September 2, 2026

10 thoughts on “From “Dialogue” to “Revolution” in Kenya: A Ten Point Theoretical Perspective

  1. Name one country in the world that’s ever developed as a result of a coup. You just want to create anarchy so you can loot peoples wealth. You forget simple logic. Uhuru was elected by God and God will protect him. Uhuru is sorting things for all Kenyans, so give up on your so called revolution and get behind our great leader.

    KSB: Your comment has been edited because it constituted what is called “hate speech” which could take you to The Hague. I have not called for a coup in Kenya neither have I called for anarchy. I have given a perspective of what is possible if Raila’s call for dialogue is not heeded by Uhuru Kenyatta. Get this right! Re-read the article to get its main thrust.

  2. “Omondi Tunya” if God “SELECTED” Uhuru, since he was never in Kenya to vote, why would you panic because of Osewe’s hypothesis? You seem not to have understood his conclusion that:

    “It has to be emphasized that this is only a theoretical perspective of KRA and not a blue print of the development of events in the run up to Saba Saba and the toppling of the Jubilee government. It is a “rough guide” to the looming Kenyan revolution especially if Raila’s call for dialogue is ignored by Uhuru. This perspective does not endorse violence in the resolution of the political crisis looming in Kenya but tries to lay bare the stark realities possible under the prevailing circumstances.”

  3. Tunya bin Tunya — go figure out for yourself:

    Soldiers in Mali, a West African nation often cited as a democratic model, overthrew the elected government on Thursday, looted the presidential palace, arrested ministers and declared that they had seized power.

    It was the latest government to fall as a consequence of the Arab Spring, though in this case it did not come through popular uprisings or protests for democracy. To the contrary, Mali was preparing to hold elections only a month from now, and the president, adhering to the Constitution, was not running again.

    Drunken soldiers have looted Mali’s presidential palace just hours after they took power. The coup deposed a president, who was just one month away from stepping down.

    The mutineers say they’re overthrowing the government because of its mishandling of an insurgency in the country’s north.

    Since the uprising began, tens of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee, and the soldiers sent to put down the insurgency say they’ve suffered serious casualties because they’re poorly equipped.

    Other Successful Coup d’etats in Africa

    Burkina Faso
    • 1966–Jan 3rd: Sangoulé Lamizana overthrows Maurice Yaméogo
    • 1980–Nov 25th: Saye Zerbo overthrows Sangoulé Lamizana
    • 1982–Nov 7th: Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo overthrows Saye Zerbo
    • 1983–Aug 4th:Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré overthrow Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo
    • 1987–Oct 15th: Blaise Compaoré overthrows Thomas Sankara

    Burundi
    • 1966–Jul 8th: Ntare V overthrows Mwambutsa IV[22]
    • 1966–Nov 28th: Michel Micombero overthrows Ntare V[22]
    • 1976–Nov 10th: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza overthrows Michel Micombero
    • 1987–Sep 9th: Pierre Buyoya overthrows Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
    • 1996–Jul 25th: Pierre Buyoya overthrows Sylvestre Ntibantunganya

    Central African Republic
    • 1966–Jan 1st: Jean-Bédel Bokassa overthrows David Dacko
    • 1979–Sep 21st: David Dacko overthrows Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa
    • 1981–Sep 1st: André Kolingba overthrows David Dacko
    • 2003–Mar 15th: François Bozizé overthrows Ange-Félix Patassé

    Chad
    • 1975–Apr 13th: Noël Milarew Odingar overthrows François Tombalbay
    • 1982–Jun 7th: Hissène Habré overthrows Goukouni Oueddei
    • 1990–Dec 1st: Idriss Déby overthrows Hissène Habré Comoros
    • 1975–Aug 3rd: Said Mohamed Jaffar and Bob Denard overthrow Ahmed Abdallah
    • 1978–May 23: Ahmed Abdallah and Bob Denard overthrow Ali Soilih
    • 1989–Nov 26th: Said Mohamed Djohar and Bob Denard overthrow Ahmed Abdallah
    • 1995–Sep 28th: Bob Denard overthrows Said Mohamed Djohar for 7 days. (see Operation Azalee)
    • 1999–Apr 30th: Azali Assoumani overthrows Tadjidine Ben Said Massounde

