Challenging Mutahi Ngunyi’s Hypothesis on the March 4th Elections

The falsification reeked of intellectual bias and dishonesty

While attacking Ngunyi is a matter of freedom of expression, opposition to his findings should be based on a factual challenge of his basic assumptions

While attacking Ngunyi is a matter of freedom of expression, opposition to his findings should be based on a factual challenge of his basic assumptions

On the surface, Mutahi Ngunyi’s warped hypothesis, claiming that the March 4th Elections had been won by the Jubilee Coalition when IEBC announced voter registration results in December last year appears very convincing. Ngunyi has received a lot of criticism following the publication of his findings while on Facebook, a “condolence book” was opened by those who believe that the quality of Ngunyi’s analysis had “passed away” and that Ngunyi’s career deserved to be buried and left to Rest In Peace.

While attacking Ngunyi is a matter of freedom of expression, opposition to his findings should be based on a factual challenge of his basic assumptions, table of figures and principle line of arguments which constitutes the nucleus of his now infamous conclusions.

Ngunyi’s first assumption is that “We do not see things as they are; we see them as we are”. This assumption is meaningless in an election context in which it was being applied. This is because it is not just numbers that are there “for us to see”. There are visible critical factors that could adversely affect the way the numbers we see impact the March 4th elections. These factors cannot be ignored if one intends to reach a credible conclusion in the kind of complex assignment Ngunyi had unilaterally awarded himself.

Ngunyi’s second assumption is that “We have made up our minds; we do not want to be confused by the facts”. While this assumption could be partially applicable in the situation under study, Ngunyi, (wittingly or unwittingly) admits that there are certain facts which are present in the matrix and which (if not ignored) could confuse the minds that have supposedly been made up. Critics who have picked up legitimate quarrels with Ngunyi appears to be transfixed on an exploratory examination of facts discarded by Ngunyi. Instead of being confused in the process (as Ngunyi warned in his preamble) they are seeking to excavate hidden realities that could effectively help dismantle Ngunyi’s conclusions and cast them in the garbage bin. What are these facts?

Exaggerations in Central Province
Ngunyi has claimed that the Jubilee Coalition has 6,188,372 votes out of which he has claimed that the “Kikuyu vote” alone is 3.4 million. This is not correct because according to IEBC statistics on registered voters, the figure for Central province where Kikuyus live stands at 2,190,477 and that is if by “Central” the reference areas are: Kiambu (860,716); Kirinyaga (262,715); Muranga 457,052; Nyandarua (252,889) and Nyeri 357,105) . If the assumption is that registered voters in Meru (483,517) and Embu (226,989) belong to the Kikuyu voting bloc, the new figure for the registered Kikuyu voters shoots to 2,900,983 so where is Ngunyi getting his figure of 3.4 million if he is referring to the same IEBC figures? Even if Tharaka-Nithi (155,823) is added to inflate the Kikuyu vote in Central province, it still does not add up to 3.4 million votes. In Nairobi, Ngunyi’s analysis leaves Cord with no single vote out of 1,778,903 votes. Even a Kenyan in the streets knows that this is not possible unless naked facts are conveniently ignored as directed by Ngunyi.

The second problem with Ngunyi’s “Kikuyu vote” is born out of analysis.  According to Ngunyi’s assumption, both the Embu and the Meru will vote for Jubilee. This is very questionable because the division between the Gikuyu and the Meru has seen leaders of the two communities set up rival parties with accusations that Uhuru Kenyatta ignored the Meru by refusing to get on the driver’s seat of the “Mbaas Party” that had been constructed by Kiraitu Murungi. Kiraitu has stated publicly that his Party will direct its members to vote for Uhuru but then, Kiraitu does not command the Meru vote.

Apart from the Kikuyu-Meru divisions which are also based on historical neglect of the Meru by the Kikuyu ruling elites once the latter came to power, Ngunyi’s analysis tends to dismiss the political clout of Gitobu Imanyara, Cord’s point-man in Meru. For Ngunyi, Cord’s vote count in both Meru and Embu is zero and this is where Ngynyi’s assumptions degenerates into “assumptions of convenience” for the purpose of arriving at a pre-determined conclusion – that Jubilee had already won the elections as Cord leaders slept. Apart from the glaring discrepancies in the Kikuyu vote calculations, Ngunyi’s analysis of the situation in the Rift Valley is even more flabbergasting.

Convenient Assumptions in Rift Valley
After a psychological preparation of his audience “to ignore the facts”, Ngunyi places the number of votes for Jubilee in the Rift Valley at 1.8 million. However, if the hard facts are examined, RV emerges as a region whose votes will be the most difficult to attach to any specific Coalition. Why?

The Kalenjin vote is not as homogenous as Ngunyi wants his audience to assume. This is because the 1.8 million votes are spread within 14 regions whose inhabitants have different cultural, linguistic and political affiliations that might result in the Rift Valley vote being split between Jubilee, Cord and Amanai Coalitions. Why?

Ethnic groups which have settled in the region known as Rift Valley are: Elgeyo, Kipsigis, Mawakwet, Nandi, Pokot, Sabaot, Terik, Turgen and Sebei. From the facts (which Ngunyi proposes should be ignored) three Coalitions could lay claim to chunks of the Rift Valley vote thereby depriving the Jubilee Coalition of all votes in the Rift Valley. The geographical, cultural and linguistic differences of communities in the Rift Valley compounded by recent historical developments in the region may play a significant role in determining the voting pattern in the province. Who could be the main beneficiaries?

The Amani Coalition, which mainly comprises of Mudavadi’s UDF and Moi’s KANU, will not leave Rift Valley empty handed because die-hard KANU supporters led incognito by former dictator Daniel arap Moi, have not forgiven Uhuru Kenyatta for abandoning KANU for almost five years when the son of Jomo was mating with Kibaki in a political marriage entered into following the stealing of Raila Odinga’s presidency in 2007. Likewise, members of the Kalenjin community are well represented in Cord and it can only be an act of fallacy for Ngunyi to claim that Cord will not walk away with a single vote in Rift Valley. It can be argued that in 2007, Rift Valley voted almost “to a man” for Raila Odinga and that this scenario will be replicated on March 4th. It might not.

This is because circumstances have changed. In 2007, there were no ICC cases hanging on the neck of a key reference figure of the Kalenjin. Secondly, it is members of the Kalenjin who gained in the 2007 PEV by virtue of having appropriated huge tracts of land that belonged to the Kikuyu. To instruct the Kalenjin to vote for a Kikuyu is tantamount to suggesting that after the vote, confiscated land will have to be returned. The impossibility of returning land to the Kikuyu is the very factor that has prevented the return of IDPs who have been rotting in camps for the last five years.

Still on Rift Valley, apart from charges of Uhuru having abandoned KANU, Ngunyi would like his audience to conveniently ignore the argument that the Kalenjin have been uneasy with the idea of them voting for Uhuru because such a move places them on a lower pedestal with the Kikuyu with whom they have fought bitter inter-community wars which were christened “ethnic clashes” during the Moi regime, clashes that have been attributed to Ruto as the master-mind. The key problem is that in 2002, the Kalenjin voted for Uhuru Kenyatta for post of President and the least the Kalenjin expected was for Uhuru to step down for Ruto this time round. For this reason, the entire Kalenjin vote in the Jubilee bag cannot be guaranteed unless one is ready to turn a blind eye to the facts as Ngunyi suggests.

Key Misrepresentations in Western Province
Further, Ngunyi’s hypothesis is built around ignoring the fact that Cord will not harvest a single vote (out of a total of 1,434,987) in Western province. Is this really possible? This is despite the fact that Cord is the only Coalition which boasts of the biggest population of key Luhya leaders with Moses Wetangula being a key partner in the Coalition. To achieve his objective of arriving at a Jubilee victory, Ngunyi assigns all Western votes to Mudavadi and this kind of skewed tabulation is what has earned Ngunyi the wrath of critics.

Mudavadi was Uhuru’s running mate in 2002 but he never got the Luhya vote because the Luhya community tilted heavily on Kijana Wamalwa who had better chances of ensuring that the Luhya would be included in the next government. In 2013, the Luhyas are well represented in Cord and only an act of blindness to facts could deprive Cord of votes in Western province in a fraudulent analysis of the type Ngunyi presented.

Omissions in Coast and Nyanza Provinces
The list of Ngunyi’s omissions continues all the way to Coast province, home to 1,164,083 voters. Just like in Western province, Ngunyi’s weird hypothesis is that Cord will never walk away with a single vote from Coast province although the so called historical voting patterns has shown that Coast is one of the strongest Cord strongholds. Once again, is this possible? The answer to this question can only be “Yes” if facts are ignored because Jubilee must win through Ngunyi’s cooked up arithmetic.

