau Mau, the Kapenguria Trial, prison and detention, release in 1961, Kanu in the run-up to Independence, the increasing differences with Kenyatta after Independence, expulsion from Government, the Kenya People’s Union, and a retirement from politics.

    Kaggia’s book therefore is the journey over the making of today’s Kenya. This rich and committed life in the service of Kenya is of the greatest interest to all Kenyans.

    Kaggia covers all these aspects. Among the key issues, (with which few Kenyans are familiar), are the confiscation of land by the colonial authorities, the betrayal of the independence struggle, the exclusion of Mau Mau leadership from government after 1963, and the issue of land consolidation in Murang’a (Fort Hall) from 1955 to 1964.

    In Chapter 21, entitled “The Betrayal of ‘Uhuru’”, Kaggia writes extensively and movingly of how the promises of the struggle for Uhuru were betrayed.

    One of the changes the freedom fighters expected in 1963 was the return of all lands belonging to Mau Mau fighters confiscated during the Emergency. “Almost 3500 people lost their land under the Native Lands Rights Confiscation Order in 1955 and 1956 alone.

    These are the official figures and much confiscated land may never have been registered, hence the real figure might be much higher (M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, 1967, Chapter 6).”(p.185). Earlier, collective punishment and the Forfeiture of Land Ordinance, 1953 had already decimated the land rights of freedom fighters and their families. Kenyatta’s government refused to meet any of these expectations.

    Kaggia’s demands on proper land consolidation were also attacked by Kenyatta. Kaggia writes, “In all the Kikuyu districts where land consolidation took place during the Emergency, many thousands of land owners were put in prison and detention camps.

    In Fort Hall District, corruption in the original consolidation had been notorious, so notorious that even the Colonial government agreed and ordered land to be redistributed before they left.

    During the second phase of consolidation, I was determined to see that mistakes committed in the Emergency were not repeated. I wanted to see all ex-detainees, who had had no say during the first colonial consolidation because they were far away in detention camps now had every chance and help in presenting their cases.

    Many of them had their lands taken over by other people, sometimes by their political enemies, the ‘home-guards’ and other collaborators.” (p.192) Kenyatta held these efforts of Kaggia to be ‘interference with land consolidation at Fort Hall’.

    Kenyatta “saw all my criticism as a threat, and to make sure they could go ahead without objection, they dismissed me” from [my] post of assistant minister in the government.(p.193)

    There can be no true understanding of Kenya’s history since independence without the reading of this biography. The authors have rendered Kenyans and all historians an invaluable service.

    Bildad’s message from 1963 was that we cannot build a nation on successive injustices forgotten. We today must likewise not close our eyes to the great injustice going on during these elections – that the price youth must pay to get employment is to forget the injustices to their parents.

    This is not a campaign favour to youth. It is tricking the youth out of their entitlement to their land, their right to lead, and their right to their family histories and achievements to accept a cheaper alternative. This can be done because we forget the betrayals of the past. And importantly, forget who betrayed the promises.

    At the mausoleum where Kaggia’s book was launched, Mrs Deborah Wambui Kaggia’s words are engraved on her polished granite gravestone: “It is not enough to remember our freedom fighters and heroes; we must also remember the traitors who betrayed our cause and our people.”

  • Blood thirsty kikuyu assasins

    Pio Gama Pinto: Mystery of his assassination solved by Kumekucha informant

    Ever since I launched this blog in May 2005, I have always believed that Kenya’s turnaround will start when the killers of one Tom Mboya (and others like JM and Robert Ouko) are brought to book. In fact the main man responsible for Mboya’s assassination is still very much alive (more on that later). And so since 2005 I have consistently maintained the hobby of researching the murder of this great Kenyan and constantly seeking new evidence wherever it can be found. It has been a fulfilling and fascinating experience. You see we live in very exciting times popularly referred to as the information age. Information is much easier to find that it has ever been in history. So fascinating stuff has cropped up on the web and at other times from very unexpected quarters. You see people get old and their conscience starts disturbing them and all of a sudden they start revealing stuff. That is exactly what happened for me to come across the explosive information I am about to publish. This information has never been published before.

    But before I do, let me also say that I love investigative detective shows on Television. But none more than Cold Case. It fascinates me that detectives can actually gather evidence from a crime scene 20 years after the crime was committed. The assassination of Tom Mboya one lunch time on July 5th 1969 remains a cold case because the main perpetrators have never been arrested. The guy who supposedly hung for the crime, only pulled the trigger.

    Well here is the information I recently came across. It sheds new light into the assassinations of two great Kenyans.

    • Both Tom Mboya and Pio Gama Pinto feared for their lives and suspected that they would be killed a few weeks before their deaths.

    Fascinatingly, a week before Pinto’s murder Mboya warned Pinto that he would be assassinated, according to my impeccable source. This information shocked me because Pinto’s murder has always been a mystery and Mboya’s name has even been mentioned as one of the people in the then powerful Kanu Kenyatta camp that sanctioned the assassination.

    My source says that Mboya told Pinto that despite their ideological differences Pinto needed to get out of the country because he was going to be killed. Mboya said that it was not in his power to prevent this happening. Pinto’s response was to ask Mboya why he was warning him. Mboya then said that he could not keep quiet about such a thing. Sadly Pinto did not believe that Kenyatta’s inner circle were capable of murder. He told Mboya that his assassination would cause too much of an uproar in the country. Mboya insisted that they were still going to do it.

    • But even more shocking are revelations of a confrontation between Pinto and Kenyatta in parliament buildings shortly before Pinto was warned by Mboya. (Few people know that Pinto and Kenyatta had a long history. Right from the days when Kenyatta was detained, Pinto used to run errands for him and fund raise for him as well). Pinto had discovered that Kenyatta had allocated himself a total of 50 farms in Central province and Rift valley. Some of the farms had poor Kikuyu squatters who were to be evicted. Others were farms that had been owned by whites and sold back to the Kenyan government. Pinto was incensed by this and despite making overtures to Kenyatta not to go ahead with the evil he was doing, Kenyatta adamantly stuck to his guns. Pinto decided to move a vote of no confidence in Kenyatta. Kenyatta confronted him within the precincts of parliament and challenged him over the no confidence vote. When Pinto refused to back down Kenyatta called him a bastard to which Pinto immediately responded by telling Kenyatta in front of witnesses and other cabinet ministers that he (Kenyatta) was also a bastard. A stunned friend pulled Pinto aside and asked him how he could call Kenyatta a bastard to which Pinto retorted, ‘he called me one first’. It was shortly after this incident that the decision was made to kill Pinto.

    Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had arranged for Pinto to hide in Mombasa and if necessary sneak out of the country from there. However Joseph Murumbi (who was to be appointed Vice President later that year) heard about this and said it was not possible for Kenyatta to kill Pinto. He promised to speak to Kenyatta himself and diffuse the situation. He told Odinga to put Pinto on the train back to Nairobi and pick him up from the station.

    • The day of Pinto’s death he was to move the motion in the afternoon session. Two fiat cars drew up at his house that morning. They were both taxis. The drivers had been paid kshs 7,000 each to do the job. There were plain clothes CID officers with them in car to ensure their escape. Pinto was killed in cold blood. It has never been revealed before but it was the realization that Pinto’s assassination had been carried out by Kenyatta insiders that led to the resignation of Joseph Murumbi as Vice President.

    • Some months later a friend of Pinto’s got a phone call from a man who claimed he knew Pinto’s killers. They agreed to meet. The man said he was a taxi driver and knew who had pulled the trigger. They (Pinto’s friend and the taxi driver) then went to a brothel where the man said the killer frequented. He said he always wore a red shirt. Some time later the man came out of the brothel somewhere in Westlands. The man surprisingly admitted to being the killer. He said that some CID officers had approached him for a job and had paid him KShs 7,000. He argued that it was so much money for a poor man that he quickly agreed.

    • On Tom Mboya, my source just confirmed information I already have. Mboya too had been warned by his American friends that Kenyatta was planning to kill him. They offered him body guards to which Mboya refused. Mboya’s assassination was organised by Njoroge Mungai who was the “Mr Fix it” in Kenyatta’s inner circle. The dirty man in Kenyattas inner circle, my source calls him. Charles Njonjo’s job was to protect him. My source also calls Njoroge Mungai the ‘organiser’.

  • The making of a dictator

    Global Insight: Another Kenyatta outsmarts the west
    By Katrina Manson in Nairobi
    30 April 2013

    The new leader is proving deft at politics even with a charge for crimes against humanity hanging over his head
    For years after Kenya won independence from the UK in 1963, its former colonial ruler ran its army, navy and air force. The SAS trained the president’s ethnic Kikuyu bodyguard.

    That was because throughout the 1960s, Kenya’s status as a cold war battleground goaded the west into action. When Russian-backed Somalia supported the secession of a chunk of Kenya’s northeast and Kenyan Somalis rebelled, the UK offered Kenya firepower in support.

    There had been hints Kenya might swing the other way. In 1964, home minister Oginga Odinga negotiated a nine-project deal with the Soviet leader, Nikita Krushchev, and agreed a $15m infrastructure loan with China.
    For the west, that was not a sensible hedging of bets by a newly independent nation; it was proof of apostasy. The US characterised Mr Odinga as a communist agent. But western support seemed to deliver: at one point, Kenya shut down a Chinese news bureau and expelled Chinese diplomats. Kenya had picked its lane.

    That polarisation suited independence leader Jomo Kenyatta as he battled Odinga, the man who had helped win him his freedom and initially supported his leadership. Into the bargain, the UK and US shored up Kenyatta’s regime as it lurched towards authoritarianism.

    When the largely non-Kikuyu army briefly mutinied in 1964, the British helped put down the revolt. Press censorship and detention without trial crept in; Kikuyu ascendancy blurred into ethnic chauvinism and the clampdown culminated in political assassinations.

    A generation later, the war on terror has replaced the cold war, western anxiety about China’s rise continues and the west finds itself outmanoeuvred for domestic political gain once again.

    Kenya’s new crop of political leaders, drawn from independence dynasties – Kenyatta and Odinga’s sons, Uhuru and Raila, are the new president and presidential runner-up respectively – is adroit at exploiting global faultlines afresh.

    President Uhuru Kenyatta – named after the Swahili word for freedom two years before his father won it for his country from the British – is just as deft at playing international politics as his father, even with an international charge for crimes against humanity hanging over his head.

    Were he found guilty, it would probably put him behind bars for decades. He is accused of bankrolling ethnic death squads that were unleashed five years ago after disputed polls saw him rise to prominence among his Kikuyu community.

    While he has since taken a stab at statesmanship – urging national cohesion at his inauguration speech this week – the attack dogs are out. His campaign team, which had British advisers, used the threat of western disapproval at his candidacy to bind support for Mr Kenyatta under the emotive banner of sovereignty.
    At his inauguration, Indian and Chinese diplomats were out on show. Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s president and the only foreign official to speak, glowered and said that backers of The Hague-based International Criminal Court, to which Kenya turned when its own justice system was too weak to go after perpetrators, were guilty of arrogance and blackmail.

    Foreign officials are penned in by such anti-colonial rhetoric, which deliberately miscasts Mr Kenyatta’s adversaries as the west rather than the five million or so who voted for Raila Odinga.

    Just as in the 1960s, western money is flowing into Kenya and security knits both together. Foreign officials remain intent on protecting western capitals by pursuing threats abroad and Mr Kenyatta reminded them in his inauguration speech that Kenya will remain a key supporter of efforts to stop the jihadists who attack Somalia and beyond.

    The US has paid for biometric identification at Kenyan borders; the UK trains Kenyan troops who battle Islamist militants, as well as 10,000 of its own per year in conditions that replicate the Afghan heat. Both run counterterrorism operations from the country.

    That makes Kenya once again seem indispensable, and this time round too, justice and ethnic chauvinism may be at stake. The withdrawal of several witness testimonies may yet see the ICC cases collapse. One Kikuyu insider expects Mr Kenyatta’s rule to return to the “brutal politics” of the 1960s.

    Western governments are destined to remain keen allies of and investors in Kenya. But they may still find themselves being outsmarted.

  • 1. JONES MUKEKA, UNTESTED EMBASSY SOURCE CLAIMING CONTACT WITH
    HIGH-LEVEL KAMBA AND KIKUYU POLITICIANS, TOLD EMBOFF FEB. 7
    THAT PLOT IS UNDERWAY TO ASSASSINATE KENYAN VICE PRESIDENT DANIEL
    ARAP MOI. PRESIDENT KENYATTA REPORTEDLY AWARE OF PLOT.

    2. ACCORDING MUKEKA, ASSASSINATION BEING PLANNED BY A KIKUYU
    NAMED MUIGAI (NICKNAMED LUMUMBA) WHO ALLEGEDLY ALSO PLANNED
    1969 ASSASSINATION OF TOM MBOYA. ASSASSIN WILL BE FELLOW
    KALENJIN. MOTIVE SAID TO BE KIKUYU UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT MOI
    AS KENYATTA’S SUCCESSOR. CONSPIRATORS REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THEY
    MUST MOVE AGAINSTMOI WHILE KENYATTA STILL ALIVE. MUKEKA FURTHER
    REPORTS KIKUYU LEADERS ALSO PLAN MOVE TO NEUTRALIZE MOI’S KEY
    KIKUYU SUPPORTERS: ATTORNEY GENERAL NJONJO AND MINISTER FOR
    COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, KIANO.

    3. SAME SOURCE REPORTS LEADING KIKUYU AND KAMBA POLITICIANS
    (INCLUDING FORMER FON MIN MUNGAI, MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND PLANN-
    ING KIBAKI AND MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT PAUL NGEI)
    SCHEDULED TO HOLD A SECOND MEETING FEB. 7-8 TO DISCUSS
    SUCCESSION ISSUE. EXPECTED TO SELECT COMPROMISE KIKUYU CANDID-
    ATE FOR PRESIDENCY. NGEI, A KAMBA, SAID TO HAVE BEEN ALREADY
    TAPPED FOR VICE PRESIDENCY.
    SECRET

    SECRET

    PAGE 02 NAIROB 01174 071431Z

    4. MUKEKA CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD FREQUENT PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH
    AF/E DIRECTOR COOTE. EMBASSY WOULD WELCOME COOTE’S COMMENTS
    ON HIS RELIABILITY.
    MARSHALL

    SECRET

    NNN

    http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975NAIROB01174_b.html

  • Kenyatta land grabber

    Kenyatta led elite in land grabbing
    By NATION REPORTER
    Posted Tuesday, May 21 2013 at 22:52

    The regime of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was riddled with land grabbing which was perpetrated by him for his benefit and members of his family.

    The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission report says that the injustice also benefitted other political leaders from other tribes.

    The report released Tuesday revealed that between 1964 and 1966, one-sixth of European settlers’ lands that were intended for settlement of landless and land-scarce Africans were cheaply sold to the then President Kenyatta and his wife Ngina as well as his children.

    The report says that throughout the years of President Kenyatta’s administration, his relatives friends and officials in his administration also benefitted from the vice with wanton impunity.

    Retired President Daniel arap Moi, who succeeded President Kenyatta at the helm of the country’s leadership, was also a beneficiary.

    Other leaders who engaged in the pratice were Mbiyu Koinange, Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, through the Luo Thrift and Trading Company, Gikonyo Kiano, J.M. Kariuki, Masinde Muliro and Paul Ngei.

    Reads the report; “Kenyatta himself appears to have benefited immensely from irregular allocations of land that should have benefited those who lost land to Arab and British colonisers.’

    Settler farms

    “By 1965, Kenyatta is reported to have been using his position as president to buy numerous settler farms in the White Highlands and also excising and allocating to himself and family government forest land in Kiambu,” went on the report.

    “President Kenyatta’s direct engagement in irregular land allocations compromised his position to prevent or remedy similar cases of land grabbing by his close associates,” the report adds.

    It says Kenyatta personally approved the purchase of large farms by his family in the Rift Valley, exempting the transactions from review by the respective land control boards.

    In the process, his family acquired vast farms in Nakuru, Njoro and Rongai areas in the Rift Valley.

    Moreover, adds the report, the President and his family owned several beach plots and hotels on the Coast where, as previously stated, many African communities lost their land, first, to Arabs and later to Europeans, rendering many landless, to this day.

  • Kenyatta land grabber

    theStar

    KENYATTA, MOI SEIZED 17% OF WHITE FARMS – TJRC

    Thursday, May 23, 2013 – 00:00 — BY NZAU MUSAU

    PRESIDENT Jomo Kenyatta and his successor President Daniel arap Moi grabbed 17 percent of white owned land after independence, according to the TJRC report released on Tuesday.

    “One sixth of the settler lands were found to have been sold intact to the emerging African elite comprising Kenyatta, his wife, children and close associates. These elites did not even need much money to buy settler farms, as they were also able to raise loans from government bodies such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the Land and Agriculture Bank,” says the report.

    The report named Daniel arap Moi, Mbiyu Koinange, Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, Gikonyo Kiano, J.M. Kariuki, Masinde Muliro and Paul Ngei as among Kenyatta’s associates who benefited from cheap land allocations.

    “By 1965, Kenyatta is reported to have been using his position as president to buy numerous settler farms in the White Highlands and also excising and allocating to himself and family government forest in Kiambu,” it says.

    Further, he personally approved the purchase of large farms by his family, exempting the transactions from review by the respective Land Control Boards. His family acquired vast farms in Nakuru, Njoro and Rongai in the Rift Valley.

    “The president and his family owned several beach plots and hotels on the Coast where, as many African communities lost their land, first, to Arabs and later to Europeans, rendering many landless, to this day,” said the report.

    The report says that the President and his family had more than eleven properties at the Coast by 1972, including hotels in addition to those he owned through proxies. Mombasa Municipal Council waived all land rates due on his property in that year.

    Despite the land shortage in Taita Taveta, Kenyatta partnered with the Basil Criticos family to establish a large sisal plantation leaving many families as squatters. Criticos owned 30,000 acres but Kenyatta’s parcel was bigger, according to the report.

    It says the President issued a decree barring the sale of any beach plots without his permission:

    “His objective was to control the lands and direct their transactions in his favour, through irregular land transactions that were overseen by the then Coast Provincial Commissioner Eliud Mahihu,” it says.

    Kenyatta reportedly allocated a lot of land at the beach and the coast in Likoni, Waitiki Farm, Casalak in Diani, Msambweni and Lunga Lunga to himself, his family, his relatives and friends.

    Among the beneficiaries listed by the TJRC report are former Eliud Mahihu, Isaiah Mathenge, Matu Wamae, John Michuki, Beth Mugo, John G. Mburu, Charles Koinange, Isaiah Cheluget, Paul Boit and Simon Nyachae.