    Congo
    • 1963–Aug 15th: Alphonse Massemba-Débat overthrows Fulbert Youlou
    • 1968–Sep 4th: Marien Ngouabi overthrows Alphonse Massemba-Débat[31]
    • 1979–Feb 8th: Denis Sassou Nguesso overthrows Joachim Yhombi-Opango
    • 1997–Oct 25th: Denis Sassou Nguesso overthrows Pascal Lissouba

    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    • 1960–Sep 14th: Mobutu Sese Seko overthrows Patrice Lumumba
    • 1965–Nov 25th: Mobutu Sese Seko overthrows Joseph Kasa-Vubu
    • 1997–May 16: Laurent-Désiré Kabila overthrows Mobutu Sese Seko

    Côte d’Ivoire
    • 1999–Dec 24th: Robert Guéï overthrows Henri Konan Bédié (see 1999 Ivorian coup d’état)
    • 2011–Apr 11th: Alassane Ouattara with French army overthrow Laurent Gbagbo the legitimate winner of the 2010 election

    Egypt
    • 1952–23 Jul: Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrow King Farouk I

    Equatorial Guinea
    • 1979 – September 29: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo overthrows Francisco Macias Nguema

    Ethiopia
    • 1910–Ras Tessema Nadew and Fitawrawi Habte Giyorgis against Empress Taytu, regent of the incapacitated Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia
    • 1916–a group of aristocrats, including Fitawrawi Habte Giyorgis and Ras Tafari Makonnen, against Emperor Iyasu V.
    • 1974–Sep 12th: Aman Mikael Andom overthrows Emperor Haile Selassie I
    • 1974–Nov 17th: Tafari Benti overthrows Aman Mikael Andom
    • 1977–Feb 3rd: Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrows Tafari Benti
    • 1991–May 21: Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF overthrow Mengistu Haile Mariam

    Gambia
    • 1994–Jul 22nd: Yahya Jammeh overthrows Dawda Jawara

    Ghana
    • 1966–Feb 24th: Joseph Arthur Ankrah overthrows Kwame Nkrumah
    • 1972–Jan 13th: Ignatius Kutu Acheampong overthrows Kofi Abrefa Busia
    • 1978–Jul 5th: Fred Akuffo overthrows Ignatius Kutu Acheampong
    • 1979–Jun 4th: Jerry John Rawlings overthrows Fred Akuffo
    • 1981–Dec 31st: Jerry John Rawlings overthrows Hilla Limann

    Guinea
    • 1984–Apr 3rd: Lansana Conté overthrows Louis Lansana Beavogui
    • 2008–Dec 24th: Moussa Dadis Camara overthrows Aboubacar Sompare Guinea-Bissau
    • 1980–Nov 14th: João Bernardo Vieira overthrows Luís Cabral
    • 1999–May 7: Ansumane Mané overthrows João Bernardo Vieira
    • 2003–Sep 14th: Veríssimo Correia Seabra overthrows Kumba Iala

    Lesotho
    • 1986–Jan 18th: Justin Metsing Lekhanya overthrows Leabua Jonathan • 1990–Nov 12th: Justin Metsing Lekhanya overthrows King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho
    • 1991–May 2: Elias Phisoana Ramaema overthrows Justin Metsing Lekhanya

    Liberia
    • 1980–Apr 12th: Staff Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrows President William R. Tolbert, Jr.
    • 1990–Sep 9th: Prince Johnson overthrows President Samuel K. Doe

    Libya
    • 1969–Sep 1st: Muammar al-Gaddafi overthrows King Idris I of Libya

    Madagascar
    • 1972–Oct 11th: Gabriel Ramanantsoa overthrows Philibert Tsiranana
    • 1975–Feb 5th: Richard Ratsimandrava overthrows Gabriel Ramanantsoa
    • 2009–Mar 17th: Andry Rajoelina overthrows Marc Ravalomanana (see 2009 Malagasy political crisis)