After effectively hiding behind the assumption of ethnic block voting, Ngunyi doesn’t factor in the Kisii vote of 414,493 and Nyamira votes (219,616) in Nyanza province because he only notices the Luo vote which he places at 1.6 million. In Ngunyi’s analysis, the Kisii and Nyamira votes are either lost in the arithmetic or belongs to “the rest” group.  This is despite the fact that Kisii is another unsung Cord strong-hold as evidenced during the 2007 voting pattern. Let me not go into Eastern and North Eastern provinces which Ngunyi proposes, ought to be forgotten. Just in passing, Ngunyi ignores his stated assumption that guides his analysis (violates his own rules) on ethnic bloc voting in North Eastern and awards Cord the Turkana vote of 120,000 probably because this move could not change the desired conclusion of a Jubilee victory. The ruse is to demonstrate that although he is being generous to Cord by awarding the Coalition votes that it does not deserve, the coalition still performs poorly.

On the whole, Ngunyi’s hypothesis appears to have been intentional to give Jubilee unnecessary mileage during electioneering. After the collapse of a previous hypothesis in which he solidly placed Mudavadi as “the next President of Kenya” (ask Jeff Koinange), it was probably time for Ngunyi to resurface in order to remain relevant for the sake of staying in business.

Through crude sophistry, Ngunyi comfortably robbed Cord of votes because Jubilee had to win. Ngunyi’s poor performance this time around was least expected and this explains the current uproar following the circulation of his half-baked combinations which spewed out of “The Consulting House” oven.

The falsification reeked of intellectual bias and dishonesty leaving the informed reader wondering whether Ngunyi has been laughing all the way to the bank following the publication of his lop-sided findings about a major national event that required more responsible handling.

Okoth Osewe
Secretary General
Kenya Red Alliance (KRA)


  • hello there you are truly wrong about where kikuyus leave, about 1million registred voters in rift valley are them , visit nakuru and laikipoia and find who the 5 outgoing mps are and you have it. visit nairobi and find out you will be shocked that mutahi ngunyi did his assignment better than you.

    KSB: Samuel, that is the problem. You are talking about the same facts Mutahi wants his audience to ignore. IEBC figures do not include ethnic identities and from a scientific perspective Mutahi uses to arrive at his conclusions, your style is not applicable. Does it follow that Cord will have zero votes from Coast, Western, North Eastern and Nairobi provinces because these are not traditionally Luo/Kamba areas?

  • Osewe: This is a well-written retort to Ngunyi’s hypothesis. I wish to add that there are non-Kikuyu residents within the former Central province who, although not many, will not vote for Jubilee. Die-hard followers of Martha Karua and Peter Kenneth will also put a dent in the bloated numbers by Ngunyi. Persons registered in trouble spots like Tana River, Garissa and sections of the Rift Valley which were affected by the PEV (yet are TNA strongholds), will most likely not vote at all. Some Nyeri IDPs had opted to boycott the voter registration exercise but were convinced that they would be re-settled; all in the name of boosting Jubilee votes. They are still rotting in the camps. The results of the bogus pre-election nominations will also affect voting patterns, come March 4th.

    As you noted, Ngunyi had earlier hypothesized that Mudavadi would be Kenya’s fourth president through a boardroom arrangement at State House, whether we wanted it or not. However, he did not factor in the rejection from Kikuyus which seriously challenged that hypothesis afterwards. Gone are the Moi days of presidential projects. On the current hypothesis, Ngunyi believes that Mudavadi will easily beat Cord in the run-off to emerge number two. Mudavadi does not solely own Luhya votes which are shared by Cord. Why would Luhyas back him 100% yet it is indicative he will not be the next president? His running mate Kioni will not bring him significant Kikuyu votes either. Moreover, the political landscape changed when their UDF party rejected the governorship nomination of Housing minister Soita Shitanda, whose sympathizers say Kakamega County is currently not a UDF zone.

    Ngunyi argues too that in the run-off, the Kamba will tilt towards Kikuyu-Jubilee, away from Cord which he sees as Luo-dominated. Since Kalonzo Musyoka was brushed aside by Jubilee, his followers will not shift allegiance at the last moment knowing he is clamouring for the vice-presidency. Kanu is giving the URP side of Jubilee a run for its money and believes it will bag substantial votes for Mudavadi in the Rift Valley.

    Jubilee die-hards assume that the ICC burden is insignificant, yet the insistence by Martha Karua on its consequences is a fact that is gradually making Kenyans think otherwise about electing Uhuru and Ruto. The US, Britain and EU have mentioned many times that they will not deal with ICC indictees. Will Kenyans be subjected to working with pariah states like Zimbabwe because Uhuru and Ruto want to be leaders at all costs? Smart Kenyans will look beyond ethnicity in the next elections.

    It’s absurd that in a recent TV discussion, TNA chairman Johnson Sakaja was excited about Ngunyi’s ‘tyranny of numbers’ which is ethnically-based, yet his Party frequently opposes opinion poll results by Infotrack and Ipsos, that are scientifically grounded.

  • a mistake noted, your location of kikuyus is mistaken, look at nakuru and laikipia, ever heard of outgoing mps such as kiuna, kinyona,lee kinyanjui,mututho, kiunjuri and nderitu muriithi, these guys do not come from central but they represented kikuyus in the last parliament find out from where, do you know bethh mugo, ever heard of simon mbugua i know you know waititu you also know dick wathika you must have heard of them they two dint come from central. Ask Britain and Us why they arent supporting any candidate .they have finished their assignment like mutahi ngunyi be ware of what is happening in nyanza as we speak and in ukambani as we speak the truth has finally downed on them we just pray that people will axcept the results from IEBC

    KSB: Njenga, that is the problem. You are talking about the same facts Mutahi wants his audience to ignore. IEBC figures do not include ethnic identities and from a scientific perspective Mutahi uses to arrive at his conclusions, your style is not applicable. Does it follow that Cord will have zero votes from Coast, Western, North Eastern and Nairobi provinces because these are not traditionally Luo/Kamba areas?

  • ‘Tyranny of Numbers’: The Devil is in the Details
    Posted: February 6, 2013

    ‘Tryanny of Numbers’ by Mutahi Ngunyi has raised quite a stir in the Kenya. Some people want to crucify Mutahi Ngunyi while others want to compose songs in his honor.

    However, what most people are not looking at is the devil in the details. People are just taking absolute figures from his analysis, formulating their own theories and seeing how those theories can fit into their political agenda.

    What Mutahi Ngunyi has dished out is a hypothetical simulation of scenarios he believes will happen ceteris paribus. What most politicians will tell you is that in politics ceteris paribus is hardly ever possible. This assertion alone puts Mutahi Ngunyi’s ‘Tyranny of Numbers’ in doubt. The ‘Tyranny of Numbers’ is by all means an educated attempt at trying to bring certainty into an uncertain world of politics.

    However, the underlying basis of the educated guess must be tackled. Does the analysis hold any water in our political reality?

    Well, two things are undeniably true in the analysis. One is that Kenyans vote on a tribal basis. The other is that Kenyans are sure to vote on the same tribal basis come March, 4th 2013.

    Let us first look at the tribal pattern in a deeper perspective. There are sub tribes amongst our larger communities. These sub tribes have been known to vote differently. This difference is always greater when supremacy battles exist between the leaders of the different sub tribes.

    For instance, it is obviously known that not all Luhya votes will go towards Mudavadi. The only question is what margin of those votes will go to Raila? Again, it is also highly presumptuous to assume that all the Kalenjin votes will go towards Jubilee. Mutahi Ngunyi commits the same errors when it comes to the Meru and Embu. It may be safe to assume that all these numbers assigned to Jubilee in error will mostly fall in the hands of Raila.

    Secondly, let us look at another critical break in Mutahi’s tribal arithmetic. There are those Kenyans who are voting on issue based politics and there are those who just wish to rebel against their fellow tribesmen.

    These Kenyans are arguable few but are they still a force to reckon with. They belong to the middle class who influence the tone and general gist of conversation within the country. This is especially true when it comes to their influence on the media and the international community.

    Let us use Ferdinand Waititu as an example. He won the TNA nomination for governor. He did this against the wishes of the middle class but the general perception of him since then has been shaped by that same class of people. They did it on Twitter and Facebook. They influenced the media and now the media portray him as the middle class view him.