    The report says many of the land allocation beneficiaries served as PCs and were sons of former colonial home guards or chiefs. When Moi became president in 1978, the report says that he resorted to massive allocations of unalienated government land and other real property in “virtually every part of the country.” “To facilitate unquestioned dealings in land, Moi re-organized key ministries, including the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and the Ministry of Defence by placing his cronies, mostly members of his ethnic Kalenjin community in strategic positions,” it says.

    They then engaed in massive illegal acquisition of lands owned by the Agricultural Development Corporation, forest lands including in the Mau Forest, protected wildlife areas, wildlife migration corridors, public beaches, government houses and lands reserved for public utilities across the country.

    The report also mentions former Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka among a list of 446 prominent persons implicated in human rights violations, ethnic clashes, land grabbing and recommended for either prosecution or investigations.

    Musyoka allegedly participated in the funding of an illegal gang ‘Kabuithu” which evicted over 2000 Tharaka families. He allegedly awarded himself a large tract of deserted land at Tholoni. His allies Senator David Musila and Leader of Minority Francis Nyenze were also named in the report.

    Nyenze is accused of illegal excision of 3000 acres of Hombe forest which was illegally allocated to himself and others when he was a minister. Musila is accused in the report of the eviction of residents in Nzalae while serving as the chairman of Nzalae Group Ranchers in early 1980s.

    Senator Samuel Moroto should be prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecution over alleged incitement in Kasarani in 2007, says the report.

    Embu Governor Nyagah Wambora should be prosecuted for involvement in the torture and ill-treatment of Mwakenya suspects in the 1980s, the report says. Cabinet Secretary Najib Balala could be prosecuted for incitement to violence in 2007/8, according to the report.

    Commission for Revenue Allocation chairman Micah Cheserem was liable for land grabbing in the 1990s. MP Joseph Nkaissery is adversely mentioned over a military operation in Pokot in 1984.

    “The operation was also spearheaded with rape and beating of the locals. The disarmament exercise resulted in deaths of civilians in what has come to be known as Lotiriri massacre,” it says.

    Others recommended for prosecutions over past violations are Senator GG Kariuki, MP Samuel Moroto, former MP Petkay Miriti, Alfred Khang’ati, Joshua Kuttuny, Njenga Mungai, John Serut, Fred Kapondi, farmer Jackson Kibor, former PC Francis Sigei, former Police boss Shadrack Kiruki, former PS Internal Security James Mathenge, former PC Joseph Kaguthi, former PC Benson Kaaria

    Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Board chairman Sharad Rao is adversely named in the report for his part in the controversial trials of alleged plotters and conspirators of the 1982 coup. The DPP has been asked to investigate him.

    The TJRC said former Chief Justice Bernard Chunga was unfit to hold any office over unfair Mwakenya trials while Brig Joseph Musomba, chair of the court martial that tried the 82 coup plotters, should be investigated over infringement of fair trial guarantees.

    Others adversely mentioned are former CID director Noah arap Too, former minister William ole Ntimama, former MP Norman Nyagah, former MPs Peter Kiilu, Kalembe Ndile, Lucas Chepkitony, former ministers Zachary Onyonka, Hussein Maalim, Sally Kosgey, Henry Kosgey, John Keen, member of the Police Service Commission Shadrack Muiu, CIC Commissioner Philemon Mwaisaka and Lazarus Sumbeiywo.

    http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-121441/kenyatta-moi-seized-17-white-farms-tjrc

  • mama ngina mwizi

    Mama Ngina listed top investor at Kenya Power with 2.2 million shares
    By BD REPORTER
    Posted Monday, May 20 2013

    Kenya Power has listed Mama Ngina Kenyatta as its fourth largest individual investor, making the electricity distributor the only Nairobi bourse-listed company bearing her name on the shareholder list.

    Filings with the Capital Markets Authority show that President Uhuru Kenyatta’s mother owns 2.2 million shares or a 0.11 per cent stake in the company, whose ownership is dominated by institutional investors like the Treasury and National Social Security Fund (NSSF).

    It’s not clear when she acquired the minority stake, which is small compared to the multi-billion-shilling investments controlled by the Kenyatta family in real estate, insurance, education, banking, manufacturing, farming and hospitality sectors.

    Very little is known about Mama Ngina, widow of Kenya’s first President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, who has managed to keep a low profile as she presided over the vast family business.

    Her Kenya Power stake, currently valued at Sh37.7 million, has baffled analysts on reasons behind holding the minority stake in the electricity utility.

    “If the share has not been hived off a larger trust, it was certainly not bought for commercial reasons,” said Johnson Nderi, an analyst at Suntra Investment Bank.

    Similar comments were made by an analyst at Standard Investment Bank. The former first lady earned a dividend of Sh1.1 million.

    Kenya Power declared a dividend of Sh0.50 for the year ended June 2012, up from Sh0.45 the previous year.

    The firm’s shares have failed to benefit from the recovery of the Nairobi Securities Exchange, shedding 6.3 per cent over the past six months in a period that has seen most counters record double-digit gain.

    Family’s business empire

    As the matriarch in charge of the Kenyatta family’s vast business empire, Mama Ngina presides over an enterprise that is associated with well-known commercial brands and blue chip companies.

    This includes Commercial Bank of Africa, which is Kenya’s largest non-listed lender with total assets of Sh100 billion and last year posted a net profit of Sh2.6 billion.

    The bank is ranked Kenya’s ninth largest with a market size index of 4.08 per cent.

    Others are Brookside Dairy — where the President’s younger brother, Muhoho, sits as executive chairman, and the upmarket hotel chain, Heritage Hotels East Africa.

    The family is also linked to Media Max Company, which owns K24 TV, Kameme Radio and The People newspaper.

    This article was first published in our sister publication Business Daily.

  • Kenyatta land grabber

    Jomo Kenyatta grabbed my land, man tells court
    Updated Wednesday, May 29th 2013 at 22:05 GMT +3

    By WAHOME THUKU

    Kenya:  An elderly man has accused the late President Jomo Kenyatta of illegally acquiring a 1.9-acre of land from him.

    Mr Gichuhi Kinyanjui, claims the late President took the land in Dagoretti area and combined it with his own.

    Kinyanjui’s story, now subject of a court petition, reads like the biblical analogy that those with less shall have everything taken from them and given to those who have much.

    Yet if he had another choice, Kinyanjui who filed the petition last month, would have opted not to drag the Kenyatta family to court, especially for his political stand.

    Being an elderly man from the same community as the late President, Kinyanjui is apologetic at the very onset for having resulted to legal action.

    “I have not gone to court in bad faith and I don’t want to be seen as undermining my community, I am only seeking justice for myself,” he told The Standard in a telephone interview.

    And he would not wish to have his picture in the media or to make his case a subject of public debate.

    Kinyanjui says his late father Kinyanjui Matubia gave the piece of land at Ngando area in Riruta to him in 1957. The Kenyatta family has for decades been on the defensive over claims the founding President Jomo Kenyatta acquired massive land across the country in unclear circumstances.

    Prime surburbs

    While the family is often targeted over thousands of acres of land they own at the Coast, Central Kenya and the Rift Valley, one 89-year old man in Nairobi has his own small claim of land against the Kenyatta family.

    Under the current market rate, the land would fetch millions of shillings being in the prime suburbs of the city.

    After demarcation, his parcel was registered as LR. Dagoretti/Riruta/94. He was given a yellow card as he waited for the processing of the title deed. Unluckily for him, his immediate neighbour was Grace Wahu Kenyatta, the first wife of Jomo Kenyatta.

    That was the source of his predicament as he waited in vain for the processing of the title deed. Emissaries approached him from Wahu Kenyatta’s family who informed him that the late President intended to consolidate his 1.9 acres with Wahu’s and he would be adequately compensated.

    He says he never reached any agreement with either the emissaries or the President and therefore the question of compensation was not discussed. “The emissaries only made verbal promises and nothing was put in writing,” he says.

    Kinyanjui says much later, he learned his land had been consolidated with Wahu’s without his consent. The consolidated land had then been registered as LR. Dagoretti/Riruta/861 and was now owned by Jomo Kenyatta.

    He never received any compensation and never heard again from the Kenyatta family.“Inquiries of the records at the lands office reveal the parcel has changed and now it’s registered as LR. Dagoretti/Riruta/4099,” he told the High Court.

  • Uhuru ICC charges

    http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2013/s3772483.htm

    Kenyan president charged with crimes against humanity
    Ginny Stein reported this story on Sunday, June 2, 2013

    ELIZABETH JACKSON: Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta has been charged with horrific crimes of using his family’s wealth to bankroll death squads that have slaughtered women and children.

    But that knowledge did not stop him, or his former foe turned running mate, from standing for the highest office in the country and getting elected.

    When Kenya’s Chief Justice declared Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner of the election, there was a fundamental shift in the way Kenyans viewed themselves and in the way others viewed them.

    Our Africa correspondent Ginny Stein reports that it’s no longer business as usual.

    GINNY STEIN: There was always going to be one guarantee when I moved to Kenya – that a lot of my time would be spent following a trial that whichever way it went, would be well written into history.

    It’s not every day that a country’s president is called to stand trial before the International Criminal Court.

    And not just any president, but the son of Kenya’s founding father Jomo Kenyatta.

    His son Uhuru, whose name means independence or freedom, was not originally thought to want a career in politics but somewhere along the line that changed.

    And according to the allegations before the court, there was little, once he decided that he wanted office, that he would stop at to get there.

    Today, he and his deputy William Ruto are united. But there was a time in Kenya when William Ruto chanted “don’t be vague, go to The Hague” when he thought it was only Uhuru Kenyatta who would be indicted.

    Now he too has been called before the court.

    Both men are accused of orchestrating murder in order to beat each other.

    Ever since 2007’s post-election violence, where more than 1300 people were killed and almost half a million made homeless, Kenya’s political elite have squirmed and turned over who should be held accountable and how justice should ultimately happen.

    Once loyal supporters of the International Criminal Court, now that the focus is at home, support in Kenya has not so much wavered, but faltered.

    In the past few weeks, political wriggling on this issue has reached new levels. The African Union this week bowed in to pressure and added its voice, with Ethiopia’s president accusing the International Criminal Court of hunting Africans because of their race.

    Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopia’s prime minister and chairman of the African Union, made it clear he would be complaining to the UN about what he viewed a flawed system, which ensured that 99 per cent of those indicted were African.

    While that animosity is expressed loudly in many quarters across Africa, so too has there been support for when it’s wanted.

    University of Nairobi Law Professor Paul Wambua says attempts to pull out of the International Court process fail to acknowledge that once a case is before the court, it is too late.

    PAUL WAMBUA: We submitted ourselves to the jurisdiction of the ICC (International Criminal Court); we are bound to co-operate.

    Now the procedure for trial of ICC cases is very clear – if for whatever reason, Kenya wants to pull out of the ICC, then the procedure is well provided, and that does not affect pending cases, which means once a case has been properly referred to the ICC it must be concluded.

    GINNY STEIN: But even before Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto decided to join forces to run for office, manoeuvring on this issue had begun.

    Despite giving assurances that are willing to front the International Criminal Court in The Hague, they would rather the case be brought back to Kenya.

    And this is despite the rules on whether and how the matter should be tried were clearly defined under a commission of inquiry into the post-election violence headed by Justice Philip Waki.

    While the International Criminal Court case looks set to proceed, there are doubts and some say the case is in fact doomed.

    The chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has revealed that unprecedented levels of witness intimidation and bribery are undermining the cases brought against Kenya’s two top politicians.

    Those tactics are only likely to escalate. In a country where power is all, it is hard to see any Kenyan brave enough or foolhardy enough to take the witness stand against a head of state.

    But the bottom line is that without an outcome, for the hundreds of thousands of people who remain homeless there will be no justice until someone is held to account.

    This is Ginny Stein in Nairobi for Correspondents Report.

  • kikuyu mafia blocks land report

    http://www.trust.org/item/20130603124352-bsiac

    Kenyan president’s office censored report on high-level land grabbing – commissionersSource: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 12:43 PM

    Author: Katy Migiro

    NAIROBI (Thomson Reuters Foundation) – Three foreign members of a commission looking into historical injustices in Kenya have said the president’s office censored a report to exclude references to irregular land seizures.

    The commissioners said the Office of the President put pressure on the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to delete paragraphs from its May report in which witnesses testified that Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta irregularly gave out public land to his family, friends and ethnic group. Current President Uhuru Kenyatta is the son of the country’s founding leader.

    “We could not in good conscience agree to the removal of these voices, particularly when such removal was so clearly motivated by political pressure from high government officials,” commissioners Ron Slye of the United States, Berhanu Dinka of Ethiopia and Gertrude Chawatama of Zambia said in a statement published on Sunday.

    As a result of this pressure, changes were made irregularly to the approved and signed report, which was published on May 21, after the end of the commission’s operational period, the foreign commissioners said. The dissenting commissioners’ opinion was also excluded, contrary to agreed procedure that it should be printed with the main report.

    “The political pressure that was brought to bear ostensibly to protect the reputation of the first President will probably have the opposite effect of tarnishing that legacy,” the statement added.

    The commissioners said they do not know whether the current president was aware of the actions of officials in his office.

    The TJRC report detailed political assassinations, human rights violations, corruption and other historical abuses in Kenya between independence in 1963 and 2008, when the commission was set up following post-election violence that killed 1,200 people.

    LEAKED TO STATE HOUSE

    Land was one of the drivers of conflict during 2007/08 and of other conflicts that Kenya has experienced since 1963.

    The commissioners said a copy of the chapter on land from its report “appears to have been leaked to individuals with ties to State House [the president’s official residence]” while the document was waiting to be printed.

    The Office of the President then insisted on being given an advance copy of the entire report so that President Uhuru Kenyatta could familiarise himself with its contents before officially receiving it.

    Soon after, several Kenyan commissioners began arguing for major revisions to the land chapter.

    “A number of Commissioners, including at least one of the international Commissioners, received phone calls from a senior official in the Office of the President suggesting various changes to the land chapter,” the statement said.

    The deleted material mainly details allegations of land grabbing by Jomo Kenyatta.

    For example, one paragraph says Kenyatta gave his son a wedding gift in 1976 of “a large tract of government land which was, apparently, acquired without official approval and without compliance with legal procedures”.

    Another paragraph says Kenyatta “unlawfully alienated to himself 250 acres” of trust land on the coast that was supposed to be held by the government in trust for the people.

    “Irregularly, President Kenyatta took all of Tiwi and Diani trust lands at the expense of local people who immediately became ‘squatters’ on the land and were subsequently evicted, rendering them landless and poor,” it said.

    Tiwi and Diani are prime holiday destinations on Kenya’s coast where international hotels line the beachfront. This land currently sells at 15 million Kenyan shillings ($176,000) per acre, the report said.

    Also deleted was a warning that such land disputes “should be carefully addressed to avert the possibility of more secessionist movements” – referring to the Mombasa Republic Council on the coast, which wants independence from Kenya.

    Campaigners have cast doubt on any action being taken in response to the alleged censorship of the report, given that President Kenyatta’s father is named as one of the main culprits in the irregular land seizures.

  • ‘Big Mama’ and the Massacre: ICC’s Reputation at Risk in Kenya

    By Erich Follath
    July 26, 2013

    The road to where she is today was long and rocky. But now, she is the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), empowered by 121 countries to hunt down the worst of the world’s mass murderers and put them behind bars, a criminal prosecutor in cases involving genocide and the world’s public prosecutor. She is, in a sense, everyone’s supreme conscience.

    Fatou Bensouda, 52, and her team have taken the bold step of indicting 51-year-old Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. But in this case, there is a stark contrast between their aspirations and reality. At the moment, Kenyatta’s attorneys seem to have the upper hand. They have demanded that the case be dropped, arguing that there is no evidence to prove that their client is guilty. In mid-June, they managed to postpone the planned court date a second time, this time for four months, on the grounds that the prosecutor’s office had not produced evidence on time.

    Throughout Africa, as well as in the West, doubts are growing as to whether the case has a future at all. Daily Nation, Kenya’s leading newspaper, called the case “a farce,” while a TV commentator in Nairobi referred to it as “suicide on the part of the world court.”

    In recent weeks, Bensouda has been doing all she can to save the situation, spending inordinate amounts of time behind the bulletproof glass windows of her office in The Hague. She works late into the night, only to take yet another look at the files early the next morning. She is possessed of an iron will.

    There is a great deal at stake. If the case against Kenyatta were to collapse, the ICC would lose what little authority it still has and would become a tool as useless as it is costly. And it isn’t just a matter of the court’s survival: The long-cherished dream of global justice seems on the verge of failure. In addition to the permanent ICC, other, temporary United Nations courts have likewise failed to produce successes.

    Holding Commanders Responsible?

    The Cambodia Tribunal, for example, a court established to try the individuals responsible for the Khmer Rouge genocide, is merely treading water. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), by contrast, has managed to produce some convictions, but a judge at the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague recently deplored the political pressure that allegedly led to the spectacular recent acquittals of senior Serbian and Croat officers. The judge said that the decisions called into question the principle that military commanders could be held responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates. It is a concern that will soon be tested on Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic, with relatives of the Srebrenica massacre victims fearful that he will be set free.

    At the ICC, prosecutor Bensouda is respectfully referred to as “Big Mama,” because of her big heart and her authority. She knows what is at stake in the Kenyatta case — for her, for the court and for the concept of a global court.

    As a little girl, Fatou Bensouda already had a clear idea of what her destiny was: She wanted to fight crime. She also knew how difficult that could be. In the early 1970s, she accompanied her aunt several times to a police station in Banjul, the capital of her native Gambia, in West Africa. The aunt’s husband had beaten her repeatedly. But the police officers refused to investigate her complaints, because it was felt that the master of the house had every right to beat his wife. Such crimes were left unpunished. It was something that Bensouda felt had to change.

    As a teenager, she always went to the courthouse after school, no matter what case the court happened to be hearing. She obsessively took notes and later discussed the cases with her mothers. Bensouda grew up in a polygamous Muslim household, in which her father had several wives.

    Later, when she was studying in Nigeria and Malta, she turned her attention to international law. A brilliant jurist, Bensouda was the first woman to become the attorney general, and later the justice minister, of Gambia. But conflict with the country’s president, in a system that is democratic in name only, was inevitable. She resigned after two years and later began working for the UN, including a stint as a trial attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established to prosecute individuals responsible for the 1994 massacre there.