    Mali
    • 1968–Nov 19th: Moussa Traoré overthrows Modibo Keita
    • 1991–Mar 26th: Amadou Toumani Touré overthrows Moussa Traoré
    • 2012-Mar 22nd: Military overthrows Amadou Toumani Touré

    Mauritania
    • 1978–Jul 10th: Mustafa Ould Salek overthrows Moktar Ould Daddah
    • 1979–Apr 6th: Ahmad Ould Bouceif and Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah overthrow Mustafa Ould
    Salek
    • 1980–Jan 4th: Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah overthrows Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Louly
    • 1984–Dec 12th: Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya overthrows Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah
    • 2005–Aug 3rd: Ely Ould Mohamed Vall overthrows Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya
    • 2008–Aug 6th: Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz overthrows Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi (see 2008 Mauritanian coup d’état)

    Niger
    • 1974–Apr 15th: Seyni Kountché overthrows Hamani Diori (see 1974 Nigerien coup d’état)
    • 1996–Jan 27th: Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrows Mahamane Ousmane (see 1996 Nigerien coup d’état)
    • 1999–Apr 9th: Daouda Malam Wanke overthrows Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (see 1999 Nigerien coup d’état)
    • 2010–Feb 18th: Salou Djibo overthrows Mamadou Tandja (see 2010 Nigerien coup d’état)

    Nigeria
    • 1966–Jan 15th: Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu overthrows Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
    • 1966–Jul 29th: Yakubu Gowon overthrows Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi
    • 1975–Jul 29th: Murtala Mohammed overthrows Yakubu Gowon
    • 1983–Dec 31st: Muhammadu Buhari overthrows Shehu Shagari
    • 1985–Aug 27th: Ibrahim Babangida overthrows Muhammadu Buhari
    • 1993–Nov 17th: Sani Abacha overthrows Ernest Shonekan

    Rwanda
    • 1973–Jul 5th: Juvénal Habyarimana overthrows Gregoire Kayibanda
    • 1994–Apr 6th: Theoneste Bagosura overthrows Juvénal Habyarimana
    • 1994–Jul 4th: Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) overthrow Theoneste Bagosura (see Rwandan Civil War)

    São Tomé and Príncipe
    • 1995–Aug 15th: Manuel Quintas de Almeida overthrows Miguel Trovoada for 6 days
    • 2003–Jul 16th: Fernando Pereira (major) overthrows Fradique de Menezes for 7 days

    Seychelles
    • 1977–Jun 5th: France-Albert René overthrows James Mancham

    Sierra Leone
    • 1967–Mar 21st: David Lansana overthrows Siaka Stevens
    • 1968–Apr 19th: John Amadu Bangura overthrows Andrew Juxon-Smith
    • 1992–Apr 29th: Valentine Strasser overthrows Joseph Saidu Momoh
    • 1996–Jan 16th: Julius Maada Bio overthrows Valentine Strasser
    • 1997–May 25: Johnny Paul Koroma overthrows Ahmed Tejan Kabbah
    • 1998–Feb 12th: ECOMOG overthrows Johnny Paul Koroma

    Solomon Islands
    • 2000 by the Malaita Eagle Force

    Somalia
    • 1969–Oct 21st: Muhammad Siad Barre overthrows Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein
    • 1991–Jan 26th: Mohammed Farrah Aidid overthrows Muhammad Siad Barre

    Sudan
    • 1958–Nov 16th: Ibrahim Abboud overthrows Abdallah Khalil
    • 1969–May 25: Gaafar al-Nimeiry overthrows Ismail al-Azhari
    • 1985–Apr 6th: Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab overthrows Gaafar al-Nimeiry
    • 1989–Jun 30th: Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir overthrows Ahmed al-Mirghani

    Togo
    • 1963–Jan 13th: Étienne Eyadéma and Emmanuel Bodjolle overthrow Sylvanus Olympio
    • 1967–Jan 13th: Étienne Eyadéma and Kléber Dadjo overthrow Nicolas Grunitzky

    Tunisia
    • 1957–Jul 15th: Habib Bourguiba overthrows King Muhammad VIII al-Amin
    • 1987–Nov 7th: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali overthrows Habib Bourguiba