    The middle class did not win but their voice was felt loud and clear. They did not ascribe to any tribal outfit but instead focused on the issues. This therefore goes to show that the middle class can influence the public’s perception of any candidate. Given enough time this perception will take root.

    The middle class are susceptible to change. If anything drastic happens before within a fortnight they will choose sides. Their choice will be firm. They will have one and a half weeks to consolidate forces and change public perception. Their efforts will not win an election for anyone but their motive would be to prevent a win.

    Thirdly, the raw data collected by Mutahi Ngunyi from the IEBC did not contain any information on ethnic demographics. It was purely numerical. This places some doubts on the figures as absolute figures.

    For instance, in Rift Valley a large cosmopolitan community exits in Nakuru, Eldoret and Kitale and in Nairobi the figures for are just too ethnically blurred to analyze. This means that Mutahi may be off by a small margin but this margin translates into thousands or even hundreds of thousands in his analysis.

    Finally, the assertion that Cord’s support will mainly come from two major tribes is simply wishful thinking. Raila Omollo Odinga has been in politics for decades. The political maverick has built up alliances and structures all across the Kenya. He garnered overwhelming support in seven provinces during the last general election. How can his support base be reduced to only two tribes? Hiyo ni nusu mkeka.

    Where Raila has seemingly lost support he has carved out lieutenants to either wrestle the entire voting bloc from his detractors or divide it. This is the role of Kosgey, Wetangula, Joho, Kalonzo etc. How then can his voting bloc be reduced to two tribes?

    In conclusion, I must agree with Mutahi that the one who needs to work harder is Cord. Cord needs to appeal to the people unlike Jubilee who can sit back on its huge flock of tribal voters and send out scouts to gather some additional voters at the last minute. Jubilee has two huge logs, Cord therefore needs to gather more bits and pieces to have enough wood for its fire.’

    Nahashon Kimemia

  • Little knowledge is very dangerous Mutahi Ngunyis intellectual (Ya Mavi) biased ,uncouth , one sided based on hate , its an oppen secret how Kikuyu ruling elites inclunding intellectuals hate Luos and mainly (Jaramogi Family)
    What worries any correct thinking Kikuyu is how do they benefit from family Kenyatta and its huge stolen wealth dominated by monopoly ,favourism, Protectionism ,tax evation ,free from govt control.
    Dont Kikuyu business men/women realize what boycott means to a country like Kenya that depends on hand-outs from Western Imperialist and EU .

    Take education in Kenya its financed by United Kingdom(UK) eu and etc .
    The ruling Kikuyu corrupt elites relies on business partners from the west.
    UK and USA has the right to interfere militarily in Kenya just as the same France has invaded Mali in the name of fighting terrorism (islamists).

    USA/Uk doesnt need any greenlight from nobody ,they can act alone and UN /AU cannot stop these super-powers from interfeering with Kenyas sovereignity hence kenya is their Puppet Nation that relies on donation from West.

    The biggest Problem with Wakenya and mostly elite(intellectuals) is their collective Amnesia(stupidity of not understanding how imperialism works when their intrests is under threat.

    Today Kenya has Oil. Gas ,Coal Titanium and other minerals etc . Here there is big competition between China and the West/EU/Uk USA/ Canada etc whose aims is to get their share and eat at this time when capitalism economy is collapsing and imperialism is busy scheming and occupying other weak nation like Mali etc,

    Mutahi Ngunyi (weakling proffessor) pseudo (half-baked) will be proved wrong very soon hence Uhuru/Ruto cannot win election in Kenya today .Kenyans of today arent the same Kenyans of Yesterday . They know Uhuru is buying voters and using Gema -State.House Hegemony ) (gema Power hence Kibaki -Muthaiga Golf -Club has money and GEMA controls State-Military ,Intelligence- police and any other organ of State.
    Some of us do fear and ask ourselves whether Kibaki will hand over power to Hon: Raila Oginga Odinga hence Cord gonna win next general election in Kenya.

  • Correcting Mutahi Ngunyi’s Self Serving Tyranny of Numbers

    I used to love reading Mutahi Ngunyi’s column, as a social science student, because of his skewed and hypothetical way of looking at reality. I always found his line of reasoning fascinating and attractive but always problematic and leaving a lot to be desired. Now I know why his writings used to make sense while at the same time seeming biased. Mutahi Ngunyi thrives not because he is the best at political analysis but because he is the best at stoking political controversy. In my own thinking, Mutahi Ngunyi has mastered the art of exaggerating the truth and using witty stories to spark controversy and attract attention. Recently he was at it again, acting brilliant with the aim of diabolically hyping ethnic calculations and machinations on the 2013 election considerations.

    Before we are accused of attacking Mutahi Ngunyi’s person without merit, let us consider his postulations. Mutahi Ngunyi argues that the 2013 elections are a foregone conclusion; Uhuru is the president waiting to be sworn in. According to Mutahi Ngunyi’s numbers, Kikuyu, the Kalenjin and the Embu and Meru are 6, 188, 372 (those are solid Jubilee votes). The Luo and Kambas are 2, 866, 000 (CORD Votes), the Luhya are 1, 780, 000 (Amani Votes) and he lumps the rest 3, 408, 000 in a basket he calls others.

    His hypothesis is that Kenyans vote ethnically and thus CORD will come third in the polls. He is a social scientist and social science truths are true to the extent your assumptions are true. 1st question, what percentage of Kenyans will not vote ethnically given in Kenya politics is not just about ethnicity but also personality? If not all Kenyans are going to vote ethnically and we could assume the 3, 408, 000 he lumps in the others are sure not going to vote ethnically, then which personality are they more likely to vote for and by what margins?

    Let us go back to the already lumped numbers, will all Kikuyu’s truly vote for only one candidate? Anyway, Mutahi Ngunyi is a Kikuyu and thus his postulations could be based on insider information on Kikuyu’s. But all said and done, at most 95% of Kikuyus (in central and rift valley) will vote of Jubilee thus approximately 2, 100, 000 votes banked. What about Kalenjins? Well we know that utmost 65% of Kalenjins will vote for Jubilee thus giving Jubilee 1, 800, 000 votes. Majority Embu and Meru will vote Jubilee but will it be a 100% majority? At most, Jubilee will get 60% of those votes; approximately 700, 000 votes. This means that Jubilee can be assured of at least 4, 600, 000 votes.

    Proportionately, what votes will Cord attract to bolster its 2, 866, 666 given by Mutahi Ngunyi? Well, we know Raila is the personality attracting votes from across the country. Let us look at the Luhya vote, how many Luhyas are truly into this Mudavadi presidency bid? The most that Mudavadi can garner from Luhya land is 50% of the vote and a good chunk of the votes will go to Cord, at least 900, 000 votes.

    Now, let us look at the others that Mutahi lumped together. We know that much of N. Eastern is Corded and that means Cord can get at least 190, 000 votes from there. As for these other tribes, I trust that Martha Karua and Peter Kenneth will get much of what is given in the opinion polls as 1% and 3% respectively from the kikuyu vote and marginally from across the country. This means that close to 3, 000, 000 votes remain out there to be split between Raila and Uhuru. Let us go back to the ethnic voting hypothesis by Mutahi Ngunyi, if all Kenyans will vote ethnically, how many Kenyans who are ethnic minded are ready for another Kikuyu presidency?

    Uhuru wanted to let go of presidency and prop Musalia Mudavadi because there was this feeling that it is time for another tribe to eat. The fact is that our friends the Kikuyus should not play the numbers card in the face of Kenyans. If CORD changes this tyranny of numbers to its advantage, then there is a likelihood of an anti-tyranny of numbers wave in the next few days. If that were to happen, then the likely scenario is as shown in the diagrams below:

    Jubilee Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Meru, Embu 4600000

    CORD Luo, Kamba, Luhya, others 7840000

    Narc Kenya Kikuyu and others 140000

    KENDA Kikuyu and others 420000

    ARK Somalis 1000

    AMANI Luhya and Others 900000

    RBK Maasai and others 100000

    Wafula Giddy

  • Samuel Njenga, Osewe is correcting you but your input is so ethnically-filled you blindly follow Ngunyi’s non-scientific assumptions without being critical of his ethnic-bias. There are large pockets of Kikuyus outside Central, no doubt, yet he did not factor them in his hypothesis. When Kenyans registered with the IEBC, they were not asked to indicate their tribes. Within Central, there are a total of four presidential candidates. It means not all will vote for Uhuru.