    A Symbol of Progress

    Bensouda was named chief prosecutor in The Hague in June 2012. The same year, Time included her on its list of the world’s 100 most influential people. She is seen as a symbol of African progress.

    Nevertheless, it is becoming clear that her influence is greatly limited. When she indicts powerful people, like Kenya’s president and vice-president, she is dealing with more than just the high-powered lawyers they hire. She also faces intimidation by those capable of manipulating public opinion in countries racked by civil war and turning it against a court that operates far away from the scenes of the crimes it addresses.

    The ICC also lacks the support of some of the world’s most powerful politicians. Although most countries have submitted to its jurisdiction, the United States and China never joined the ICC. Both Iran and Israel are also unwilling to relinquish a part of their judicial sovereignty.

    The court began prosecuting crimes against humanity 11 years ago, but its track record has been deplorable. This is partly due to sloppy investigations and the arrogance of Bensouda’s predecessor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, who once said: “We are changing the world, guys.” So far, the ICC can boast of only one conviction, and that in a case relating to a second-tier defendant. In 2012, the ICC sentenced Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubanga to 14 years in prison for using child soldiers as cannon fodder. Arrest warrants have been issued against other butchers, like Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony — but the men are still at large, because they are too important to be extradited.

    The ICC is currently investigating eight cases, all of them in Africa — a situation which has engendered criticism. The prosecution of crimes by the ICC has degenerated into “race-baiting,” Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said at the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa at the end of May. In a resolution, the leaders of AU member states demanded that the case against Kenyatta be dismissed and remitted to the courts in Nairobi.

    Bensouda calls the attacks “outrageous.” Speaking with SPIEGEL, she pointed out that she herself is black and investigates cases without regard for skin color or nationality. “It is indisputable that Africans are being raped, displaced, tortured and held as child slaves by other Africans. Are we supposed to ignore that?”

    Misplaced Optimism?

    Besides, she added, the list of countries the ICC is currently focusing on also includes Afghanistan, Honduras and Georgia. “What offends me most of all is how quickly many concentrate on the words of the powerful, forgetting the millions who have no voice. We investigate without distinction of person or political rank.”

    “Big Mama’s” staff members have rarely seen their boss looking as nervous as in recent days. Almost defiantly, as if to embolden herself, she says: “We will bring Kenyatta to trial here in The Hague, and I am very optimistic that we will achieve a guilty verdict against him and his vice-president, William Ruto.”

    But despite Bensouda’s optimism, Kenyatta continues to reside in an opulent mansion next to the State House, the president’s official residence in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. Kenyatta is the country’s largest landowner and he also controls its largest bank, not to mention a major hotel chain.

    With an estimated net worth of $500 million (€378 million), Kenyatta is one of the 25 richest and most powerful men on the continent. Kenyan politics reflects the extent to which a handful of clans dominate the country. Fifty years ago, shortly after independence from Great Britain, a Kenyatta and an Odinga competed for power. In March 2013, nothing had changed except the first names of the contenders. The sons, Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, had followed in the footsteps of their fathers, Jomo and Oginga.

    The scourge of nepotism is compounded by ethnic division, in a country whose leaders are more likely to champion the interests of their tribes than ideologies or political platforms. They procure jobs and perks for their “blood brothers” and, if need be, they incite ethnic groups against one another, sometimes to the point of tribal wars.

    The Kenyattas are part of the Kikuyu tribe, which makes up more than 20 percent of the population in Kenya and is the most economically successful ethnic group. Kenyatta did not run for the presidency in the December 2007 election, choosing to support Mwai Kibaki, a fellow Kikuyu, instead. After a highly disputed vote count, Kibaki was declared the winner and promptly sworn in. In the ensuing mayhem, members of the Kalenjin, Luhya and Luo tribes (US President Barack Obama’s father was a member of the Luo tribe) exacted bloody revenge on the “imposters.” The Kikuyu then struck back.

    Divided by Hate

    Before long, villages were fighting villages. In some “mixed” regions, it was street against street. It was only through the intervention of then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that the situation settled down after a few weeks. But by the time the slaughter had ended, there were 1,100 dead with more than half a million people having been driven out of their home provinces. The country was divided by hate.

    At the urging of a Kenyan judge, the ICC turned its attention to the instigators of the violence. In early 2012, the court in The Hague confirmed charges against Kenyatta and Ruto, his rival from the Kalenjin tribe. But can someone be locked up for this indirect form of culpability? And can prosecutors in the Netherlands prevail against men who are sufficiently cunning and unscrupulous to exploit racial hatred? In other words, can these crimes even be defined in legal terms? That is the existential question the ICC faces.

    When it became clear that the two men were to be dragged before the world court, Kenyatta and Ruto devised a clever strategy: They joined forces to form a political alliance of convenience, the Jubilee Alliance. Before long, without any aspects of the 2012 massacres having been cleared up, they began campaigning for election together.

    For much of the campaign, it looked as they had little chance, with Odinga — the opposing candidate and a member of the Luo tribe — maintaining a solid lead. But then Johnnie Carson, head of the Africa division in the US State Department at the time, publicly threatened “consequences” if the Kenyans voted the two men, who had been indicted by the ICC, into the country’s highest offices.

    The threat provided Kenyatta with fodder for his campaign. From then on, whenever he made a campaign appearance he would ask his “sovereign people” whether they should allow foreign powers to dictate to them their choice of national leaders. Kenyatta turned the election into a fight against foreign intervention and the “Western diktat.” The overwhelming majority of Kenyans were unaware of the ironic fact that a London PR firm had developed the campaign strategy for Kenyatta — and that British lawyers make up the bulk of his defense team for the ICC trial.

    A Deaf Ear

    Kenyatta won an absolute majority, with 50.07 percent of the vote. Observers noted that voter turnout was implausibly high, at 86 percent. Rival candidate Odinga suspected fraud and took his case to the country’s supreme court, but it turned a deaf ear to his petition challenging the election results.

    Of course, the West failed to make good on its threats to impose sanctions. Kenya’s cooperation as a strategically important country in the fight against terrorism in Somalia and Sudan is too important to Washington, Paris and London, and they are also eager to prevent China from trumping the West in Nairobi. The new president has been self-confident recently, saying that he would cooperate with the ICC, submit to questioning by video link and, if necessary, even appear in person before the court in The Hague. His supporters refer to him as “Njamba,” or “The Hero.”

    In The Hague, his adversary Bensouda says: “We want the trial to begin as soon as possible. And we deeply appreciate the witnesses’ courage and willingness to make sacrifices. Nowhere else have they come under such great pressure as in Kenya.”

    Many witnesses live in the Great Rift Valley. The steep cliffs, which divide East Africa into two parts, open to form a kind of Garden of Eden, a landscape of volcanic cones, misty lakes and tropical vegetation that offers a habitat to rhinos, flamingos and myriad other forms of wildlife. Anthropologists see the region as a cradle of mankind. But in the first days of 2008, it was more of an Armageddon to residents in the Rift Valley towns of Nakuru and Naivasha.

    A Raging Mob

    “We lived here in peace and good neighborly relations with the other tribes for a long time. We rented our house from a Kikuyu,” says Monicah Akinyi, a Luo woman. Her eyes are dull, rendered lifeless by sadness and desperation. “Then came the day when a raging mob of Kikuyu descended upon us with knives and machetes.”

    “I was pregnant at the time, awaiting our ninth child,” says Akinyi, her voice faltering. “My husband and I worked at one of the big farms that grow roses for export to Europe. Our children played with the Kikuyu children.” As the menacing mob approached, Akinyi took the children and fled to the police station. Her husband tried to help some friends and rushed back to the house. But he didn’t get far before assailants swooped down on him with knives, dozens of them stabbing him again and again.

    The mob raged for days. Akinyi wasn’t even able to recover her husband’s body. She was left with nothing but a photo a journalist had taken of her husband’s corpse. She later learned that similar acts of brutal violence had occurred in other Rift Valley towns, as well as along the coast. Who were the culprits? Can the chain of command in what were clearly actions controlled by others be traced to Kikuyu leader Kenyatta?

    “Today I only live for my children,” says Akinyi, who looks much older than her 37 years. She was pleased when she heard that a woman in a faraway country wanted to bring the culprits to trial. But now she no longer dares to hope. “It all happened more than five years ago,” says Akinyi. “I think the world has forgotten ordinary victims like us.”

    Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
    http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reputation-of-icc-on-the-line-in-case-against-kenya-president-kenyatta-a-913090.html

  • Kenyatta heart attack

    Daily Nation: Kenyatta health scare sparks succession war
    By JOHN KAMAU
    Posted Monday, August 5 2013 at 01:00

    Sometime at the end of April, 1968, President Jomo Kenyatta suffered a heart attack at his Bamburi home in Mombasa.

    The President, who fell into a coma for three days, had been driven to the Coast for what was described as a “busy working holiday.”

    This incident sparked off a fierce jostling for power within government and the ruling party Kanu. It involved politicians Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, Tom Mboya, and Attorney-General Charles Njonjo.

    At the Coast, part of the planned activities for the President was a Labour Day rally on May 1, where, according to the itinerary, he was to arrive at 10 am.

    Everything was set for the function.

    At 10 am there was no President Kenyatta. Instead, Dr Njoroge Mungai, then Minister for Defence and Kenyatta’s personal physician, arrived at the stadium with the President’s official speech. Although the Minister for Labour, Ngala Mwendwa, was there, Dr Mungai insisted that he was representing Kenyatta.

    There was no mention of Kenyatta’s whereabouts. The next day, May 2, at State House Mombasa, Attorney-General Charles Njonjo arrived with puisne judge Justice Dennis Farrell. He wanted him sworn in as the new Chief Justice to replace Sir John Ainley, who had retired.

    The picture taken during the swearing in showed Kenyatta sitting on a sofa-set, while everyone else stood.

    The head of Presidential Press Unit, Mr Kenyanjui Kariuki, guarded the leaks. But on the afternoon of May 4, British journalist David Carlsberg, who was a sub-editor at the Daily Nation, was given a cryptic teleprinter message from a Mombasa correspondent that some medical equipment had been rushed to the residence of a “certain person.”

    George Githii, a former private secretary to the President, was Nation’s Editor-in-Chief. He had also got wind of the rumour from his many State House sources. He confirmed the obvious: Kenyatta was in a coma after suffering another stroke.

    Within an hour, Githii had flown to Mombasa and two journalists. Carlsberg and Philip Ochieng were taken off their normal duties to prepare a 16-page supplement on the death of the President.

    Mr Ochieng wrote the stories capturing the life of the President and they were all laid and encased with a heavy black border. As Mr Carlberg would recall to the Reading Chronicle in 1978, that was the night of the long wait:

    “By nightfall, there was no news yet. It became the longest night I have ever known. Nearly everyone stayed at the office, journalists and the printing workers. People just sat around, hardly saying a word, expecting the telephone to ring any second. At 3 am, I was told to go home and be at work at 7.30 am. The paper was sent to press without the supplement.”

    Kenyatta never died. But the story was kept in safe custody and would be used in 1978, just hours after Kenyatta’s death.

    As rumours persisted, on May 7, Dr Mungai broke the silence and admitted that the President had been “indisposed for the last three days.” He added a rider which was an obvious lie: with “fever”.

    Every day, for the next two days, Dr Mungai, who had taken charge, would release a “Medical Bulletin” on the President’s health. The most classic was the May 8 edition, which simply said that Kenyatta had “normal meals and had been out of bed for a walk”. The reality was that Kenyatta had almost died.

    Former Central Bank governor, Duncan Ndegwa, who was one of the first people to visit Kenyatta after he regained consciousness, would later write that the President had been in a coma for three days at his Bamburi home.

    “Mzee wanted the state of his health kept secret… (Those) were three days of uncertainty …and when he came out, I asked him what had happened. He replied that he had visited weru wa mukaaga (expansive plain),” wrote Mr Ndegwa in his book, Walking in Kenyatta’s Struggles.

    Unknown to many, the May 1968 incident kick-started what would become a ruthless Kenyatta succession struggle. For the first time, associates of Kenyatta realised that anytime soon, the President would die.

    By law, Daniel arap Moi would have automatically succeeded Kenyatta, but he was hardly a year in office as Vice-President.

    On May 10, three days after Kenyatta woke up from the coma, he was driven to the nearby Bamburi Lodge, where he made his first public appearance accompanied by his wife, Mama Ngina. That morning, Dr Mungai had issued a bulletin saying Kenyatta was “in good health” and was able to walk.

    A brief function was held, more of a public relations exercise, in which Kenyatta handed over a tree seedling to his Vice-President Daniel arap Moi, to go and plant in the Shimba Hills during the national tree planting day.

    The news of Kenyatta’s illness had sent everyone in panic. That Sunday, the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK) instructed all the member churches to conduct “special prayers.” Other prayers were said at the Siri Gurdwara Temples, Legio Maria churches and at the Mosques. The official account was that Kenyatta had “an ordinary fever.” That is what North-Eastern Provincial Commissioner, Mr Godhard Mburu, told a prayer meeting in Garissa.

    While there was total secrecy on Kenyatta’s health, it was not lost to observers in 1968 that he was unable to travel to the May 13 Summit of East and Central African States, where he was represented by Moi, who told the parley that “Mzee was slightly indisposed and is now well.”

    As the western media reported that Kenyatta had suffered a heart attack, Dr Mungai told Parliament that the President did not have a heart attack, coronary thrombosis or any illness of that nature. “This has been said in several overseas papers, but it’s not true,” he said.

    Mungai added that “all traces of the President’s indisposition have now disappeared and I am sure the whole country will rejoice in this matter.”

    It was KPU member, Mr Tom Okello-Odongo, who had demanded a statement on the health of the President. He wanted to know the origins of the rumours that the President was dead “while actually, he was only slightly indisposed” at his home in Bamburi.

    In reply, Dr Mungai said the rumours “must have been started by irresponsible psychotic demagogues”. He sais: “It is not the first time this has been done. I remember that when the President did not go to Mwanza, people said that he was sick, but it was only because his car had broken down.”

    It was not the first time that Kenyatta had been indisposed. In July 1966, Dr Mungai had ordered the 75-year old President to take a week-long break. Even then, Dr Mungai refused to disclose the nature of Kenyatta’s illness, apart from the noticeable limping.

    When he resurfaced that August, Kenyatta lashed out at the Western media, which had speculated that he was about to retire due to old age.

    A state parade was quickly organised in Mombasa and Kenyatta was driven around the coastal town to assuage his supporters.

    That Kenyatta was in bad health had been noticed during the April 1962 Lancaster conference, when he went down with “nervous exhaustion” following the marathon talks.

    Media reports said then that Kenyatta had an “uneasy night”, and that his personal physician, Dr Mungai, spent the night in the President’s room. Although Kenyatta attended the final meeting on the fate of the coastal strip in the morning, he returned to bed immediately.

    After 1968, the battles within Kanu started. That June, some radical changes were made to the Constitution as tensions within the party increased. Kenyatta’s right-hand man, Mr Mbiyu Koinange, and finance minister Mr James Gichuru, started plotting, with Mr Njonjo in tow.

    The General Election was months away. A group led by 37-year-old economic planning minister Tom Mboya, was also plotting to control Kanu and get ready to take on the Mungai-Gichuru-Koinange group.

    Mr Mboya was not lucky. Just as Kenyatta was recovering from the stroke, the Constitutional amendment Bill (No 2) of May 1968 was passed on June 25. It simply stated that if the Presidency became vacant, the vice-President would take over for three months and with limited powers. Initially, the Koinange group wanted the successor to be elected by Parliament acting as an electoral college.

    In March, 1968, another Bill had been taken to Parliament stating that if the President died, the Vice-President would succeed him for the rest of the term. This was amended to six months, and also disqualified independent candidates from running. It was claimed that this was a Moi-Njonjo-Mungai Bill.

    When Kenyatta suffered a heart attack in April, 1968 the Bill was still under discussion and a chance to lock out contestants was brought. This time, the minimum age for contesting the Presidency age was increased from 35 to 40. It was clear that the target here was Mboya, who was 37.

    From then, Mboya, who could not run as an independent and by virtue of his age, had an ambivalent relationship with the group, which was more worried about losing grip on power. Kanu was also going through a political turmoil and there was fear that Mboya had become a populist for his anti-Asian policies.

    On July 5, 1969 Mboya was gunned down on Government Road.

    The waiting for Kenyatta to pass on continued until 1978.

  • Uhuru should ease off a little on his celeb stints and rule Kenya. A government is run by a political party that wins (or grabs) power. This institution remains the same. KANU debts have been paid by NARC/PNU. Kibaki’s unfinished business will be completed by Jubilee which must also correct Government ills of the past. There is no way you can start on a “clean slate” – you’d have to tear down Nairobi and other towns, uproot all roads and rail lines to begin afresh…in the stone age.

  • Mama Ngina mwizi

    President Uhuru Kenyatta’s mother, Ngina, listed among Africa’s few billionaires
    Updated Tuesday, October 8th 2013 at 08:15 GMT +3

    Africa has 55 billionaires, far more than previously thought, Nigeria-based Ventures financial magazine says.

    They include three women – the mother of Kenya’s president, a daughter of Angola’s president and a Nigerian oil tycoon and fashion designer.

    The richest man is Nigeria’s Aliko Dangote, with a fortune of $20.2bn (£12.5bn), Ventures said.

    The list is likely to reignite debate about inequality between rich and poor people in Africa, correspondents say.

    In April, the World Bank said the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa had risen in the past three decades from 205 million to 414 million.

    ‘Conservative estimate’

    A report earlier this month by research group Afrobarometer suggested that economic growth in Africa was primarily benefiting a small elite.

    . This is the first time the respected Ventures magazine has published a list of rich Africans, reports the BBC’s Tomi Oladipo reports from Nigeria’s main city Lagos.

    The 55 billionaires it has identified are more numerous than the 16 listed by US financial magazine Forbes last year.

    It was able to identify dozens more billionaires by using “on-the-ground knowledge” to overcome hurdles that may have “hampered” other researchers, Ventures said.

    The magazine estimated the 55 billionaires’ combined fortunes at $143.88bn, an average of a $2.6bn per person.

    Of the 55, 20 are Nigerian, nine are South African and eight are Egyptian, Ventures said.

    The richest woman is Nigeria’s Folorunsho Alakija, who made her $7.3bn fortune mainly in the country’s oil industry, it added.

    She also studied fashion in London and made dresses for Maryam Babangida, the late wife of Nigerian military ruler Ibrahim Babangida, Ventures said.

    Isabel Dos Santos, an Angolan investor and the eldest daughter of Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, together with Ngina Kenyatta, the mother of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta, also made the cut, it added.

    Ventures listed Harvard-trained businessman Allan Gray as South Africa’s richest man, with a fortune of $8.5bn.

    “This media-shy South African moneyman controls two investment companies that collectively manage over $50bn in assets,” Ventures said.

    Nathan Kirsh, a property tycoon in the tiny kingdom of Swaziland, also made it on the list.

    He is worth $3.6bn, and has business interests in London and New York, Ventures said.

    Ventures editor-in-chief Oozo Eewala told the BBC’s Focus on Africa radio programme that its estimate of 50 billionaires was probably conservative.

    “There is this culture of you don’t necessarily want to show your wealth, considering the gap between rich and poor,” he said.

    “If you have a lot of money, there are a lot of people that you have to support so we think people may be a little reluctant to be all splashy about what they have and what their assets are.”

    BBC

  • Jaramogi and Jomo

    Intrigues of Jomo’s and Jaramogi’s Secret Joint Account in London

    Fri, 07/12/2013 03:10PM -0500 .

    Before they fell out, Kanu leaders Jomo Kenyatta and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga ran a joint bank account in London where money from various sources was received.

    Today, the only remaining evidence is a statement of a suspense account where some of the money was deposited by the likes of Bildad Kaggia, Pio Gama Pinto, Joseph Murumbi and Othigo Othieno — some of the avowed socialists within Kanu.

    It is not indicated where the money came from but some of it was used to establish the Lumumba Institute, on a 20-acre piece of land in Kasarani, Nairobi. (The road to this former institute is still known as Lumumba Drive). On the face of it, the college was a training ground for Kanu cadres but clandestinely a plot to infiltrate the party with socialists.

    The amount of money transferred via this account might never be known but between February and December 1962, the account had received £62,400 (about Sh8.1 million at the current exchange rates).

    The first entry into the account in the Bank of India Ltd, 17 Moorgate, London EC2, was £15,000 dated February 1962 at the time when Kenyatta and Jaramogi were in London for the second Lancaster Conference.

    The fact that this money was in a suspense account means that the two operated another account in the London bank, perhaps with much more money than indicated in the statement.

    There is little in the public domain about this account and we could not verify what happened to it after they fell out over land, socialism, and as the Kenyatta succession struggles started within Kanu.

    The only thing we know is that part of that cash found its way to the building of Lumumba Institute, a thorny project that saw the final fallout between Jaramogi, Tom Mboya and to a greater extent – Kenyatta. Interestingly, Jaramogi had registered the title to the property in his name although it had been built with donations from Kanu activists and “friendly” countries.

    In his book, Not Yet Uhuru, published in 1967, and written before controversy over the ownership of the institute started, Jaramogi states that the “institute was made possible by aid from socialist countries”.

    On December 12, 1964, as a new republic was born, Kenyatta and Jaramogi, who had just been appointed Vice-President, officially opened the institute.

    To Kenyatta, Lumumba Institute, named after Congo’s Prime Minister who was assassinated by the CIA, was a dream come true for the ruling party Kanu. The party, he thought, would now have a base to train its members, activists and youth wingers. He said as much at the opening ceremony.

    But Jaramogi and his socialist allies had other ideas. It was a plan to take over Kanu.

    Initially the institute was to admit 108 students — mainly Kanu leaders at the district level, but all that was left to Jaramogi. As Kenyatta and his advisers were to later realise, that was a major blunder. The building of the institute was also kept secret lest the inquisitive Governor-General Malcolm McDonald got wind of it.

    McDonald, previously the colonial Governor, had been retained by the British government in Kenya to oversee Kenyatta’s take-over of power. (He went on to become the first British High Commissioner to Kenya.)

    It was this transition that would spoil the relationship between Kenyatta and Jaramogi and which gave the Lumumba Institute the initial spark.

    The main question that separated politics in Kenya was what to do with the land previously held by white farmers. While Jaramogi believed that land was a free entitlement, Kenyatta was for a market economy: willing-buyer, willing-seller policy that was agreed during the Lancaster Conference as part of the independence deal.

    During the first Lancaster negotiations (Kenyatta was still in restriction), Kanu leader James Gichuru and Secretary-General Tom Mboya emerged as the key pillars of the party, eclipsing Jaramogi who was busy cultivating relations with the Eastern bloc.

    To outfox both Mboya and Gichuru, Jaramogi became one of the strongest pro-Kenyatta campaigners fervently demanding his release from restriction, a position that endeared him to Kenyatta. Clandestinely, the British made sure that he did not make it to the June 1963 Cabinet though Kenyatta had been expected to name him as a deputy prime minister.

    “My exclusion from the Cabinet was interpreted by the people as a surrender to the British government … a betrayal of the struggle,” says Jaramogi in his autobiography.

    Jaramogi was assigned the task of building Kanu and it was during this period that the idea of Lumumba Institute was hatched. How Jaramogi managed to convince Kenyatta to approve the Lumumba Institute even today remains unanswered. But Kenyatta had lots of trust in him in the earlier years before they disagreed over the president’s push for capitalism.

    At the institute, Jaramogi had brought two Russian “instructors”— Mr Alexei Zdravomyslova and Mr Andrei Bogdanov — to teach “principles of socialism”, the Leninist art of political action.

    Donations to the institute had started to flow in from Eastern Europe. On March 4, 1965, Jaramogi was photographed receiving books, blankets and two cinema vans, among other items, from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, East Germany and China at the institute.

    It was Mboya who started the war on the institute in Parliament after he was briefed about its activities by US Ambassador William Atwood. After killing Lumumba and installing Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa, an institution in Africa in Lumumba’s honour was anathema to Washington.

    Mboya told a stunned House that he was worried because the institute was producing two categories of politicians. “There are those who wish to give the impression that the institute is the only place where true nationalists reside. There are those who wish the institute to be regarded as a den where revolution is cooked, where subversion is discussed, where communism is promoted and dished out. Both these images are wrong.”

    In order to water down the workings of Lumumba Institute, Narok East MP Justus ole Tipis moved a motion for the Ministry of Education to take over the institute and vet the curriculum.

    Tipis told the House that his intention was to “repair any damage which has been done as far as the management and the running of this institute since it was established before the damage has gone beyond repair.”

    But even before the motion had been disposed of, the students at Lumumba Institute called a press conference and rubbished Tipis and his efforts. They apparently played into the hands of capitalists.

    Home Affairs minister Daniel arap Moi described the students’ statement as “the worst ever to come from a Kenyan institution”. He claimed that the institute was infiltrated by a clique of “professional instigators”.

    When former Kadu president Ronald Ngala, then Kilifi South MP, demanded its closure, Jaramogi’s loyal lieutenant, Mr Luke Obok, reacted: “If Mr Ngala is upset by the presence of some Russian teachers on the staff of the institute, as a good nationalist, he should also demand and agitate for the nationalisation of several other institutions in Kenya which are run and controlled by Americans, the British, Germans and Israelis”.

    Although Mboya never mentioned Jaramogi by name, he told Parliament it was “bad” that “someone should begin to transform the institute into a place where party officials and organisers began to think they were a class above others the moment they took studies there, thus departing from the policies of Kanu, its manifesto and its leaders.”

    The motion by Tipis was passed and Lumumba Institute was to be registered under the Ministry of Education and its syllabus vetted. The institute was shut down and the foreign teachers deported. But not before the students staged the last fight.

    To forestall the changes, the students and teachers, led by deputy principal Wanguhu Ng’ang’a and student leader David Munyendo, on July 16, 1965, staged a “coup” at the Kanu headquarters, then on Nairobi’s Mfangano Street, and ostensibly “removed” the entire Kanu leadership apart from Kenyatta and Jaramogi claiming that the party had failed to conduct a national election. They were all arrested and Attorney-General Charles Njonjo personally prosecuted the case.

    Njonjo told the court that the 26 men and one woman before the court were “calling themselves Kanu chairmen and secretaries” and that they had “broken” into Kanu headquarters” with instructions from a mastermind”. Although Njonjo did not name Jaramogi, it was obvious who he was referring to.

    “It is time people learned there is a Constitution in Kenya to be followed and not behave like thugs and irresponsible people,” said Njonjo.

    They were found guilty and Ng’ang’a and Munyendo were jailed for 18 months at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison, while others got one year’s jail term. By the time the first group was released, Jaramogi had already left Kanu and formed the Kenya People’s Union.

    Lumumba Institute was now overgrown with grass and rotting. Jaramogi would stage yet another fight to sell it claiming it was his property. Kenyatta at first refused, but Odinga still had the title deed. Finally, after a battle that lasted several years and a detention of his close allies, Jaramogi was allowed to transfer the property.

    Today, it houses the Pan African University.

    Besides Kaggia, who was chairman of the board, others members included Pinto, Aneko, Othieno, Kung’u Karumba, Fred Kubai, F. Oluande, Paul Ngei and Joseph Murumbi.

    Apart from Ngei and Karumba, all the others were socialist sympathisers.

    – Daily Nation

  • Analysis: Kenyatta escapes the ICC, and shows others how it’s done

    Simon Allison

    06 Feb 2014 06:09 (South Africa)

    Question: what’s the best way to escape international justice? Answer: Get yourself elected president, of course. At least that was Uhuru Kenyatta’s solution, and it worked. By SIMON ALLISON.

    It’s all over bar the shouting, and a few more tedious court proceedings. Unless something drastic changes, Uhuru Kenyatta will not face trial at the International Criminal Court – and the thousands of victims of Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-election violence will be denied their chance to see justice done.

    Wednesday was supposed to be the first day of his trial, in which he would defend himself against charges of indirect complicity in crimes against humanity for his alleged role in inciting, organising and funding the violence. It was also going to be a milestone in international justice: the first time that a sitting head of state faced an international court on charges of this severity.

    But Kenyatta didn’t show. He didn’t need to. The prosecution case had already unravelled to such an extent that instead of arguing for and against his innocence, the lawyers present were squabbling about whether the case should go ahead at all. There was one thing they could all agree on, however: with the current collection of evidence, there’s no way that Kenyatta’s guilt can be proved.

    “The prosecution has realised that its case has collapsed,” defence lawyer Stephen Kay told the judges. “We have come to a stage where the case presented reveals that it is not a case; it is a case with allegations based upon falsity and the prosecution knows that. The problem is now though that having taken two sides to go into a trial, a political problem emerges. But the politics of this matter should not be a consideration.”

    Of course, the defence would say that. But the prosecution’s verdict on its own case is just as damning. On Wednesday, it was reduced to pleading with the judge for more time, and for the court to get involved in the collection of documents from the Kenyan government. Specifically, prosecutors want access to Kenyatta’s financial records from the time, hoping that these will show that he funnelled money to perpetrators of the violence. But the Kenyan government isn’t being particularly helpful.

    “It is nearly two years since we asked for this material,” said prosecution lawyer Ben Gumpert. “Of all the leads available to us, we have exhausted all reasonable prospects. But we are under a duty to pursue our investigations…We characterise the position of the government of Kenya as one of pure obstructionism.”

    Of the investigation as a whole, Gumpert glumly concluded: “The stones that remain to be turned are getting less and less promising.”

    So what went wrong? How did the case against Kenyatta – once promised to be rock solid – collapse so spectacularly?

    At a micro level, the prosecution has been badly damaged by the withdrawal of a number of key witnesses. In an open letter, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda explained that there were two witnesses in particular who the prosecution was relying on. When they withdrew in late 2013, the prosecution case no longer satisfied “the high evidentiary standards required at trial”. In court filings, prosecutors have said that their witnesses were blackmailed, bribed and intimidated into withdrawing, and blamed the government of Kenya for creating a “climate of fear”.

    Kenyatta’s lawyers dismissed this, describing the prosecution’s complaints as an attempt to cover up their own failings. “It is a blame-shifting exercise onto the government of Kenya,” said Kay. This is disingenuous.

    Zoom out of the nitty-gritty of the court proceedings, and there’s an obvious explanation for all the prosecution’s woes (the witness withdrawals, the Kenyan government obstructionism, and the climate of fear): Kenyatta is the head of state, and as such it is his privilege to direct the resources of state. Why would the Kenyan government offer documents which might, in essence, incriminate itself? What Kenyan witness would be prepared to risk defying Kenyatta, in the full knowledge that the organs of state which are designed to protect him – the police, the courts, even the media – answer either partly or wholly to the same man. Even if Kenyatta did not deliberately set out to create a climate of fear, one exists purely by virtue of his position.

    This, of course, was the intention. Kenyatta was not president when he was indicted by the ICC. The successful presidential bid came later, a barely-disguised attempt to secure himself a get-out-of-jail-free card. That it worked is not just an indictment of Kenyatta, but of Kenyan voters too. Kenyatta gambled that the irresistible power of the president’s office would be enough to get him out of trouble – so far, the gamble has paid off magnificently.

    Is Kenyatta guilty? I don’t know. That’s for the judges to decide. But that’s not the point. By taking office, Kenyatta ensured that witnesses would not speak against him, that documents would not incriminate him and, ultimately, that justice – whether it convicted or exonerated him – would be unable to be served.

    Perhaps the most disturbing element of the Kenyatta case is not even the specifics of his situation, but what his strategy means for others who are facing or will face international justice in the future. Will Kenyatta’s example warrants encourage war lords and genocidaires to seek more power rather than less when threatened with international arrest warrants? Will the ICC process actually incentivise its targets to seek office, rather than acting as a deterrent? On this issue, the ongoing trial of Kenyan Vice-President William Ruto (allied with Kenyatta now, but on the opposite side of the post-election violence) may offer a few clues.

    In The Hague on Wednesday, the judges delayed ruling on the prosecution’s request for more time to gather evidence on Kenyatta. For the sake of international justice, let’s hope the prosecutors get what they want, and that they are able to use the time to find some evidence that sticks – enough to at least force Kenyatta to stand trial in person. This would give Kenyatta the chance to convince the world he is innocent, if he is; and perhaps persuade others that assuming the presidency is not quite the get-out-of-jail-free-card it’s cracked up to be. DM

    Read more:

    Kenyatta trial doomed unless Kenya helps – ICC prosecutors on Reuters


    Dirty tactics: how Kenyatta and Ruto will beat the ICC on Daily Maverick


    Analysis: Ruto and Kenyatta are still one step ahead of the ICC on Daily Maverick


    Oh Kenya, what have you done? on Daily Maverick

    Photo by Reuters.

  • challenges for ICC

    Challenges for the International Criminal Court

    By: Ambassador Hans Corell, Former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel, United Nations and former Swedish judge
    The International Criminal Court (ICC) has now been in operation for more than ten years. The question is: what about its record? As a former judge and later government chief legal adviser, as a war crimes rapporteur in the former Yugoslavia in 1992-1993, as the UN Legal Counsel from 1994 to 2004 involved in the establishment of all existing international criminal tribunals except the one in Lebanon, and as the Secretary-General’s representative at the Rome Conference in 1998, I must confess that I have followed the development with great concern.

    A comparison between the record of the ICC and the records of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is, sad to say, not favourable to the ICC. In all fairness, it must be recognized that the responsibility for the shortcomings of the ICC does not rest with the Court only. The ICC is dependent on cooperation from states, in particular states where investigations are conducted. The lack of full and effective cooperation on the part of all such states is certainly a major problem. One would also have expected a more effective and determined support from the UN Security Council in cases where the Council has asked the prosecutor of the ICC to address situations. Another factor is the way in which the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) fulfils its duties under the Rome Statute.

    This brief presentation will focus on the manner in which the ICC has dealt with the cases relating to Kenya and the consequences to be drawn from this. I have been following these cases with particular attention because of my role as the Legal Adviser for almost six years to Kofi Annan and the other members of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, established by the African Union. From 2008 to 2013 this Panel was engaged in what became known as the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation. The references to these cases are intended to serve as an illustration to the questions of principle discussed in this article.

    The background to the Kenyan cases before the ICC is that a national commission had proposed that a special national court should be established to try those suspected of having orchestrated the so-called Post-Election Violence in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. When a proposal to this effect had been defeated twice in the National Assembly, representatives of the government of Kenya sought the assistance from the ICC Prosecutor. This led the Prosecutor to seek in December 2010 proprio motu indictment of six persons for crimes against humanity.

    On 23 January 2012, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC confirmed the charges against four of these persons, William Samoei Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang, Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and committed them all to trial. On 18 March 2013, the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura were, however, withdrawn. This means that out of the original six persons indicted, three remain on trial for crimes against humanity. The trial in the case against William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang started on 10 September 2013. The trial in the case against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta was scheduled to start on 5 February 2014 but it has now been postponed.

    In discussing these cases, let me first categorically emphasize that the presumption of innocence is a given. Under no circumstances can anyone be considered guilty of crimes before he or she is found guilty by a competent court of law. However, the question that presents itself here is how a court should deal with persons who are suspected of very grave crimes. One of the first things that I learnt as a young court clerk more than 50 years ago is that if someone is indicted as suspected for very grave crimes, by definition this person should be arrested and put in detention on remand.Otherwise, he or she may try to evade the trial and also engage in interfering with the evidence.

    In my view, the Kenyan cases before the ICC went wrong from the very beginning, and there is now a serious risk that they might become unmanageable at the trial stage. Needless to say, since I am not familiar with all the details of the cases it is difficult to know exactly where the fault lies. But it is obvious that serious mistakes have been committed. The responsibility might rest with the Prosecutor who may have taken the cases to the Court before he had made sufficiently thorough investigations. The responsibility might also rest with the judges who obviously have not understood what a court must do if it confirms charges against persons for very serious crimes under international law and commits them to trial.

    A possible scenario is that the Prosecutor approached the Court before he had solid cases and that the judges (judge Hans Peter Kaull dissenting) did not realize that they should have sent the cases back to the Prosecutor asking him to make a more reliable investigation before reverting to the Court, cf articles 54(1)(a) and 61(7)(c) of the Rome Statute..

    However, since the charges were confirmed and the suspects were committed to trial, by not arresting them, the ICC did not use the same yardstick as has been used by the ICC and other international courts in cases where high level personalities have been charged. And, as just said, there is a risk that such accused will try to evade trial and start interfering with the evidence. Should what is happening now be seen in this perspective?

    An additional complication is that in spite of the fact that the charges confirmed related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence the suspects were allowed to return home where two of them engaged in the 2013 presidential election campaign. The contestants in the 2007 election now joined hands and the result is well known: in March 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta was elected president of Kenya and William Ruto became vice president.

    As I said in an address in 2012, available here, you do not even have to go to Chapter 6 of the Kenyan Constitution to realize that persons indicted for crimes against humanity cannot run for such offices – already common sense gives the answer. And yet, Kenya allowed this to happen.

    I am afraid that, due to the manner in which the ICC has dealt with these cases, both Kenya and the ICC are in an impossible situation. I reiterate: the presumption of innocence is a given. But persons suspected of grave international crimes simply must be dealt with in a professional manner.

    Because of the way in which the ICC has handled these two cases various attempts have been made, including by the African Union, to stop the trials with reference to the positions that two of the accused presently hold in Kenya. This has led to the very unfortunate result that the ASP at its meeting in November 2013 added new provisions to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence that might conflict with the very clear provision in article 63 (1) of the Rome Statute that the accused shall be present during the trial.

    The first of these new provisions (rule 134bis) would allow an accused to be present through the use of video technology during part or parts of his or her trial. The second provision (rule 134ter) concerns excusal from presence at trial, and the third provision (rule 134quater) concerns excusal from presence at trial due to extraordinary public duties. The question is whether these rules are in conformity with the Rome Statute. If they are not, the ICC has no other choice but to invalidate them.

    The thinking behind the last provision also seems to miss a very important point. One of the basic features in the system of international criminal justice is that it is likely that the evidence might lead the Prosecutor to persons in very high positions at the national level, including the head of state or government. If the evidence leads in this direction, it is precisely persons at this level who should be brought to justice before the ICC.

    As I have developed in an address concerning international prosecution of heads of state for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, available here, the possibility of bringing officials at the level of head of state or government to justice at the international level is a necessary ingredient in a rules-based international society; it is at this level that the principal standards applied in conflicts where international crimes may be committed are set, and it is at this level that the overriding orders are given.

    If the officials who bear the greatest responsibility for international crimes committed in a particular situation are not brought to justice, this constitutes a clear risk not only for a continuation of the conflict at hand, but also for breeding new conflicts in the future.

    The obvious question that the ICC must consider is whether it is at all possible to try persons at this level if they remain at large.

    In my view the ICC is in a very serious situation, and it is important that the different actors under the Rome Statute understand their roles and their responsibilities. What the ASP must realize is that the persons who serve in different capacities in the ICC must have extensive courtroom experience whether as judges, prosecutors of defence counsel. As I have developed in more detail in the foreword to a book on international prosecutors, available here, my recommendation for achieving an effective, efficient and professional ICC in the future is that the ASP should:
    •Elect competent judges with genuine courtroom experience to the ICC;
    •Abolish candidate list B in the Rome Statute (which entails that diplomats and law professors with no courtroom experience whatsoever can be elected as judges); and
    •Agree among themselves not to elect judges who will pass 70 years (common national retirement age) during their nine-year tenure in the court.

    With respect to the last point: what impression does it give if among the judges of the ICC there are individuals who are no longer considered suitable to serve on the bench in their national courts? In this context, it was reassuring to see that the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges has included “Date of birth” in the suggested arrangement for the CV of candidates (see ICC-ASP/12/47, Annex III, paragraph 2). A true judge would realize that to present oneself as a candidate for judge in an international court without disclosing one’s date of birth is, to put it simply, unethical.

    Finally, I also addressed the need to abolish vote trading and similar unworthy features in the process of electing judges, closing on the note that my remarks in that contribution in no way should be understood as criticism of the present judges of the ICC but as addressing systemic questions which are the sole responsibility of the ASP.
    http://www.judicialmonitor.org/current/specialreport1.html

  • kenyatta dodging icc

    Trotting ahead

    Kenya is rollicking haphazardly along. But its president, distracted by his indictment by the International Criminal Court, is hamstrung by greedy old-timers
    Mar 15th 2014 | NAIROBI | From the print edition

    AS THE sun goes down over Nairobi, a new rich set of T-shirt-wearing Kenyans, most of them black and in their 30s, roar with laughter as they quaff whiskies and smoke giant cigars in the Capital Club, the country’s latest temple to Mammon. A year’s membership, a beautiful waitress proudly purrs, is “a million shillings”—about $10,000. Your correspondent watches English football on one of four large television screens, alongside a wall of faux-Masai shields, while waiting for his would-be host, the spokesman of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Alas, the spokesman fails to turn up; it is a Saturday evening, but the president is apparently too busy to spare him. Mr Kenyatta, one of Kenya’s richest oligarchs, who next month will complete his first year in office, is reportedly fond of similar ritzy watering-holes.

    Barely a mile away from the Capital Club, the acrid fumes of charcoal fires in Kibera, a notorious slum, mingle with the stench of sewage running down the muddy alleys where perhaps 800,000 Nairobians live in hugger-mugger squalor. The government, says May Achieng, who runs a church-linked school there, provides “absolutely nothing” in the way of services. Manual workers lucky enough to have a job in the metropolis can earn 200-300 shillings ($2-3) a day. Domestic and gang violence are rife. Armed police have a station at the entrance to Kibera, but generally keep out of the slum. Visitors are warned to watch out for robbers and “flying toilet”—bags of excrement chucked out of houses at night. Politicians, says Mrs Achieng, turn up only at election time, “or if there is a fire or some kind of disaster”.

    These two Kenyas exist cheek by jowl, both of them, in their way, equally dynamic. Half a century after independence from Britain, rich and poor are both locked into a system of patronage and tribe, all competing for advancement, whether for modest jobs in the civil service or for huge bribes to fix contracts for grand infrastructure projects. In the aftermath of a disputed election in 2007, Kibera, whose districts are unofficially divided along tribal lines, was affected as bloodily as anywhere. “One community chopped off the sexual organs of another community,” says Mrs Achieng, a Luo, whose leader, Raila Odinga, was reckoned by independent observers to have been cheated of victory. Defeated again last year, in a fairer though still flawed poll, he remains the opposition’s head.

    If this system is to hold, several requirements must be met in the years to come. The weather, notoriously variable, must be clement enough to satisfy the more than half of Kenyans who still live on the land. At the time of independence, in 1963, the countryside barely sustained a population of 8m; that has now swollen to 45m. Law and order must continue more or less to prevail, even while the police, in the words of a security analyst, “are corrupt from top to bottom”. Terrorism, especially a recent wave of it perpetrated by recalcitrant Somalis and sundry Islamist extremists, must be contained. The balance of power, already skewed, must not tilt too far in favour of one tribe. And the economy must grow fast enough to spread the largesse of patronage, leaving enough to trickle down even to the masses in the likes of Kibera.

    None of this can be assured. And yet, polarised and unequal as Kenya is, its progress punctuated by electoral violence and spasms of ethnic tension, the country has for the most part muddled valiantly ahead.

    It remains the economic and political hub of wider east Africa, drawing a quarter of a billion people into its orbit. The stock- and housing markets are booming, prices in parts of Nairobi rising sevenfold since 2009. The economy grew by 5% last year and is likely to do just as well this.

    Full speed somewhere

    Diplomats seeking to solve crises in Somalia, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region encompassing Rwanda and eastern Congo are based in Nairobi, which also hosts a plethora of UN regional headquarters. Some international companies are shifting their African headquarters from South Africa to Kenya, the fifth-biggest economy south of the Sahara. Kenya Airways is among the best in Africa.

    The country is also bidding to become a hub of IT. Its M-Pesa mobile-telephonic banking system, from which more than half of Kenya’s people benefit, has proved a global model. The country has one of the highest rates of Facebook membership in Africa; more than half a million Kenyans are on Twitter. In the Kilimani suburb of Nairobi, a thriving outfit called the iHub, led by a red-bearded American called Erik Hersman, serves a burgeoning community of innovators, technology investors and researchers, spurred on by Google and Microsoft, among other companies.

    Hopes have been rising that discoveries of oil in remote Turkana county, in the north-west, may soon be matched by an offshore gas bonanza. This could give a boost to the much-delayed Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor, known as LAPSSET, which would include a railway, fibre-optic cable and pipeline, even if its proposed connection to South Sudan (now in the throes of civil war) and Ethiopia is uncertain.

    At last Kenya is seriously trying to improve its dreadful transport links, with help from China. Nairobi’s traffic is still in a perpetual jam, but work on a ring road is under way and there are plans to build a new railway line from Mombasa to Nairobi, besides revamping the one that goes on to Uganda. A trans-Africa highway should eventually run from Mombasa through Kenya and Uganda and even across Congo to the Atlantic.

    Danger: exploding light-bulbs

    Against this hopeful backdrop, grave worries persist. The attack by Somali extremists on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre in September, which left at least 69 people dead, has shaken confidence in the police and armed forces, who looted the place afterwards. Gross overreaction by the police against suspected Islamist extremists on the coast, involving extrajudicial killings, has served only to recruit more people to the extremists’ cause. Another attack on a prominent target is all too likely—and could drive away foreign investment. Several close shaves since December include a bomb that failed to detonate near the British Airways check-in counter at Nairobi’s main airport, ludicrously shrugged off by the interior minister as “an exploding light-bulb”.

    This year has witnessed a sharp rise in violent crime, already at epidemic levels. The police are frequently suspected of complicity. Big companies rely on private-security firms, of which there are at least 200 in Nairobi alone. Their staff are far better paid and equipped than the police, though they are not allowed to be armed.

    Mr Kenyatta has stirred up Kenyans and fellow African leaders against the ICC, badly damaging relations with allies in Europe and America. If the case fizzles out, they may be repaired. But much of Mr Kenyatta’s first year in office has been wasted on this issue. In any case, there is a growing perception that he lacks grip. He failed to sack any senior figures in the wake of the Westgate fiasco. Despite his declarations against corruption, he has instigated no investigations over the railway contracts and other dodgy-sounding schemes.

    Kenyatta, dodging the dock

    And Kenya remains split along tribal lines. Mr Kenyatta’s fellow Kikuyu, the largest and richest group, are perceived by members of other tribes to be “eating”—as the Kenyan metaphor goes—more than their fair share of the cake. William Ruto, the vice-president, who heads the Kalenjin group that ruled the roost under a previous president, Daniel arap Moi, is said to be unhappy. He, too, has been indicted by the ICC. Should the case against the president fail but the one against Mr Ruto drag on, the coalition would wobble and could fall. Mr Kenyatta is said to be lining up Mr Moi’s son Gideon as a possible replacement.

    “Kenya is very polarised,” says John Githongo, a veteran anti-corruption campaigner who in 2002 was entrusted with cleaning up government but had soon to flee abroad for his life. “It is a country no longer at ease with itself.” The “coalition of the accused”, as he has mockingly called it, may not last. “The Kalenjin will never trust the Kikuyu,” says a banker friend of Mr Kenyatta. “No matter what the ICC says, Kikuyus in their hearts believe Ruto orchestrated the violence against them. But for the sake of the government’s survival, they’re not saying it too loudly.”

    Campaigners for democracy and openness are worried that Mr Kenyatta and his friends are trying to impede them, much as the government has plainly done its best to hamstring the ICC’s investigation. Bills are being put forward in Parliament to curb the buoyant media and to limit foreign funding for NGOs. On March 7th one of Kenya’s liveliest anti-establishment campaigners, Boniface Mwangi, was beaten up by police. “There’s a danger we are sliding back to the ways of the Moi era,” says another disconsolate pro-democracy activist.

    Nonetheless, in its usual inequitable and patchy manner, Kenya is powering ahead. The vitality and reach of social media make it impossible for Mr Kenyatta to acquire the sort of powers Mr Moi exercised in what was then a one-party state. But he is finding it hard to keep Kenya both dynamic and harmonious. A year into office, he still has to prove that he is the right sort of leader. If the ICC case is put to one side, he will have no excuses.
    http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21599029-kenya-rollicking-haphazardly-along-its-president-distracted-his

  • Breaking News: President Uhuru REMOVES Facebook post where Kenyans openly told him he’s TRIBAL

    Posted in: News|May 15, 2014

    Intolerant to feedback? President Uhuru Kenyatta has removed the Facebook post where he was told by thousands of Kenyans that he is the worst tribalist in the history of the country.

    Thousands of disgruntled citizens, including his ethnic Kikuyu, told the President to his face that his manner of public appointments is living the country divided and people highly angered.

    He pulled it down. Intolerant? Here is one of the posts:

    Mr. KIURA KABIRU wrote:

    “There has been much grumbling and actually its true, that this Government is falling to the vices of the Govts b4 it-TRIBALISM in senior most positions. Every time there is a replacement its between 2 communities-KIKUYUS or KALENJINS. You at the top seats don’t feel the heat down hear, the hot hatred heats from other 40 tribes, you don’t bare the insults we get on the streets-GREEDY KIKUYUS: you want everything for yourselves, you don’t experience our hustles and tussles we undergo as we tries to eke a living around. We have to blush shoulders with each and every other tribe in our jobs or businesses but it hurts our entrepreneurial skills badly every time this issue of tribalism crops up from the same-same community customers we want to woo, endear n serve.
    Mr. President if you do listen and i hope you dearly do, make a government to be admired, live up to your promise-AN ALL INCLUSIVE GOVT IRREGARDLESS OF OUR ORIGINS: Reach out to other tribes-I think in other tribes too there are deft and multi-talented professionals: professionals cant be only from YOUR TRIBES or RUTO’S Communities only, others too have,reach out onto them to bring a regional balance in sharing this National cake.

    We hate insults we get from the streets. We detests the suspicious looks we receive on streets anytime time we speaks our tongues, we dont at all like it the mistrust mistreatment we are subjected to in our jobs by members from other tribes not that the mistakes are ours but Yours and your advisers’. Us we just exercised our democratic rights in anchoring you to your office hoping you would help us as Kenyans achieve our dreams-BUILDING AN ALL INCLUSIVE KENYA, AN ADMIRED KENYA, A BETTER AND DIFFERENT REGIME FOR THIS GOOD NATION-are you up-to the task!? Other decision making are yours-depends on you not us-our rights ended with the casting of our VOTES TO YOU. So change these images, let the Mirror reflect with newer national-wide images, you need these reflection come the next 15 yrs or so you intend your Umbrella to rule.

    Sam Kamau Bigsam SAYS”:>

    “I hope Uhuru and his close advisers read the heated debate and anger in response to his FB post about the swearing in of the new NYS boss. The actions of Waiguru and by extension Uhuru only serve to reinforce the notion that only one tribe is favoured in Kenya and most important , it serves to alienate ordinary Kikuyus like me who are not beneficiaries of the Kukuyu presidency but suffer the same plight as all Kenyans. Of a greater concern however , is the fact that our brothers from Rift Valley are unhappy and have a right to be and In that sense, Waiguru’s actions are a liability to the Jubilee unity and to Uhuru”

    Well, the post is HIIDEN from his wall, it is NOT DELETED>> You can follow it here>>

    Shocking rumour: Why Uhuru’s Press Team -PSCU removed the Offensive Facebook post

    Posted in: News|May 15, 2014

    File picture: Director of New Media (including social media) Mr Denis Itumbi
    The great whisperer – anonymous – has revealed to Kenya Today that the ethnic laden Facebook post of President Uhuru Kenyatta was allegedly pulled down by the National Intelligence Service when it became clear it was creating a ‘security situation’ in the country.

    An early meeting at the Office of President attended by top security honchos of the country resolved to prevail on the President to bring the post down. However, when it reached State House, the guys at the President’s Strategic Communications flatly refused; they could hear none of it, claiming it will be a public relations disaster, politically, for the President.

    Another source/rumour revealed that the police impounded, around Salgaa accident prone spot, over 5000 copies of the facebook comments in the president’s wall (a booklet), headed to a destination believed to be the Rift Valley, where URP MPs have called for Weekend mass charged rallies to ponder over the future of their vote as the kalenjin sackings continue in government.

    It is alleged that since UhuRuto took power, over 100 kalenjins have lost their jobs, some through SMS, like happened to Kiplimo Rugut, the latest casually of what is now known in social media as GEMAnization spree.

    It is instructive to note that many ethnic kikuyus felt disappointed by Pres. Uhuru, and they too joined the rest of Kenyans to castigate his tribal appointments.

  • online critics necessary

    Why we need online state critics more than a tired Cord

    Kenyans seeking punchy, informed counterattacks to state policy look to Twitter or Facebook.

    On Wednesday, this newspaper reported that the Director of Public Communications had introduced a new hashtag #StopHatespeechKenya. Ms Mary Ombara’s sentiment is (of course) unimpeachable. Who wouldn’t want to stop hate speech?

    Nevertheless, her announcement was absurd. The power to stop hate speech lies with the government and not through censorship or regulation. If some of the many reforms and policies agreed as possible solutions to ethnic violence over the past 20 years could be maintained, then hate speech would be less of a concern.

    #StopHatespeechKenya is one example among many of the government confusing a social media hashtag or soundbite for policy.

    Moreover, it is an expression of a typical misapprehension about Twitter that mistakes online debate for political action. Even if it were to catch on, after a few weeks the hashtag would follow the ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ and ‘Kony 2012’ campaigns into oblivion.

    But for every example of the banality of social media, each week in Kenyan politics throws up many instances of the potential power of Twitter.

    READ: Raila: We are not seeking regime change

    READ: IEBC petition ‘no Cord project’

    For all the complaints by the likes of Ms Ombara about the potential for hate speech, Twitter has become one of the few arenas in which the government meets sustained and informed criticism. Its value as an all-too-rare forum for open, unrestricted debate far outstrips its capacity for becoming a place for prejudice.

    Followers of Ory Okolloh have been accustomed to her ability to switch between discussion of football and the nuances of Kenyan politics. It was no surprise therefore to see her timeline during Tuesday’s World Cup semi-final alternate between posts about Brazil’s humiliation and reports of violence in Tana River county.

    Ms Okolloh’s timeline quickly filled with links to relevant news reports and sections of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s report on Kipini. Historic land grievances, insight into current disputes in the county and discussion on the effects of mining were aggregated and analysed systematically. She was writing the first draft of history – 140 characters at a time.

    Ms Okolloh is the best known Kenyan politics commentator on Twitter but she is not alone. Mr Boniface Mwangi and other politically engaged individuals are also attempting to hold leaders of all parties to account.

    Social media commentators are important for two reasons. They will not change Kenya by tweets alone but their work fills a gap left by the pacification of Parliament, demise of investigative journalism and the absence of research sponsored by civil societies.

    DISREGARD FOR EVIDENCE

    When trying to write a chapter on violence in the 1990s, I drew on parliamentary inquiries, bulletins produced by the National Council of Churches of Kenya and articles in the Nairobi Law Monthly. Clergy, activists, politicians and professionals documented the abuses of the Moi regime.

    A similar set of sources is not readily available today. For whatever reasons, newspapers and broadcasters are reluctant to be combative with government and the capacity of civil society to investigate atrocities and abuses is much reduced.