    Uganda
    • 1966–Feb: Milton Obote overthrows King Mutesa II of Buganda
    • 1971–Jan 21st: Idi Amin overthrows Milton Obote
    • 1979–Apr 11th: Tanzania Peoples Defence Force and Uganda National Liberation Army overthrow Idi Amin
    • 1980–May 12: Paulo Muwanga overthrows Godfrey Binaisa
    • 1985–Jul 27th: Tito Okello Lutwa overthrows Milton Obote
    • 1986–Jan 26th: Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Army overthrow Tito Okello Lutwa

    Zanzibar
    • 1964–Jan 12th: John Okello overthrows Sheik Abdulrahman Muhammad Babu

    Source: AFP/Wikipedia/BBC/Reuters 2012

  4. To Secede (or Not) from Kenya?: The Case for Ingo Secession:

    By mhamishi March 19, 2013

    The recent 2013 General Elections in Kenya have given rise to deep divisions and an unparalled levels of ethnic animosity in the country. But the most interesting has been the emergence of talk of secession by various regional based disgruntled persons of varying ethnicities. Currently this talk by itself is not likely to lead to dissolution of this country into separate states or regions, but with the planting of this seed in the minds of many, it now does not seem inconceivable. The issue, therefore, should be taken seriously and examined carefully.

    Secession politics in Kenya is not new. Currently there is a strong secessionist movement at the Coast province fronted by the Mombasa Republican Council. Previously between 1963-67 there was a secessionist conflict in North-Eastern Kenya that was called the ‘Shifta War’. At first glance these movements have legitimate historical and cultural reasons for seeking separation but a close study shows that they display an amazing ignorance of realpolitik power politics as they are driven by political adventurism/posturing against a heavily armed state machinery. For the MRC, this amateurism reached its peak in July 2012 when a court ordered the government to un-ban the MRC, with the presiding judge recommending to the MRC political registration. The MRC subsequently dismissed this suggestion and continued with its militant agenda through threating to disrupt national examinations, stopping voter registration, boycotting national elections and even disrupting the voting process. Everyone knows what happened next in October 2012.

    Historically, the military option has been the most effective method of driving a successful secessionist agenda. Eritrea and Southern Sudan are examples of secessionist success in Africa with a few others currently actively engaged all over the continent and elsewhere. However in Kenya’s case, engaging in an all-out fratricidal secessionist war will lead to the deaths, maiming and displacements of hundreds of thousands with no guarantee of the results.

    This leaves exploiting the political space as the only option for driving an effective secessionist movement in Kenya. Let me make it clear from this point that the Constitution of Kenya exists solely to protect the ruling class and their side-kicks so it is inconceivable for a state authority such as Kenya to voluntarily give away territory. However there is also no state authority in the world that will stand before an idea whose time has come such as a popular revolution.

    The Case for Ingo Secession
    I hereby unequivocally call for the Secession of the Four Counties of the historical Western Province of Kenya to form either an autonomous or independent political entity called Ingo (Luhya for Home). Ingo would be a Swiss-style confederation of the Four Counties with a collective administration and rotational head of state system.

    The unsavory truth that the 2013 elections exposed is that of the 42 ethnic groups in Kenya, only a person from one of the big five of the Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba has a shot at the presidency. Of these big five, it’s only the Luhya (People from the Four Counties) who are the most democratic in terms of splitting their voting patterns for all tickets irrespective of the ethnic backgrounds of the candidates. Unfortunately the 2013 elections seem to have cemented a political hegemony that makes it virtually impossible for people from the Four Counties let alone the other 39 ethnic groups to have meaningful political aspirations in Kenya where 2 ethnic groups have now contrived to dominate the country’s politics.

    The People from the Four Counties much like the rest of Kenya are at a crossroads. On the one hand, we desire peace & prosperity yet on the other hand without political equity, all other forms of equity claimed under the Constitution as well as national harmony do not amount to much.