    What is it that will be a shock in Nairobi? This is a cosmopolitan area comprising all ethnic groupings, so Jubilee has no guarantee of bagging it 100%. You alluded to the non-endorsement of candidates by US and Britain as if it is game done: – Uhuru will be the next president – surrender to the fact. They did not endorse anybody because they do not want to influence the election process. Uhuru and Ruto called a press conference after Obama’s recent message of peace during the elections and they thought he had endorsed them. Why did they not do the same yesterday when Johnnie Carson minced no words by saying they had no time to deal with their likes? The ICC is a judicial process, while the General Election is a Kenyan affair which is not their business, as long as it’s conducted fairly.

    You mentioned Simon Mbugua and Dick Wathika who both lost their parliamentary seats in Nairobi. These are yesteryear examples that are currently off politics. Be aware that Nairobi has had other non-Kikuyu MPs during the past 10 years.

    Can you tell us what’s happening in Nyanza? The area is occupied by Luos, Kisiis and Kurias. Kurias are almost 100% in Cord just like Luos. Cord is dominant among the Kisii and clearly TNA Ongeri has failed in his campaigns to promote Jubilee. Ruto was told to his face recently by Kisiis that they were not happy because of Kalenjin attacks during the PEV. Jubilee has no inroads in that area.

    KSB: Jared, the problem with the likes of Samuel is that they don’t appreciate the application of Ngunyi’s assumptions on both sides. Every sane Kenyan knows that Kikuyus reside in the Rift Valley and Nairobi. Samuel and his followers would like these Kikuyus recognized while the presence of Cord supporters (read Luos and Kambas according to Mutahi) in Coast, Western, Nairobi and North Eastern provinces should be ignored including Cord following in Kisii, home to more than half a million registered voters who have been classified as “others” by Ngunyi.

  • Beth Mugo mwizi

    KENYA: The Ruby Rip-Off
    Monday, Oct. 14, 1974

    Kenya is a land of fabulously unspoiled game preserves, stable government and excellent trade opportunities. Taking advantage of those opportunities, as foreign businessmen have rue fully discovered, sometimes involves entering a twilight world of official corruption. Corporation executives doing business in Kenya are often asked by high government officials for “contributions” to various charities, though some doubt that the money ends up in the coffers of such worthy recipients as hospitals or orphanages. Early this year, James Skane, the American managing director of Esso Standard in Kenya, was declared a “prohibited immigrant” and summarily expelled from the country after he aggressively tried to collect some $70,000 in unpaid fuel bills. Unfortunately for Skane, it turned out that the money was owed by a series of farms reportedly owned under different names by Kenya’s lionized President Jomo Kenyatta.

    The latest story about scandal in Nairobi involves two American geologists, who claim that they have been euchred out of their ownership of what may be the world’s richest ruby mine by some well-connected Kenyans. It all started about a year ago, when John M. Saul, 37, and his partner Elliot (“Tim”) Miller discovered in Kenya’s Tsavo West National Park a deposit of rubies that was later estimated to be worth at least $5 million. Saul and Miller got a fully legal permit to develop their find. Figuring local participation would ease their way, they shrewdly offered 51% of the deal to a group of high-ranking Kenyans, including Vice President Daniel Arap Moi.

    Unfortunately for the two Americans, others got wind of the rich discovery. One of them was Beth Mugo, Kenyatta’s niece and unofficial lady in waiting to his vivacious wife, Mama Ngina; another was a wealthy Greek resident of Kenya, George Criticos, a friend of the President’s and Mama Ngina’s partner in running the Kenya Trade Development Corp. Saul and Miller charge that Beth Mugo and Criticos encouraged other leading Kenyans, including Mama Ngina, to demand a bigger share of the take. The two Americans agreed to let the Kenyans’ share go up to 72%. Still not satisfied, the Kenyans evidently decided to push the ruby discoverers out of the deal altogether.

    Private Pockets
    Last June Saul was abruptly declared a “prohibited immigrant” and given 2½ hours to leave the country. At first Miller went into hiding to keep the same thing from happening to him; after a month underground he left the country for London. After Saul’s expulsion, Kenyatta, in an apparent reference to the ruby mine, publicly declared that no foreigner should be allowed to exploit Kenya’s resources for his own private benefit. That is, no doubt, a valid general principle. But in this case it seems that the wealth of the mine is intended for private pockets, not the public welfare. With the Americans out of the way, the mysterious Criticos began mining rubies at Tsavo, continuing even after a Kenyan court had temporarily enjoined him from doing so. There have been allegations that the claims book at the Kenyan Ministry of Natural Resources, in which the two Americans had originally registered their find, has disappeared. In its place, supposedly, is a new claims book listing Criticos’ claim to the Tsavo mine.

    U.S. Ambassador Anthony D. Marshall has protested the highhanded treatment of the two Americans. Meanwhile, Saul and Miller are suing in Kenyan courts for recovery of their ruby mine. Few, however, believe that the case will be decided in the Americans’ favor. Kenya is sticking to its claim that Saul was expelled because of gemstone and ivory smuggling.

    So far, no stories about the big ruby rip-off have appeared in Kenya’s press, and the government apparently wants to keep it that way. Without directly mentioning the ruby affair, the Foreign Ministry warned at week’s end that it “will not tolerate any section of the press, whether local or overseas, which tends to discredit the image of Kenya abroad.” Kenya is a one-party state, and President Kenyatta has already been declared re-elected to another five-year term for lack of opposition. Still, in the parliamentary elections next week, publicity about high-level hanky-panky over the ruby mine could tarnish the government’s reputation in the eyes of Kenya’s 12 million people.

    Time Magazine

  • Freedom Fighter

    The worst case scenario will happen if this coming election turns violent ,this time it will justify western imperialism to invade Kenya hence UK/EU/USA wont sit idle and let kenya become another Somali.

    Idont understand why commentators in this blog cannot see that Kenya is heading into civil-war hence injustices ,hate among tribes .impunity ,nepotism ,tribalism and Kikuyu ruling class hegemony and chauvinism
    and arrogancy demonstrated by all kikuyu tribe wherever they are and the collective brainwashed that they (kikuyus) fought for the freedom from british-colonialists alone without other tribes of kenya .

    Time has come for wakenya to kill this myth by voting another kenyas 4th president from another kenya tribe so kikuyu myth and blind -worshipping of this orligachic Kenyatta Family of thieves and land grabbers be burried for ever in kenyas history.

  • Here’s a video link with Kikuyu and Kamba victims of the election violence in 2008. The video shows how poor Kenyans are helpless in the justice system. Why can’t Jubilee talk about them? Uhuru has so much money, why has he never thought of hiring them lawyers to defend their cases? Instead, the Kikuyu elites have made the victims believe that Raila is their problem while they are busy hooking them up to vote for Ruto the Kiambaa Butcher alias Kabuga, who hates them.Jubilee is not for Kenyans who want credible leadership.

  • Kibaki met Mungiki

    Kibaki Admits Meeting Mungiki Leaders

    President Kibaki was recently put on the spot by non-gema PNU aspirants over his the alleged MOU with the Mungiki leaders. The MOU, among other things, promises police and armed forces jobs to Mungiki members (see below)

    Kibaki admitted having met Mungiki leaders severally but denied that he is party to the MOU. Kibaki, however, stated that during the meetings which were arranged by the defence minister and other top Mt. kenya MPs the key agenda was to bring out the differences between the government and Mungiki and explore ways that the two can work together for the benefit of the Kikuyu community.

    Kibaki is reported to have told the PNU aspirants that he has a clear understanding of who Mungiki are and that they have no aim at hurting other communities. This could be true since Mungiki operates in Gema areas only and it is known to slaughter Kikuyus only.

    Kibaki said that Mungiki is a religious group whose freedom of worship must be protected by the government. Kibaki said Mungiki supports many Kikuyu cultures which have been eroded by Mzungu. He said some of these traditions are important to the Kikuyu since they unite them. Some of the traditions include circumcision of both boys and girls. It is on basis of this that Martha Karua never attended the meeting since Mungiki had at some point challenged her to say whether she is circumcised or not. Njoki Ndungu was also forced out of PNU elections board when some Gema Aspirants said she is not circumcised and therefore a likely Raila mole.

    Kibaki promised to hire up to 20,000 Mungiki members in the Kenyan military and police forces, and give Mungiki control of bus terminuses from 2008 if he returns to power in exchange of the sect’s support during this year’s election.
    Our sources say Mungiki leaders came with a long list of demands, which included:
    • Being recruited in the military and police
    • Stopping police crackdown on its members in Central Province
    • Getting control of bus and matatu termini
    • Given government appointments
    • Being allowed to own firearms
    • Allowing Mungiki to protect their lands in Rift Valley

    Kibaki is said to have agreed to all the demands and promised to act on them if he is re-elected.

    The issue of recruiting Mungiki members in the army was first raised by Subukia MP Koigi Wa Wamwere. It’s not clear whether Mungiki want to be a part of the Kenyan military or form an elite separate grouping within the force.

    During 2002 election campaigns, former president Daniel Arap Moi’s government is said to have given Mungiki members several military vehicles to perform some mysterious functions for KANU.

    The management of bus terminuses, according to the agreement, would be under a private company fronted by Mungiki, an anonymous State House source privy to the secret meeting has revealed.

    Essentially, Mungiki would be allowed to set the prices for buses using the termini as it wishes, despite the fact that bus parks and matatu terminus are built from tax payers’ funding.

    The agreement came after the spate of killings in Central Province including Kibaki’s Othaya backyard. According to our source, the killings were instigated this year to blackmail the president into signing the deal with the violent sect.

    Our source says Mungiki leaders met with Kibaki at State House Nairobi on several occasions between July and October this year, in secret meetings organized by a prominent politician from Central Province .

    Our source, however, declined to name the politician but said the media has mentioned him several times in connection with the sect.

    Defense Minister Njenga Karume, Internal Security Minister John Michuki and Assistant Minister for information and broadcasting Koigi Wa Wamwere and Uhuru Kenyatta are some of the politicians who have been associated with the sect.

    In the agreement, Kibaki is said to have promised Mungiki immunity from prosecution for punishing owners who don’t comply with their requirements.

    Mungiki is known for beheading and mutilating the genitals of people who defy its orders. Early this year, the sect was blamed in an incident the beheaded and mutilated body of a 2 year old boy was discovered in Nairobi . The brutal killing is believed to have been retaliation to the government’s crackdown among its rank in Nairobi .

    Kibaki also promised to stop cracking down on Mungiki foot-soldiers racketeering in Nairobi and its environs, essentially putting the sect members above the law.

    Beside the demand to control bus parks and matatu terminuses, the sect also demanded to be given control of providing vigilante-type security in Nairobi slums like Mathare, Majengo and Korogocho. Our source tells us Kibaki was non-committal to the demand, but he did not dismiss it.

    But it seems as if the group got what it wanted. Even after the much-publicized police crackdown on the sect’s activities in Mathare, Mungiki adherents still continue unabated to charge protection fees from poor Mathare residents. Failure to pay the fees could lead to severe beatings and even death.

    In exchange, the group promised not to interfere with Kibaki’s campaigns and instigate violence in opposition controlled zones such as Langata’s Kibera, whose former area MP is ODM’s presidential candidate Raila Odinga.

    Kibaki noted that when he took over power Mungiki was a gang for hire but during his reign it has been converted into an enterprising youth group. He drew parrallels between Mungiki, Transcentury Group and the Mega Initiative. He said these groups have transformed the Kikuyu youths from idlers to hardworking business people who make money from the services the offer to the community.

    The Mungiki network, according to our statehouse source, is being seen as key in ensuring 95% voter turnout in Mt. Kenya Region. Mungiki youths have been enrolled in the Kibaki Tena Secretariat to offer consultancy services on oathing.

    Apart from oathing the group is being used to intimidate people to get out to vote for Kibaki otherwise dire consequences will fall on those whose relative dont go home to Vote on December 27. Many people have been pleading with their relatives to be around including those overseas to avail themselves on the voting day for fear of beheadings of their loved ones.

    Mungiki leaders were wary of the president’s gentleman’s agreement. The said they don’t trust Kibaki to honour any future gentleman’s agreements since they were swindled during the referendum. They also demanded compensation for their members who have been killed by the government. Part of the Kshs 1 Billion raised at the exclusive dinner the other week will go to this initiative as Kibaki promised.

    The non Gema PNU aspirants who included Kombo, Mungatana, Nyachae, Obwocha and Tuju left convinced that there is nothing sinister in Kibakis engagement with Mungiki. Infact Nyachae offered to have Chinkororo meet the president at a latter date.

    Gema group was represented by David Mwiraria, Njenga Karume, Joe Wanjui, Mutahi Kagwe, Amos Kimunya, Judy Kibaki and John Michuki

  • Kikuyu tribe (wakikuyu) will be the first people to suffer if they elect Uhuruto as their President.
    The consequences of electing Uhuru as next president. will be mostly felt by kikuyu tycoons (businessmen)where many will wail and gnash their rotten teeth for making collective silly mistake of electing violators of human right as their president and doing this after being warned by UK/USA governments,

    KSB: Keith, note that the “rotten teeth” part could make your post be classified as “hate speech”. Be careful next time.

  • Human Rights Watch

    High Stakes
    Political Violence and the 2013 Elections in Kenya

    Click to access kenya0213webwcover.pdf

  • Uhuru actually had a chance of being president if not for the ICC. Uhuru used to be a nice guy until the elite Kikuyu old men made a killer out of him and the ICC made him too bitter, angry and tribalized to lead. I have no question in my mind whatsoever that Uhuru will not be president. He will be either stopped by the courts or at the ballot, but he will never be inaguarated.

  • Mungiki man killed


    The Mungiki leader named by the International Criminal Court as having attended a meeting at State House to plan the Naivasha revenge attacks in the 2007-08 post-election violence was lured to his death by a top government official who called him to a Nairobi hotel to collect money. Joseph Maina Kang’ethe aka Maina Diambo is mentioned in the ICC case against Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Muthaura.

    The details of the November 26, 2007 State House meeting were laid bare during the ICC confirmation of charges last year. Diambo dropped out of school in class seven at Nguruweini Primary school in Kandara, Muranga. He did menial jobs before trying his hand at managing matatu fleets in Dandora, Nairobi. He later joined the Mungiki and rose to positions of influence, coordinating the sect’s activities in Nairobi. He was the only son of Mary Muthoni Kang’ethe.

    Close family members yesterday revealed that Diambo and two of his Mungiki colleagues were on July 6, 2008 called by a top government official to collect Sh3 million donation for the burial of then Mungiki leader Maina Njenga’s wife Virginia Nyakio. Nyakio together with her bodyguard and driver had been killed in mysterious circumstances in March 8, 2008 and their bodies recovered in Gakoe forest in Gatundu.

    According to sources, who requested for anonymity, the day before Diambo disappeared he had received the first donation from the same politician at a government office. The money was allegedly in a briefcase. Diambo was accompanied to the the first meeting by the Wagacha brothers — Charles Ndungu Wagacha and George Njoroge Wagacha — who were later murdered in Mai Mahiu.

    At the meeting they allegedly received Sh3 million, which they were to deliver to Njenga, then incarcerated at Naivasha Maximum Security Prison. The Wagacha brothers, who were aides of Njenga together with another man identified as Naftaly Irungu, were shot dead as they drove to Naivasha on April 29, 2008. The following day, Diambo received a phone call asking him to go to a Nairobi hotel and meet the contact to collect another tranche of cash.

    According to those close to Diambo, he was at the City Bus Station area when he received the call for the urgent meeting. The 43-year-old immediately headed to the hotel alone and was never seen again. Diambo’s wife reported his disappearance to Nairobi’s Central Police Station. Diambo was said to have been very a close associate of Njenga. Njenga is now a born-again Christian and runs the church Hope International Ministries in Nairobi. At the time Njenga was in jail, Diambo ran the Mungiki gang.

    Around the same time, another key operative in Central Province, Alfred Peter Njoroge, went missing never to be found. Njoroge who had earlier been arrested and charged in connection with hate leaftlets that were spread in Muranga town in 2007, went missing on April 22. Njoroges’ wife Rigidia Njoki said the 38-year–old father of three was arrested by a gang in Marurui, Nairobi, as he drove to Komarock where he worked as land broker. The matter was reported to Kasarani Police Station.

    Anthony Mwangi alias Norieng, another Mungiki adherent, also went mission on April 12, 2008 and is yet to be traced. The 34 year-old father of three went missing hours after he was released from a Thika court where he was charged with touting. His wife Margaret Wambui said she reported to Thika police that her husband was arrested by police officers minutes after he was released from the courts. Wambui said her husband together with four other young men were picked up by Thika police from his farm in Kiandutu on April 11. His body is yet to be found.

    Sources in the sect said Norieng was an active Mungiki member and a key organiser in Central Kenya. According to the ICC prosecutor, Diambo attended the State House meeting together with two other individuals. In the confirmation of charges verdict, the ICC judges said that in the meeting were then State House Comptroller Hyslop Ipu, Presidential Press Service head Isaya Kabira, official Stanley Murage, Uhuru and Muthaura.

    Muthaura reportedly introduced the Mungiki as “youth” and a sect representative then presented their demands on behalf of Maina Njenga, who was then in jail, in exchange for the sect’s support for President Kibaki. “After hearing the Mungiki demands, the President addressed Mr Muthaura telling him something to the effect of: “You have heard what the youth want, so now it is upon you,” the judges quoted a witness as saying. State House has since denied that Mungiki attended any meeting there. Some of the youth who attended the meeting have publicly claimed that they were not Mungiki.

    In January 2008 another payment of Sh20 million was allegedly taken to Njenga in prison by Diambo and two other individuals whose names were redacted (blacked out) in the ICC prosecution report. The witness said that it was after receiving this money that the Mungiki carried out attacks in Naivasha. Njenga was released from jail where he was on a five-year term for illegal possession of a firearm in 2009, nearly two years after the post-election violence.

  • Kwekwe hunters (worldwide)

    How can a Land grabber solve land issue in Kenya (Uhuru Kenyatta family grab bed land in every province of Kenya how comes millions of Kikuyu IDPs trust the Same Uhuru Kenyatta to settle them?)

    It has been Preached in Central Province (kikuyu republic) that Uhuru Kenyatta saved Kikuyu Sons and daughters of Muumbi from maraunding(Kalenjin-worriours) Commanded by William Ruto from eliminating kikuyus from the earth and each and every home in central province is made to swallow such Nonsense! Was Uhuru Kenyatta a defense Minister to save kikuyus from kalenjin-Worrious? Where was the Kenya Army?

    where was the Dreaded Rapist GSU commanded by Mathew Iteere? Where was the Army man (Hussein Ali) and his police force?

    How comes Uhuru Kenyatta saved Kikuyus from the Kalenjins?

    Uhuru (The genuine Mungiki Leader) From the Time of Daniel Arap Moi Uhuru Moi issued Mungiki Leaders with Military Land-Rovers fitted with (HFFR)communication iquipment!

    Wasnt Mungiki Uhur Army and its in Public domain how Uhuru/Michuki has eliminated thousands of mungiki youth using Kwekwe Secret police formed purposely for Killing Mungiki and any other opposing Gema Hegemony in Central Province .

  • Crisis in Kenya

    I. Disputed 2007 Presidential Election: Political & Humanitarian Crisis
    II. International Response to halt the spread of violence
    III. International Criminal Court Launches Investigation

    a. Commission investigates post-election violence

    b. ICC Confirmation of Charges
    IV. Preventing Future Crimes

    V. Civil Society Commentary on the Crisis

    I. Disputed 2007 Presidential Election: Political & Humanitarian Crisis

    From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential election held on 27 December 2007. A country with over 70 distinct ethnic groups – the five largest being Kikuyu (20%), Luo (13%), Luhya (14%), Kalenjin (11%) and Kamba (11%) – Kenya’s elections since gaining independence in 1963 have been dominated by ethnic affiliation, resulting in exclusion and discrimination of those affiliated with the opposition.

    In the lead up to the 2007 elections, the two coalitions vying for government – the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Party of National Unity (PNU) – were strongly supported by ethnically-rooted political constituencies; the ODM by Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin, represented in the Nyanza and Western Provinces and Rift Valley; the PNU by Kikuyu, based in the Central and Eastern Provinces and strongly represented in Nairobi, the Coast Province and Rift Valley.

    The turnout for the election between incumbent president Mwai Kibaki of the PNU, ODM leader Raila Odinga and ODM-Kenya’s Kalonzo Musyoka was the highest on record, with approximately 70% voter participation. Opinion polls published prior to the election showed Raila Odinga with a narrow lead, however on 30 December 2007, Kenya’s Electoral Commission chairman Samuel Kivuitu declared Mwai Kibaki the winner and a couple of hours later he was hastily sworn in as President. Odinga and the ODM immediately rejected the results stating the elections had been rigged, a position foreign election observer missions, in particular the European Union (EU) election monitors, agreed with.

    The announcement of the results triggered widespread and systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the PNU by ODM, and counter-attacks similarly intent on killing people in ODM-aligned communities. Due to the ethnic nature of the crisis, violence was particularly endemic in the Kikuyu-dominated region of the Rift Valley, where land inequity amongst the ethnic communities of Kikuyu and Kalenjin is most prevalent. Following the conflict, evidence arose suggesting much of the violence was pre-meditated and planned by politicians and community leaders at both local and national levels. Kenya’s police forces were also implicated, with reports suggesting they were responsible for almost 40% of civilian deaths.

    II. International Response to halt the spread of violence

    Due to Kenya’s role as a Western ally and regional business hub, external intervention was almost immediate. The severity of the crisis led French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner to appeal to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in January 2008 to react “in the name of the responsibility to protect” before Kenya plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement expressing concern for the ongoing violence, calling for the population to remain calm and for restraint to be shown by Kenyan security forces. On the same day, then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour called on the Kenyan Government to abide by its international human rights obligations.

    Efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis through dialogue were undertaken in the first week of January 2008, first by South Africa’s Archbishop Desmond Tutu on 2 January and quickly followed by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer on 5 January. On 8 January, former African presidents Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania), Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique), Ketumile Masire (Botswana) and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) arrived in Kenya ahead of African Union Chairman, Ghanaian President John Kufuor, for talks with President Kibaki. Despite all mediation attempts however, no one was able to broker a successful peace.

    On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan – heading the African Union Panel of Eminent Personalities, including Mozambican Graca Machel and Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkana – was accepted by both the ODM and the PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Following Annan’s meetings with both parties’ negotiation teams, individual discussions with Kibaki and Odinga, as well as dialogue between all three actors, mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28 February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the creation of three commissions – the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and coordinated reaction by the international community was praised as “a model of diplomatic action under the Responsibility to Protect”.

    III. International Criminal Court Launches Investigation

    a. Commission investigates post-election violence

    On October 15, 2008, CIPEV – also known as the Waki Commission (after Commission Chairman Philip Waki) – published its Final Report on the post-election violence. The Report stated that the cycle of government impunity was at the heart of the post-election violence, and recommended the creation of a domestic special tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes committed.

    The Commission sent the names of six individuals deemed most responsible for the post-election violence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) following two failed government attempts to establish a tribunal The ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo, having received the names from the Waki Commission, met with Kibaki and Odinga on 5 November 2009 and announced the opening of the ICC investigation – the first time the Prosecutor brought a case proprio motu (of his own volition). On 15 December 2010, the Prosecution sought a summons for the six main suspects – also referred to as the ‘Ocampo Six’ – Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, and Mohammed Ali from the government and William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang aligned with ODM. Kenyatta and Ruto had both previously announced their intention to run in the 2013 Presidential Elections.

    b. ICC Confirmation of Charges

    On 23 January 2012, Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) of the International Criminal Court confirmed the charges of crimes against humanity against four of the Ocampo Six – the government’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Francis Muthaura, and William Ruto and Henry Kosgey (ODM’s Deputy Party Leader and Chairman). Louis Moreno-Ocampo’s announcement on 24 January 2012 suggested the ICC trial would take at least 18 months to prepare.

    Following public pressure in the wake of the announcement, both Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta resigned their Ministerial posts (Head of Civil Service/Secretary to the Cabinet and Minister of Finance respectively) on 26 January 2012, though Kenyatta retained his post as Deputy Prime Minister. Both Kenyatta and Ruto reaffirmed their decisions to run in the 2013 Presidential elections.

    IV. Preventing Future Crimes

    Following the end of the crisis, the Kenyan government began taking steps towards ensuring that widespread violence would not reoccur in the next presidential elections. On 4 August 2010, the Kenyan public voted to accept a new draft constitution. The constitution’s key focus devolves power to local governments, provides the Kenyan people with a bill of rights and paves the way for land reform. In particular, the new constitution vests coherent executive authority with the president rather than splitting power between the president and prime minister, as was previously the case. It also strips the presidency of certain powers and patronage that allowed dictatorial presidential rule in the 1980s and 1990s. Under the new constitution, the electoral commission is considered independent and beyond presidential control.

    Civil society organizations pointed to the responsibility of the international community to maintain pressure and commitment in the rebuilding phase to prevent any re-occurrence of violence. Human Rights Watch in its March 2008 report Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance, called on the duty of foreign and neighboring governments and institutions to “keep all diplomatic mechanisms on the table and to provide all necessary assistance in order to ensure that the agreement to share power works and delivers on promises to address long-running human rights violations”. This report underlined actions for the international community to take, including the provision of financial and technical support to any and all bodies set up during and after the mediation, including the Independent Review Committee on the elections, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and the Commission of Inquiry into the violence. Similarly, The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect published a policy brief in August 2010 entitled The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges. It concluded: “Kenya revealed how non-coercive tools, such as mediation, can halt atrocities when employed early, with sufficient resources and international support”.

    Though RtoP places responsibility on the international community to implement a broad range of timely and decisive measures should a state fail to protect its population, RtoP is founded on the prevention of mass atrocities. Actors at the international, regional and national levels can continue to uphold their Responsibility to Protect in Kenya by remaining seized of the situation and supporting post-crisis reconciliation and reconstruction.

    V. Civil Society Commentary on the Crisis

    Gareth Evans, author of The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, described the violence in Kenya as a “classic R2P” situation. However, Deputy President of the International Crisis Group Don Steinberg suggested in his op-ed, Responsibility to Protect in the Real World: From Rwanda to Darfur to Kenya, that Kenya’s being labeled as an RtoP situation only after the initial threat of violence was no longer imminent was positive for the norm, saying that at the time, “given the backsliding and buyer’s remorse in the international community regarding the R2P norm, it is perhaps fortunate that no one labeled this as an R2P situation”. Both Gareth Evans and Don Steinberg highlighted the political will of the international community to quell the violence in this particular case.

    Civil Society Responses to the Crisis:

    • AMANI Forum – Regional Parliamentarians Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya on the Post-Election Violence (13 – 21 January 2008)

    • International Crisis Group– Kenya in Crisis (26 February 2008)

    • Friends Committee on National Legislation – Kenya: Temporary Cease-Fire or Lasting Peace? (Policy Brief 2009)

    • Friends Committee on National Legislation – Kenya’s National Elections: Violence Renewed or Crisis Prevented? (31 October 2011)
    • International Peace Institute – A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya (August 2009)
    • Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect – The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges (18 August 2010)

    • Human Rights Watch– Turning Pebbles: Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya (9 December 2011)

    • International Crisis Group– Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings (9 January 2012)

    • Coalition for the International Criminal Court– Four Kenya Post-Election Violence Suspects to Face Trial at ICC (23 January 2012)

    UN & ICC Responses to the Crisis:

    • United Nations briefing note on Kenya (7 February 2008)

    • Report from OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya (6 – 28 February 2008)

    • UN News – UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide urges end to violence in Kenya, sends staffer there (28 January 2008)

    • Kofi Annan, Opening Remarks to the Opening Plenary Session – Kenya National Dialogue: One Year Late (March 2009)

    • International Criminal Court – Summary of decision in the two Kenya cases (23 January 2012)

  • Read between the lines of US President’s message to Kenya

    The genius of President Obama is his ability to communicate his vision, thoughts and intentions without sounding threatening. On this occasion I questioned whether his motive was to exhort Kenyans, whether he was using the bully pulpit to put questionable presidential candidates on notice or whether he was using his foreign policy philosophy of “soft power” to stave off a potentially volatile poll reminiscent of the bungled 2007 elections. Perhaps, he was going on record to counter the common misconception that he has a bias for Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s CORD alliance.

    What folks seemed to have missed is that the message was loaded with conditional political promises and overtures that isolated a particular candidature without giving any endorsements and conversely without making any veiled threats. The saying goes that an accused is innocent until proven otherwise hence one cannot make judgments. The saying also goes that the guilty are afraid hence one can only make the observation that those the message may have been directed to quickly responded. In a hastily convened press conference shortly after the message was released, the Jubilee Alliance leaders thanked Obama for reiterating his neutrality.

    Now the million dollar question is whether Jubilee presidential candidate Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto were responding out of trepidation of being put on notice as unfit leaders given their ICC woes or out of overconfidence of a decisive election victory because of what political pundit Mutahi Ngunyi called the “Tyranny of Numbers”? Was President Obama speaking as a big brother intent on saving Kenyans from themselves and protecting them from The Hague-bound duo who have successfully tied their personal criminal fate to the destiny of Kenya or in concession to an obvious triumph by the Jubilee Alliance in which case the world would be forced to deal with the intrigue of an Uhuru/Ruto presidency? Your guess is as good as mine but the US President does not take two and half minutes out of the worlds pressing problems exactly a month to the election unless it is a priority. Kenya’s fate lies in the answer to this question and while it is still a mystery, the answer will be determined at the ballot box on March 4.

  • Nancy berglund berg

    Jomo Kenyatta reminds me how the Old man introduced Homosexuality in Kenya After bliving so many years in London selling him cheaply .

    go read his poorly written book Facing Mount Kenya ! see how kikuyu culture and homosexuality incense is kikuyus culture and tradition.

  • Kenya’s Sessional Paper No 10 in 1965 authored by Tom Mboya and Kibaki had directed the government to spend resources only in areas with high potential. The outcome was political exclusion and economic marginalisation of communities in the arid north and rural areas of Kenya, away from big cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa.
    Kenya’s development problem consisted of raising everybody’s incomes as rapidly as possible. Vigilance rather than economic policy was the means to prevent the development of systematic social inequality.

    Whatever the merits of these arguments of the development strategy, the government now required a plethora of economic controls which in turn were particularly beneficial to a section of the new elite that was able to take advantage of their proximity to state patronage (in spite of the assurances of the Sessional Paper 10) to greatly enhance their wealth either through rent seeking activities or directly through their control of public resources and their allocation. For the most part, these beneficiaries were members of the political elite who quickly entered the capitalist system through this route. Ethnic patronage was also an important avenue for the consolidation of power by the new elite and thus became an instrument by which state resources and economic opportunities were skewed in favour of particular region.

    There is some debate about this however. From a purely economic standpoint, when resources are scarce and an economy small the most efficient means of attaining high levels of growth is to invest where the returns are highest. This approach outlined in the Sessional Paper of 1965 however had the effect of skewing the distribution of development expenditure in favour of those parts of the country that had already earlier benefited from economic development. In particular this has been perceived as unduly favouring the Central Province from which the dominant group in the new national elite hailed.

    Although ‘equitable development’ is a stated goal in the Sessional Paper 10 of 1965, in practice little action was taken to put into effect until after the Kenyatta regime with the ill fated ‘District Focus for rural Development’ strategy launched in 1983. In addition, the economic model pursued created ever increasing distortions that would eventually lead to its unraveling.

    Click to access class%20formation%20&%20inequality%20in%20kenya.pdf


    Kibaki government had nothing to do with Mungiki. We tend to forget who said he can negotiate with these killers. This are people out of their mind. They kill without sense. Not long before 2008 election, they killed a chief in Kibaki Othaya area, what did he said during the national holiday “The goverment will take care of them’
    This is the government they wish did not exist( Michuki RIP). The story we hear about extra judicial killing do not surprise me at all. And again, during 1992 clashes in Molo, oppressed people fought back, were they Mungiki, or when you defend yourself you become a Mungiki??
    Take Maina Njenga to ICC, he will shed broad light on who his group was supporting. And this will clear Uhuru.

  • Uhuru paid Mungiki

    Uhuru channeled funds to Mungiki

    Increasing Threats and Extrajudicial Killings
    ¶4. (S) Kenya’s government, political leaders, and criminal gangs have historically utilized intimidation and varying degrees of violence against opponents. During the post-election crisis period in early 2008, Kenya experienced extensive violence, returning to relative calm after the signing of the National Accord in February 2008. However, since the March 2009 killing of two directors of the Oscar Foundation (a local NGO which documented and publicized cases of extrajudicial killings by GOK security forces) by suspected members of a police death squad, we have noted a steady rise in the number of individuals threatened or killed for apparent political reasons. A number of witnesses who testified before the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence, also known as the Waki Commission, have already been threatened. Two classes of post-election violence witnesses are most vulnerable: ethnic Kalenjin witnesses in Rift Valley province, and ethnic Kikuyu witnesses to post-election violence in Nairobi and Central province, especially those with links to the Mungiki movement. However, due to the widespread and complex nature of the post-election violence, witnesses can come from all ethnic groups and walks of life, and unlike HRDs, are not part of a civil society network.

    ¶5. (S) Politically-motivated intimidation and violence in Kenya spans a broad spectrum of perpetrators and victims. After the Oscar Foundation murders, post helped four witnesses to relocate to Uganda after they were allegedly threatened by the police. Members of Parliament and their staff who have sought to advance legislation to establish a local tribunal to try suspects implicated in post-election violence have received death threats. One parliamentarian’s aide received a text message stating “u better stop associating with him…do you want we start counting your days also” two days before three suspects attempted to kidnap the aide. Since 2007, security forces have often used lethal and excessive force when apprehending suspected members of the Mungiki, an ethnic Kikuyu movement linked to various criminal activities, especially in Nairobi and Central province. In November 2009, Mungiki spokesman Njuguna Gitau was killed on a busy Nairobi street by suspects alleged to be undercover police officers. At the time of his death, Gitau was working to register a political party to represent Mungiki and youth interests. According to one source, Gitau may have been the lynchpin to channel funding from Uhuru Kenyatta to the Mungiki during the post-election violence.

    ‘Project Uhuru’, Mungiki and the Kikuyu – Excerpt fom Charles Hornsby’s book – Kenya: A History Since Independence (1963-2011)

    ‘Project Uhuru’, Mungiki and the Kikuyu
    At this point in 2002, there were stirrings of resentment, but KANU’s grip remained strong. Politicians from all over the country declared themselves for Uhuru Kenyatta, despite the fact that many had not even met him until recently. The Standard and Kenya Times supported Uhuru’s candidacy, with some backing from the Nation as well. Television saw wall-to-wall coverage of him, replacing Moi as the lead in almost every KBC bulletin.

    An opinion poll in August now put Uhuru ahead of all the other candidates. As Uhuru toured Central Province and Nairobi in May–August 2002, he received a rapturous reception from ex-opposition supporters, now converted to support KANU by the lure of power for the Kikuyu. Without a clear opposition candidate, it appeared inevitable that KANU would win Central Province, and dozens of southern Kikuyu opposition leaders defected to KANU. Particularly galling for Kibaki was the defection of his old ally Karume in August. One Safina MP was given a Cabinet post in return for his defection. Meanwhile, Uhuru and KANU were preparing for the election. There were reports that Uhuru’s campaign budget was Ksh15 billion (US$200 million), to be raised from foreign donations, allies and the Kenyatta family fortune.
    The state machinery was reluctant, but there were signs that it was stirring into action in his support. Uhuru was receiving briefings from the intelligence services, while his security detail was seconded from the state. Behind the scenes, a team of Rift Valley leaders was coordinating his campaign, including Gideon Moi, Hosea Kiplagat, Ruto, Sunkuli, State House Comptroller John Lokorio and Biwott. There was now another link between KANU and the Kikuyu: a Kikuyu religious sect, known as Mungiki (‘the Multitude’, ‘the masses’ or ‘a united people’). Part traditionalist religion, part self-help group and part criminal mafia, it had emerged from the growing sense of alienation amongst poor Kikuyu.

    Mungiki espoused a return to animist religions and opposed women’s liberation, Western influences and Christianity. It also represented a revival of the Kikuyu ethnic nationalism that had underlain Mau Mau and which British victory and independence had delegitimised. During the 1990s, it had gained immense influence amongst poor young Kikuyu. The sect’s origins were in Laikipia in the 1980s, and many early members had been radicalised during the 1992–3 ethnic clashes, evicted from their lands like the squatters of the 1940s. It also drew strength from the poverty that KANU’s policies and structural adjustment seemed to have brought on the Kikuyu. Mungiki provided a social welfare organisation for the poorest of the poor, crusading against drunkenness, drug addiction and prostitution. It used oathing and religious techniques to build and retain loyalty.

    As a violent, Kikuyu-focused movement appealing to the marginalised and talking of revolutionary change, Mungiki raised echoes of Mau Mau. It was therefore a serious concern to the government, which outlawed the group in 2000, repressed its meetings and jailed its members. Despite this, the movement grew, centred in Kiambu, Nairobi, Laikipia and Nakuru, and was believed to have 2 million members by 2002. It was well organised and financially secure. Acting as a criminal mafia, Mungiki took over matatu routes during 2000–1, and operated mob justice in Kikuyu-dominated shantytowns.
    There was evidence of the sect’s involvement in drug dealing and murder. At some point, the movement also acquired wealthy Kikuyu allies, including incumbent MPs and even ministers. This reflected a common radical ethno-nationalism, but equally important was the desire of some politicians to use Mungiki to support their own agenda. In the run-up to the elections, there was a bizarre change of stance by KANU.
    In late 2000, Moi had made a secret deal with Mungiki, fearful of the security implications of the group’s alleged conversion to Islam, giving it more of a free hand. In 2001, KANU entered into a brief alliance with the outlawed sect, seeking Kikuyu youth support for Uhuru. After Mungiki leaders declared their support for Uhuru in March 2002, police harassment abated, despite the group’s killing of 23 people (most Luo) in a Nairobi slum in the same month. There was a remarkable rally on 21 August 2002 during which several thousand armed Mungiki members marched through Nairobi, under police protection, and the sect campaigned for Kenyatta in the 2002 elections. Several Mungiki officials were nominated as KANU parliamentary candidates, and they were supplied with army Land Rovers to help them campaign for Uhuru. It was not to last.

    The negative reactions to the association of the educated Uhuru with a Kikuyu-chauvinist mafia contributed to a sudden reversal of policy before the polls. Uhuru flatly disowned Mungiki on 6 October 2002 and its Chairman Maina Njenga, KANU’s candidate for Laikipia West, had his nomination revoked.

    Mungiki ‘insiders’ on ICC list of witnesses against Uhuru
    By Felix Olick

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) has a list of former Mungiki members set to testify against Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former Head of Civil Service Francis Muthaura.
    However, the prosecution says several top officials of the outlawed Mungiki sect were murdered after the post-election violence, a big security concern should their identities be disclosed.

    According to prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, the slain Mungiki officials were instrumental in the sects’ participation in the violence that rocked the country after the bungled 2007 presidential polls.
    She revealed the witnesses believe the killings and forced disappearances was part of a post-election violence “clean-up” conducted by State agents to conceal the involvement of the accused and other senior officials.

    “Several senior Mungiki members disappeared or were murdered by suspected members of the Kenyan security apparatus in the immediate aftermath of the PEV. These individuals had direct knowledge of the accused contributions to the crimes charged,” Bensouda said.

    She revealed the details in an application seeking authorisation from the bench to delay disclosure of the identities of six witnesses in Uhuru and Muthaura case.

    And in a separate application, Bensouda is seeking to delay the disclosure of identities of nine witnesses involving Eldoret North MP William Ruto and radio journalist Joshua Sang.

    Bensouda, who made an extensive tour of the country early this month had complained that some key witnesses have been intimidated, compromised, or threatened with death and execution.

    In her application, she revealed that four of the witnesses in the Uhuru- Muthaura case are former Mungiki insiders who provide substantial linkage evidence regarding the accused interactions with the Mungiki during the violence.

    She said the nature of the ‘insiders’ evidence creates a powerful incentive to the suspects to interfere with them so that they do not testify. One of the witnesses provides critical evidence regarding the strategic meetings in which the Rift Valley attacks were organized and set in motion.

    She maintained the said witness has information on how Uhuru and Muthaura gave instructions, money and materials to the Mungiki so that they could attack perceived ODM supporters in Nakuru and Naivasha.
    Bensouda also told the three judges that one of her witnesses accepted money, uniforms and guns reportedly sent by Uhuru and Muthaura during the violence.

    She pleaded with the judges to grant her request saying there is limited pool of Mungiki members who are still alive and willing to testify.

    “The insiders’ evidence is irreplaceable. Were they to be tampered with, it would substantially affect the prosecution’s case. This creates a powerful incentive to interfere with the insiders,” argued the prosecutor.
    She, however, said the identities of five insider witnesses the prosecution relied on during confirmation have already been disclosed to the defence.

    In her submission, Bensouda said disclosing identities to the defence under a confidential designation is inadequate to their security concerns.

    She said the concern stems from the accused and their supporters since the counsel of both Uhuru and Muthaura have insisted they cannot withhold from their clients any material provided to them.
    “Because the accused are not in custody, their contacts with supporters or potential witnesses cannot be limited and monitored. The ICC has no capacity to control, or even to know about, the conduct of persons in a non-custodial situation thousands of miles from the seat of the court,” she said.

    “In addition, these particular accused have influential positions within and/or close ties to, the Government of Kenya, which compound both the risks they pose and the difficulties in mitigating them,” Bensouda noted.

  • Dnt the truth ngunyi is right


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.