    Even from a distance at her home in South Africa, by pointing readers towards important sources available online, Ms Okolloh and others like her are performing a vital service to our democracy through Twitter.

    Moreover, perhaps unwittingly, the insistence that critiques of the government be substantiated with accessible sources stands in stark contrast to the government’s own disregard for evidence, namely the records about President Kenyatta’s finances and communications requested by the International Criminal Court.

    The second value of the work of Ms Okolloh and other online government critics is that they are making up for some of the shortcomings of the opposition.

    Kenyans interested in punchy, informed counterattacks to state policy have become accustomed to looking at Twitter or Facebook rather than to the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (Cord).

    Saba Saba has done little to revitalise a moribund opposition.

    In the days leading up to Monday’s rally, much was made of the similarities between the protests against the Kanu regime in 1990.

    But the differences are far more telling. Saba Saba 2014 was a party rally not a demonstration by a broad alliance of politicians, human rights activists and clergy. Yet it is precisely that breadth that Cord needs to appeal to if it is to challenge Jubilee in 2017.

    The opposition hopes that the new 13-point agenda marks something of a renaissance but that is highly unlikely. In contrast to the youthful energy of online debate, Cord’s leadership is tired and familiar.

    The value of Kenya’s online commentators will remain undiminished so long as the country has a government that introduces a hashtag to counter hate speech rather than addressing the underlying causes of ethnic violence and an opposition that is unable to build consensus.

    Prof Branch teaches history and politics at Warwick University, UK. dan.branch@gmail.com

  • Jubilee thieves

    EXPOSED: FULL LIST of Jubilee land grabbers/ corruption mongrels- UHURU/ RUTO lead

    Tuesday July 22, 2014 – Due to public demand, the Kenyan DAILY POSThas decided to publish a list of Jubilee alliance leaders, who are land grabbers and corruption mongrels.

    President Uhuru Kenyatta has not involved himself in any land grabbing case in Kenya because it is a fact that the huge tracts of land he owns are an inheritance from his father late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta.

    But he features prominently in the list because of the Sh 9.6 billion Computer Error Scandal when he was Finance Minister.

    Here is the list of Jubilee coalition leaders with their scandals.

    1. President Uhuru Kenyatta – The Sh 9.6 billion Budget Error Scandal (he later explained it and was exonerated by the Parliamentary Public Finance Committee).

    2. Deputy President, William Ruto – Grabbing 600 acres of land in Embakasi together with former Lugari MP, Cyrus Jirongo, Ngong Forest Land Scandal and the Sh 2.6 billion Maize Scandal with former Prime Minister, Raila Odinga.

    3. Kiambu Governor, William Kabogo – Grabbing plots in Ruiru, Thika and Kiambu town and connections to some drug cartels.

    4. Othaya MP, Mary Wambui – Grabbing Twiga Farm in Ruiru- 1,500 acres and connections to some drug traffickers and ivory poachers.

    5. Former Minister, Amos Kimunya – Sh 2, 5 billion Grand Regency Hotel Scandal and grabbing a Ministry of Agriculture farm in Nyahururu.

    6. Meru Senator, Kiraitu Murungi – The Anglo Leasing Scandal where Kenyans lost Sh 56 billion.

    7. Former Minister, Chris Murungaru – The Anglo Leasing Scandal where Kenya lost Sh 56 billion.

    8. Nairobi Senator, Mike Sonko- Grabbing land in Lavington, Nairobi and Kwale County.

    Now you can compare and contrast with the CORD list we published on Monday and you will establish who are fathers and mothers of corruption and land grabbing in Kenya!

    The Kenyan DAILY POST
    – See more at: http://trendingnewsroom.com/readfeed/210852/qa/exposed-full-list-of-jubilee-land-grabbers-corruption-mongrels-uhuru-ruto-lead#sthash.7cD9vJcj.dpuf

  • more kyuk land grabbing in Lamu

    Directors of one of the companies allocated land in Lamu, the Minister said, had used their title deed to get a loan of Sh1 billion from the National Bank of Kenya.

    Last evening, the list of directors of some of the firms came out, showing that 10 of them were not in the database.

    They include Witu Nyangoro Ranch (DA) Company which got 79,534 acres, Witu Conservation Self Help Group (54,201 acres), Baragoni Boni Community which got 19,760 acres, Mokowe Kibokoni Ranch (6,725 acres), Taabu Company (6,000 acres) and Pandanguo Boni (2,350 acres). Lamu Estate Ranch, Enganani and Amu ranches are not registered.

    Suprisingly, two of the companies share one name — Bricks Investment Company.

    Mr Jonas Geke and Timothy Njuguna Kariuki of Nairobi own the first one registered in August 2011 while Ms Alice Masaa and Ms Margaret Kavulani incorporated a second one in December 2011. Each was allocated 40,014 acres.

    Ms Masaa and Ms Kavulani also own Dynamic Trading Company formed in September 2011 and which owns 22,230 acres. A firm with a similar name is owned by Vijay Kumar and Ankit Bhardwaj of Village Market in Nairobi.

    Mat International Company which owns 40,014 acres is owned by Twalib Ali Mohamed and Abdiwahid Haji Yerrow.

    Shanghai Africa Investment Ltd is owned by
    John Kiarie,
    Peter Muchangi Njiru,
    Peter Mwangi Karenju,
    Daniel Gacheru Mwangi,
    Simon Ng’ang’a Wanjohi,
    Burton Kibui Maina,
    Michael Nduhiu Kariuki and Jeremiah Mbiata Gikonyo. They own 19,760 acres.

  • Ruto land grabber

    Ruto’s among 345 title deeds revoked by State

    Updated Thursday, December 9th 2010 at 00:00 GMT +3

    By ATHMAN AMRAN

    Suspended Cabinet minister William Ruto is among politicians and private companies whose land the Government has repossessed.

    Lands Minister James Orengo yesterday said 345 title deeds issued illegally have been revoked.

    “Necessary measures to prepare title deeds for the parcels of land are underway and once they are all ready, the Government will issue the titles back to the institutions,” Orengo said during a news conference at his Ardhi House offices in Nairobi.

    Others who have lost their land include Lamu West MP Fahim Twaha. Companies affected include Lima Limited, Somog Limited, Sote Flowers Limited, Hass Petrol Station and Leisure Lodge in Diani, Kwale.

    Among the tiles recovered are five parcels of land belonging to the Kenya Wildlife Service in Lamu, and another five parcels belonging to the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute in Mombasa.

    Gazette notice

    Also recovered are two parcels of land for the Jomo Kenyatta Public Beach in Mombasa and 19 parcels of land reserved for Kenya Civil Aviation Authority and Meteorological Department in Mombasa.

    Other parcels of land recovered were reserved for Government houses in Kizingo, Buxton Gardens in Mombasa, Municipal Council of Mombasa houses, parking lots, security operation zones and a road reserved for the Kenya Ports Authority. In Nakuru, 28 parcels of land have been revoked. They include those reserved for Nakuru Municipality Water Treatment Plant and Moi Primary School. And 13 parcels of land reserved for Machakos Prison have also been recovered.

    The Government has also recovered 13 parcels of land reserved for Kakamega County Council and 58 parcels of land registered under Kisii Municipality, which had been reserved for Gusii Community Centre.

    In Kisumu 37 tiles reserved for the High Court and Municipal houses have also been recovered.

    Others are 43 titles reserved for the Eldoret Town Hall, 11 titles reserved for the Ukunda Airstrip, 156 titles reserved for Woodley Estate, Dagoretti Estate, Kenya Institute of Administration and for Nairobi City Council Public Market.

    The Government has further recovered 31 title deeds in Ngong that were reserved for Administration Offices, Bus Termini in Ngong Town and a Community Centre.

    In Kitale five titles reserved for the Kenya National Library Services have been recovered while 14 others for land reserved for Kenya Agricultural Research Institute in Tigoni, Limuru, have also been recovered.

    Orengo said the titles have been published in a gazette notice of November 26, 2010.
    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000024305/ruto-s-among-345-title-deeds-revoked-by-state

  • Kenyan history

    Kenya: On Edge, Rights at Risk

    Aug 05 2014

    by Frank Holmquist

    Kenya is in a bad place. Violent attacks from Al-Shabaab, an Islamist group out of Somalia and an Al Qaeda affiliate, and smaller violent attacks and conflicts involving known and unknown sources in rural and urban settings, as well as a rise in general street level crime, have created an insecure, anxious, and deeply divided population. They have also created a problematic context for the protection of democratic rights. Last September Al-Shabaab said it executed the attack on the upscale Westgate Mall in Nairobi causing at least sixty-seven deaths and many injuries. Recently, there were attacks on the small town of Mpeketoni and its environs at the coast with over sixty deaths. Again, Al-Shabaab took “credit.” But President Kenyatta said otherwise—that Al-Shabaab was not responsible for the attacks and that instead, local political networks aiming to kill the Gikuyu people orchestrated them. The elected Lamu County Governor, Issa Timamy, has been arrested for murder, terrorism, and other charges. The governor says that the accusation is only the latest in a stream of harassment because of his efforts to protect his area from powerful people trying to take advantage of opportunities from a huge forthcoming infrastructure project. The president implied that the national political opposition had an indirect hand in the Mpeketoni affair because alleged hate speech was designed to cause instability. The statement immediately activated deep division within Kenyan society, most of it ethnically coded. Tensions are high.

    Let us step back for a moment, take a look at relevant history, assess how Kenya got to this point, and why Kenya has had an on again off again experience with democratic rights since independence. In 1963, Kenya gained independence, emerging from a painful history of severe social inequality and violence. Under colonialism, European settler farmers captured the economy and benefited from it. The movement for independence and the Land and Freedom Army fought back as the colonial regime worked hard to divide Kenyans. Democratic rights were won during the struggle, but they were lost again early in the post-colonial years, only to be gradually won back in the aftermath of the demise of de jure single party rule in 1991.

    The fact that hard won democratic reforms are in danger once again fifty-one years after independence may appear surprising. After the election of 4 March 2013, Kenyan society breathed a collective sigh of relief when—despite the defeat of opposition candidate Raila Odinga in a dubious election process—the country did not experience a repeat of the horrific post-election violence (PEV) of 2007-2008. However, the new government led by President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto failed to practice inclusion or to consolidate and expand reform. Instead, the government has attempted to implement a legislative platform that threatens to rollback rights. Meanwhile, the heavily criticized police force appears to be ineffective and in need of reform at a time when escalating crime and insecurity has put the country on edge.

    This essay is particularly concerned with the prospects of protecting democratic political rights amidst severe social class inequality. The social class divide is important because the accumulation of wealth—sometimes fantastic wealth—in Kenya has long been linked with obtaining political office or gaining access to those in office. The political class (top politicians and civil servants) uses the language of ethnic identity to gain political legs and public office, while avoiding class-based issues and pressures from below that threaten their economic standing and that of their well-to-do supporters.[1] I will not discuss the political class’ use of ethnic discourse per se, but it will come up in discussion of the broad historical rights arena within which politics operate. While the political class does not account for everything having to do with the reproduction of Kenya’s severe social class divide, its power, ideology, and policy preferences are key components of that divide.

    Necessary History

    Kenya has had an uncertain experience with democratic rights. The first president, Jomo Kenyatta, presided over substantial economic growth with expanded smallholder production. But he also engineered the loss of democratic rights through a variety of formal and informal means that altered the constitution, centralized power, constrained the press, favored his Gikuyu ethnic base, and allowed corruption to grow. More importantly, however, he demobilized those in the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party and veterans of the liberation struggle who expected radical land reform and protection of worker rights. The regime also tamed parliament and civil society. In the late 1960s, it undermined and then eliminated the Kenya Peoples Union, a political party led by Oginga Odinga. The Kenya Peoples Union was, with the brief exception of the Social Democratic Party during the 1997 election, the last above ground left-of-center political formation promoting moderate redistribution of wealth. Unexplained assassinations eliminated critics and rivals, including the popular populist politician, J.M. Kariuki.

    With the death of Kenyatta in late 1978, Vice President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi became president. The intensification of the ethnic (Kalenjin) ruling group strategy, an expanded loss of political rights, grand corruption, repression (including torture and assassination), de jure single party rule, and economic stagnation marked his nearly quarter century of rule. Growing popular unease and the end of the Cold War with threatened cuts in donor support for the regime brought the demise of the one-party system in 1991, leading to a multi-party election in 1992.

    Despite several competitive elections, and counter to most expectations, both state-supported and privately-generated violence expanded up to the present day, with some of it coming from militias tied to politicians. The major violence (labeled “ethnic clashes”) before and after elections in 1992 and 1997 was state sanctioned and saw hundreds killed and displaced, especially in Moi’s Rift Valley province and at the coast in 1997. The violence was related to Moi and KANU’s electoral calculations and was designed to consolidate support by opening up land and opportunities as presumed ethnic opponents were driven away or killed. Moi remained in office and successfully parried threats from electoral democracy by using the powers and resources of the state to create unleveled electoral playing fields. Through it all, government institutions frayed.

    After the political opening of the early 1990s, and despite obstacles the regime presented, vigorous and brave reform efforts by people in the streets, civil society leaders, organizations, and some members of the political class, brought on moments of popular mobilization. This gradually gave birth to the relative freedom to voice and organize. These were major progressive victories. Moi was constitutionally barred from competing for another term in the 2002 election and he decided to front Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, for president against long-time politician Mwai Kibaki. Unlike the 1992 and 1997 elections, this time the opposition came together and Kibaki won overwhelmingly. Euphoria swept the land. One post-election poll had Kenyans as the most optimistic people in the world. Kenya was back. But was it?

    Reform practice after 2002 was uneven at best. The victorious electoral coalition soon fell apart as Kibaki pushed coalition partner Raila Odinga and his allies to the margins of power. They were on opposite sides, as Kibaki supported a draft constitution that failed in a national referendum in 2005, and would have left considerable power with the president. Meanwhile grand corruption continued and John Githongo, the point man charged with battling corruption in the highest reaches of the state, had to flee the country in 2005. The Institute of Certified Accountants of Kenya’s 2013 estimate suggested that roughly thirty percent of the national budget is annually wasted or unaccounted for.

    Political and ethnic tensions rose to a high level as the December 2007 election approached, followed by terrible violence in the immediate aftermath of the disastrously conducted election. Up to 1300 were killed and roughly six hundred thousand were displaced. The mayhem shocked the world and ultimately brought on an African Union and donor-supported agreement on 28 February 2008 brokered by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. The agreement ended the violence and mandated a formal coalition government, including Raila Odinga as prime minister.

    The Annan Agreement called for a local tribunal to try those who planned and funded much of the violence. But with notable exceptions, much of the political class was implicated in the abuse of office in one form or another. From their point of view, it was best to circle the wagons and assure that impunity was in place for all of them, lest inquiries get out of hand. With a Kenyan tribunal as a non-starter, the only remaining source of accountability was the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which Kenya was a member. Kofi Annan handed the names of possible suspects to the ICC through the Waki Commission, a Kenyan commission of inquiry that the agreement to investigate the nature of the post-election violence set up. Formal ICC indictments for crimes against humanity were later levied against the soon-to-be-elected President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto.

    The 4 March 2013 Election

    As the 2013 election approached, many observers feared that peace would not hold due in part to ethnic mobilization but especially the vigorous ethnic campaign strategy of the Kenyatta/Ruto campaign. When asked in mid-2012 what issues would dominate the election, a top Kenyatta strategist said “ethnicity only.” So-called prayer meetings that the Kenyatta/Ruto campaign put together became quasi-ethnic celebrations and ginned up considerable enthusiasm. According to a source close to the Kenyatta campaign, the use of costly helicopters was necessary in order to get to and from the extraordinary size and energy of rallies. Prayer meetings brought an additional benefit to the campaign by further drawing religious leaders into ethnic camps. This helped strip religious leaders of their fading image of standing above ethnic politics and defending political rights, a status they rightly earned in the struggle against Moi.

    The well designed, well run, and well-funded Kenyatta/Ruto campaign, assisted by a British consulting group, constructed a creative campaign narrative that joined the personal interests of the top two candidates, their co-ethnic countrymen, and the alleged protection of national sovereignty against Western neocolonial (read ICC) intrusion. Kenyatta argued that his ICC indictment was a personal matter and would not get in the way of his exercising his presidential duties should he win the election. Such an assertion was unlikely, given a prison term hanging in the balance.

    Both candidates wrapped themselves in their respective ethnic flags and joined their interests in holding the ICC at bay. The campaign discourse was complex, but one subtext became “protect our sons from the ICC,” an institution that neocolonial Western interests drove, according to them. They made this argument despite the fact that African states referred the five of the eight current cases out of Africa, while the Security Council referred two other cases. The fact that the United States supports the ICC but is not a member of it aided the neocolonial argument by charging the United States with hypocrisy. The campaign also argued that the ICC was doing the bidding of their local opponents who helped the ICC gain indictments against them. But it was William Ruto who was a leader of the effort to stop any local tribunal, thus guaranteeing that the cases would move to the ICC in accord with the Annan Agreement. At the outset of the campaign, there was considerable support for the ICC process across ethnic categories, and the popularity of Kenyatta and Ruto and their alliance was tepid, even among their respective ethnic cohorts. Voters, and especially their ethnic cohorts, had to be convinced, and many were. The campaign gained strength and ended strong. One wonders if they would have run together, let alone won, if there were no ICC indictments lodged against them.

    Kenyans were anxious as the 4 March 2013 election approached, and to make matters worse, the election-day process was again a technical disaster.[2] The elaborate and largely untested electronic apparatus collapsed. Kenyatta and Ruto may have received the most votes against their major opponent Raila Odinga, but it is unclear whether the victors received the fifty percent plus one vote to avoid a run-off that was never called. An exit poll conducted by US academics found that the Kenyatta/Ruto campaign did not receive the fifty percent plus one vote.

    Despite the flawed election process, no violence occurred in the aftermath. There are several reasons for this. In 2007, the major geography of the violence was in the Rift Valley, with the Kalenjin population feeling aggrieved by historical decisions that caused the Gikuyu to migrate to their land. This largely took place during the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta, a Gikuyu. It was a fight over land that has been at the heart of Kenyan politics and its extreme social class inequality ever since European settlers entered at the turn of the twentieth century. But when Kenyatta and Ruto joined hands and ran together, the most dangerous geographical and ethnic conflict was taken off the electoral table.

    Other reasons for the peaceful election included good news on the governance front. There were high expectations for the new constitution that became the law of the land after a twenty-year struggle. The constitution formally constrained the overwhelming colonially derived power of the presidency, and it decentralized power and a considerable amount of finance to forty-seven new counties. There was a widespread, though inflated, popular belief, especially in poorer regions feeling left out of historical government largesse, that with devolution on hand, development was finally at hand. Devolution also meant that if favorites lost at the president and deputy president level, post-election prospects might look good at the county level. This was true for Odinga’s Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), which won a majority of the governor races.

    Other positive governance news found the judicial system going through a reform process that the new and popular former pro-democracy activist and now chief justice, Willy Mutunga, headed. With Mutunga at the helm, there was a belief that the judicial system might finally be trusted. But when the Supreme Court unanimously supported the verdict of the electoral commission and accorded victory to Kenyatta and Ruto, despite multiple anomalies, there was a visceral anger from the losing side and major civil society leaders. But there was little violence due in part to the “peace narrative” that a wide range of interests in the run-up to the election developed. Nearly all involved parties—the political class, religious institutions, business, mainstream media, donors, and the average citizen—told each other that if conflict developed it could get out of hand and bring on another round of post-election violence. After the election the new government and its supporters used the peace narrative to encourage citizens not to dwell on the questionable election and instead “move on” and let the government get on with governing. It is the height of irony that the new popular constitution, a reforming judicial system, and a relatively peaceful election helped bring on a regime that was not particularly reform minded.

    The Election in a Divided Society

    Peace prevailed but there were costs associated with this peace due to deep divisions Kenya’s political history produced. Reactions to the election outcome give an indication of how this could be true. Kenyatta/Ruto supporters argued that there was an election and they won—full stop.

    Opponents had a very different point of view. For many of them, there was no real election, and the problem was not just one election, but a string of bogus elections and political verdicts ever since independence. These perspectives suggest that ethnic stereotypes and a deeply divided understanding of post-colonial political history are all too alive. Kenya’s painful history is a continuing, vivid, and provocative presence and it threatens democratic rights. The political class is also deeply divided and fragmented and this contributes to a sense of national uncertainty or “drift,” as well as a sense of dread as trouble mounts without a satisfactory government response.

    The major contributor to the sense of dread is the deteriorating security situation. Kenya’s porous borders have facilitated the entry of violent elements, while others are probably locally generated. In October 2011, Kenya’s military entered southeast Somalia with the intent of diminishing the radical Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgency and protecting Kenya’s border. Apparently lacking an exit strategy at the outset, the military remains in Somalia after re-hatting in June 2012 as part of AMISOM, a six country African Union force. Meanwhile, the Al-Shabaab threat has expanded into Kenya. The major attack was on Nairobi’s up-scale Westgate Mall in September 2013, with the killing of at least sixty-seven and well over one hundred people injured. Al-Shabaab took “credit” for the horror. The tragedy was met with a hapless response from government spokespersons and security forces, as well as some military personnel’s apparent theft of valuable items in the mall, caught on CCTV. No official explanation of the government’s response was forthcoming and, despite promises, no independent commission of inquiry was appointed.

    The confluence of historical state and up-country discrimination against the coast region, and coastal suspicion of government in return has developed into a near dialogue of the deaf. Some background is needed. First, lacking political leverage, coastal people feel they have long suffered historical marginalization at the hands of the state and up-country people. Second, Muslims, largely at the coast and numbering at least eleven percent of the population, feel they have fallen under the predominantly Christian majority’s suspicion in the wake of recent violent acts. Three prominent militant Muslim clerics, at least one of which supported the attack on the mall, have been assassinated in the past couple of years, with much opinion blaming the government for the killings. In early June 2014, a leading moderate cleric was also assassinated. Third, Kenyan Somalis feel they have long been singled out for suspicion and abuse in the post-colonial era after a desire to link a piece of their ethnic turf with Somalia at independence was registered in a referendum in 1962. The Kenyatta government denied this request leading to an insurgency of several years duration.

    On 2 April 2014, in an operation reminiscent of the colonial era, over six thousand police and military were involved in a massive sweep of residents in Eastleigh, a predominantly Kenyan Somali residential and commercial area of Nairobi that had previously experienced abuse from the police. The sweep with arrests and detentions has continued and was expanded elsewhere. Deportations followed with some refugees returning to the Dadaab refugee camp in the north; the police’s move was crude ethnic profiling. Rather than going after carefully targeted suspects, the apparent intent was to search for instruments of violence and nab non-citizens and send them packing. The police did so by going residence to residence, picking up bystanders in the street, allegedly abusing some physically, and sometimes demanding money for their release. Some say the police view the victims as ATM machines. The heavy-handed government dragnet will only escalate the enmity and tension. This will also contribute to the radicalization of unemployed youth with their numbers already expanding. Meanwhile, violent incidents and travel advisories from some Western countries have hit tourism hard with hotels closing (twenty by early June 2014) and over seven thousand workers laid off. The World Bank has lowered its predicted growth rate for 2014-2015 to 4.7 percent. The dragnet will also hobble already severely challenged community-government trust that is necessary for painstaking intelligence gathering and is essential for any move toward a safer Kenya.

    As if this form of insecurity was not enough, the past year has also seen an alarming rise of generalized crime (car-jacking, street crime, and home break-ins) that has recently penetrated upper income residential areas that were formerly somewhat immune. The multiple sources of insecurity and the rising number of incidents have created an opinion that the government must “do something.” Such support for government intervention suggests that many Kenyans may support heavy-handed measures to deal with the threats, and in the process, rollback not just the rights of ethnic Somalis, but perhaps everyone’s rights in the name of security. Insecurity and escalating everyday crime have brought few arrests and few convictions, leaving citizens believing their government cannot protect them.

    There are other matters that opinion polls say register heavily on the minds of citizens, such as the high and rising cost of living, and high unemployment. The media is rife with stories of alleged corruption that reflects long-standing networks within the civil service, the political class, and private sector allies within and beyond the country. The president has even complained of corruption among those around him, but there is no evidence of follow-up. Meanwhile, the unclear start to the highly desirable, but complex, costly, and sometimes confusing devolution process leaves few major players looking good. Intense turf wars have enhanced uncertainty as leaders of new institutions test the limits of their power and resources, while fears grow that a strong presidency may be reasserting itself. Members of the national level political class have acted as de facto negative role models to the counties with their alleged openness to corruption coupled with their unrelenting and successful efforts to raise their salaries and perks to world class levels in a poor country.

    Political parties are in some disarray, which is normal between elections in Kenya where parties lack firm structure and internal democracy. Moreover, politicians who are constantly jockeying for office and advantage in emerging coalitions for elections yet to come are leading these political parties. The growing battle for future control of the major opposition party is on hold for a spell as Raila Odinga returned to Kenya after a post-election period in the United States at Boston University. He firmly reasserted his leadership and brought the opposition back to life with his call for a national dialogue over vital issues. The call for dialogue was subsequently changed to advancing three referendums if, as the constitution allows, a million signatures are collected and half of the counties assent. The soon-to-be-drawn referendums will concern insecurity, disbandment of the electoral commission, and allocation of more national revenues to counties. Dissent from the Rift Valley’s politicians has promoted a widening gap within the ruling party coalition, criticizing Ruto for not standing up for their interests against Kenyatta in top regime appointments. And then there are the ICC indictments. Here Kenyatta and Ruto have fared quite well. The case against Ruto has weakened considerably and the case against Kenyatta has all but collapsed as witnesses peel off while rumors circulate of weak ICC investigation, poor witness protection and witness tampering involving threats, bribes, and disappearances. The prosecution also accuses the regime of not cooperating in the provision of essential information.

    Attempted Legislative Rollback of Rights and Push Back

    The government has been laying down a legal platform to, if “necessary”, roll back some democratic reforms of the past twenty or so years, and recentralize power back to the presidency. But what is the strength of political forces that might deter or block such an effort? This is uncertain, but what is certain is that Kenya at fifty-one years is not the same Kenya at year one. At independence, the political center had certain advantages. There was a popular desire to build the nation and give the benefit of doubt to the movement/party and persons that “brought” independence and assumed top political offices. This created weak terrain on which to fight against the loss of democratic rights. In addition, the priority interest of Western donors was to find allies during the Cold War, and Kenya was one of them. In the face of Kenya’s anti-democratic practices there was occasional hand wringing by donors but no major disruption of aid flows.

    In 2014, the old methods of undermining political rights, if applied, would find a harder go of it. But the political class’ use of a pervasive ethnic political discourse will hobble the push against the loss of rights. Along with religious institutions, the media is among the most trusted of all national institutions. But the government passed legislation that will regulate the media through a commission appointed by the executive that licenses journalists, while offending journalists and their institutions may be fined substantial sums. There was a vigorous outcry from the media, civil society forces, and the political opposition prior to the National Assembly’s passage and the president’s signature. The media bill will, however, face court challenges, and, this time, in a court more independent of the executive than all prior ones.

    Proposed legislation regulating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was also heavily criticized, but unlike the media bill, it was withdrawn from the National Assembly, although it will return with amendments for another try at a later date. The legislation would have created a government appointed commission to grant licenses to operate NGOs. It would have also limited external funding to fifteen percent of NGO budgets and as a result, severely hobbled and perhaps eliminated some rights-supporting and development project-based NGOs.

    The regime also retained as county commissioners the old provincial administration structure that operated as an arm of the president. The rationale is that commissioners will coordinate arms of the state in devolved governance. They may do that, but they are likely to again act as a wide-ranging arm of the president, thereby violating the spirit and perhaps the letter of the new constitution.

    In laying a legal groundwork for a rights rollback, the regime triggered an opposition of some strength and efficacy. This all occurred in the context of the post-1991 political opening that has enhanced transparency, but not accountability of top leadership for corruption and fostering violence.[3] Transparency has expanded greatly. The media have carried extensive discussions of alleged corruption scandals and they have broadly reshaped national public policy debate. Committees of the National Assembly also call on government figures to explain their policies and actions. With growing transparency, court reform, and with an anti-corruption commission at work, impunity for corruption may be eroding for mid-level officials and the spotlight may move upwards. But for now impunity reigns at the top of the political system despite the fact that these days “more eyes are out.” While transparency tends to shame abusers of office and sometimes even divert careers, it rarely leads to indictments, let alone convictions. A case in point lies in the fate of the report of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission set out by the Annan agreement in 2008 that looked at political violence and corruption since independence. The National Assembly tabled the report saying that when the report comes up for extended discussion it may be changed. Likely changes will include the cases and names of a number of top politicians (over four hundred of them), including the president and deputy president, and others from all political corners that are mentioned for investigation and possible court action.

    Civil society organizations were crucial to redefining public debate and regaining rights in the 1990s. But how strong are they today? These organizations range from religious institutions with deep popular roots, to small civil rights groups that lack those roots. Some of the leadership was considered among the severely repressed political left of the 1980s that embraced socialist ideas of modest wealth redistribution. But with the end of the Cold War and Western donor enthusiasm for neoliberal structural adjustment policies, civil society leadership suddenly dropped socialist discourse as if a switch was flipped. Concerns about the social class divide gave way to a focus on rights and democracy. All good things were expected to follow in the train of electoral democracy. The call for democracy and rights laid the groundwork for a pan-class alliance advocating a return of rights, and funds were tapped from post-Cold War Western aid sources that suddenly looked more kindly on electoral democracy and rights protection. The opening to electoral democracy afforded long repressed political voices and organizations new space for maneuver, but concerns about severe social class inequality and its wider political implications were largely absent. And there was virtually no discussion of how inequality might exacerbate ethnic division.

    Understanding the uncertain political leverage of Kenyan civil society today requires knowing that political victories can be debilitating. Kenya’s rights victories in the 1990s raised questions of what civil society would do next and who would be on board for the second act. Political preferences divided the leadership, often ethnically tinged, once the goal of removing Moi from office was accomplished in 2002. After the 4 March 2013 election, top civil society leadership said they could not remember a time when they were so divided, dispirited, and lacking a focused agenda. These days are nothing like the years when agitation for a new constitution acted as an umbrella under which progressives could press their favored issues including devolution, civil rights, anti-corruption, environmental protection, and inclusion for youth, women, and those with disabilities. But a portion of civil society is present today with its broad defense of democratic rights, and its critique of police sweeps and abuse of Kenyan Somalis and Muslims while most of the political class is silent. Civil society is also well networked. It has some access to the mainstream press and that access has been used skillfully. However, in the face of rising insecurity and government crackdowns, there is opinion critical of civil society leadership and groups for questioning police action and “giving heart” to criminals and violent actors.

    At the moment there are no broad-based national progressive social movements, although there are some locally based ones, nor are there well organized and effectively national political parties. This is a huge problem as far as any struggle against social class inequality is concerned. Trade union political activism was broken in the immediate post-colonial period and has not come back to life beyond the salary and benefits focus of several unions of middle class professionals (bank workers, nurses, doctors, teachers and lecturers) that have frequently gone on strike in recent years. In the 1980s, Moi’s regime repression stifled university political activism and sowed ethnic divisions. Neither students nor faculty have been conspicuous rights activists in an organized manner ever since. External donors were central to the funding of major rights groups from the 1990s to the present. But lacking an organized and financially sustaining popular base, civil society organizations became vulnerable to the accusation that they were too dependent on external funding and foreign agendas. Supporters of the Kenyatta/Ruto campaign saw civil society leadership linked to the ICC process and dubbed them the “evil society.” Some civil society leaders have received threats.

    Meanwhile, Western donors grew very concerned about Islamist forces in neighboring Somalia and on the coast of Kenya. Donor counter-terror efforts include Western aid to the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit that Open Society Justice Initiative and Muslims for Human Rights say has a poor human rights record and has abused international, regional, and domestic Kenyan law.[4] The terror threat especially, and perhaps Kenya’s pivotal role in East Africa as well as new found oil and gas deposits, means that while donors may voice criticism to regime figures in private, they are not likely to threaten significant withdrawal of aid or engage in public diplomacy with a strong critique of regime rights abuse.

    The growing professional middle class (PMC), and sometimes the entire middle class, are said to have political leverage and favor rights protection. Indeed some professionals were leaders of the pro-democracy struggle of the late 1980s. Their concern for rights stem from, among other things, a desire to practice their craft—lawyers to practice freely, teachers and professors to profess, the clergy to preach, journalists and writers to write, and businesspeople to contract freely. But they also tend to embrace an ideology of market celebration that celebrates wealth and sometimes elevates the very wealthy to celebrity status. There is relatively little anxiety among the PMC about inequality beyond a desire of some to deal with poverty by raising the floor of incomes to a higher level through growth rather than through targeted policies of long-term wealth redistribution. The PMC voices commitment to fighting corruption, but there are back sliders among them, some are apolitical, and the category lacks broad organization, popular roots, and a coherent agenda beyond law and order and “good governance.” And when political push comes to political shove they are likely to support co-ethnic members of the political class.

    Conclusion

    Kenya’s extreme social inequality was born in a colonial and settler past and was ramped up in the post-independence era. It is a little discussed factor that hampers the protection of democratic rights. With the political opening in the 1990s competitive elections, welcome as they are, begged the question of how members of the political class would appeal to the vast majority of voters who are poor. The answer was found in the political class continuing to package themselves as ethnic stalwarts calling for ethnic solidarity with themselves as leaders, protectors, and patronage distributors. While ethnicity is definitely not the only issue voters frame or raise, it is usually the primary option available to voters at times of presidential contests.

    The political class has offered no stable progressive electoral options concerning the material life of the majority outside of individual politicians’ occasional pleas. In the short run, a progressive national agenda, were it to be presented, might seem like a ‘pie in the sky’ and voters may not gravitate to it since it has been left off the table of electoral choice for so long. While voters may have limited trust in ethnic cohorts to deliver the goods (often targeted needs such as medical or school fees, jobs, local social services like a medical clinic, roads, cash for loan payments) through patronage flows in identity channels, voters also fear that opponents of other identities will definitely not respond to their needs. In the short run, historical experience will likely guide citizens who will continue to “read” the ethnic identity of agenda presenters more closely than the messages they offer.

    Political rights were re-gained in the 1990s because the vast majority of citizens were fed up and elements of civil society along with some members of the political class went on the offensive. This combination continues to act as a buffer against any major rollback of political rights. But the fragility of rights will remain until national level issues surrounding modest redistribution and the material life of the majority begin to dent ethnic identities as the primary political discourse of the political class at the national level. This will occur only—and this is key—with effective national pressure from below that challenges social class inequality and the political class’ heavy use of ethnic discourse that aids and abets inequality. That pressure is absent today and as a result the political journey will take time and great organizational effort.

    Unfortunately the promise of a challenge to inequality and greater protection of democratic rights down the line is even more distant at the present time. As was noted above, Al-Shabaab took “credit” for recent attacks on Mpeketoni and its environs, but President Kenyatta said otherwise. The government failure on the security front, as well as on other issues, plus a revived opposition, may have prompted the regime to blame their difficulties on the domestic political opposition. This view of the current insecurity updates the campaign narrative of last year that joined ethnicity, nation, and the protection of the nation state from external forces. It appears to privilege certain ethnicities as representatives of the nation and its best protectors against an apparent direct or indirect alliance of opposing political forces and external threats. It also implies that national discord is so severe that democratic rights to voice and organize may be a luxury. This sets the stage for a possible crackdown on the opposition. The president’s statement on Mpeketoni was immediately and popularly viewed through the ethnic lens of Kenya’s political history. This is a context where democratic rights are at risk and the matter of inequality takes a back seat.

    Meanwhile, Kenya’s extreme class-based inequality aids the rise of everyday crime that threatens all classes in all places at all times. It is another reason to take inequality very seriously sooner rather than later.

    [1] Two recent political histories demonstrate the use of ethnic discourse by the political class. The bibliographies are copious. Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), and Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). A recent extended study of ethnic politics is: Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also the discussion of economic inequality and policy suggestions in Kenya’s Vision 2030: An Audit from an Income and Gender Inequalities Perspective (Nairobi: Society for International Development, 2010).

    [2] Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 no. 1 (2014). The entire issue is devoted to the 4 March 2013 election.

    [3] Mwangi wa Githinji and Frank Holmquist, “Reform and Political Impunity in Kenya: Transparency without Accountability,” African Studies Review 55 no. 1 (April 2012), 53-74.

    [4] Open Society Justice Initiative and Muslims for Human Rights, “‘We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court’” (Nairobi: Open Society, 2013).
    http://interviews.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18734/kenya_on-edge-rights-at-risk

  • Many European farmers decided to quit immediately following Macleod’s declaration and others formed parties of an extreme right wing hue, in the mistaken belief that by doing so they would ward off what they believed to be the evil day. Only one group pursued a
    relentless uncompromising course to full democracy – the nationalist heavyweights that believed in majority rule – one man, one vote – and would brook no deviation. These were Tom Mboya, Odinga Oginga, James Gichuru,Mungai Njoroge,Mwai Kibaki, Julius Kiano and so many others that comprised the three great tribes of Kenya – the Kikuyu, the Luo and the Kamba.

    For sheer ability, Mboya stood out and he had increasing influence and power until his assassination in 1969. He was a Luo and, as such, it is unlikely that he would ever have reached the pinnacle of power and become President of Kenya. He did not suffer fools gladly and he made many enemies amongst his intimates. For some time he had been the member for Nairobi, with its numerous tribal components, and he had to rely on a volatile, fickle electorate for his political existence. It was the absence of a firm tribal power-base that often gave rise to extremist speeches in which he only half believed.

    These outbursts usually indicated that his political position had weakened and needed a shot in the arm. The story goes that he was set on his political career by an idle remark from a European woman who came into a shop that sold sanitary equipment for the Nairobi City Council. Looking around she only saw Tom, without doubt one of the greatest brains ever to come out of Africa. “Is anyone here?”, she asked, and so was born one more nationalist, whose invective was for a long while particularly directed against the white woman. His death by an assassin’s bullet was an immense loss to Kenya and Africa and the contribution he made to Kenya’s stability was second only to that of Kenyatta himself.

    Odinga was another thing. Also a Luo, he belonged to the tribal aristocracy and viewed Mboya as something of an upstart from a small island in the middle of Lake Victoria. Jealousy and envy, added to hostility, were ingredients that soured their relationship
    and because Mboya had gone to the West for money to buttress the trade union movement, which he had started, Odinga went to China for funds for his political purposes. Odinga was a flamboyant creature and at the opening of a parliamentary session, when traditional dress was often worn, he would appear in a close-fitting frog suit, made of blue, white and red beads.Mboya would talk of African socialism and positive neutrality, but Odinga would reflect the political hues of those whose finances he tapped and clearly wished to have little truck with the West. At the same time, he was
    proud of his personal wealth and would refer to himself as the only capitalist of any substance in the House. He was to become Minister of Home Affairs and a Vice President and was guilty of treason many times over before Kenyatta finally had him restricted. The ‘Old Man’ would say “He helped me in the old days. Let him be. Anyway, I would rather have him where I can see him” He remained a member of the cabinet, until the final break when he formed his own party, the K.P.U. (Kenya People’s Union), which
    was eventually proscribed and most of its leading adherents arrested and imprisoned, some like Achieng Oneko for many years.

    Odinga was the first man to call publicly in the House for the release of Kenyatta so he could take his place as head of state. Those who had held back, deriving an opportunity from the absence of such a national figure, joined in the clamour and the election of
    1961. The election, which resulted from the most recent constitution, was fought on the twin issues of Kenyatta’s release and independence. Two fingers would be raised in salutation – not like Churchill’s inspiration to ultimate victory, not as an obscene sign of disapproval, but to signify the two goals. It was for this election that I decided to step down from the presidency of the KNFU and offer myself as a candidate.

    Purple Shadows by Peter Marrian

    Click to access purple_shadows.pdf

  • Kenyatta opulence

    President Uhuru’s Niece, Nana Gecaga, Imported a Maid from UK Whom She Pays Ksh 600,000.

    A niece of President Uhuru Kenyatta, Nana Gecaga, has now imported a maid from United Kingdom whom she is paying Ksh 600,000 in salaries.

    Nana, Jomo Gecaga’s sister, has a young baby and is living with the recently elected Mathare MP Steve Kariuki.

    So friends of the couple were recently overheard discussing the pay of the maid recently. Close friends of the couple were surprised that Nana could import a British maid to come and teach her child manners, grammar and good etiquette when there are enough Kenyans who can work with the salary and do a better job.

    Now even Kenyans working in State House wonder why the President can allow this in his family when he said that Kenyans will be considered first in employment. How will Jubilee generate employment with such discriminative tendencies from the family level?

    Jomo, Nana and Soiya Gecaga are children of Udi and Jeni Gecaga (first President’s daughter). Udi Gecaga is the uncle-in-law of President Uhuru Kenyatta and the former vice-president of privately owned investment company Lonhro East Africa.

    Nana owns the Bora Ubora PR firm which has currently been getting a good chunk of government deals. She is also a columnist with the Star newspaper. Jomo Gecaga was the man who delivered the VW Passat for ministries while his uncle was the boss at the Treasury.

    Nana recently attended a wedding at the Coast with the British nanny.
    http://info-sasa.com/president-uhurus-niece-nana-gecaga-imported-a-maid-from-uk-whom-she-pays-ksh-600000/#more-2745

  • Kenya in Somalia

    Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia: An intricate process
    By Luckystar Miyandazi

    In the midst of Somalia’s decades of conflict, al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based terrorist group with al-Qaeda links, has become particularly noticeable not only nationally but also regionally. Foreign intervention, therefore, is no new phenomenon in Somalia. Yet, when on 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to launch a military offensive against al-Shabaab, called Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country), the reality of the al shabaab menace in the region was highlighted. The Kenyan intervention in the Somalia conflict is, however, fraught with its own challenges for Kenya, Somalia and the entire region a year into the operation.

    Introduction
    Kenya puts forward a variety of reasons, linked to the insecurity caused by al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa region, to justify its military intervention in Somalia. As well as having concerns over border security, Kenya maintains that al-Shabaab’s frequent kidnappings and killings of tourists in its coastal and north-eastern provinces had become a threat to trade and tourism, both of which are vital sectors of Kenya’s economy. Al-Shabaab, which means ‘youth’ in Arabic, is an insurgent terrorist group that rose to regional prominence in the mid-2000s. Al-Shabaab gained prominence fighting against Ethiopia’s ‘occupation’ of Somalia from 2006 to 2009. At that time the group was a popular Islamist guerrilla movement.2 When the Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia, al-Shabaab seized most of southern and central Somalia, areas which they maintained in their control until 2011. Members of al-Shabaab are interested in advancing their commitment to regional jihadism,3 while promoting Somali nationalism. Although the scale of the operation launched by Kenya indicates that plans for such an offensive had been underway long before the actual invasion, questions have been raised over the overall preparedness and coordination of the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) for the operation, given the domestic vulnerabilities evident in the consequent counter attacks launched by al-Shabaab militia on Kenyan civilians. Now that the KDF and units of the Somalia National Army (SNA) have claimed victory over al-Shabaab, having liberated their last stronghold, the port city of Kismayo, on 29 September 2012, 4 many questions still linger on the forces’ plans following this success.

    While various actors, both on the Kenyan and Somali side, have debated on the pros and cons of the decision to intervene, this Policy & Practice Brief aims to explore the justification for and consequent implications of the invasion of Somalia by the KDF, especially in light of an existing African Union (AU) mission in Somalia. It also examines the challenges that Kenya experienced as a result of its decision to invade Somalia and provides an assessment of the sustainability of Kenya maintaining its presence in the country.

    Click to access ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-19.pdf

  • William Ruto wanted ICC

    21/2/2009

    Ruto: Why I prefer The Hague route

    Agriculture minister William Ruto wants the secret envelope containing names of the post-election violence suspects handed over to the International Criminal Court at The Hague without further delay.

    Mr Ruto says the two-month period given by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to Kenya to make a new attempt at setting up a local tribunal to try the suspects was unnecessary.

    “Kofi Annan should hand over the envelope that contains names of suspects to the International Criminal Court at The Hague so that proper investigations can start,” Mr Ruto said. “Mr Annan should allow us to move forward. We cannot just get stuck in one place addressing the same thing.”

    Mr Ruto’s latest stand contradicts the position of Prime Minister Raila Odinga, leader of his ODM party, who prefers a local tribunal.

    A government motion to set up a special local tribunal was defeated in Parliament earlier this month, raising the possibility that suspects whose names were given to Mr Annan in a sealed envelope by the Waki Commssion could be taken to The Hague for trial.

    The Hague option was to be activated should Kenya fail to establish a local tribunal as proposed by the commission that investigated the post-election violence.

    Mr Ruto – whose constituency was among those worst hit by violence — spoke during the week he weathered a storm in Parliament over a maize scandal in which brokers are believed to have benefited by trading with national food security reserves at a time when the country was facing widespread hunger.

    The minister described the attempt to pass a no-confidence motion against him as his most trying moment politically.

    “It touches the soft belly of the nation. Food and hunger are very sensitive and delicate issues. When a whole machine has been turned against you as the cause of hunger in the face of hungry people, it is very trying to try to explain your contribution. Thank God I managed to explain myself,” the minister told the Sunday Nation.

    In a wide-raging interview Friday, Mr Ruto maintained that Justice and Constitutional Affairs minister Martha Karua had approached him seeking to form a political alliance ahead of the 2012 elections.

    “She attempted to draft me into the 2012 succession game. She sent emissaries to me, and we met twice, but I declined because we had just come out of a very difficult time of violence. She has tried to deny this saying I had baggage. When did she discover I had baggage, and which William Ruto was she desperately looking for?” he asked.

    But Ms Karua told the Sunday Nation that there was no way she would have sought an alliance with “someone who has baggage over corruption cases”.

    Ms Karua has repeatedly asked Mr Ruto to “take political responsibility” and resign over the maize scandal. The matter attracted a new ally for Mr Ruto in Energy minister Kiraitu Murungi, who challenged Ms Karua to show what practical steps she had taken to fight corruption instead of asking her colleagues to resign.

    Analysts saw Mr Murungi’s stand as the purchase of political insurance from Mr Ruto should the Energy minister have to face a censure motion in Parliament over the Triton scandal involving petrol storage and distribution.

    However, Mr Murungi said that his position was informed by a principled stand against “the doctrine of political responsibility where ministers pay for the crimes of civil servants.”

    And speaking in Sotik on Saturday, Mr Ruto faulted the Waki Commission’s post-election violence report yet again, saying it was “full of rumours and hearsay”.

    He said it was misleading for the report to state that the violence had no relation with the announcement of the presidential results.

    The minister alleged that the Waki report targeted those who complained about the outcome of the last General Election while leaving out those who he claimed engineered an alleged electoral fraud.

    And for a third time, the extent of the frosty relations within the grand coalition Cabinet came out in the open.

    Mr Ruto accused Ms Karua of “doing nothing” to fight corruption and asked her to resign.

    The minister was accompanied by his Roads counterpart Franklin Bett, assistant minister for Energy Charles Keter, MPs Joyce Laboso (Sotik), Isaac Ruto (Chepalungu), Francis Chachu (North Horr) and Sotik DC Amphrey Nakitare.

    Mr Ruto said that witch-hunting would not help improve the lives of Kenyans and urged leaders to come up with coherent plans to fight corruption instead of fomenting political hate. He urged Kenyan leaders to take responsibility and lead from the front if they expect to build a united and healthy nation.

    The minister at the same time censured church leaders who publicly criticised President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga during a meeting at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre.

    He said it would have been more equitable had the church leaders booked appointments with the President and the PM at State House to discuss their issues.
    http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/533390/-/view/printVersion/-/btqgchz/-/index.html

  • Uhuru Kenyatta the messy leader

    Stand up for Kenya, Mr President, and stop this mess

    By The Standard
    Updated Sunday, November 1st 2015 at 13:10 GMT +3

    “Today I draw the line. No one will stand between Kenyans and what is right in the fight against corruption and other monstrous economic crimes,” President Uhuru Kenyatta while addressing Parliament on March 26, 2015

    Mr President, that line has been crossed far too many times. In fact, there is nothing to show that such a line ever existed. You must draw that line again. And if you do, do it with conviction. Corruption has become a way of life in your government. And on this subject, we speak to you candidly because we speak for Kenyans; all Kenyans. We speak for the 6,173,433 Kenyans who elected you and the 6,156,595 Kenyans who rejected you at the ballot in 2013.

    And our message is simple. Call out the thieves in your government and save our country from the firm grip of evil racketeers and shameless conspirators. Call them by their names and damn the consequences. Do not allow them to throw Kenya to the dogs in exchange of temporary political convenience. If you don’t save Kenya now, Mr President, the millions of jobless youths; the helpless patients dying at home and in public hospitals; the children who have been robbed of their childhood by land grabbers and the mothers and fathers who toil on barren shambas for zero returns will forever remember you. Remember you as the President under whose watch Kenya fell apart.

    The poor of this country may sing and dance for you whenever they get the rare opportunity to come close to you. But deep inside, they are frustrated by their inability to hold thieves in your government to account. They may never tell you this Mr President, but take it from us; you have surrounded yourself with far too many corrupt people. Shake them off and set Kenya free!

    So shameless and emboldened are the evil schemers that in their scramble for the public pie, your pet projects have presented the perfect opportunity for theft and primitive accumulation of wealth. The laptops project has collapsed under the weight of corruption. The slums upgrading programme has been turned into a cash cow by people you have entrusted with its management. The 2014 recruitment of police officers was cancelled courtesy of corruption at a time when Kenyans were falling like flies under Al-Shabaab fire. And today, as leaked national examination papers circulate in social media, the people you have put in charge of education are telling you all is well. What a shame!

    Walk the talk Mr President and stand up for your country. Stand up for your government. Theft of public resources by people you have appointed to State jobs is not only a betrayal of public trust; it is evil and it is immoral. It gets worse, Mr President, that when the culprits do it, they do it with impunity.

    You must hear this Mr President and believe it because it is the truth. In the fight against corruption and in efforts to hold this country together and deepen our democracy, the media are not your enemy. In fact, we are the most reliable partners to deliver the Kenyan promise. You may want to find out, Mr President, why President Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the United States of America — a man who bore the brunt of media criticism on daily basis — found the conviction within himself to declare that “were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers and be capable of reading them”.

    It is common knowledge Mr President that you will be seeking a second term in office. That is your constitutional right and we sincerely wish you and other presidential hopefuls well. It takes courage and great sacrifice to seek to serve one’s country at the very top; and especially if that country is Kenya. But what would be the point of being President of a country whose people are under sustained attack from an economy on a free fall courtesy of your own appointees who have made corruption the second name of your administration?

    What do you owe this cabal of corrupt officials that you must allow them to continue plundering our economy and making you look so bad? When you chair Cabinet meetings, what do your ministers tell you about the cost of living for millions of the poor Kenyans who call you “my President”? What do they tell you about theft of national exams? What do they tell you about the plight of dying patients who can’t access basic emergency medical care? What do they tell you about the billions of shillings sunk in the slums upgrading programme? What do they tell you about the stability of the Kenyan shilling which stood at Sh84 against the dollar when you took office and is now trading at Sh102 against the dollar? What do they tell you Mr President?

    On November 7, 2013, you made history by blowing the whistle on corruption in your office. You stated clearly that “the biggest corruption in Kenya occurs in the Office of the President. Security-related agencies are the basis of corruption in this country”. But you did not have the courage to name the people seated at your table and stealing from Kenyans under your watch.

    A very bad example has been set at the top and it is being perfected at the bottom of the pyramid, every day. The burden of life for majority of Kenyans has become too heavy to bear. You can dismiss your rivals and scoff at the gospel of Opposition politicians on corruption; in any case they too are not as clean as they would want Kenyans to believe. But they did not swear the oath of office to protect this country. You did.

    Remember April 9, 2013 Mr President. The Holy Bible at hand, the First Lady by your side and surrounded by a multitude of witnesses, you swore to “truly and diligently serve the people and the Republic of Kenya in the office of the President of the Republic of Kenya; that I will diligently discharge my duties and perform my functions in the Office of President of the Republic of Kenya; and I will do justice to all in accordance with this Constitution, as by law established, and the laws of Kenya, without fear, favour, affection or ill-will. So help me God.”

    Ask God to help you Mr President. Help you to hold this country together and inspire hope and confidence in the young and the old, those who support you and those who oppose you. Only you, Mr President, can set the pace of rebuilding our country and our economy. Don’t allow them — your friends, political allies and rivals — to cause you to preside over the collapse of our beautiful country.
    http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000181273/stand-up-for-kenya-mr-president-and-stop-this-mess

  • hata mimi pia naamini hivo na hakufanya poa

  • no comment is required provided that thorough and proper investigation was done.

  • He has immersed quite the wealth in the years

  • Mother Teresa women & children female welfare organization
    Registered Trust No 47/2008
    No 40.Pillayarkoil Street
    Kadambadi
    NAGAPATTINAM TAMILNADU
    INDIA
    Respected Sir Madam

    Our genuine women charity request
    Grant or Loan any one helping

    Own fund Raising Schemes
    request

    Project 1

    Sanitary Nabkin best quality Produced Per day 8pads packet 100 thousands Packets produced. Next few days all the above Girls Studying Educational Institutions Sales Rs 20-00 per packet. Market price Rs 40-00 & above.

    Project 2

    Global warming claimate change Now using plastic carry bags Our District.
    Our Trust Large quantity Cloth Carry Bags Produced. Next few days all the above Sales to All Shops.

    Project 3

    Led Bulb now heavy rate Sales
    Our Charity Large quantity Led Bulbs Manufacturing. Next few days all the above
    Sales Electric Shops. Our State Govt permission All Ration Shop sales
    3 Watts 5 Watts Led Bulb reasonable Rate

    Project 4

    Export & Import business
    Iam already studied above course Three months
    2 years child to Old Age person pure Vegetarian prepared food
    All men and women health food
    Rice rava Punjab Wheat Rava Wheet Floor
    More than 10 varities all pure Vegetarian Preparation food. BIS MARK Licence

    The above Four project sales income per month 1 Million usd and above Our Charity Recurring Grant per month.

    Already running our Trust
    Motger Less Babies Home
    Orphanage Home
    Old Age Home
    Only

    Our Trust proposed programmes
    All women and girls Short StayHome

    All Foreign Women and Children’s
    Guest house all Suit Aircontioned With Modern amenities. Pure Vegetarian Food supply
    boarding and Lodging all free only.
    Our Trust expenses.

    Nagapattinam near Velankanni SHRINE BASLICA MATHAChurch Here Throughout
    years Foreigners come to this Church

    All BC and MBC HigherStudying Girls Hostel
    All SC and ST HigherStudying Girls Hostel

    All Rural studying Bright Students Girls and boys Coching Class all Govt. Examination
    Boarding and Lodging all free only All our Trust expences.

    Our Trust request grant 4 Miliion usd only one time only
    Or Loan 2.5 Million US Dollars only
    Request

  • JUDGING ON THE ABOVE STATEMENT THE ONLY THING THAT KENYATTA HAS EVER DONE GOOD WILL NEVER EVER BE MENTIONED. HE WILL RULE AS LONG AS THE FOUNDING FATHER DID.

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