    Rather than continuing to engage in the prevailing Kenyan angst, the People from the Four Counties ought to realistically view the Case for Ingo Secession as an option that balances economic development and political equity. Indeed if one does an opportunity cost analysis, there would be a heavy price to pay for secession than if Ingo were to remain part of the Kenyan republic. But yet again, does the economic value of being part of a larger unit such as the republic outweigh the self-dignity of political equity, not being dominated by hegemonic forces? This is the fundamental question that People from the Four Counties would need to answer.

    The first question is whether secession is legal. The 2010 Constitution declares Kenya a unitary state and that only through a public referendum can the boundaries of Kenya be altered. Here we learn a telling mistake from the MRC on why they are being so ineffective; the same 2010 constitution has devolved and granted county governments, a trojan horse which the MRC chose to ignore. The political entities that are the counties of Kenya offer an amazing legal loophole for Ingo Secession because there is no legal limitation on them from marshaling Plebiscites among the Four Counties for secession. Such referenda would draw inspiration/be similar to the 1995 Quebec Referendum, the 2009, 2011 & 2014 Catalonia Independence Referendums. Simply put, whilst the Constitution of Kenya is a strong legal document, there is no constitution or other legal document that can stand in the way when a population votes in a referendum for Self-Determination which is one of the guaranteed human rights under the UN Charter of 1948.

    The Shifta War insurgents and the MRC adopted a militant posture for their demands which was a welcome cue to Kenya government to respond with violence in a pattern that implies secession is illegal and unconstitutional, and severe punishment awaits those who try to secede. However this is the same government that was a key player in the 2005 Sudan CPA as well as in provision of logistics and training for the 2011 South Sudan referendum. Whilst the Kenya government has the legal case against secession, it does not have the moral argument to enforce unity when a populace has voted for secession. The court of international public opinion would make it difficult for the Kenya government to act against the Case for Ingo Secession if the People of the Four Counties can conduct a well-organized, free and fair referendum that advocates for secession.

    A second question arises over whether the Kenya government could allow the People of the Four Counties to secede, especially since without a doubt this action would trigger a domino-effect on other counties most notably in the Nyanza and Coast regions. If one of either Ingo, Nyanza or Coast regions secedes, rest assured that the next day the other two would follow suit which would be a living nightmare for the Kenya government threatening its very existence, sovereignty and power over the remaining regions. Most likely under pretext of the need to maintain law and order, the Kenya government would come up with an excuse for invasion of the secessionist counties. For them to maintain control of these seceding counties, they would need to conduct some form of genocide, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and curfews like they did in the 1984 Wagalla Massacre and 2008 Mount Elgon Operations. However military action against a freely independent voting populace would invite extra-ordinary condemnation and sanctions from the international community as well as further inflame secessionist movements in the other counties. Additionally, it is hard to think that the troops would actually bludgeon or kill people expressing freely their right to self-determination. Even if they proceed with the orders, their current ethnic constitution where they are dominated by certain ethnic groups would be seen as some form of genocide resulting in a population that would be uncontrollable by the Kenya government.

    The realistic scenario is that the Kenya government, instead of engaging in futile military actions, would seek to negotiate some agreements around greater Ingo autonomy as well as demonstrating the extent of financial risk for an independent Ingo entity with the hope that such ‘carrot-stick’ scenarios would win back the Four Counties to the republic. In voting for a referendum for autonomy/independence, the People of the Four Counties need to know their worth and at the very least to walk out such a vote with political autonomy, separate vote and own documentation (passports, id’s etc).

    There would be another strategy that the Kenya government would employ against secessionist counties that involves no military actions but a few phone calls where they would call the Nakumatts, Equity Banks, StanCharts and other business operations in the Four Counties to cease doing business. This economic sabotage has happened before where bus companies and other businesses have been held back during elections and other periods so as to deny people from Ingo travel or other activities. In fact the economics is the glaring weak link for People from the Four Counties; until they manage to develop/own the systems and means of productions across a broad economic base, Ingo would be highly dependent on others in the short run 5-15 years.

