Kikuyu land grabbers
According to the Ndung’u Report (2004), which resulted from a Commission constituted by President Kibaki to investigate land allocation in Kenya, the late Jomo Kenyatta, first president of the Republic of Kenya (1963-1978) illegally and irregularly acquired public land including government property (buildings) such as:
• Government House (and land) Mara Road, L.R. No.209/7997);
• Government land Upper Hill (L.R. No. 209/7998; and
• Upper Hill L.R. No. 209/7999 (with 5 Government Houses No. HG/60, HG/19, HG/81/HG/76).
The Report recommended that the government should revoke these titles held by the Kenyattas and repossess the public land; Ndung’u Land Report Annexes Vol. 1 pg 796-797. (Cited by KNHRC 2011, in its publication ‘Lest We Forget: The Faces of Impunity in Kenya pg 68).
The late Mbiyu Koinange, Cabinet minister and a close confidant of Jomo Kenyatta, also owned massive tracts of prime land. In December 2010, his son David Njuno Mbiyu was arrested for the murders of two Maasai men, Moses Mpoe and Parsaaiyia Ole kitu. He denied his role in the killings. The late Mpoe had challenged ownership of the 4,900-acre Muthera Farm belonging to the Mbiyu family, situated in Mau Narok. The government had planned to resettle IDPs in Mau Narok, but the Maasai people wanted the vast 30,000-acre ancestral land returned to them. However, the government claimed it owned a 2,400-acre parcel in Mau Narok and wanted to resettle IDPs on it. The Maasai say their fertile land was taken by the colonialists in early 20th Century and when Kenya gained Independence, it was handed to friends and allies of Jomo Kenyatta. (See: ‘Sordid History of Tribal Land Rights Emerges with Assassination of Activist’ by Dorah Nesoba, October 1, 2011).
The Maasai landlessness is another sad chapter in Kenya’s history. Over two million acres of land in the Laikipia plateau was taken from them by the British colonialists, who signed a treaty in 1904, to lease it for 100 years. The lease expired on August 15, 2004. Another treaty signed in 1911 to replace the first one, authorized the British to take the Maasai’s best land, while they were confined in reserves and banned from leaving them. Descendants of the white settlers currently own private commercial ranches and animal reserves which earn them millions of dollars from tourism, while the Maasai lack grazing land for their livestock.
In 2004, the then Lands minister Amos Kimunya, responded to the Maasai demand for a return of their ancestral land this way: “There is no way we can reverse history and go to 1904. I think these are matters that were overtaken by events in 1963 when we created a new independent Kenya, with a new constitution, and with a new way of doing things.” Kibaki’s administration said the land lease was for 999 years and not 99 years. It is unfortunate, because the government inherited the Anglo-Maasai treaties at independence in 1963 (Gary Phombeah: ‘The Maasai’s century-old grievance. September 1, 2004).
The politics of IDPs
Kenyan IDPs are political hostages used by politicians during national elections, every five years. According to Fiona Mati (2009), “Kenya’s internal conflict has been almost like clockwork set to the political scene during general election years of 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007, as well as the constitutional referendum of 2005. Every five years people have had to flee their homes and that is why the IDP situation falls into the category of a ‘complex emergency’” (see ‘Kenya’s IDP crisis: Only history can judge our collective inaction’).
Mati also decried Government’s slow pace in the resettlement operations and cited problems affecting IDPs as such: “poor co-ordination and corruption; insecurity; child and gender-based violations; inadequate shelter and compensation for loss.”
In May 2008, the government, with assistance from humanitarian agencies, began a resettlement program dubbed ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani’ (Return Home) which facilitatied the return of 255,094 IDPs to pre-displacement areas or new locations. A ‘start-up fund’ amounting to KSh10,000 was given to each household for families that were willing to return to their farms. Although government officials claimed that those who remained in the camps were only 5,021, the exact number was not known. Results from a profiling done by UNHCR and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in June 2008, indicated that there were 663,921 PEV IDPs in the country. The government then closed official IDP camps, yet many of those who were resettled had not re-built their homes, and instead moved into ‘transit camps’, and still live in deplorable conditions.
It is feared that the IDPs’ issue is losing out in the national debate and very few politicians are currently bothered with their fate. In an article by Maina Kiai titled: ‘Deafening silence from politicians on displaced people raises eyebrows’ (Daily Nation November 4, 2011), he mentioned that the origianl concern by the Kikuyu leadership for Kikyu IDPs was waning. Instead, attention was focused on the ‘Ocampo Six’.
Nation TV reported on November 8, 2011 that Special Programs minister Esther Murugi whose docket handles the IDPs issue, had said that: “The government resettled over 2000 internally displaced persons last month alone. Murugi says the government has slowed the process of resettling IDPs due to land ownership rows in places identified and earmarked for IDPs resettlement but is promise that all displaced persons will have places to call home by end of the year.” Nonetheless, not all IDPs were resettled by the end of 2011.
Kibaki and Uhuru should be philanthropic
With huge tracts of prime land in the hands of a few Kikuyu families, the issue of resettling Kikuyu IDPs needs a radical approach. Uhuru Kenyatta owns 500,000 acres of land according to Forbes magazine and earns millions of dollars from other businesses. There’s no debate that the land he inherited was acquired illegally by his father, Jomo Kenyatta.
Uhuru has declared his candidacy in the 2012 presidential race and his Kikuyu people will form the core of his voting bloc. Therefore, he needs to become philanthropic and donate huge chunks of his land to Kikuyu IDPs for resettlement, because they live in squalor, with no means of livelihood. Kenyatta has a moral obligation to make a positive difference. How does he feel when mentioned to be worth $500,000 dollars by the American Forbes magazine, yet many of his Kikuyu people live in abject poverty? US billionaires like Bill Gates and Warren Buffet, are philanthropists who provide a high quality of life with their generous charitable donations, to underprivileged people worldwide. This has never affected their net worth and they have given a human face to wealth. In Kenya, the ruling elite like Uhuru, live ostentatiously at the expense of the poor taxpayer (on account of not paying taxes as MPs), yet they have enormous personal wealth.
Recently, Uhuru Kenyatta’s cousin Beth Mugo, who is also a major beneficiary of her uncle Jomo Kenyatta’s political patronage, had a successful breast cancer operation in the United States. She is Minister for Public Health and Sanitation, yet cannot rely on Kenya’s health services. Imagine if the Kenyattas could build centers to promote basic healthcare or facilitate cancer screening machines for the masses; they would leave a memorable legacy.
On October 14, 1974 Beth Mugo was mentioned in the explosive Time magazine’s article titled, ‘KENYA: The ruby rip-off’. Together with Mama Ngina, Uhuru’s mother, she was linked to the shrewd take-over of a deposit of rubies in the Tsavo West National Park, discovered by two American males, and estimated to be worth at least $5 million. One of the Americans was deported in June 1974, having been declared a “prohibited immigrant.” They robbed the two Americans of their discovery.
Although President Kenyatta publicly declared that no foreigner would be allowed to exploit Kenya’s natural resources for private benefit, the rubies were being mined by George Criticos, a Greek resident of Kenya, who was Kenyattas’ business partner, in the Kenya Trade Development Corporation. He continued to do so even after a court order had stopped him, because Kenyatta supported and gained from the illegal deal.
In September 2010, when Mama Ngina was asked by a journalist at a charity event whether she could donate land to resettle IDPs, she looked shocked and hurriedly moved away without answering.
Kibaki and his wife’s recent gesture of sending hot meals to IDPs at the Mawingu Settlement Camp during Christmas of 2011, was a drop in the ocean given that these people need land and sources of income, to participate in his much lauded economic growth. Kibaki could improve his perceived mean, uncaring nature and contempt for the poor, by donating portions of his vast land to suffering Kikuyu IDPs. It would be the best legacy ever. He has more than enough wealth and after all, he has invested in other lucrative businesses apart from land ownership. The issue of resettling displaced Kikuyus needs a permanent solution.
IDP Milka Wanjiru’s story
“Belonging to the “wrong” ethnic group in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province cost Milka Wanjiru her home, her farm and her shop. After elections in 1992, the mother of 11 lost it all to looters and arsonists.
“It is now 20 years since I became displaced, I have known no peace since then,” Wanjiru told IRIN in Nakuru, the main town in Rift Valley, where the family lives in a rented house. “Two years after we were displaced, we tried to return to our home to rebuild our lives but we were shocked to find a note on the charred kitchen door saying ‘We have already burnt everything, now we want your husband’s head’. We left and have never gone back.”
To survive, Wanjiru and her children turned to casual labour in farms at Mutukanio, Nakuru North District. Her family is one of 2,700 grouped under the Greater Subukia Zone internally displaced persons (IDPs), who were uprooted from their homes in the Rift Valley during the 1992 and 1997 election years.
Thousands of families such as Wanjiru’s find themselves uncertain of ever resettling as political, policy and technical difficulties persist in the country’s handling of IDPs” (cited verbatim from, ‘Analysis: IDPs as political pawns in Kenya’ – May 29, 2011).
Jared Odero
About the Author
Kikuyu land grabbers. The heading of the video clip says it all. The implication and message that is being sent is if X is a kikuyu then it follows he is definitely a land grabber. Blanket condemnation. This is what the ongoing cases at the ICJ are all about, the cases for Rwanda and Kenya, and the consequences arising from articulating grievousness in this way. This two part article beings with the statement, “During the 2007 presidential election, members of the Kikuyu community voted for President Kibaki to a man” and goes on to expound on the notion, as right as it may be, on how the Kikuyu have been mistreated by their political elite. The implication and message here is that the Kikuyu should know better by now and should have voted in another fashion. They are the reason behind the current misery in the country because they voted as they did. I expect the author and publisher of the article will protest most strenuously at my conclusions and interpretation. But the message is clear and has been delivered, Kikuyus messed up and chose to identify with the thieves in government.
What is interesting for a neutral observer like myself is the motive behind the writing and publishing this kind of article and what the intended message intends to accomplish. Articles are wriiten and published with some purpose in mind. How does the blanket condemnation of the Kikuyu community and their crucifixion on KSB help in diffusing an already fragile and volatile state of affairs? During the 2007 presidential election, members of the Luo community voted for Prime Minister Odinga to a man, members of the certain Luhya communities voted for Deputy Prime Minister Mudavadi to a man, and members of the certain Kamba communities voted for Vice President Kalonzo to a man. What was so special about how the Kikuyu voted in 2007 to favour the special attention they have recieved on KSB? I am all for putting facts in their historic perspective and understanding how Kenya has degenerated to the level it has, but Kenya has had three administrations. Three Presidents have held and executed executive powers since independence. The article seems to dwell on those from just the Kikuyu community and is completely silent when it comes to the years 1978-2002 during Toroitich arap Moi’s tenure. As we all know, this is when corruption, nepotism and impunity was refined and taken to earlier unknown heights. Heinous murders were committed, bleeding dry of state owned cooperation’s, mismanagement of public resources, torture of dissidents and disappearances and the beginning of tribal cleansing are some of the highlights of this period in Kenyan history. And yet there is not a word or reference. Is this a case of selective amnesia or have I stumbled on something more sinister?!
O.Hatari: Thanks for your reaction to the article. The pieces I have penned so far at KSB especially on Kibaki’s leadership have been critical, with in-depth audits of promises he reneged on during his two terms. In my opinion, Kibaki’s presidency has failed in many ways. He keeps talking about economic growth, yet few parts of the country have benefited. For instance, beautifying some roads in the country is not equal to national development. Further, all his Executive directives to resettle IDPs in the past four years have never been effective, showing that he lacks authority within his Administration. Let us see how his yesterday’s directive to resettle all IDPs will be carried out this time.
In this piece, I played devil’s advocate to provoke readers, then invoked Kikuyu landlessness and the recurring displacement, especially in Rift Valley. The sub-heading “Kikuyu land grabbers” is contextual and emphasizes the genesis of corruption by the late President Jomo Kenyatta and his cronies in the resettlement of Kikuyus immediately after Independence. The omission of former Dictator Moi’s era was deliberate. Since Kibaki benefited immensely from the land resettlement program in the 1960s at the expense of Kikuyu peasants, he should have approached the IDPs matter in a humane way. I think he refused Orengo’s suggestion in 2008 to resettle IDPs outside Rift Valley, because the process would rekindle the reasons behind their [Kikuyu] displacement from Central province. Therefore, this section of the article does not have a blanket condemnation of the Kikuyu community, but emphasizes the insidious effects of their politically-engineered displacement.
The statement, “During the 2007 presidential election, members of the Kikuyu community voted for President Kibaki to a man”, can be interpreted in many ways. However, as the author, I wanted to focus on the paradox of voting in politicians that are generally not bothered with the wellbeing of Kenyans, once they join Parliament. It is also a rhetorical introduction, and questions why Kikuyu IDPs are the most suffering ones, yet Kibaki, a fellow Kikuyu, has all the resources to get them out of their misery. In the back of my mind, I was also focusing on some noted characteristics of Kibaki, i.e. being a ‘use and dump’ person, not concerned with the poor masses, and so forth. His blatant lies such as not going for a single presidential term, signing the Memorandum of Understanding with Raila in 2002 to appoint him as Prime Minister, and many others, also add to his dubious “fence-sitting” character.
The narrative of Milka Wanjiru at the end of the piece, was used to depict the plight of other displaced Kikuyus since 1992, during former Dictator Moi’s era, yet no political action has been taken to resettle them. In my opinion, the Kikuyu elite do not want land issues in Central province to be discussed because that would be like waking up the displaced, to fight for their rights. A few years ago, it was noted that around 4 million acres of prime land in Kenya belong to families of the ruling elite, their cronies and a minority of whites.
As you have noted, the article reflects Kibaki’s lack of concern for Kikuyu IDPs, and shows how he has silenced them to the extent that the discourse of land allocation by Kenyatta and the Kikuyu elite, has died a natural death. We recall that the Ndung’u report on past land allocation was never implemented by Kibaki. While writing the piece, I wondered where that fierce fighting spirit of the colonial-era Kikuyus has disappeared to. There is currently almost no debate about past and ongoing injustices faced by many Kikuyus, yet they have collectively had two Kikuyu presidents for a total of 25 years. Very few felt sorry for the families that faced the horror of losing their sons in the extra-judicial killings carried out by Kibaki’s administration. How many Kikuyus have protested the continued battering of IDPs by government security whenever they march towards Nairobi from Rift Valley to try and meet Kibaki?
I salute Maina Kiai, a Kikuyu, who has stood by the IDPs and continually speaks about their misfortune. However, those that he’s fighting for saw him as an enemy in 2008, for having condemned Kibaki’s bungled presidential election. John Githongo is another Kikuyu ‘ostracized’ by a section of his people, for talking about corruption in Kibaki’s administration. He also continues to mention the sad situation of IDPs and their neglect by a president they voted for.
Tribally-inclined voting patterns will not end soon in Kenya and the saddest thing is, the presidency is dominated by tribal demographics and the absence of results-oriented candidates. Does the electorate have a choice in 2012 to vote in a president of their choice? I don’t think so; but that’s a topic for another article.
Kariuki Karuku’s narrative
Here in Kagoshi, Kariuki Karuku, born in 1926, summed up many of the ambiguities. He was a Mau Mau soldier who fought the British in the mid-1950’s. The aim, he said, was not only to gain independence, but also to acquire land.
“In that time of King George and Queen Elizabeth,” he said, “those people gave us a lot of problems.”
But life did not get better for Mr. Karuku after independence in 1963. Like many other Mau Mau soldiers, he was promised land but never got it. He lived in a forest near Mount Kenya, tending trees in exchange for the right to farm a small plot of public land, until the late 1980’s.
Then the government expelled the people from the forest. Some of the land, they say, has been used for planting trees. Some was given to rich people, and some of it lays idle.
With no other choice, Mr. Karuku took up residence on the roadside. His family of 14 has two shacks, one of them less than three feet from the road.
“Now the people who became our leaders are behaving just like the white people,” he said. “They are still oppressing us.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/01/world/battle-for-land-in-kenya-has-deep-bitter-roots.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
Kenya: Country Fairing Badly On IDPs’ Welfare, Says UN
Kibiwott Koross
24 January 2012
KENYA is among 15 countries that have failed to adequately protect internally displaced persons, a report said yesterday.
According to a Brookings London School of Economics study, the report that was released in Geneva said most people who were displaced during violence in the 15 countries have been neglected.
About 600,000 people in Kenya were displaced from their homes in 2008 after the bitterly contested general election. Another 1,333 lost their lives. “The key finding in this study is that the governments do not quite meet the benchmarks for adequate protection of IDPs,” UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs Chaloka Beyani said during the release of the report.
Titled From Responsibility to Response: Assesing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, the report comes at a time when cases of four Kenyans accused of bearing greater responsibility in the violence were confirmed by the International Criminal Court at the Hague, Netherlands, yesterday.
Former Cabinet minister William Ruto, Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, Civil Service head Francis Muthaura and and radio presenter Joshua Sang had their cases confirmed while suspended Cabinet minister Henry Kosgey and Postmaster-General Hussein Ali had their cases dropped.
While the study does not rank the performance of the governments, Ferris said Kenya Colombia, Georgia and Uganda are clearly heading in the right direction, while the Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen got the least marks. The other countries looked at in the study were Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Turkey.
The study recommends that governments make the issue of IDPs a political priority, designate an institutional focal point to provide assistance to IDPs, amend or adopt relevant legislation, devote sufficient funds to the cause, support the work of national human rights institutions engaging in IDP issues, ask for international assistance where necessary and search for durable solutions with the participation of IDPs.
Jared’s comments are indeed thought provoking and his perception on the prevailing political situation in Kenya perhaps valid from his viewpoint. If a surmise correctly, the genesis of his arguments is that Kibaki should use his position as head of state to assist the Kikuyu IDP’s. By virtue of being Kikuyu and President, Kibaki should therefore be in the frontline in resolving the issue of the Kikuyu IDP’s. This would then portray Kibaki in a more humane light as in his approach to resolving the situation.
I would not be incorrect in stating that IDP’s in Kenya today do not only belong to the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu’s may make up the majority, but I do recall other communities were also put to flight during the chaotic period following the 2007 elections. As for contextual statements, I urge Jared to consider other modes and avenues of reference besides tribe as to be more precise, since using Kikuyu’s, Luo’s or Luhya’s refers to a great number of people that are not privy to the governance of Kenya.
Kenyan politicians have prefected the habit of using tribe and members of these communities to cover up their intrigues and corruption. Take for example the resettlement and allocation of land to the landless in the Rift Valley and Coastal region during Kenyatta’s administration. The same strategy was used during Moi’s tenure at the Mau Forest. This is done to enable those in power to allocate land to themselves and provide deniability if the question of land allocation arose. In the event that indignation and protests would occur, they simply whip up tribal sentiment and claim their tribe was being persecuted. Any reasonably minded, politically conscious Kenyan without tribal bias would be able to recognize this pattern by now. I expect any elected holder of public office in Kenya to execute their duties without regard to their tribe. We should expect no favoritism just because holders of public office happen to come from our community. Should we expect Kibaki to resolve the IDP question just because the majority of these people are Kikuyu? Kibaki should act because it is part of his job description and responsibility to do so. Nothing more, nothing less. This is why a constitution exists, otherwise a free for all would ensue to fill in the vacuum for the lack of one. This was indeed the general consensus when agitating for the new constitution, or am I in error?
Fighting an external enemy is always a clear cut affair since this enemy is easily identifiable. An internal enemy on the other hand is an uphill task since the traditional methods of waging war do not apply. This may explain why Jared is perplexed by the lack of the legendary fierce fighting spirit of the colonial-era displayed by the Mau Mau. A similar armed struggle would not be in the interest of any Kenyan community as they would be shedding the blood of kith and kin. This does not however exclude the war to win the hearts and minds of Kenyans towards achieving the independence their forefathers envisioned and they deserve albeit more that forty years belated.
I find it appalling that Jared would reduce the great achievements and sacrifices made by Maina Kai and John Githongo. These gentlemen, and that they are, may come from the Kikuyu community but their actions and motives have not been spurred on by this fact. They are not protesting against Kikuyu’s in power but the abuse of power by those elected to serve Kenya regardless of tribe. Their agenda is national and not ethnical, and I would imagine they would take great exception at anyone stating or suggesting otherwise. Moreover, I detest this fixation of always associating Kenyans and what they do as being representative of the communities they come from or being reflective of that community. The issue facing us as a country is not the Kikuyu as a community, but mismanagement and impunity being perpetuated by those in power regardless of tribe. One hardly pauses to ask about tribe when accosted by robbers, even Kikuyu ones.
Those misusing the mandate granted to them by the Kenyan people should be made to account for their actions without having to sully and muddy the waters by dragging in an entire community in the process. Uhuru Kenyatta and Ruto are to be put on their defense at The Haig and are to account for their actions post 2007 elections as individuals, I am yet to hear the honorable judges referring to the communities Uhuru and Ruto come from in their deliberations.
O.Hatari, my article delineated the plight of Kikuyu IDPs and acknowledged that there are non-Kikuyu ones too. I explained why my focus was on Kibaki, who should have applied a humane approach to this matter, which involves a majority of his ‘tribespeople’. I also mentioned that his executive orders to resettle the IDPs have been non-effective. The matter is complex. I was equally specific about the historical shortchanging of Kikuyus in the land resettlement program, by Jomo Kenyatta.
I feel that you are taking me outside the context of my article, whose introduction is very clear about its text. I explained the paradox of the Kikuyu community voting for Kibaki to a man, yet many are now suffering as IDPs.
I wrote in my response that the piece was meant to provoke, thus reading beyond the presented context shifts its objective.
Maina Kiai and John Githongo are on record as being the few “voices” representing the grievances of IDPs in general, and specifically, the Kikuyu ones. It is a fact that Kiai was challenged by fellow Kikuyus for pointing on Kibaki’s political blunders, and similarly, Githongo. Apart from them, very few other Kikuyus are publicly concerned about their IDPs. And yes, I believe the fighting spirit of other Kikuyus on behalf of the IDPs has waned.
A section of Kiai’s op-ed (November 4, 2011) on the deafening silence in the IDPs’ situation reads: “Hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu were displaced during the crisis (and many more from the state-sponsored violence in Rift Valley in 1992, 1993 and 1997). But even this original concern for Kikuyu IDPs has dissipated somewhat, with many leaders more focused on “protecting” one of the Ocampo Six.”
Kibaki has spent and will continue to spend taxpayers’ money to shield the “Ocampo Two” (Uhuru and Muthaura), while the IDPs remain an eyesore.
President Kibaki’s Political Failures Obscured a Legacy of Economic And Social Progress
Nick Wachira, East African 24 July 2011
Nairobi — On a busy September afternoon in 2002, Mwai Kibaki, then the head of the official opposition party in Kenyan parliament and the chairman of the Democratic Party of Kenya, sat in his office relaxed and unhurried, ignoring signals by his aide to cut short an interview with a newspaper reporter.
Though his campaign for the presidency was gathering steam, his narrative on economic issues was not that obvious to the discerning voter who needed details.
To the ordinary voter, Kibaki was known as a brilliant and gentlemanly economist who had twice failed to win the presidency. He spoke authoritatively on national issues of the day like taming corruption and mismanagement of public corporations. His signature tune was to call on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to tame the beast of corruption by starving president Daniel arap Moi’s regime of economic aid. He had recently mollycoddled a motley collection of 14 political parties into a coalition called the National Alliance of Kenya, which had given him the clout he need to negotiate with a group of Kanu rebels that called itself the Rainbow Coalition and was headed by Raila Odinga.
If these two camps did not unite, they faced defeat in the hands of Uhuru Kenyatta, a 42-year-old protégé of Moi, in the December election. Later that October, Kibaki would get the momentum that would steamroll him into the presidency after signing a coalition with the Rainbow team that became the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).
That afternoon, Alfred Getonga, Kibaki’s personal assistant then, had invited me for a 20-minute chat with the “Chairman” at his offices at Parliament Building to understand his vision for the Kenyan economy. I was working for the Standard newspaper at the time as the business editor.
For a young journalist, the chat with the chairman turned out to be a confusing deviation from the traditional question-and-answer session between a reporter and a source, into questions of political economy, rural economics, and occasionally literature. Basically, he spoke of stamping out corruption in the public service, investing in the rural economy by subsidising milk and coffee farmers, restarting failed state corporations, and fixing infrastructure. All this was in generalities. The chairman cleverly sidestepped any attempts to extract details that I presumed already existed in his famed economic mind or even the party propaganda that NAK had fashioned.
The interview lasted almost two hours. I could claim I had a good conversation with a man who could one day become the president of Kenya — for he was one of the several contenders — but I did not have a story.
I never wrote a word about the interview, and I even remember an angry Getonga calling me in the middle of the night castigating me for blacking out his candidate, when the likes of the Financial Times and New York Times were falling over themselves to write about him.
On Monday, December 29, 2002, Kibaki was sworn in as Kenya’s third president sitting in a wheelchair in front hundreds of thousands of supporters at the Uhuru Park and millions watching the event on television. His 1,922-word speech — possibly the best ever he has ever made–brought tears to the eyes of many and a new sense of nationhood.
400 days to go
Now 3,455 days since that swearing in ceremony and nearly 400 days more to go from this week, and nearly $90 billion of public spending programme that his two terms will cover, how has the Kibaki presidency changed or not changed Kenya? How has the image of the country shifted in the eyes of the international community? This is a question that will both interest historians and ordinary folk struggling to understand a complex and fast changing world.
In order to answer this question, The EastAfrican chose to parse Kibaki’s presidency through a measurable metric that can allow ordinary Kenyans to judge how it has affected their lives — the change in the quality of life over the past decade. This has been made possible by the release last week of significant amounts of government information going as back to 2001 under the World Bank-funded Kenya Open Data Project on the Internet as part of the global Open Government initiative that the country aspires to join.
When Kibaki took over, recently revised economic data reveals that Kenya was starting to recover from the trough of a decade-long economic decline induced by a debilitating toll of grand corruption that sapped public finances and the resulting shocks induced by massive cuts in economic aid.
There were no decent jobs for college graduates, businesses had cut costs to the bone, including a series of massive layoffs, banks typically charged individual borrowers 30 per cent interest for a loan, the masses could not easily open a bank account, tarmac roads were impassable, and the waiting list to get a telephone connection was estimated to be in the range of 500,000 customers.
As for the quality of life, at least 56 per cent of the population was classified as living below the poverty line, which meant they earned less than $1 a day. The situation was even more critical when measured against key statistics that make up the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index.
Kibaki’s Grand Strategy
While Kibaki’s mission was to foster a national renewal through the fight against corruption, and economic reconstruction through investment in social services and infrastructure, he was also focused on framing the emergence of a new Kenya in the context of the wider region.
In the off-the-cuff remarks after his first inaugural speech, he identified restoring Kenya’s image in the world as his third priority after promoting nation building and economic reforms.
“We as residents of East Africa, we will unite with our sister countries, which are here today to build a new Africa,” he said, “My government will continue to play a leading role in East Africa, Africa and the world. It will support and facilitate all positive efforts to resolve the conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other trouble spots in Africa. Kenya continues to bear a heavy burden of these regional conflicts with hundreds of thousands of refugees in our land. As a country that has suffered two devastating terrorist attacks, we shall work closely with others to root out causes of terrorism in the world. We desire to live in a peaceful world, united by a common sense of purpose in pursuit of a safe common future.”
Clearly, with or without intending it, President Kibaki on his first day stated what academics and the foreign policy community call the Grand Strategy — a collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools to advance that state’s national interest.
Kenya under the Kanu regime had played an important role in peace negotiations in the Sudan and Angola and at one point the country was among the biggest contributor to troops to UN peacekeeping missions around the world. But presidents Kenyatta and Moi were not big on foreign policy adventurism.
Under Kenyatta, and later Moi, Kenya had made major strategic blunders that dimmed the country’s image in pan-African politics. For instance, Kenya not only failed to grasp the strategic importance of supporting ANC in its fight against apartheid — a role Zimbabwe and Tanzania grabbed — but went ahead to support the white supremacists. Kenya under Moi watched quietly as Rwanda descended into genocide and even facilitated the escape of some of the biggest perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
It is no wonder, that after his first official state visit out of Kenya, to Uganda in July 2003, South Africa was Kibaki’s second port of call the following month, with visits to the US and Britain in October that year. He would visit Rwanda in April 2004.
However, Kenya’s diplomatic blunders continue to affect its relations with South Africa today as witnessed by the cool relations Nairobi has with the likes of Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, after the latter was snubbed as a negotiator between the Kibaki and Odinga camp during the 2008 political crisis. The relations with Rwanda have fared much better, with Kenya helping the country navigate the political terrain of joining the East African Community in 2006 and recently giving up the fight to have its own national become the secretary general in favour of Rwanda. Trade between the two nations has thrived.
While Moi’s foreign policy had been shaped by the destabilising effect of civil conflicts extending from the Great Lakes region to the Horn of Africa, and a decade-long isolation by a Western world order that wanted him out of power, Kibaki’s worldview on the first day saw a vast realignment shaped by economic opportunity.
This was to be achieved by courting Kenya’s neighbours in the EAC and South Africa, as witnessed by his official state visits, and the West, which meant mostly the Americans and British. These were his most enthusiastic supporters in his first year in politics. The Americans saw a key ally who would advance their national interests in their counterterrorism strategies, while the Brits wanted to cement historical economic and cultural ties.
Honeymoon, interrupted
However, the honeymoon did not last long. In the first weeks of Kibaki’s first term, his closest political advisors had sown the seeds of destruction while the president was ailing in the first month — and it is widely believed — during his first year in power. Five days after being sworn in, Kibaki announced his first. It represented a major betrayal of his coalition partners. In the final weeks before the 2002 election, the coalition had signed a power sharing agreement that promised a prime minister’s post to Odinga and a more equitable sharing of Cabinet positions. This agreement was tossed out and murmurs of betrayal started being heard. Another major strategic miscalculation was that the new president had not clearly organised a broad-based transition team and he failed to bring his coalition partners as equal players to the table earlier on.
This meant that his closest advisors (private businessmen from his Kikuyu community) who helped him pick the first Cabinet — composed mainly of outsiders — had little knowledge of how the government ran and had misread the mood of the country to mean that the electoral landslide for the coalition meant a mandate for Kibaki to rule unilaterally. In its first month in power — for current head of civil service and Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Muthaura started on the job at the beginning of February — the government was in disarray.
Cabinet ministers had opened wars on many fronts trying to upend Kanu’s well-oiled corruption machinery. And corruption did fight back. This would become clear a year later when the media reported that the men who whispered in Kibaki’s years had inherited a monstrous security procurement scandal now known as the Anglo Leasing saga that had been marinating for six years under the Moi regime. Anglo Leasing spoilt the mood of Kenyans, who now favoured the Odinga faction in the NARC coalition, and foreign governments such as the UK — which was most vocal; and the US –which would have cut links, but was more worried about its security interests.
The significance of Anglo Leasing in defining the narrative of the Kibaki presidency lingers to this day. While the new president had promised a bright future where the CEO of Kenya Inc. would spend his days signing deals with foreign multinationals rushing to open local subsidiaries, local middle-aged businessmen chasing deals in the region, and happy schoolchildren enjoying a good education and free lunches, the reality turned out to be different. The opposition, the media and diplomats would paint a meta-narrative of an ineffective president who was unwilling to punish his powerful-and-corrupt political friends.
It did not help that the seemingly growing stockmarket and economy only widened the gap between the rich and poor, who were constantly fed on a media image of a raving kleptocracy gone amok. This image led to the biggest failure of his first term — his inability to deliver a new Constitution not in the first 100 days in power as he had promised, but in the first two and half years in power after he lost the first referendum to change the supreme law of the land in May 2005. He dissolved NARC the day after he lost the referendum, fired Odinga and his men and brought in a government of national unity. Thus began the second chapter of Kibaki’s presidency, which would end up with his controversial re-election and a political disaster.
The economic man
However, if one were to look only at Kibaki’s political failings, one would miss an important element of his presidency that is evolving, but which will be appreciated many years after he leaves power. That yes, there have been lots of political problems, but his years in power have been marked by remarkable economic and social progress compared with Moi’s last decade in power.
To put it in perspective, at an average exchange rate, in 2002, public spending was in the range of $3.6 billion, in 2011 it ranges at $12.5 billion. This massive growth in public expenditure has largely been fund by increased tax collection as the economy has grown and improved collection rates. Kibaki’s first economic plan also ushered in an era of low interest rates, which coupled with the government’s decision to leave the private sector to thrive allowed businesses to increase domestic investment and hiring. The growth in public spending was also financed by heavy public borrowing — underwritten by a growing economy — that saw public debt double from $8.5 billion in 2002 to $16.4 billion in 2011. An expanding economy was largely financed by a huge trade deficit and large remittances and capital inflows kept the balance of payments in the black.
When the new regime was elected, a key campaign platform was free primary schooling and creation of at least 500,000 jobs annually. Statistics from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics show that the promise has largely been met, with 70 per cent of the jobs coming from the informal sector. However, this achievement pales in comparison with the scale of unemployment in the country, which needs at least one million jobs a year to make a dent.
The government has come under heavy criticism over the failure of the benefits of growth to trickle down to lower income groups, leaving household incomes to lag far behind the rate of inflation and the cost of living.
A recent UNDP report ranked Kenya among the most unequal societies in the world, indicating that the steady growth that the country realised in the past five years has done little to bridge the yawning gap between the rich and the poor. The average annual wage per worker has shot up 33.9 per cent over the past five years. Ordinarily, such a level of income growth should have left households with more disposable income and stimulated consumer markets’ growth but high inflationary pressure that almost tripled from 11.9 per cent in 2005 to 29.3 per cent late in 2009 eroded much of the public’s purchasing power.
With inflation having climbed for seven months now, this has ignited the old debate as to whether the recent economic growth has had any impact on Kenya’s proverbial mountain of poverty that has left more than half of the population in the bottom income band. It should also temper recent enthusiasm over Kenya’s economic prospects, which the analysts see as promising but fraught with downside risks.
Towards social progress
While economic growth has taken too long to trickle to the bottom, one way of judging Kibaki’s presidency is looking at social progress in health, education, and general quality of life. The Kenyan population suffers one of the biggest disease burdens in the world, mostly from malaria, respiratory diseases and HIV/Aids. The biggest killer diseases in Kenya are preventable either through proper sanitation, drainage or the use of bed nets.
In 1998, only 44 per cent of Kenyans had access to safe drinking water. A third of the rural population, and 87 per cent of urban dwellers could get a clean glass of water; a decade later in 2008, the number had risen to 59 per cent.
The 2009 census data showed that the pit latrine is the most common human waste disposal method in Kenya (69.6 per cent of households mainly use a pit latrine). Out of 47 counties, only one county–Nairobi–uses a main sewer line as the major sanitation facility (47.7 per cent of Nairobi households use the main sewer line). Seven counties use the bush as their main disposal method, mostly in arid and semi-arid Kenya, such as Turkana, Samburu, West Pokot, Marsabit, Tana River, Narok and Wajir. The significance of this data comes from the fact that half the number of illness reported in Kenya can be traced to unsafe water and poor sanitation.
One of the areas where Kenya has seen some progress is in lowering the number of children and mothers who die at birth in the past decade. In 1990, out of a sample 1,000 babies born, 64 or 6.4 per cent would die before their first birthday, 100 would die before the age of 5. However, in 2009, child deaths before first birthday had fallen to 55 deaths per 1,000 births and 84 would see their fifth births.
Kenya seems to have done a good job in advancing the quality of life in the past decade, but it still lags behind the major achievements by Rwanda and Tanzania. For instance, Kenya has seen full immunisation coverage for children under one year grow from 47 per cent in 2002 to 83 per cent last year, an indicator more children are now protected from killer diseases such as TB, polio and measles. However, Tanzania and Rwanda have over 90 per cent coverage. The region is also racing ahead in the fight against malaria, with Rwanda achieving full coverage of the population sleeping under a sleeping net.
When he came to power in 2003, President Kibaki promised to roll out free learning both in primary and secondary schools, the two programmes that have over the years found themselves in the middle of a clash between public policy and politics.
Enrolment in primary schools has climbed from six million in 2002 to 9.3 million last year, an indicator the free primary school education programme has attracted more children to school, although one million children are still said to be out of school.
The subsidised secondary education introduced three years ago has helped push enrolment from 882,000 in 2003 to 1.7 million last year.
The introduction of the twin social welfare plans was touted as the most effective social equalisation programme, opening the doors for children from poor backgrounds to attain basic education and giving them a chance to scale the career ladder.
While the programmes have proven successful by raising enrolment, their effectiveness seems to be running into headwinds, especially at the secondary school level, where the main beneficiaries are children from well-to-do families. A study by Uwezo, a local education think tank, on the status of Kenya’s primary education shows a child from a Kenyan wealthy family is twice as likely to perform better in school and land a good job than one from a poor household as parents can afford better incentives. This highlights the contribution of the education system to the widening gap between the rich and the poor.
Foreign policy adventurism
As the final chapter closes on Kibaki, he is increasingly cultivating an image of a statesman with wide interests in foreign policy, namely securing Kenya’s economic and security interests in the region. He is pushing for the world to pay more attention to Somalia and South Sudan. He has scolded Eritrea, which is accused of financing Al Shabaab; he wants to open trade links with Ethiopia and South Sudan and deepen security co-operation.
Since January, Kibaki has hosted at least four presidents from Africa and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel to discuss issues ranging from trade to security in the region.
In March, he met Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss a “significant amount of gold,” estimated to be worth $113 million, smuggled into Kenya from eastern Congo. Two weeks ago, he hosted the German Chancellor Angela Merkel as Europe’s biggest economy sought the support of African countries in bid to get a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while also seeking to secure sources of energy. President Kibaki invited German investors to take up huge lucrative infrastructure projects such as the construction of the Lamu Port and the Lamu-Ethiopia-South Sudan rail, road and pipeline link.
“Initially, the president looked like an inward leader but of late he is showing more impetus on regional affairs, perhaps with an eye to leaving a holistic legacy that will have implications both in Nairobi and the EAC region,” said Adams Oloo, who teaches political science at the University of Nairobi.
“Since the referendum last year, we are seeing Kibaki becoming more visible both in the region and also taking control of national affairs. However, I am not convinced he will be so enthusiastic about playing the regional role after he retires,” said Dr Lukoye Atwoli, a political analyst. “It seems it is his minders who are pushing him into regional visibility for political leverage,” he added.
The president, analysts said, is keen to turn negative economic data such as surging inflation, poverty and joblessness to his advantage as his tenure enters the final stretch. He seems to have learnt harsh political lessons along the way that saw him choose popular causes that are in line with mood of the country, such as his support for the new Constitution and allowing due process to follow its course in appointment of key officers in the judiciary.
However, the biggest challenge to his legacy as he leaves office will be whether he delivers a free, fair and peaceful August 2012 presidential and general election.
Additional reporting by Christine Mungai and Mwaura Kimani
Forgotten And Unwanted – the Plight of IDPs And the Balkanisation of the Nation
Maina Kiai, 13 May 2011
opinion
Nairobi — The past months have highlighted just how unwanted and neglected IDPs in Kenya have become.
Like a festering wound, they have been ignored for years by the regimes in power, used as pawns in power games.
And this has been going on for decades, even though it is only now that the issue is getting prominence as communities reject IDPs from settling near them, and the regime purchases land that is barely tillable, just as elections beckon.
The IDP issue must be traced to the 1990s when state-sponsored violence ravaged the Rift Valley, first to show that multi-party politics was untenable; then to carve out exclusive zones for Moi’s KANU to dominate; then to ‘address” old issues of land ownership; and finally in 2008, as pawns in a high political stakes game that was made worse by obvious rigging to maintain power.
Mark you, the land issue while simmering underground, was never the trigger for the violence: it was an excuse that arose after violence had erupted.
Note that in the years between elections there was virtually no pattern of violence despite political tensions. Note, too, that there was no violence in the 2002 elections when the two main candidates were Kikuyu.
Along the way, chances to deal with the IDP issues were spawned first by the Moi regime, and later by the Kibaki regime.
Moi’s refusal to deal with the issue is understandable (not acceptable) for it was under his watch, and with the help of the state that the evictions took place.
For Kibaki, his refusal to institute a Truth Commission in 2004/5 that could have allowed the airing of views — in a possibly tense but ultimately peaceful manner — is different.
By rejecting the demands for a Truth Commission, which he had promised in his 2002 campaigns, Kibaki signalled that impunity was okay.
This failure to confront the violence of the 1990s contributed in no small measure to the violence of 2008, as the message was clear: violence is a useful tool and there is no accountability!
Left to their own devices, and forgotten by the state, people took action on their own. Some joined militias — such as Mungiki — as self-defence and survival options.
Others decided that it was safer to live only among “their own.” So from 1996, exchanges of farms between Kalenjins who lived in Nyahururu and Kikuyus in Eldoret, for instance, started.
After 2008, Kenya’s balkanisation into ethnic enclaves gathered pace as farm exchanges increased dramatically; business people shifted to be among their own; workers on tea estates and flower farms feared to return; and even the high-density areas in Nairobi coalesced into distinct tribal villages.
This balkanisation of Kenya — met with a loud silence from the regime and the political class — makes a mockery of the Constitution, and the notion of Kenya as a nation-state.
How sad and unfortunate, for after 50 years of independence we are less of a nation than ever before. A nation is about the rights of any of its citizens to settle anywhere and feel a part of the community that one moves to.
It was instructive that at the post-Hague rally at Uhuru Park, as William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta pledged a new era of peace in the Rift Valley neither mentioned the return of IDPs to the land that many have owned for years.
What sort of alliance is this that ignores fundamental questions of nationhood? The issue is broader than the Rift Valley.
It must include the whole of Kenya, and there must be sustained, systematic state action and policy to have any Kenyan settle, do business and own property in any part of the country, no matter their tribe.
In fact what would be wonderful would be to see Kikuyu politicians invite Kalenjin farmers who are experts at maize production and animal husbandry to Central Kenya to invest even as they invite foreign investors.
Or Luo leaders meeting Somali and Kamba traders to settle and invest in Luo Nyanza; or Kalenjin politicians inviting Luhya and Kisii farmers to show how to eke a living from small-scale pieces of land…
Without a conscious policy that operates on the notion of Kenyanness, we will not resolve the issue of IDPs.
Without such a policy — accepted by the entire political class — Kenya will not be a nation, no matter the rhetoric and slogans and neither will we benefit from the advantages of our diversity. And that is simply a crying shame.
O.Hatari: I wish to refer you to Prisca Kamungi’s detailed chapter published in a 2011 project report titled: ‘From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement’.
Her case study, ‘National Response to Internal Displacement: Achievements, Challenges and Lessons from Kenya’, delves into various factors behind the current pathetic situation of the IDPs (pages 231-257). Below is a synopsis.
Overview of Internal Displacement in Kenya
The political crisis that engulfed Kenya after the 2007 disputed election results led to the displacement of 663,921 people across the country. However, this was not the first time the country had experienced violence-induced displacement; Kenya has had a long history of forced displacement linked to conflicts over space among different identity groups in multiethnic regions. In Kenya, as in most agriculture based economies, those who control land also control economic and political power. The competition for control of land, particularly in the Rift Valley, has been protracted, resulting from mutually exclusive claims based on property rights by migrant groups and assertion of cultural heritage rights by indigenous groups. This has made the Rift Valley the theatre of the most vicious episodes of violence and displacement, particularly since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s.
Identity-based politics and contested land rights are the cause and consequence of cycles of displacement in multiethnic regions. The relationship between political affiliation, ethnic identity and land ownership form the basis for contestation, whereby members of ethnic groups associated with rival political opinion are labeled ‘outsiders’ and violently ejected from their farms. In this regard, contested claims about ‘who owns the land’ and therefore who has the right to vote or be voted for on that land becomes a mobilizing slogan in the competition for political power. Political strategies to disenfranchise perceived hostile voters and the culture of impunity for political elites cause displacement to become protracted. Conflicts over land make it difficult for IDPs to return to their farms and for the landless to purchase land elsewhere.
The government’s apparent failure to effectively address impunity and “historical injustices” over land access in the Rift Valley and Coast provinces attenuates the realization of durable solutions for conflict-induced IDPs. This has resulted in increased migration to urban areas and the establishment of transit sites from which returnees commute to their farms during the day. Other IDPs have decided to sell or exchange their land and migrate permanently from ethnically heterogeneous regions to safer areas, a coping mechanism that inadvertently seems to support ethnic cleansing. Similarly, the government’s intervention to buy land for landless IDPs far from where they were displaced also seems to result in that unintended outcome.
Apart from political violence and “ethnic clashes,” internal displacement in Kenya is caused by conflict over natural resources, particularly among pastoralist groups; natural disasters such as floods, landslides, drought and famine; incursions into Kenyan territory by armed militia from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia; infrastructure development projects such as the construction of roads; and environmental conservation projects. Seven and a half thousand households have been evicted from forests across Kenya] to conserve the environment. The number of IDPs in Kenya is contested as different sources provide unreliable estimates. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) suggests there are about 200,000 IDPs while government statistics indicate that there were only 158 households in eight camps as of the end of May 2011.
The government did not expressly recognize the presence of IDPs before the 2007 post-election crisis. However, the national and international response to internal displacement in Kenya since 2007 has employed the cluster approach as the modus operandi. Kenya has experienced both the advantages and challenges of the collaborative response as reported in the Cluster Approach Evaluation report, particularly the challenge of coordination and the lack of an exit strategy at the end of the emergency phase and the beginning of the early recovery stage. Lack of timely and efficient profiling of IDPs created loopholes for imposters to infiltrate IDPs camps, where they pose as IDPs in order to benefit from assistance programs, including land allocation. While the Ministry of Special Programs is the line ministry, it is a headquarters ministry with hardly any field staff; implementation of IDP-related programs is carried out by other collaborating
Ministries such as Lands, Internal Security and Provincial Administration.
Since ministries are equal and autonomous, inter-ministerial coordination and oversight are palpable challenges for the line ministry. In addition, ineffective sequencing of IDP management activities led to use of force to close camps. Failure to consolidate peace and reconciliation efforts to create conditions of voluntary, safe and dignified return, lack of meaningful consultation with IDPs and receiving communities in host areas; contributed to rejection of IDPs seeking to settle in safer regions. The lack of clear policy guidelines for the management of the IDP crisis has led to concurrent application of ad hoc and disjointed approaches—such as disbursement of money, (re)construction of houses and land allocation to IDPs—while large numbers of deserving IDPs are excluded from assistance programs. The 2010 draft National Policy on the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection and Assistance to IDPs in Kenya, which provides comprehensive guidelines for responding to all categories of IDPs in all phases of displacement, has yet to be adopted and implemented. Enabling legislation has yet to be developed for pertinent draft policies, including a disaster management policy, human rights policy, peace-building policy, and so forth.
The main protection and assistance concerns facing IDPs include violent attacks, including gender-based violence, sometimes by government officials, humanitarian workers, fellow IDPs and members of host communities; lack of food, water and sanitation; and lack of livelihoods. The government has subsidized access to health care and primary school education for all Kenyans; hence IDPs do not face specific challenges in accessing social services. However, in ethnically segregated parts of the Rift Valley, access to schools and other social services is mutually exclusive for IDPs and members of local communities. The government has taken a number of steps to respond to the problem of internal displacement. This case study examines the progress, challenges and obstacles faced in implementing these measures against the 12 benchmarks in the Framework for National Responsibility.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/11_responsibility_response_ferris/From%20Responsibility%20to%20Response%20Nov%202011doc.pdf