    However in my opinion, in the long run an economic sabotage programme would be the best for the Four Counties as it would enable the people to rapidly develop self-sufficiency through “import replacement” where all the goods and services that are currently consumed in the counties would have to be produced locally. Initially they would be expensive but over time would improve in cost and quality as well as put more people to work through intelligent recycling and manufacturing. Also with over 5 million people spread across the region, the Four Counties would be in a better position to harvest the rewards of the abundant human capital in the form of a well spread tax base to provide county revenue and services.

    The People of the Four Counties and Ingo do not have the obvious geographical advantages that Coast region would have (by virtue of having ports, airports, tourism, infrastructure etc), therefore the Case for Secession needs to acknowledge the Tyranny of Geography where as a landlocked entity it would be dependent on others for import-export gateways. The Case for Ingo Secession argues that in order for it to be successful, the Four Counties need to establish economic viability through specializing in production of high value items that need air shipments e.g. medical devices, engineering components, jewelry etc as well as services like education, insurance, banking and tourism etc.

    I am personally very optimistic about the potential and Case for Ingo Secession because I foresee that the current ethnic polarization in Kenya has set the grounds for the inevitable Yugoslavia type of breakup be it in 10-60 years; it’s not a matter of if but when therefore the Four Counties would best be prepared to survive and move forward from this eventuality. Even if it’s not ethnic hatred that splits Kenya apart, the winds of global crisis indicate a future where national economies will be forced to transform themselves with more emphasis on local economies. From high oil prices to real-estate bubbles, spiraling national debt to resource scarcity, the future would require a downscale and re-scale of everything where a small, independent entity like the Four Counties would be better buffered through relatively self-sufficiency.

    Kenya is not working; it’s time for the People of the Four Counties to make a Case for Ingo Secession!

    References:
    1.2013 The Luhya Have Set a Good Precedent: Edwin Mulochi (The Star Kenya Mar 16 2013)
    2.2013 Kenya Electoral Politics and Transition: Antony Otieno Ong’ayo
    3.2012 Losing the coast: Kenya’s secessionist dilemma, Patrick Kelly (Africa News 27 July 2012)
    4.2012 Kenya: Secession Is Not the Best Option for Coast, Hassan Ole Naado (The Star Kenya 3 February 2012)
    5.2000 The Case against Secession: Mackubin Thomas Owens
    6.2005 The Case for American Secession: Still a Good Idea by Kirkpatrick Sale
    7.2007 A Theory of Secession, The Case for Political Self-Determination: Christopher Heath Wellman

  5. “KRA has historically fallen short of its revenue collection targets, partly because of the complexity of the country’s taxation laws and poor compliance levels, especially by wealthy individuals and multinationals. Inability to collect the right taxes has reduced KRA’s focus to easy options like income and consumption taxes.

    Income tax, for instance, is the most important source of ordinary revenue for KRA, making up about 50 per cent of the total collection.”

  6. A new research has revealed that during the past year, the US and other countries in possession of nuclear weapons have upgraded and boosted their arsenal despite a commitment to reduce the number of their nukes.

    The Sweden-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said on Monday that the US and Russia are jointly in possession of more than 90 percent of the World’s nuclear arsenal.

    Estimates show the US has about 7,300 warheads while Russia has 8,000.

    “Once again this year, the nuclear weapon-possessing states took little action to indicate a genuine willingness to work toward complete dismantlement of their nuclear arsenals,” SIPRI researchers Shannon Kile and Phillip Patton Schell said in a statement.

    The report also said that the possessors of nukes continued to upgrade their nuclear forces and delivery systems.

    “The long-term modernization programs under way in these states suggest their views that nuclear weapons will remain deeply embedded elements of their strategic calculus.”

    Based on the report, the US has allocated 350 billion dollars for upgrading and maintaining its nuclear forces in the coming 10-year period.

    “Over the past five years there has been a steady decline in the overall number of nuclear warheads in the world”. However, in its yearly report on world nuclear forces, the SIPRI think tank cautioned that the decline does not imply a real commitment by the nuclear powers to give up their arsenals.

    Experts say that the nuclear armed countries have only given up their old nuclear weapons which had high maintenance costs and replaced them with the upgraded ones that have a much higher destruction power.

Leave a Reply

Discover more from KENYA STOCKHOLM BLOG

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading