34 thoughts on “Martin Ngatia Speaks on Kenya-Somali War: Part 6”
U.S. troops are on their way to Nigeria to help fight Boko Haram, in yet another newfangled military intervention into Africa. Boko Haram are an Islamic terrorist group, but its not clear what danger they’ve ever presented to America. Nevertheless, this new war is not much different from the Obama administration’s other martial adventures in the region, in Somalia with al Shabaab, in Uganda with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and beyond.
War Kills ,War maims ,War destroyes,War drains treasury money intended to equip Hospitals, Schools ,build roads is channeled to the Military etc> Stop the war in Somalia and Pray for peace in the Region>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BX3uFqXeIo&feature=related
5 Reasons Why Kenya’s Invasion of Somalia is a Mistake
By Kwaku Osei in Global Africa
Entering its third week, Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan army’s invasion into Somalia to fight terrorist group Al-Shabaab, threatens to devolve into the realm of the absurd. A military spokesman announced on Friday that large groups of donkeys in Somalia will be considered Al Shabaab “activity.” Questionable military strategy aside, I fear this endeavor may turn out to be a huge mistake. Here are five reasons why:
1. Kenya may be underestimating the enemy
There seems to be a general impression that Al Shabaab is currently weakened and can thus be easily defeated. The recent spate of attacks attributed to the group in Kenya and Uganda, however, seem to point to the contrary. Additionally, Al Shabaab has proved extraordinarily resilient in the past. The whole mission rests on the assumption that the objectives can and will be achieved relatively quickly. However, the lessons of history suggest otherwise. Additionally, the Kenyan army has as yet failed to articulate a clear exit strategy. It is also important to note that the repeated abductions which prompted the invasion may not have been the work of Al Shabaab (who have categorically denied involvement), but rather that of smaller pirate groups or independent militias. In this case, then Kenya’s enemy in Southern Somalia is not Al Shabaab but general lawlessness in region, a much more formidable foe.
2. Similar operations (by better armies) have failed
In October 1993, American and UN peacekeepers suffered heavy losses at the hands of Somali militias, prompting a U.S. withdrawal. In 2006, the Ethiopian army, backed by the United States, successfully liberated Mogadishu from Al Shabaab and handed it over to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government only to see the city fall again to a new Al Shabaab. When it comes to military strength, Kenya is not Ethiopia, much less the United Nations or the United States. One therefore has to wonder how the Kenyan army hopes to succeed where these others have failed.
3. There is significant opposition from key stakeholders
Somalia’s President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed has been openly critical of Kenya’s presence in Somalia, fearing that Kenya intends to establish an autonomous region in Juba. It is rumored that Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki was also initially opposed to the invasion and had to be convinced by senior advisers in the administration. Reactions from the independent Kenyan press have been lukewarm at best, and public opinion is likely to turn as soon Kenyan soldiers begin to suffer casualties. Critically, Kenya does seem to have the support of the Somali population, however if the civilian casualties already sustained continue to rise, this is unlikely to hold. Further, Al Shabaab and other Somali militias have in the past proved successful at rallying the population against the interference of the West, so French and U.S. support for the operation (initially denied but now confirmed) could quite easily turn the tide of support against the invasion.
4. The timing is poor
This invasion comes after one of the worst droughts in 60 years and before the start of harvesting season in the region. It is unclear how the mission will impact the region’s ongoing food crisis. It is also occurring during the rainy season which, with the lack of infrastructural development in southern Somalia, presents a serious operational and logistical challenge for any army (hence the use of donkey’s to transport arms). It is also bad timing for Kenya, which has internal structural problems,has a struggling economy affected by the weak dollar, and is experiencing rising tensions ahead of next year’s elections. This mission will be difficult to sustain economically and politically.
5. There is likely to be significant backlash
Destroying the group’s base in southern Somalia may have the counterproductive effect of splintering the organization and forcing it towards a more transnational method of operation which would mean increased attacked in places like Nairobi and Kenya. In fact, Al Shabaab, who pledged to respond in this way has already made good on its promise. Attacks of this kind are likely to increase the longer the operation is sustained.
Given the above, one wonders whether it wouldn’t be wiser for Kenya to leave the business of defeating Al Shabaab in Somalia to those currently tasked with it and focus instead (with the help of its international allies) on improving border security, improving internal monitoring and surveillance (a la the United States and Nigeria against Boko Haram), and cutting off Al Shabaab’s sources of funding in Nairobi.
They’re taking their sweet time, the Kenyan military. Despite launching their incursion (some say invasion) into Somalia nearly three weeks ago in a firestorm of bravado, they’ve yet to encounter Al Shabaab properly, and haven’t managed to get near the enemy’s stronghold, the port of Kismayo, only a couple of hundred kilometres from the Kenyan-Somali border. So what’s taking them so long? By SIMON ALLISON (@simonallison).
Kenya is blaming the rain for its army’s slow progress in Somalia. In a cruel irony, the weather in the Horn of Africa is compensating for the long drought which caused the famine in Somalia by bucketing down with rain. It’s no compensation though; it’s as difficult to grow crops in too much rain as in too little, and nothing about Somalia’s current political situation encourages complex agriculture.
But the rain is making it very difficult indeed for Kenyan troops to advance. Somalia has poor roads at the best of times. Where there are roads, they are mostly ungraded dirt tracks that become nearly impassable mud at the first hint of moisture. And while Al Shabaab fighters, who know the area intimately, can use back routes and passes, the relatively clueless Kenyans are stuck on the main roads with their heavy vehicles, most of which appear to be old armoured personnel carriers from the 1980s. There have even been some unconfirmed reports that the army has been reduced to using donkeys to move equipment.
Despite this, the Kenyan Defence Force is relatively sophisticated as far as African militaries go, commented John Stupart of the African Armed Forces Journal in an interview with iMaverick. But no amount of training and equipment, even the most modern and expensive, can make up for a flawed strategy which is at the root of Kenya’s problems. “The Kenyan incursion is strategically unfeasible,” Stupart said. “The offensive frankly makes no military sense. Two-thousand Kenyan troops trying to bloody the nose of anywhere between 2,500 and 20,000 Al Shabaab militants on their home turf will not end well.”
According to Stupart, Al Shabaab is pursuing classic military strategy in luring Kenya further and further into Somalia. By stretching the Kenyan military out, thinning supply lines and dragging the incursion on and on Al Shabaab will either make the Kenyan forces vulnerable to a direct attack, or force them to withdraw thanks to fatigue or cost or a combination of the two. “Ultimately, they’re trying to do too much with too few forces and during the wrong season. At best they can hope for a few firefights where they’ll clobber the Al Shabaab militants in a standing fight, but they’ll never really defeat Al Shabaab in Somalia. Doing that would require 20,000 combat troops with all the trimmings (tanks, artillery, etc), not 2,000.”
Stupart’s is a disturbing analysis from the Kenyan point of view, but one which looks more accurate as their forces remain on the ground for longer. Already questions are being asked in Kenya about how much the expedition is costing and politicians are studiously avoiding answering these questions. And military spokespeople have set themselves the near impossible goal of remaining in Somalia until the threat to Kenya from Al Shabaab is neutralised; presumably, this means either establishing some kind of buffer state along with a border, or wiping out Al Shabaab entirely, perhaps by taking Kismayo and using the Kenyan troops as the basis for an African Union peacekeeping force there.
But none of this is possible as long as they fail to engage with the enemy. And, if it’s true that Al Shabaab is hosting seasoned al Qaeda fighters from the Afghanistan theatre, they might just know a thing or two about fighting a guerrilla insurgency. Kenya’s army might find themselves mired in the Somali mud for some time yet. DM
Letter from Human Rights Watch to Kenya Gov’t
« Thread Started Yesterday at 4:20pm »
——————————————————————————–
Retrieved from my inbox:
From: Neela Ghoshal
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2011 3:37 PM
To: Neela Ghoshal
Subject: HRW Press Release: Kenya: Respect Law in Somalia Military Operations
For Immediate Release
Kenya: Respect Law in Somalia Military Operations
Investigate Civilian Deaths; End Arbitrary Arrests, Mistreatment
(Nairobi, November 18, 2011) – The Kenyan government should ensure that its forces in Somalia abide by the laws of war and avoid harm to civilians, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to the Kenyan minister of state for defense. The government should also promptly and impartially investigate recent incidents in which Kenyan forces may have violated international humanitarian or human rights law.
Kenyan armed forces entered Somalia on October 16, 2011, in military operations against the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab called Operation “Linda Nchi” (Swahili for “Protect the Nation”). Human Rights Watch expressed concern regarding three separate incidents in which Kenyan armed forces may have conducted unlawful attacks harming civilians or mistreated people in custody in Somalia and Kenya. All parties to the armed conflict in Somalia should respect the laws of war, Human Rights Watch said.
“Kenya’s Somalia operation has resulted in apparent attacks on a camp for displaced people and a fishing boat,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Kenya needs to find out exactly what happened and make sure that those responsible for any wrongdoing are punished appropriately.”
On October 30, the Kenyan air force carried out an attack with aerial bombardment that struck an internally displaced persons camp on the outskirts of the town of Jilib, Somalia. A witness wounded in the attack described to Human Rights Watch seeing a dark green plane drop one bomb on the camp, return to drop a second bomb on the camp, and then start machine gun strafing. The international humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières reported treating 45 wounded people, including 31 children, and confirmed 5 civilian deaths following the aerial bombardment. Kenyan authorities later confirmed conducting a military operation in the vicinity.
On November 4, the Kenyan navy attacked a fishing boat at Kiunga, near the Somali border, resulting in the death of four Kenyan fishermen, ages 60 to 84. The authorities claim the fishing boat refused to stop for inspection. But survivors told the Muslim Human Rights Forum that the boat was anchored offshore when the attack occurred. Military personnel then allegedly beat the survivors who had swum to shore.
The Kenyan authorities should publish the findings of an investigation into the Jilib attack promised by Prime Minister Raila Odinga, and investigate the attack on the fishing boat, Human Rights Watch said. Those harmed in unlawful attacks or their families should be appropriately compensated.
In a third incident, Kenyan military personnel arbitrarily detained and mistreated civilians in the town of Garissa, Kenya, on November 11. A witness told Human Rights Watch that soldiers picked up people who looked Somali, beat them, and forced them to sit in dirty water while interrogating them.
“The Kenyan authorities should not use the current military operation as an excuse to clamp down on the rights of people within its borders,” Bekele said.
For more Human Rights Watch reporting on Kenya and Somalia, please visit:
In London, Ben Rawlence (English, Swahili): +44-7984816013; or rawlenb@hrw.org
In Nairobi, Neela Ghoshal (English, French): +254-729466685; or ghoshan@hrw.org
Sovereignity my foot! Sorensen26 pls give us a break. Where was this animal called ‘sovereign’ when Kenyans were being murdered like chicken during the PEV; where has it been when political assassinations take place in this country;when public coffers get plundered (goldenberg,maize-berg,triton-berg,education-berg) u name it;and lately even when the president was breaking the law by force.Where does this idiot called sovereignty live so that we go smoke it out to act and protect its people the citizenry against of manner of abuse?.FYI,even dictatorial countries like Zimbabwe,Libya,Egypt and even Ivory-Coast are all sovereign states by virtue of practising self-rule.That tittle alone should not be used to cover-up evil against its own people Kenyan style just like a lot of us use the description ‘experienced’ to cover up their mistakes and incompetence while blocking the youth from job opportunities. Style up and give us another objective argument behind your reasoning and not that our ills should not be pointed out bcoz we are a damn sovereign state.
Subscribe | Subscription Renewal | Advertise in Air Force Times | About Air Force Times | Customer Service | RSS | Digital EditionLogin | Register
Home News Benefits Money Careers & Education Community Off Duty Entertainment Marketplace Classifieds
Air Force NewsAll Air Force News Guard & Reserve This Week’s Issue Subscribe to RSS Quick Links
Hall of Valor
AirForce Discussions
Frontline Photos
Honor the Fallen
Webtools
Click here for Military Times Webtools Tweet http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/12/army-africa-mission-may-be-just-starting-120511w/
The Secret War: Africa ops may be just starting
By Sean D. Naylor – Staff writer
Posted : Monday Dec 5, 2011 11:36:03 EST
There was clearly something suspicious about the two western-looking “civilians” and their interpreter who the Ethiopian security forces were questioning.
For a start, they were in Ethiopia’s bandit country — near the town of Fiq in the Ogaden region that borders Somalia. Secondly, they claimed to be working for the Red Cross, but a quick check of their persons turned up sidearms, which the Red Cross forbids its personnel from carrying. By the time the “civilians” admitted they were U.S. military personnel, the damage had been done. They were on their way to an Ethiopian jail, and an international incident was brewing.
The Ogaden incident, which occurred between March 2007 and March 2008 (sources were unable or unwilling to be more specific), infuriated not only the Ethiopian government but also U.S. intelligence, military and diplomatic leaders in the region.
The Secret War
Read all stories in the six-part series
The episode was one of several irritants in U.S.-Ethiopian relations after Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion of Somalia. Others included revelations in the U.S. press about AC-130 gunship missions being flown out of Ethiopia and a general reluctance on the Ethiopians’ part to cooperate too closely with U.S. forces in Somalia. Nonetheless, U.S. and Ethiopian special operations forces continued to work together in very small numbers until Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in January 2009.
The U.S. military personnel whom the Ethiopians took prisoner in the Ogaden were human intelligence soldiers working for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s intelligence directorate. They were authorized “to go out beyond the wire,” said retired Marine Maj. Gen. Timothy Ghormley, the U.S. Central Command chief of staff at the time, who had previously commanded CJTF-HOA, based in Djibouti.
They were not supposed to be undercover, according to Ghormley.
“They’re completely overt,” he said. “They’re supposed to identify themselves as U.S. service members.”
But a senior intelligence official, also familiar with the episode, used different terminology.
“It was a clandestine operation,” the official said. The troops weren’t in uniform, “but … if they were detained they would be able to say, ‘We’re members of the U.S. military,’ so somebody could get them the hell out of there.”
The soldiers’ first mistake was venturing into an area they’d been expressly forbidden from entering, Ghormley said. “They went where they’re not supposed to, they went up near Fiq, and going up into the Fiq area was probably not the brightest thing in the world to do,” he said.
“We said, ‘Don’t go into those regions until we can verify the security and safety,’” said a State Department official. “And they ignored it completely. They put themselves at risk.”
The soldiers risked capture by ethnic Somali guerrillas who “don’t like Americans,” the official said. “They would have killed them.”
But the soldiers’ biggest error was to tell Ethiopian troops who confronted them they were members of a Red Cross team, Ghormley said.
“The colossal mistake they made — the final mistake they made — was concocting a cover story,” he said. “It was a spur-of-the-moment thing, from what I understand.”
The pretense didn’t last long.
“The Ethiopians found pistols on them,” instantly invalidating the cover story, Ghormley said. “With that, they were determined to be hostile, and when they finally did tell the Ethiopians who they were and what they were, the Ethiopians were just kind of ticked off. So they decided they would bring them in.”
The soldiers were detained for “roughly” 10 days, the senior intelligence official said.
Ghormley disagreed.
“They were probably held 48 hours, maybe, not much longer than that,” he said.
Nevertheless, high-level diplomatic and military pressure was required to get the men released, sources said.
“It took the ambassador, it took the CENTCOM commander [Adm. William Fallon], it took the State Department to get involved,” the intelligence official said.
“An incident occurred in which a couple of guys were detained,” said Fallon, who retired in 2008. “They were using poor judgment to go to a place they shouldn’t have been, [which was] not authorized and not sanctioned and not smart.”
“The Ethiopians were good about it,” but the fiasco had long-term consequences, the intelligence official said.
The soldiers had been carrying a lot of information about U.S. intelligence operations in the region that was instantly compromised.
“All their documentation, papers, notepads, military stuff were collected [by the Ethiopians],” the State Department official said.
“It was like amateur hour, this team that got rolled up,” the intelligence official said. “There was information that they had that they should not have been carrying … It gave away techniques and procedures that we couldn’t afford to do, because we knew at that time that al-Qaida was building up its capability in Somalia and that was why we were trying damn hard to get into Somalia with really sensitive collection.”
The incident “put a spotlight on everything” U.S. intelligence was doing in the Horn, the official said. “It became a big deal and it actually hurt us, I would say, for a couple of years … around the region.”
Military intelligence operations now had to be coordinated through the CIA.
“That coordination just dried up,” the official said.
Fallon disputed that interpretation.
“It was certainly not helpful, and it caused a lot of anxiety. But at the end of the day, there was no major damage done,” he said.
(Hilary Renner, spokeswoman for the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, and Simon Schorno, a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross, each declined to comment on the episode. The Ethiopian Embassy in Wash
ington, D.C., did not respond to a request for comment by deadline.)
Recent strides
Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Somalia ended neither the war in that country nor the U.S.’s role in it.
Although the Ethiopian invasion had quickly ousted the Islamic Courts Union from Mogadishu, a hard-line Islamist faction called al-Shabaab (the Youth) soon emerged to battle the Ethiopians, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the African Union peacekeeping force that replaced the Ethiopians.
Since then, and particularly during the past six months, the pace of U.S. operations appears, if anything, to have accelerated as an increasing number of actors are drawn into the war in Somalia.
• On Sept. 14, 2009, a U.S. special operations helicopter raid killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaida in East Africa figure.
• On April 19, 2011, the U.S. captured Somali national and al-Shabaab member Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, 25, as he crossed the Gulf of Aden on a ship to Yemen from Somalia. The U.S. held Warsame, who allegedly has links to Yemen’s al-Qaida branch, for two months on a Navy ship before flying him to the U.S.
• On June 7, TFG forces killed Harun Fazul, the most-wanted al-Qaida figure in East Africa, when he mistook their roadblock in Mogadishu for an al-Shabaab position.
• On June 23, U.S. drones struck al-Shabaab targets near Kismayo.
• On July 6, there were reports of airstrikes in Lower Juba, the southernmost region of Somalia, according to the website SomaliaReport.com.
• In early August, under increasing military pressure from the TFG forces backed up by 9,000 African Union peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, al-Shabaab announced its withdrawal from Mogadishu.
• On Sept. 15, there were more airstrikes on an al-Shabaab training camp in Taabta in Lower Juba, according to SomaliaReport.com.
• On Sept. 21, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. is building a “ring of secret drone bases” including facilities in Ethiopia, the Seychelles and “the Arabian Peninsula.”
• On Sept. 23, airstrikes hit al-Shabaab’s main camp at the Kismayo airport.
• On Oct. 4, an al-Shabaab truck bomb killed an estimated 65 people in Mogadishu.
In mid-October, Kenya’s military began a substantial incursion into southern Somalia, which has since bogged down short of the port of Kismayo. By late November, there were reports that Ethiopia had again sent forces into Somalia in support of the Kenyan invasion. The New York Times quoted U.S. officials Oct. 21 saying the Kenyan action had taken them by surprise and there were no U.S. military advisers with the Kenyan force. Even if that is the case, U.S. officials say the secret war in the Horn of Africa is by no means over.
Mixed success
Looking back, U.S. officials are divided over what they achieved in the Horn in the years following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Successes were rare in the early years of the campaign against al-Qaida in East Africa. The only al-Qaida fighters known to have been killed between 2001 and 2005 were a bodyguard who blew himself up to enable Harun Fazul to escape Kenyan security forces in 2003 and another “minor player” who died of wounds received when Kenyan police seized him, said an intelligence source with long experience in the Horn.
During that period, warlords paid by the CIA helped render “seven or eight” al-Qaida figures out of Somalia, the source said. But although the U.S. focus was on rendering, rather than killing, members of al-Qaida in East Africa, this presented its own challenges.
“The big problem was, what do you do with one of these guys” once he had been captured, a senior military official said. That was “the $100,000 question.”
The U.S. was reluctant to put its captives on trial.
“All the evidence [against the al-Qaida figures] is intelligence,” the official said. “So unless you want to give it up … we have a problem with [that] based on sources and methods.”
Normal procedure was for the warlords to capture the targets, who were then transferred to Djibouti, processed and sent on from there, according to the intelligence source. As for their ultimate destinations, “the only ones I knew were sent to the ‘Salt Pit’ in Afghanistan,” the source said. The “Salt Pit” is the name of a CIA clandestine prison — sometimes referred to as a “black site” — north of Kabul.
Most sources Army Times interviewed said Operation Black Hawk — the CIA-led campaign against al-Qaida in East Africa — had a direct impact on the terrorist network’s efforts in the Horn. Black Hawk was a success, said the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn, because the al-Qaida cell “was certainly degraded, perhaps eviscerated.” In addition, the source said, “we believed we were able to foil several [al-Qaida] operations” along the lines of another embassy bombing or a plane attack.
However, even as he focused tightly on the manhunt and the renditions, John Bennett, the CIA’s station chief in Nairobi in the 2002-03 time frame and now the head of the Agency’s National Clandestine Service, had his doubts about that approach, the intelligence source said.
“Bennett always felt that [by focusing on rendition] you weren’t getting at the larger problem,” the source said.
Always interested in getting at how al-Qaida was targeting U.S. interests in the region, Bennett wanted to go after al-Qaida’s network and finances, the source added. (Bennett declined an interview request.)
“We rarely stepped back to ask, ‘What does this thing really look like, and so what?’” the source said. “Not because we didn’t think about it but because we went after what we knew.”
Combat complications
U.S. efforts were complicated by the fact that there were “two proponent agencies” for the war on al-Qaida in the Horn — U.S. Special Operations Command (higher headquarters for Joint Special Operations Command, whose elite operators were heavily involved in the Horn) and the CIA — according to the intelligence source. This created friction between the CIA and JSOC during the early years of the campaign, the source said. The Horn was what the source described as “a Title 50 environment,” meaning it was not considered a combat theater. (Title 50 is the section of the U.S. Code dealing with covert intelligence issues, while Title 10 deals with the armed services, including clandestine military operations.)
Operating out of a sovereign nation — Kenya — in a Title 50 environment meant “we had to let the Kenyans in on anything short of a covert operation,” leaving some JSOC “shooters” eager for more aggressive action “very frustrated,” the source said.
“Nairobi is a good example of JSOC wanting to come in and conduct operations — let’s say a Little Bird [helicopter] strike against a target in the tri-border area of Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya,” the source said. “More than one [JSOC] O-6 came through Nairobi and said, ‘We can do whatever we damn please.’” The source noted that “at the time SOCOM and JSOC were accustomed to working in Title 10 environments” such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where the rules governing combat action were much looser.
Assessing the threat
No U.S. military personnel have died in combat in the Horn since 9/11, which the senior intelligence official described as “amazing.” But despite the low cost in American blood, some special operators question whether the U.S. effort there has been worth the risk.
“I never thought any of the African targets were important,” said a special operations officer. “They don’t show a direct threat to the homeland. They don’t have the ability to project.”
He dismissed the argument that Somali immigrants to the U.S. who have returned to fight for al-Shabaab represent a threat to the homeland.
“Can you show me intelligence that shows that that network is posing a direct threat to the United States or its allies?” he asked, emphasizing that he was referring to a current threat, not past attacks such as al-Qaida’s 1998 bomb attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa.
The senior intelligence official’s take was very different.
“The scale of the problem in Somalia was huge,” the official said. “We’re talking a large number of al-Qaida, a couple of training camps over the years that have trained, in the case of two examples, a couple of hundred people who are now out there. Some probably left the continent and returned to Europe, some may have returned to Afghanistan and some may have returned to Iraq, and some may just still be in Somalia fighting.”
Although there are terrorist training camps in Somalia, the special ops officer acknowledged, “there are training camps all over the place. But what was the threat tied to our homeland or our allies?”
“Somalia definitely has a cell [of al-Qaida] but the connectivity to the rest of al-Qaida is really specious, it’s very frail,” said a special mission unit veteran.
The diaries of senior Arab al-Qaida members such as Ramzy Binalshib and Abu Zubaydah express clear racism toward black people that would complicate any attempt at close cooperation between the Arab-dominated group and its African franchise, he said.
“What they [i.e. the targets in Africa] did enable us to do was see the network, because they had to communicate, so that’s always good,” the special ops officer said. “It made us understand the network, that’s the biggest success story. And it’s another example of how we can work quietly with others.”
“We managed to strengthen bilateral relations in the region with numerous countries,” agreed the intel source with long experience in the Horn.
But the recent flurry of airstrikes in Somalia, combined with senior leader comments, suggests that there is much work yet to do.
In a March 1 hearing, Marine Gen. James Mattis, head of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: “…we see [al-Qaida] links going down into Somalia with al-Shabaab.”
“There’s been a lot of very challenging things done there and, sadly, we’re going to have to do,” said the senior intelligence official. But although the CIA and JSOC continue to be active in Somalia — a recent article in The Nation outlined close links between CIA and the TFG’s intelligence agency — the military has no permanent presence in the country, the intelligence official said.
After expanding for most of the past seven years, JSOC’s presence in the Horn “is steady — it’s definitely plateaued,” the senior intelligence official said. In fact, the official said, it’s probably dropped a bit” because a couple of “the key targets” have been killed.
There are no JSOC personnel in Somaliland, Sudan or Eritrea and only a very small intelligence team in Ethiopia, the official said. “On a given day in Kenya, you probably have a couple of dozen guys — that’s about it,” the official said. “Enough to do, if required … a high-value capture-or-kill mission. And then we certainly have the ability to move guys pretty damn quickly to there.”
But despite JSOC’s acute interest in Somalia, there is a limit to what the command can achieve there, said a Defense Department official. “JSOC is not going to be the deciding force in whatever happens in Somalia,” the official said. “They can’t kill them all. They can’t capture them all.”
When it comes to Somalia and Yemen, “we’d like to be doing much more in both those places,” the senior military official said. “The State Department came down hard and said we don’t want a third front in an Islamic [country] … Our State Department doesn’t want us to have campaign plans in these two countries.
“It’s a tale of frustration, tears and woe — of what we wanted to do and what we thought we’d be allowed to versus what we’ve been able to do.”
In the meantime, said the senior intelligence official, “Somalia remains a huge problem.”
You are here: National National Garissa police force Star to delete photos of wounded TFG soldiers Skip to content
Garissa police force Star to delete photos of wounded TFG soldiers Tuesday, 06 December 2011 00:03 BY STAR REPORTER
PRESS FEEDOM: Media covering a function
POLICE in Garissa yesterday forced a Star journalist to delete photographs of 25 injured TFG soldiers. The wounded soldiers had been airlifted from Somalia after a firefight last Friday with al Shabaab at Hayo camp, 25 kilometres from Afmadow.
Star correspondent Stephen Asteriko chanced on the soldiers who had been admitted to the Garissa General Hospital before being flown to Nairobi for further treatment. The photojournalist was accompanied by a Citizen TV cameraman. “I went to the Garissa General Hospital for the day’s assignment to check on the doctors’ strike. While still I was still there, I got news that an explosion had occurred in Ifo refuge camp in Dadaab district,” Asteriko said.
“So I decided to do a follow-up of both stories at the hospital. The injured TFG soldiers were waiting to be flown to Nairobi for medication. They were supposed to be taken to the airstrip by an ambulance and so I decided to take the pictures,” Asteriko said. “I did not know that there were military police or civilians who were providing security to the soldiers at the hospital,” he said.
Asteriko explained that the soldiers confiscated the camera claiming that “it is now in the hands of the military”. “Upon seeing the cameras, after I had taken several photos together with my colleague from Citizen TV, the guy rammed me and confiscated both cameras. He threatened to destroy them if we continued questioning him about the fate of our cameras,” stated Asteriko.
The two journalists were handed over to the medical superintendent, who then handed them over to two policemen. After interrogation at Garissa Police Station, the police instructed the journalists to erase all their pictures which they did. Last Friday 25 TFG soldiers were wounded in Hayo, 25 km from Bilis Kokani, during an attack by a large group of al Shabaab.
The soldiers, mostly below the age of 20, had received serious injuries to the head, chest and leg. Thirteen were to be flown to Nairobi for specialised treatment after being attended to by the Kenya Army doctors at the Garissa Hospital under heavy guard.
Some of the injured still had bullets in their bodies, according to a source. “We come across these militias. They ambushed and started shooting at us. Fortunately no one was killed in the shootout. They ran away and disappeared in the bush, “ one TFG soldier told curious onlookers in Somali.
However other sources claimed that al Shabaab had overrun the TFG forward camp at Hayo on Friday. The camp was manned by an estimated 300 TFG soldiers, mainly consisting of Ras Komboni militias loyal to Ahmed Mabhobe. An estimated 1,000 al Shabaab attacked the camp. No Kenyan soldiers were in the battle.
The al Shabaab reportedly captured seven “technical” vehicles and are reported to still be occupying the camp at Hayo, according to the Somali source. Army and civilian doctors at Garissa were unwilling to talk to the press as was Northeastern PPO Leo Nyongesa.
Meanwhile, yesterday a police officer was killed and three injured by an explosion at Ifo 3 at the Dadaab refugee camp. The three officers on regular patrol had parked their car and were resting under a tree on the road linking Ifo to Dagahaley. A remote control device then exploded at 10 am killing the Administration Police officer and injuring his colleagues. Police have since arrested 60 people.
The attackers might have known that the policemen routinely use the tree as a patrol base. “These people knew very well what they were doing because immediately the officers sat under the tree, somebody somewhere detonated the device from a remote location,” added the source. Dadaab DC Albert Kimathi said one of the injured officers was taken to Garissa Hospital while his two colleagues received treatment in Dadaab.
After the explosion, a man came out of the bush to try and take their guns but a Department of Refugee Affairs vehicle arrived and chased him away. He abandoned the weapons and disappeared into the thickets. Nyongesa said police have mounted a search for the people behind the explosion.
Two weeks ago a police van hit a landmine injuring four officers on board. The convoy was taking UN staff from Hagardera refugee camp to Dadaab UNHCR sub-office base after their duties. Refugee leaders immediately condemned the incident blaming it on the al Shabaab.
Why Kenya is not making any strides in the war against Al Shabaab two months into incursion
By FRED OLUOCH
Posted Monday, December 12 2011 at 00:00
The Kenyan Defence Forces in Somalia have not made any significant territorial progress over the past one month, but the military publicity department is not ready to reveal that they have stalled because of factors beyond their control — a situation that has left Nairobi rethinking its approach to the incursion against the Al Shabaab militia.
The force on the southern front that entered Somalia through Kiunga is stuck in Burgabo, 60km from the Kenyan border, where they will have to cross a deep creek. The only advance being realised is on the central front, that recently took Bilis Qooqaani and is preparing to take Afmadow. The two teams are eventually meant to meet in Kismayu.
Investigations by The East-African have revealed that a number of logistical and political issues have forced the KDF to go slow contrary to the initial plan for a swift operation.
There are four major factors that have bogged down the military campaign. They are: Lack of finances to run a long-drawn war; the differences between interested parties over whether to divide Somalia into autonomous regions or maintain one united country; differences over the option to engage Al Shabaab in a political dialogue, and the ambivalence of Somalia’s President Sheikh Shariff Ahmed.
Already, the Kenya public and the politicians have started questioning whether the Kenyan involvement in Somalia is likely to last longer than was initially intended.
However, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) spokesperson Maj Emmanuel Chirchir maintained that the reason the Kenyan advance has slowed down is because they are combining the offensive angle with humanitarian operations. “When we started the operation we had the offensive, defensive and humanitarian operations components. At the strategic level, the long term goal still remains but at the tactical level, things have to change every now and then because you are dealing with human beings,” he said.
Still, Kenya has support around the world for entering Somalia. Experts on Somalia argue that it would be a disaster if Kenya came out of Somalia with egg on its face or without substantially crippling Al Shabaab, as this would embolden the militia group to such an extent that the international community would not be able to deal with.
The importance of Kenya’s intervention has been recognised by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who last week said in Nairobi that Kenya’s leadership role in efforts to stabilise Somalia, has presented an opportunity to the people of Somalia to realise stability and prosperity after 20 years of civil war.
The Kenya government has secured moral and political support from various nations and organisations including the Commonwealth, the AU, the EU, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the EAC, the ACP and Comesa.
But the war is not as simple as Kenyans were made to believe when the military entered Somalia in October. For a start, Kenya was not prepared for a long-drawn-out war, and is already finding its resources stretched. To maintain two infantry fronts, navy and fighter jets on the ground for this long is proving to be a major financial strain and sources revealed that Kenya has been reaching out to the United States and other Western allies for help.
It is estimated that it costs Ksh210 million ($233,000) per month to keep the soldiers in the battlefield. This amount comprises the cost of moving the troops and supplying them with food and water, communication and medical care.
That is part of the reason why the government last Wednesday sought the approval of parliament (and got it) to allow Kenyan forces to be placed under the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) — to offset costs.
In parliament, a number of MPs questioned the country’s war strategy in Somalia, with others calling for a short war. Kenya’s military has no experience in counter-insurgency, and the country needs logistic support from its allies. Al Shabaab is fighting a classic guerrilla war by melting into the civilian population and forcing the KDF to fight on its terms. The United States is providing Kenya with satellite images of real time movements of Shabaab and deploying drones, but the militia’s tactics remains a challenge for a conventional army.
Part of the reason why the Ethiopians overcame the Union of Islamic Courts in two weeks in 2006 is because of a superior air force, especially helicopter gunships.
The second reason for the slow progress by the KDF is the differences among interested parties over whether to maintain a united Somalia with power concentrated in the centre or split the country into various autonomous regions. These interested parties include Kenya, Ethiopia, the TFG, a number of Western countries led by US, and the Somali people.
Kenya is proposing the division of Somalia into eight autonomous regions: Central region or Hiran; Somaliland; Puntland; Bay Bakool; Jubaland; Shabelle; Gedo and Mogadishu, commonly known as Banadir.
Sources revealed that the proposal involves various regions governing themselves but maintaining strong contact with the centre through a rotational presidency. However, President Shariff, who comes from Johar near Mogadishu, is strongly opposed to the idea of autonomous regions.
Currently, there are three autonomous regions — Somaliland, Puntland and the central region of Galmudug, commonly known as Hiran. Unlike the secessionist Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia, Galmudug, is not trying to get international recognition as a separate nation. It considers itself an autonomous state within the larger federal republic of Somalia. Galmudug was established on August 14, 2006 and Mohamed Warsame Ali “Kiimiko” was elected president.
Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula refused to be drawn into discussing the progress of the war. He also denied that Kenya is seeking to divide Somalia into autonomous regions, but argued that the Somalia Transitional Charter that created TFG says that Somalia shall be a federal government, but leaves how to go about it to the Somali people.
“If it is the process that will bring peace to Somalia, then Kenya will support it. But we want it to be Somalia-driven, not Kenya-driven,” he said.
Rashid Abdi, a specialist on Somalia with the International Crisis Group, noted that the international community has not yet learned the lesson that re-establishing a European-style centralised state based in Mogadishu is almost certain to fail, because for most Somalis, their only experience with the central government is that of predation.
“Since Independence, one clan, or group of clans, has always used its control of the centre to grab most of the resources and deny them to rival clans. Thus, whenever a new transitional government is created, Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, or no support, fearing it will only be used to dominate and marginalise them,” he said.
Amisom spokesperson Paddy Asnkunda, told The EastAfrican that the peace process is expected to produce peaceful federated states, working more or less autonomously with a central authority in Mogadishu. He, however, maintained that the Somali political dialogue can go on even without the participation of Al Shabaab because, as he put it, “They have no support among the people and that’s what matters. They have lost political legitimacy by killing innocents.”
Autonomous regions aside, the focus is shifting to President Sheikh Shariff Ahmed and his role in the conduct of the war. After what appeared to be a misunderstanding in the early stages when he questioned Kenya’s intentions in Somalia, it is now emerging that Sheikh Shariff is a strong believer in Wahhabism, which is close to the Al Shabaab philosophy.
He is associated with the Salafi group that believes strongly in Sharia law. His kitchen Cabinet, called Al Sheikh, are mostly hardline Islamists, who blame him for appearing moderate. This group believes that the Djibouti agreement that brought together hardliners and secularists, is watering down the tenets of Islam.
While he remains ambivalent over the Kenya intervention, the TFG’s official mandate ends in August next year without initiating the expected Somalia national political dialogue. The concern for Kenya is that given the divisive politics and the short timeframe, it is unlikely the TFG will deliver significant progress on key transitional objectives, such as stabilising Somalia and delivering a permanent constitution.
That is why Kenya is looking at alternative ways of pacifying Somalia by trying to persuade the international community to concentrate its support on the more effective local entities, until a more appropriate and effective national government is negotiated.
As it stands, Kenya cannot afford to go to war right now. Aside from internal structural problems and the open question of next year’s general election, the struggling dollar has contaminated the economy further as the woes of our biggest trading partners bleed into our own problems. With a bloated government, which was put into power in part to keep the peace and which will continue to grow as constitutional changes create a more federal system, government expenditure has never been higher or, arguably, less productive. All of this comes in the shadow of a slow response to what experts are calling the worst drought in the region in 60 years. (As one Kenyan noted on Twitter, it seems that in Africa they always have money for war but never enough for food.)
Even so, the changing circumstances of al-Shabaab’s increasing aggression and apparent lack of central command have led to unspeakable violence against Somali and international civilians, and is a question that demands a robust answer. The troubling issue is whether the Kenyan government, even (or especially?) with French support, is in a position to manage the inevitable fallout.
Kenya has lost war in Somali ! Kenya must Stop being used by Imperialist>USA/FRANCE to fight dirty wars in Africa & the Horn>French ships, U.S. drones attack Somalia as Kenyan troops invade: U.S.-backed regimes abet imperialist aggression
SOURCE: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=27597
This Artical Killed/Assasinated/Maimed/Raped/Coerced/Suffocated Kenyas Commissioner of Human Rights Mr Omer Hassan>———————–
By Hassan Omar Hassan
It is highly unlikely that Kenya’s next president would be a Kikuyu. President Kibaki is not the iconic Nelson Mandela. It did not matter at the point of Mandela’s exit as president of South Africa that a fellow Xhosa would succeed him.
Yet Kibaki had an unparalleled opportunity to position himself as an iconic statesman, Africa’s reference point. We were at ‘Tahrir’ well before the Tunisians or Egyptians got there. Many then thought our democratic revolution of 2002 that ‘overthrew’ Moi and Kanu would give rise to the ‘African spring’.
Apart from some expanded roads with flyovers and an economic growth index, Kibaki’s legacy reflects an unacceptable institutionalisation of ethnicity. The imbalances in the recruitments in Public Service as supported by the report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to shameless dominance of all key sectors of Government. In 2002, it did not matter whether Kibaki or Uhuru Kenyatta became president.
From the unfortunate look of things, ethnicity will impact on the choice of president in the 2012 General Election. The 2007 presidential election were too ethnically charged. The Waki and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reports on the 2007 post-election violence provided a clear background as to some of the circumstances leading to the violence. Ethnic exclusion and imbalances, perceived victimisation particularly of Moi’s Rift Valley communities among a host of inequities and injustices.
You scar and bleed a nation when you willfully negate its sensitivities. To pass the microphone from one Njoroge to another, then to Nyoike and Murungi while addressing the soaring costs of energy. Or when Ndung’u passes the microphone to Kinyua then to Kenyatta to tell us why the shilling is losing ground. Or when the leadership of the country’s security apparatus is almost exclusively from Kibaki’s ethnic Kikuyu. You then wonder why there’s ethnicity in Kenya when the Government is working ‘tirelessly’ to patch your roads and build you new ones with flyovers. Kenyans are not idiots. We are a people endowed with sufficient talent, intellect and reason, alhamdulillah (Thank God)!
A possible Uhuru victory is premised on the G7 Alliance holding together. It cultivates on the common belief that Prime Minister Raila Odinga is behind their Hague predicament and consolidates itself on account of demonising Raila. If the cases proceed to full trial upon confirmation the unifying factor around the ‘Raila theory’ will puncture.
Many of the testimonies to the Waki Commission, the KNCHR and the Human Rights Watch on the violence in Rift Valley were from PNU co-ordinators and activists. I trust that a number of the Moreno-Ocampo witnesses in the Ruto case are too from this political divide. When the politics of the violence plays out at The Hague, many of the theories and conceptions would be demolished. The G7 Alliance, which provides a realistic formula for an Uhuru triumph might be unable to hold on account of these revelations.
The chances of ‘Kibaki’s men’ succeeding Kibaki rest on high improbabilities. It is therefore puzzling to read reports of how some of these operatives are attempting to centralise power through the devolution bills or such nonsense as locking out popularly elected governors from County security committees. Wisdom would dictate that there is more reassurance and ‘protection’ in decentralising power and ‘weakening’ the influence of the centre. In trying to decimate the motivation, one wonders what the Kibaki men know or are planning. Can they imagine a successor dictator president from outside their axis with an overloaded centre who proclaims to follow in these footstep and kufuata nyayo!
15 SOLDIERS KILLED IN 100 DAYS .
Monday, 30 January 2012 00:04 BY DOMINIC WABALA
Two majors and four lieutenants are among 15 Kenya Defence Forces officers who have been killed in the last 100 days since Kenya sent its troops to Somalia. In their quest to take over Dhobley, Ras Kamboni, Beles Qooqani, Tabda, Amuma, Buale, Dheere, Oddo, Fafadun, Afmadhow, Afgoye, Jilib, Dinsoor and Bardheere, Kenyan troops have paid the ultimate price.
Maj Samuel Keli Kavindu and Maj Kizito Wahiza Nyamohanga of the Joint Helicopter Command are the most senior Kenyan military officers to die since ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ was launched in October. The two were both commissioned as army officers in 1997. They died when a helicopter they were travelling in crashed at a military base near Liboi Primary School on the night of October 16, last year at about 7pm, close to 14 kilometres from the Kenya-Somalia border.
Operation Linda Nchi spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir said the helicopter developed mechanical problems and crashed before exploding. Defence minister Yusuf Haji yesterday paid tribute to the fallen soldiers and thanked Kenyans for supporting the war against the al Shabaab militia. “We are all mourning the death of these gallant soldiers who fought for their country. We send our heartfelt condolence to their families. We thank all Kenyans for the support they give to our forces on the warfront that gives them the morale to continue with the mission,” Haji said in Addis Ababa where he was on an official visit.
The Kenyan military spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna on Saturday termed their deaths as the ultimate price a soldier pays in his or her duty to protect the country from its enemies. “They stood in between the al Shabaab bullet and the Kenyan citizen. We are proud of them,” Oguna said at a briefing at police headquarters.
Corporal Francis Muli Solovea who was enlisted into the military in 1987; Corporal Noel Kipkurgat Kipkosiam enlisted in 1994; and Corporal Francis Imenyi Languchia enlisted in 1994, who were all attached to the Joint Helicopter Command, also died in the crash that claimed the first casualties in the war against al Shabaab. Lieutenant K.A Webi of the 1st Kenya Rifles who was commissioned into the Kenya Defence Forces as an army officer in May 2009 died in the line of duty on January 22 when his unit conducted a raid on al Shabaab camps in Delbiyow and Hosingow.
Another officer who was injured in the same incident and had been undergoing treatment at the hospital, Lieutenant Edward Okoyo attached to the 3rd Kenya Rifles. Also later died. He had only served for one-and-a-half years. He had been commissioned into the Kenya Defence Forces on June 30, 2010. Four AK-47 rifles, a large amount of ammunition, communication equipment and a collapsible water tank were recovered during the raid in which 11 al Shabaab fighters were reportedly killed.
Raymond Kirui, attached to 7 Kenya Rifles, and who joined the Kenya Defence Forces on October 25, 2010 died on November 24, last year when the vehicle he and 13 other soldiers were travelling in drove over an improvised explosive device in Bulla Garaay area near Mandera. Four of his colleagues were seriously injured and airlifted to Garissa hospital for treatment.
Lieutenant Evans Kipkorir Ngetich is another senior military officer who was killed by al Shabaab during fighting around Tabda area. He was attached to the 76th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. Six al Shabaab fighters were also killed in the incident. Kenya Defence Forces troops moving from Beles Qooani to Dhobley came into contact with al Shabaab fighters and a fierce gun battle ensued during which the senior officer sustained fatal injuries. Two other soldiers were also injured.
Lance Corporal Willie Njoroge attached to the 1st Kenya Rifles died during a confrontation between his unit and al Shabaab fighters in Somalia on December 29 last year. His unit had raided the al Qaeda linked insurgents base south of Beles Qooqani when he was killed. Five al Shabaab fighters were killed and many others injured during the incident. He joined he Kenya Defence Forces on August 3, 2002.
Others who have been killed are Yusuf Abdullah Korio, a private in the 15th Kenya Rifles. Korio joined the military in 1992 and died during combat on December 22 last year when during fighting between Tabda and Dhobley. Ronald Kipkemboi Kiptui, who joined the army on October 29, 2007 and was attached to the 7th Kenya Rifles, died on December 3, last year.
Two Kenya Navy officers, bombardier Edward Kiboi Mugo and gunner Kevin Mgogoyo Wamai, both of the 77 Artillery, drowned at sea on October 1 and October 2 when their boat capsized in the Indian Ocean. Mugo joined the military in 1994 while Wamai had served in the military since April 27, 2009.
One other officer, Philip Onyango, from the same unit is still presumed missing at sea since the incident. The Kenya Defence Forces has in its medical scheme a system of compensating the families of soldiers who die in the line of duty apart from taking care of the burial arrangements. The family of the dead soldier is always the first to receive the news after his or her seniors. This is done by a team of officers who are dispatched to the deceased soldier’s home to personally break the news.
Policemen and civilians have also been killed in grenade or improvised explosive device either lobbed into buildings or planted on roads. KDF entered Somalia in October with a mission to weaken and destroy al Shabaab militia. The militia have termed Kenya’s entry an act of war and threatened to retaliate. They have so far claimed responsibility for a number of attacks within Kenya that have left several people, mainly civilians, dead.
Bring our soldiers in Somalia back home
By WILLIAM OCHIENG’
Posted Wednesday, February 1 2012 at 20:00
We have bombed them, whacked them and clobbered them. What next? Every event, however nice or ugly, must have an end – be it a dance, sex or beer-drinking. If you outstretch the limit you might die.
The government must decide when to put a stop to our foray in Somalia. To roam all over Somalia chasing Al-Shabaab will be futile. We think they have been taught a lesson. All that remains is to tell them: “Behave yourselves, or else, we will return”.
Yes, let a team of our army join the pan-African force in Mogadishu to support the Somali Government to do its work. The point, however, is that Kenya has no capacity to hold Somalia for long. We have better things to do with our funds.
Many of our institutions are asking for better salaries, and some of our trunk roads have began to fall apart.
It is time to quit. After all, we are not colonisers!
What has shocked us are the brutal conditions in which Al-Shabaab have held their people. It is a pointer that there are many human beings who have not crossed the road from wildlife to modernity.
Al-Shabaab did not care that there was a big drought, and famine in their country. They even denied the donor communities the chance to distribute food to their people. Will the feeble Mogadishu Government ever humanise these brutes?
We must do the Barack Obama thing: Call our boys back home, stay armed, alert and vigilant. We must work with the international community as we keep our borders safe and secure.
Indeed, our policy should be to keep 100 miles of bordering Somali territory clean of Al-Shabaab. Should they attack us again, then we must (in collaboration with the United Nations Security Council) determine the next phase of conflict.
For many years, since the Shifta war in the 1960s, we kept our defence force away from the international spotlight. Some of our neighbours have boasted that the Kenya Army would be a walk-over in any fight.
Well, our forces have shown that they have mettle.
But we cannot keep them slogging in a dysfunctional war. Fighting Al-Shabaab is like keeping weaver birds off a garden, knowing you cannot chase each bird to its nest. Our army must be trained to help modernise and expand our infrastructure, rebuild our forests, and manage disasters.
There is also the question of whether that country, if properly reconstituted, could in the future resume its earlier agitation for a “greater” Somalia. We hope not, but in case that agitation returns, it should be met by a multilateral force that includes Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
Besides, it is hoped that the Somali citizens of neighbouring East African countries will not be lured to take part in utopian ethnic bandwagons.
Ultimately, however, it is our hope that the Somali Republic will be absorbed into the East African Community, where it rightly belongs.
Somalis are a very industrious and friendly people. Their economy combines agriculture, in a few well-watered valleys, with pastoralism. They have been traders and fishermen for centuries, and it is suspected that Somalia, like neighbouring territories, might have vast oil deposits.
Prof Ochieng’ teaches history at Maseno University.
On 16 October 2011, Kenya’s armed forces invaded southern Somalia in the midst of a severe regional famine. Their purpose is to capture the port city of Kismayu and to remove the Al Shabaab Islamist militia from the region. This presentation will review the background to Kenya’s military action, setting it in the context of the securitization of development in the wider region of eastern Africa. Refugees still flood across the borders of Ethiopia and Kenya, simultaneously presenting a humanitarian and a security challenge. Famine has been both a cause of the invasion and a cloak behind which its politics can be hidden: issues of international responsibility, and of citizenship and surveillance, loom large. It will be argued that the Kenyan invasion implies a strengthening of sovereignty in this region, through the militarization of politics. The weak states of eastern Africa are being remade at their borders through warfare and conflict. A decade on from 9/11, the global war on terror is having a profound impact upon the region where the threat of al Qaeda first became manifest to the world.
We must pull out foreign troops, give Somalia back to its people
The United Kingdom will host a conference on Somalia next week on February 23. I have also been invited to the UK to attend a conference on Somalia next month. This conference seeks to bring together “senior level practitioners and policy makers, community representatives, analyst and academics… and draw on expertise from the US and Europe, alongside Somali experts, academics and community leaders based in the UK, Somalia and East Africa”. Both the conferences are broadly organised under the auspices of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Over the last few years, I have been invited to various international initiatives and conferences on Somalia. Internationally, there is broad acknowledgement that fight against terrorism cannot be won only through military means. I am also not in doubt that no solution for Somalia will succeed if the people are not in the centre and in deed own the process. My principle though for participation has been to support any genuine efforts aimed at the resolution of the crisis in Somalia. Human rights actors both locally and internationally are alive to the attendant violations as a consequence or under the guise of combating terrorism directly linked to the Somali crisis. The impact of the crisis to Kenya’s Muslim community and in particular Kenya’s Somali community is evident. The resolution of this crisis has Kenya’s Muslim community as one of the principal beneficiaries.
I am pleased that the international community has been unequivocal about supporting military intervention in Somalia under the command of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom). Kenya’s request to join the Amisom was undoubtedly as a consequence of being left with no choice. Military action is costly both in human and a financial sense. Demonstrated zeal to combat terrorism usually attracts the West’s military and financial support. Not this time! Where all major powers have diplomatically or politically supported Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, there has been less zeal to provide more tangible military and financial support. A prolonged incursion has an obvious financial cost which will eventually bite the taxpayers. Such a state of affairs will occasion questions as to the strategy or wit of the military operations.
Most of the present day military engagements were at the onset popular and legitimate. This is in particular reference to Afghanistan and Iraq. As the cost of war soared, casualties increased and no end was in sight, respective populations across a host of Western nations started to ask the hard questions.
What began as popular and legitimate security/military interventions cost politicians their popularity and power, the taxpayers their resources and raised critical questions as to the justifications of the military operations. In my view there were numerous strategic oversights or assumptions on our part. In particular, international support that was not forthcoming as fast as was hoped. We claim to have weakened the Al Shabaab yet need international support to enter Kismayu. We now hope that the partnership between the Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda will attract an international coalition. It is your ‘war’, fight it!
Yet in the alternative, this partnership also ushers the entry of international jihadists who are being left ‘idle’ owing to US pullout in Iraq and the intention to pull out of Afghanistan. This might lead to the increase of violence in Somalia. As the world seeks a solution to Somalia, we must aim at ending the violence, pull out foreign troops and give Somalia back to its people. This will be my message to the conference!
The writer is a lawyer and former commissioner with the KNCHR
30 Kenyan civilians killed in revenge attacks by Somali al-Qaida group since Kenya’s incursion
By Associated Press, Published: February 18
NAIROBI, Kenya — An al-Qaida-linked Somali militant group is suspected of killing at least 30 Kenyan civilians since Kenyan troops entered Somalia, a police spokesman said Saturday.
Eric Kiraithe said the killings are believed to have been carried out by sympathizers of the Somali insurgent group al-Shabab since October in Kenya. He said most of the attacks were carried out in towns near the border between the two nations.
Police say that dozens of Kenyan youth have been recruited by al-Shabab and are operating in the country. Al-Qaida announced earlier this month that it was merging with al-Shabab.
A Kenyan man admitted to being an al-Shabab member and was sentenced to life in prison late October after pleading guilty to throwing a grenade at a packed bus stop that killed one person in the capital city.
Kenya blames the militant group for several kidnappings, including those of four Europeans on Kenyan soil.
Soon after Kenya’s military incursion, al-Shabab vowed to bring down skyscrapers and carry out suicide bombings in Kenya’s capital.
The militant group claimed responsibility for the July 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda which killed 76 people watching the World Cup final.
Military spokesman Col. Cyrus Oguna said the government is in discussions with influential religious leaders and community leaders to intervene to seek the release of more than 10 Kenyans being held captive by al-Shabab.
He said since the operation began the Kenyan army is now 68 miles (nearly 110 kilometers) inside Somalia but their advance has been slowed down because efforts to pacify the local communities.
“Pacification must continue until we are confident that the area is very stable very secure allow us to move forward,” Oguna said.
U.S. troops are on their way to Nigeria to help fight Boko Haram, in yet another newfangled military intervention into Africa. Boko Haram are an Islamic terrorist group, but its not clear what danger they’ve ever presented to America. Nevertheless, this new war is not much different from the Obama administration’s other martial adventures in the region, in Somalia with al Shabaab, in Uganda with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and beyond.
Read the whole article
War Kills ,War maims ,War destroyes,War drains treasury money intended to equip Hospitals, Schools ,build roads is channeled to the Military etc> Stop the war in Somalia and Pray for peace in the Region>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8BX3uFqXeIo&feature=related
5 Reasons Why Kenya’s Invasion of Somalia is a Mistake
By Kwaku Osei in Global Africa
Entering its third week, Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan army’s invasion into Somalia to fight terrorist group Al-Shabaab, threatens to devolve into the realm of the absurd. A military spokesman announced on Friday that large groups of donkeys in Somalia will be considered Al Shabaab “activity.” Questionable military strategy aside, I fear this endeavor may turn out to be a huge mistake. Here are five reasons why:
1. Kenya may be underestimating the enemy
There seems to be a general impression that Al Shabaab is currently weakened and can thus be easily defeated. The recent spate of attacks attributed to the group in Kenya and Uganda, however, seem to point to the contrary. Additionally, Al Shabaab has proved extraordinarily resilient in the past. The whole mission rests on the assumption that the objectives can and will be achieved relatively quickly. However, the lessons of history suggest otherwise. Additionally, the Kenyan army has as yet failed to articulate a clear exit strategy. It is also important to note that the repeated abductions which prompted the invasion may not have been the work of Al Shabaab (who have categorically denied involvement), but rather that of smaller pirate groups or independent militias. In this case, then Kenya’s enemy in Southern Somalia is not Al Shabaab but general lawlessness in region, a much more formidable foe.
2. Similar operations (by better armies) have failed
In October 1993, American and UN peacekeepers suffered heavy losses at the hands of Somali militias, prompting a U.S. withdrawal. In 2006, the Ethiopian army, backed by the United States, successfully liberated Mogadishu from Al Shabaab and handed it over to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government only to see the city fall again to a new Al Shabaab. When it comes to military strength, Kenya is not Ethiopia, much less the United Nations or the United States. One therefore has to wonder how the Kenyan army hopes to succeed where these others have failed.
3. There is significant opposition from key stakeholders
Somalia’s President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed has been openly critical of Kenya’s presence in Somalia, fearing that Kenya intends to establish an autonomous region in Juba. It is rumored that Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki was also initially opposed to the invasion and had to be convinced by senior advisers in the administration. Reactions from the independent Kenyan press have been lukewarm at best, and public opinion is likely to turn as soon Kenyan soldiers begin to suffer casualties. Critically, Kenya does seem to have the support of the Somali population, however if the civilian casualties already sustained continue to rise, this is unlikely to hold. Further, Al Shabaab and other Somali militias have in the past proved successful at rallying the population against the interference of the West, so French and U.S. support for the operation (initially denied but now confirmed) could quite easily turn the tide of support against the invasion.
4. The timing is poor
This invasion comes after one of the worst droughts in 60 years and before the start of harvesting season in the region. It is unclear how the mission will impact the region’s ongoing food crisis. It is also occurring during the rainy season which, with the lack of infrastructural development in southern Somalia, presents a serious operational and logistical challenge for any army (hence the use of donkey’s to transport arms). It is also bad timing for Kenya, which has internal structural problems,has a struggling economy affected by the weak dollar, and is experiencing rising tensions ahead of next year’s elections. This mission will be difficult to sustain economically and politically.
5. There is likely to be significant backlash
Destroying the group’s base in southern Somalia may have the counterproductive effect of splintering the organization and forcing it towards a more transnational method of operation which would mean increased attacked in places like Nairobi and Kenya. In fact, Al Shabaab, who pledged to respond in this way has already made good on its promise. Attacks of this kind are likely to increase the longer the operation is sustained.
Given the above, one wonders whether it wouldn’t be wiser for Kenya to leave the business of defeating Al Shabaab in Somalia to those currently tasked with it and focus instead (with the help of its international allies) on improving border security, improving internal monitoring and surveillance (a la the United States and Nigeria against Boko Haram), and cutting off Al Shabaab’s sources of funding in Nairobi.
Kenya’s mud-mired trudge into Somalia
They’re taking their sweet time, the Kenyan military. Despite launching their incursion (some say invasion) into Somalia nearly three weeks ago in a firestorm of bravado, they’ve yet to encounter Al Shabaab properly, and haven’t managed to get near the enemy’s stronghold, the port of Kismayo, only a couple of hundred kilometres from the Kenyan-Somali border. So what’s taking them so long? By SIMON ALLISON (@simonallison).
Kenya is blaming the rain for its army’s slow progress in Somalia. In a cruel irony, the weather in the Horn of Africa is compensating for the long drought which caused the famine in Somalia by bucketing down with rain. It’s no compensation though; it’s as difficult to grow crops in too much rain as in too little, and nothing about Somalia’s current political situation encourages complex agriculture.
But the rain is making it very difficult indeed for Kenyan troops to advance. Somalia has poor roads at the best of times. Where there are roads, they are mostly ungraded dirt tracks that become nearly impassable mud at the first hint of moisture. And while Al Shabaab fighters, who know the area intimately, can use back routes and passes, the relatively clueless Kenyans are stuck on the main roads with their heavy vehicles, most of which appear to be old armoured personnel carriers from the 1980s. There have even been some unconfirmed reports that the army has been reduced to using donkeys to move equipment.
Despite this, the Kenyan Defence Force is relatively sophisticated as far as African militaries go, commented John Stupart of the African Armed Forces Journal in an interview with iMaverick. But no amount of training and equipment, even the most modern and expensive, can make up for a flawed strategy which is at the root of Kenya’s problems. “The Kenyan incursion is strategically unfeasible,” Stupart said. “The offensive frankly makes no military sense. Two-thousand Kenyan troops trying to bloody the nose of anywhere between 2,500 and 20,000 Al Shabaab militants on their home turf will not end well.”
According to Stupart, Al Shabaab is pursuing classic military strategy in luring Kenya further and further into Somalia. By stretching the Kenyan military out, thinning supply lines and dragging the incursion on and on Al Shabaab will either make the Kenyan forces vulnerable to a direct attack, or force them to withdraw thanks to fatigue or cost or a combination of the two. “Ultimately, they’re trying to do too much with too few forces and during the wrong season. At best they can hope for a few firefights where they’ll clobber the Al Shabaab militants in a standing fight, but they’ll never really defeat Al Shabaab in Somalia. Doing that would require 20,000 combat troops with all the trimmings (tanks, artillery, etc), not 2,000.”
Stupart’s is a disturbing analysis from the Kenyan point of view, but one which looks more accurate as their forces remain on the ground for longer. Already questions are being asked in Kenya about how much the expedition is costing and politicians are studiously avoiding answering these questions. And military spokespeople have set themselves the near impossible goal of remaining in Somalia until the threat to Kenya from Al Shabaab is neutralised; presumably, this means either establishing some kind of buffer state along with a border, or wiping out Al Shabaab entirely, perhaps by taking Kismayo and using the Kenyan troops as the basis for an African Union peacekeeping force there.
But none of this is possible as long as they fail to engage with the enemy. And, if it’s true that Al Shabaab is hosting seasoned al Qaeda fighters from the Afghanistan theatre, they might just know a thing or two about fighting a guerrilla insurgency. Kenya’s army might find themselves mired in the Somali mud for some time yet. DM
Letter from Human Rights Watch to Kenya Gov’t
« Thread Started Yesterday at 4:20pm »
——————————————————————————–
Retrieved from my inbox:
From: Neela Ghoshal
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2011 3:37 PM
To: Neela Ghoshal
Subject: HRW Press Release: Kenya: Respect Law in Somalia Military Operations
For Immediate Release
Kenya: Respect Law in Somalia Military Operations
Investigate Civilian Deaths; End Arbitrary Arrests, Mistreatment
(Nairobi, November 18, 2011) – The Kenyan government should ensure that its forces in Somalia abide by the laws of war and avoid harm to civilians, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to the Kenyan minister of state for defense. The government should also promptly and impartially investigate recent incidents in which Kenyan forces may have violated international humanitarian or human rights law.
Kenyan armed forces entered Somalia on October 16, 2011, in military operations against the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab called Operation “Linda Nchi” (Swahili for “Protect the Nation”). Human Rights Watch expressed concern regarding three separate incidents in which Kenyan armed forces may have conducted unlawful attacks harming civilians or mistreated people in custody in Somalia and Kenya. All parties to the armed conflict in Somalia should respect the laws of war, Human Rights Watch said.
“Kenya’s Somalia operation has resulted in apparent attacks on a camp for displaced people and a fishing boat,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Kenya needs to find out exactly what happened and make sure that those responsible for any wrongdoing are punished appropriately.”
On October 30, the Kenyan air force carried out an attack with aerial bombardment that struck an internally displaced persons camp on the outskirts of the town of Jilib, Somalia. A witness wounded in the attack described to Human Rights Watch seeing a dark green plane drop one bomb on the camp, return to drop a second bomb on the camp, and then start machine gun strafing. The international humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières reported treating 45 wounded people, including 31 children, and confirmed 5 civilian deaths following the aerial bombardment. Kenyan authorities later confirmed conducting a military operation in the vicinity.
On November 4, the Kenyan navy attacked a fishing boat at Kiunga, near the Somali border, resulting in the death of four Kenyan fishermen, ages 60 to 84. The authorities claim the fishing boat refused to stop for inspection. But survivors told the Muslim Human Rights Forum that the boat was anchored offshore when the attack occurred. Military personnel then allegedly beat the survivors who had swum to shore.
The Kenyan authorities should publish the findings of an investigation into the Jilib attack promised by Prime Minister Raila Odinga, and investigate the attack on the fishing boat, Human Rights Watch said. Those harmed in unlawful attacks or their families should be appropriately compensated.
In a third incident, Kenyan military personnel arbitrarily detained and mistreated civilians in the town of Garissa, Kenya, on November 11. A witness told Human Rights Watch that soldiers picked up people who looked Somali, beat them, and forced them to sit in dirty water while interrogating them.
“The Kenyan authorities should not use the current military operation as an excuse to clamp down on the rights of people within its borders,” Bekele said.
For more Human Rights Watch reporting on Kenya and Somalia, please visit:
http://www.hrw.org/en/africa
For more information, please contact:
In London, Ben Rawlence (English, Swahili): +44-7984816013; or rawlenb@hrw.org
In Nairobi, Neela Ghoshal (English, French): +254-729466685; or ghoshan@hrw.org
j
Kenya Govt wants the People of Kenya ,and the world to believe this Nonsense of Kenya Defence Forces loosing only 8 (eight) soldiers ,since the start of Kenya Somali War>Just add 10×8=80 .That is the collect number in govts files.but in every war no side tells the truth and never ever buy such govt gossips and hogwash>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/kenya-military-says-8-of-its-soldiers-killed-since-somalia-incursion/2011/11/19/gIQAbo71aN_print.html
Moslim Countries Oppose Israel Intervention in Somali Kenya war of Expansion>
ttp://allafrica.com/stories/201111221391.html
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/11/11-kenyan-soldiers-hurt-in-landmine-attack/
Sovereignity my foot! Sorensen26 pls give us a break. Where was this animal called ‘sovereign’ when Kenyans were being murdered like chicken during the PEV; where has it been when political assassinations take place in this country;when public coffers get plundered (goldenberg,maize-berg,triton-berg,education-berg) u name it;and lately even when the president was breaking the law by force.Where does this idiot called sovereignty live so that we go smoke it out to act and protect its people the citizenry against of manner of abuse?.FYI,even dictatorial countries like Zimbabwe,Libya,Egypt and even Ivory-Coast are all sovereign states by virtue of practising self-rule.That tittle alone should not be used to cover-up evil against its own people Kenyan style just like a lot of us use the description ‘experienced’ to cover up their mistakes and incompetence while blocking the youth from job opportunities. Style up and give us another objective argument behind your reasoning and not that our ills should not be pointed out bcoz we are a damn sovereign state.
Kenya Army looses 40 soldiers with Al-shaabab youth>http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news
Somali as a Muslim Country has the Right to ask ISLAMIST STATE OF IRAN MILITARY HELP TO DEFEND ISLAM >http://www.presstv.ir/detail/213760.html
Subscribe | Subscription Renewal | Advertise in Air Force Times | About Air Force Times | Customer Service | RSS | Digital EditionLogin | Register
Home News Benefits Money Careers & Education Community Off Duty Entertainment Marketplace Classifieds
Air Force NewsAll Air Force News Guard & Reserve This Week’s Issue Subscribe to RSS Quick Links
Hall of Valor
AirForce Discussions
Frontline Photos
Honor the Fallen
Webtools
Click here for Military Times Webtools Tweet http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/12/army-africa-mission-may-be-just-starting-120511w/
The Secret War: Africa ops may be just starting
By Sean D. Naylor – Staff writer
Posted : Monday Dec 5, 2011 11:36:03 EST
There was clearly something suspicious about the two western-looking “civilians” and their interpreter who the Ethiopian security forces were questioning.
For a start, they were in Ethiopia’s bandit country — near the town of Fiq in the Ogaden region that borders Somalia. Secondly, they claimed to be working for the Red Cross, but a quick check of their persons turned up sidearms, which the Red Cross forbids its personnel from carrying. By the time the “civilians” admitted they were U.S. military personnel, the damage had been done. They were on their way to an Ethiopian jail, and an international incident was brewing.
The Ogaden incident, which occurred between March 2007 and March 2008 (sources were unable or unwilling to be more specific), infuriated not only the Ethiopian government but also U.S. intelligence, military and diplomatic leaders in the region.
The Secret War
Read all stories in the six-part series
The episode was one of several irritants in U.S.-Ethiopian relations after Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion of Somalia. Others included revelations in the U.S. press about AC-130 gunship missions being flown out of Ethiopia and a general reluctance on the Ethiopians’ part to cooperate too closely with U.S. forces in Somalia. Nonetheless, U.S. and Ethiopian special operations forces continued to work together in very small numbers until Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in January 2009.
The U.S. military personnel whom the Ethiopians took prisoner in the Ogaden were human intelligence soldiers working for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s intelligence directorate. They were authorized “to go out beyond the wire,” said retired Marine Maj. Gen. Timothy Ghormley, the U.S. Central Command chief of staff at the time, who had previously commanded CJTF-HOA, based in Djibouti.
They were not supposed to be undercover, according to Ghormley.
“They’re completely overt,” he said. “They’re supposed to identify themselves as U.S. service members.”
But a senior intelligence official, also familiar with the episode, used different terminology.
“It was a clandestine operation,” the official said. The troops weren’t in uniform, “but … if they were detained they would be able to say, ‘We’re members of the U.S. military,’ so somebody could get them the hell out of there.”
The soldiers’ first mistake was venturing into an area they’d been expressly forbidden from entering, Ghormley said. “They went where they’re not supposed to, they went up near Fiq, and going up into the Fiq area was probably not the brightest thing in the world to do,” he said.
“We said, ‘Don’t go into those regions until we can verify the security and safety,’” said a State Department official. “And they ignored it completely. They put themselves at risk.”
The soldiers risked capture by ethnic Somali guerrillas who “don’t like Americans,” the official said. “They would have killed them.”
But the soldiers’ biggest error was to tell Ethiopian troops who confronted them they were members of a Red Cross team, Ghormley said.
“The colossal mistake they made — the final mistake they made — was concocting a cover story,” he said. “It was a spur-of-the-moment thing, from what I understand.”
The pretense didn’t last long.
“The Ethiopians found pistols on them,” instantly invalidating the cover story, Ghormley said. “With that, they were determined to be hostile, and when they finally did tell the Ethiopians who they were and what they were, the Ethiopians were just kind of ticked off. So they decided they would bring them in.”
The soldiers were detained for “roughly” 10 days, the senior intelligence official said.
Ghormley disagreed.
“They were probably held 48 hours, maybe, not much longer than that,” he said.
Nevertheless, high-level diplomatic and military pressure was required to get the men released, sources said.
“It took the ambassador, it took the CENTCOM commander [Adm. William Fallon], it took the State Department to get involved,” the intelligence official said.
“An incident occurred in which a couple of guys were detained,” said Fallon, who retired in 2008. “They were using poor judgment to go to a place they shouldn’t have been, [which was] not authorized and not sanctioned and not smart.”
“The Ethiopians were good about it,” but the fiasco had long-term consequences, the intelligence official said.
The soldiers had been carrying a lot of information about U.S. intelligence operations in the region that was instantly compromised.
“All their documentation, papers, notepads, military stuff were collected [by the Ethiopians],” the State Department official said.
“It was like amateur hour, this team that got rolled up,” the intelligence official said. “There was information that they had that they should not have been carrying … It gave away techniques and procedures that we couldn’t afford to do, because we knew at that time that al-Qaida was building up its capability in Somalia and that was why we were trying damn hard to get into Somalia with really sensitive collection.”
The incident “put a spotlight on everything” U.S. intelligence was doing in the Horn, the official said. “It became a big deal and it actually hurt us, I would say, for a couple of years … around the region.”
Military intelligence operations now had to be coordinated through the CIA.
“That coordination just dried up,” the official said.
Fallon disputed that interpretation.
“It was certainly not helpful, and it caused a lot of anxiety. But at the end of the day, there was no major damage done,” he said.
(Hilary Renner, spokeswoman for the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, and Simon Schorno, a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross, each declined to comment on the episode. The Ethiopian Embassy in Wash
ington, D.C., did not respond to a request for comment by deadline.)
Recent strides
Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Somalia ended neither the war in that country nor the U.S.’s role in it.
Although the Ethiopian invasion had quickly ousted the Islamic Courts Union from Mogadishu, a hard-line Islamist faction called al-Shabaab (the Youth) soon emerged to battle the Ethiopians, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the African Union peacekeeping force that replaced the Ethiopians.
Since then, and particularly during the past six months, the pace of U.S. operations appears, if anything, to have accelerated as an increasing number of actors are drawn into the war in Somalia.
• On Sept. 14, 2009, a U.S. special operations helicopter raid killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaida in East Africa figure.
• On April 19, 2011, the U.S. captured Somali national and al-Shabaab member Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, 25, as he crossed the Gulf of Aden on a ship to Yemen from Somalia. The U.S. held Warsame, who allegedly has links to Yemen’s al-Qaida branch, for two months on a Navy ship before flying him to the U.S.
• On June 7, TFG forces killed Harun Fazul, the most-wanted al-Qaida figure in East Africa, when he mistook their roadblock in Mogadishu for an al-Shabaab position.
• On June 23, U.S. drones struck al-Shabaab targets near Kismayo.
• On July 6, there were reports of airstrikes in Lower Juba, the southernmost region of Somalia, according to the website SomaliaReport.com.
• In early August, under increasing military pressure from the TFG forces backed up by 9,000 African Union peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, al-Shabaab announced its withdrawal from Mogadishu.
• On Sept. 15, there were more airstrikes on an al-Shabaab training camp in Taabta in Lower Juba, according to SomaliaReport.com.
• On Sept. 21, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. is building a “ring of secret drone bases” including facilities in Ethiopia, the Seychelles and “the Arabian Peninsula.”
• On Sept. 23, airstrikes hit al-Shabaab’s main camp at the Kismayo airport.
• On Oct. 4, an al-Shabaab truck bomb killed an estimated 65 people in Mogadishu.
In mid-October, Kenya’s military began a substantial incursion into southern Somalia, which has since bogged down short of the port of Kismayo. By late November, there were reports that Ethiopia had again sent forces into Somalia in support of the Kenyan invasion. The New York Times quoted U.S. officials Oct. 21 saying the Kenyan action had taken them by surprise and there were no U.S. military advisers with the Kenyan force. Even if that is the case, U.S. officials say the secret war in the Horn of Africa is by no means over.
Mixed success
Looking back, U.S. officials are divided over what they achieved in the Horn in the years following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Successes were rare in the early years of the campaign against al-Qaida in East Africa. The only al-Qaida fighters known to have been killed between 2001 and 2005 were a bodyguard who blew himself up to enable Harun Fazul to escape Kenyan security forces in 2003 and another “minor player” who died of wounds received when Kenyan police seized him, said an intelligence source with long experience in the Horn.
During that period, warlords paid by the CIA helped render “seven or eight” al-Qaida figures out of Somalia, the source said. But although the U.S. focus was on rendering, rather than killing, members of al-Qaida in East Africa, this presented its own challenges.
“The big problem was, what do you do with one of these guys” once he had been captured, a senior military official said. That was “the $100,000 question.”
The U.S. was reluctant to put its captives on trial.
“All the evidence [against the al-Qaida figures] is intelligence,” the official said. “So unless you want to give it up … we have a problem with [that] based on sources and methods.”
Normal procedure was for the warlords to capture the targets, who were then transferred to Djibouti, processed and sent on from there, according to the intelligence source. As for their ultimate destinations, “the only ones I knew were sent to the ‘Salt Pit’ in Afghanistan,” the source said. The “Salt Pit” is the name of a CIA clandestine prison — sometimes referred to as a “black site” — north of Kabul.
Most sources Army Times interviewed said Operation Black Hawk — the CIA-led campaign against al-Qaida in East Africa — had a direct impact on the terrorist network’s efforts in the Horn. Black Hawk was a success, said the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn, because the al-Qaida cell “was certainly degraded, perhaps eviscerated.” In addition, the source said, “we believed we were able to foil several [al-Qaida] operations” along the lines of another embassy bombing or a plane attack.
However, even as he focused tightly on the manhunt and the renditions, John Bennett, the CIA’s station chief in Nairobi in the 2002-03 time frame and now the head of the Agency’s National Clandestine Service, had his doubts about that approach, the intelligence source said.
“Bennett always felt that [by focusing on rendition] you weren’t getting at the larger problem,” the source said.
Always interested in getting at how al-Qaida was targeting U.S. interests in the region, Bennett wanted to go after al-Qaida’s network and finances, the source added. (Bennett declined an interview request.)
“We rarely stepped back to ask, ‘What does this thing really look like, and so what?’” the source said. “Not because we didn’t think about it but because we went after what we knew.”
Combat complications
U.S. efforts were complicated by the fact that there were “two proponent agencies” for the war on al-Qaida in the Horn — U.S. Special Operations Command (higher headquarters for Joint Special Operations Command, whose elite operators were heavily involved in the Horn) and the CIA — according to the intelligence source. This created friction between the CIA and JSOC during the early years of the campaign, the source said. The Horn was what the source described as “a Title 50 environment,” meaning it was not considered a combat theater. (Title 50 is the section of the U.S. Code dealing with covert intelligence issues, while Title 10 deals with the armed services, including clandestine military operations.)
Operating out of a sovereign nation — Kenya — in a Title 50 environment meant “we had to let the Kenyans in on anything short of a covert operation,” leaving some JSOC “shooters” eager for more aggressive action “very frustrated,” the source said.
“Nairobi is a good example of JSOC wanting to come in and conduct operations — let’s say a Little Bird [helicopter] strike against a target in the tri-border area of Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya,” the source said. “More than one [JSOC] O-6 came through Nairobi and said, ‘We can do whatever we damn please.’” The source noted that “at the time SOCOM and JSOC were accustomed to working in Title 10 environments” such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where the rules governing combat action were much looser.
Assessing the threat
No U.S. military personnel have died in combat in the Horn since 9/11, which the senior intelligence official described as “amazing.” But despite the low cost in American blood, some special operators question whether the U.S. effort there has been worth the risk.
“I never thought any of the African targets were important,” said a special operations officer. “They don’t show a direct threat to the homeland. They don’t have the ability to project.”
He dismissed the argument that Somali immigrants to the U.S. who have returned to fight for al-Shabaab represent a threat to the homeland.
“Can you show me intelligence that shows that that network is posing a direct threat to the United States or its allies?” he asked, emphasizing that he was referring to a current threat, not past attacks such as al-Qaida’s 1998 bomb attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa.
The senior intelligence official’s take was very different.
“The scale of the problem in Somalia was huge,” the official said. “We’re talking a large number of al-Qaida, a couple of training camps over the years that have trained, in the case of two examples, a couple of hundred people who are now out there. Some probably left the continent and returned to Europe, some may have returned to Afghanistan and some may have returned to Iraq, and some may just still be in Somalia fighting.”
Although there are terrorist training camps in Somalia, the special ops officer acknowledged, “there are training camps all over the place. But what was the threat tied to our homeland or our allies?”
“Somalia definitely has a cell [of al-Qaida] but the connectivity to the rest of al-Qaida is really specious, it’s very frail,” said a special mission unit veteran.
The diaries of senior Arab al-Qaida members such as Ramzy Binalshib and Abu Zubaydah express clear racism toward black people that would complicate any attempt at close cooperation between the Arab-dominated group and its African franchise, he said.
“What they [i.e. the targets in Africa] did enable us to do was see the network, because they had to communicate, so that’s always good,” the special ops officer said. “It made us understand the network, that’s the biggest success story. And it’s another example of how we can work quietly with others.”
“We managed to strengthen bilateral relations in the region with numerous countries,” agreed the intel source with long experience in the Horn.
But the recent flurry of airstrikes in Somalia, combined with senior leader comments, suggests that there is much work yet to do.
In a March 1 hearing, Marine Gen. James Mattis, head of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: “…we see [al-Qaida] links going down into Somalia with al-Shabaab.”
“There’s been a lot of very challenging things done there and, sadly, we’re going to have to do,” said the senior intelligence official. But although the CIA and JSOC continue to be active in Somalia — a recent article in The Nation outlined close links between CIA and the TFG’s intelligence agency — the military has no permanent presence in the country, the intelligence official said.
After expanding for most of the past seven years, JSOC’s presence in the Horn “is steady — it’s definitely plateaued,” the senior intelligence official said. In fact, the official said, it’s probably dropped a bit” because a couple of “the key targets” have been killed.
There are no JSOC personnel in Somaliland, Sudan or Eritrea and only a very small intelligence team in Ethiopia, the official said. “On a given day in Kenya, you probably have a couple of dozen guys — that’s about it,” the official said. “Enough to do, if required … a high-value capture-or-kill mission. And then we certainly have the ability to move guys pretty damn quickly to there.”
But despite JSOC’s acute interest in Somalia, there is a limit to what the command can achieve there, said a Defense Department official. “JSOC is not going to be the deciding force in whatever happens in Somalia,” the official said. “They can’t kill them all. They can’t capture them all.”
When it comes to Somalia and Yemen, “we’d like to be doing much more in both those places,” the senior military official said. “The State Department came down hard and said we don’t want a third front in an Islamic [country] … Our State Department doesn’t want us to have campaign plans in these two countries.
“It’s a tale of frustration, tears and woe — of what we wanted to do and what we thought we’d be allowed to versus what we’ve been able to do.”
In the meantime, said the senior intelligence official, “Somalia remains a huge problem.”
You are here: National National Garissa police force Star to delete photos of wounded TFG soldiers Skip to content
Garissa police force Star to delete photos of wounded TFG soldiers Tuesday, 06 December 2011 00:03 BY STAR REPORTER
PRESS FEEDOM: Media covering a function
POLICE in Garissa yesterday forced a Star journalist to delete photographs of 25 injured TFG soldiers. The wounded soldiers had been airlifted from Somalia after a firefight last Friday with al Shabaab at Hayo camp, 25 kilometres from Afmadow.
Star correspondent Stephen Asteriko chanced on the soldiers who had been admitted to the Garissa General Hospital before being flown to Nairobi for further treatment. The photojournalist was accompanied by a Citizen TV cameraman. “I went to the Garissa General Hospital for the day’s assignment to check on the doctors’ strike. While still I was still there, I got news that an explosion had occurred in Ifo refuge camp in Dadaab district,” Asteriko said.
“So I decided to do a follow-up of both stories at the hospital. The injured TFG soldiers were waiting to be flown to Nairobi for medication. They were supposed to be taken to the airstrip by an ambulance and so I decided to take the pictures,” Asteriko said. “I did not know that there were military police or civilians who were providing security to the soldiers at the hospital,” he said.
Asteriko explained that the soldiers confiscated the camera claiming that “it is now in the hands of the military”. “Upon seeing the cameras, after I had taken several photos together with my colleague from Citizen TV, the guy rammed me and confiscated both cameras. He threatened to destroy them if we continued questioning him about the fate of our cameras,” stated Asteriko.
The two journalists were handed over to the medical superintendent, who then handed them over to two policemen. After interrogation at Garissa Police Station, the police instructed the journalists to erase all their pictures which they did. Last Friday 25 TFG soldiers were wounded in Hayo, 25 km from Bilis Kokani, during an attack by a large group of al Shabaab.
The soldiers, mostly below the age of 20, had received serious injuries to the head, chest and leg. Thirteen were to be flown to Nairobi for specialised treatment after being attended to by the Kenya Army doctors at the Garissa Hospital under heavy guard.
Some of the injured still had bullets in their bodies, according to a source. “We come across these militias. They ambushed and started shooting at us. Fortunately no one was killed in the shootout. They ran away and disappeared in the bush, “ one TFG soldier told curious onlookers in Somali.
However other sources claimed that al Shabaab had overrun the TFG forward camp at Hayo on Friday. The camp was manned by an estimated 300 TFG soldiers, mainly consisting of Ras Komboni militias loyal to Ahmed Mabhobe. An estimated 1,000 al Shabaab attacked the camp. No Kenyan soldiers were in the battle.
The al Shabaab reportedly captured seven “technical” vehicles and are reported to still be occupying the camp at Hayo, according to the Somali source. Army and civilian doctors at Garissa were unwilling to talk to the press as was Northeastern PPO Leo Nyongesa.
Meanwhile, yesterday a police officer was killed and three injured by an explosion at Ifo 3 at the Dadaab refugee camp. The three officers on regular patrol had parked their car and were resting under a tree on the road linking Ifo to Dagahaley. A remote control device then exploded at 10 am killing the Administration Police officer and injuring his colleagues. Police have since arrested 60 people.
The attackers might have known that the policemen routinely use the tree as a patrol base. “These people knew very well what they were doing because immediately the officers sat under the tree, somebody somewhere detonated the device from a remote location,” added the source. Dadaab DC Albert Kimathi said one of the injured officers was taken to Garissa Hospital while his two colleagues received treatment in Dadaab.
After the explosion, a man came out of the bush to try and take their guns but a Department of Refugee Affairs vehicle arrived and chased him away. He abandoned the weapons and disappeared into the thickets. Nyongesa said police have mounted a search for the people behind the explosion.
Two weeks ago a police van hit a landmine injuring four officers on board. The convoy was taking UN staff from Hagardera refugee camp to Dadaab UNHCR sub-office base after their duties. Refugee leaders immediately condemned the incident blaming it on the al Shabaab.
Why Kenya is not making any strides in the war against Al Shabaab two months into incursion
By FRED OLUOCH
Posted Monday, December 12 2011 at 00:00
The Kenyan Defence Forces in Somalia have not made any significant territorial progress over the past one month, but the military publicity department is not ready to reveal that they have stalled because of factors beyond their control — a situation that has left Nairobi rethinking its approach to the incursion against the Al Shabaab militia.
The force on the southern front that entered Somalia through Kiunga is stuck in Burgabo, 60km from the Kenyan border, where they will have to cross a deep creek. The only advance being realised is on the central front, that recently took Bilis Qooqaani and is preparing to take Afmadow. The two teams are eventually meant to meet in Kismayu.
Investigations by The East-African have revealed that a number of logistical and political issues have forced the KDF to go slow contrary to the initial plan for a swift operation.
There are four major factors that have bogged down the military campaign. They are: Lack of finances to run a long-drawn war; the differences between interested parties over whether to divide Somalia into autonomous regions or maintain one united country; differences over the option to engage Al Shabaab in a political dialogue, and the ambivalence of Somalia’s President Sheikh Shariff Ahmed.
Already, the Kenya public and the politicians have started questioning whether the Kenyan involvement in Somalia is likely to last longer than was initially intended.
However, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) spokesperson Maj Emmanuel Chirchir maintained that the reason the Kenyan advance has slowed down is because they are combining the offensive angle with humanitarian operations. “When we started the operation we had the offensive, defensive and humanitarian operations components. At the strategic level, the long term goal still remains but at the tactical level, things have to change every now and then because you are dealing with human beings,” he said.
Still, Kenya has support around the world for entering Somalia. Experts on Somalia argue that it would be a disaster if Kenya came out of Somalia with egg on its face or without substantially crippling Al Shabaab, as this would embolden the militia group to such an extent that the international community would not be able to deal with.
The importance of Kenya’s intervention has been recognised by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who last week said in Nairobi that Kenya’s leadership role in efforts to stabilise Somalia, has presented an opportunity to the people of Somalia to realise stability and prosperity after 20 years of civil war.
The Kenya government has secured moral and political support from various nations and organisations including the Commonwealth, the AU, the EU, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the EAC, the ACP and Comesa.
But the war is not as simple as Kenyans were made to believe when the military entered Somalia in October. For a start, Kenya was not prepared for a long-drawn-out war, and is already finding its resources stretched. To maintain two infantry fronts, navy and fighter jets on the ground for this long is proving to be a major financial strain and sources revealed that Kenya has been reaching out to the United States and other Western allies for help.
It is estimated that it costs Ksh210 million ($233,000) per month to keep the soldiers in the battlefield. This amount comprises the cost of moving the troops and supplying them with food and water, communication and medical care.
That is part of the reason why the government last Wednesday sought the approval of parliament (and got it) to allow Kenyan forces to be placed under the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) — to offset costs.
In parliament, a number of MPs questioned the country’s war strategy in Somalia, with others calling for a short war. Kenya’s military has no experience in counter-insurgency, and the country needs logistic support from its allies. Al Shabaab is fighting a classic guerrilla war by melting into the civilian population and forcing the KDF to fight on its terms. The United States is providing Kenya with satellite images of real time movements of Shabaab and deploying drones, but the militia’s tactics remains a challenge for a conventional army.
Part of the reason why the Ethiopians overcame the Union of Islamic Courts in two weeks in 2006 is because of a superior air force, especially helicopter gunships.
The second reason for the slow progress by the KDF is the differences among interested parties over whether to maintain a united Somalia with power concentrated in the centre or split the country into various autonomous regions. These interested parties include Kenya, Ethiopia, the TFG, a number of Western countries led by US, and the Somali people.
Kenya is proposing the division of Somalia into eight autonomous regions: Central region or Hiran; Somaliland; Puntland; Bay Bakool; Jubaland; Shabelle; Gedo and Mogadishu, commonly known as Banadir.
Sources revealed that the proposal involves various regions governing themselves but maintaining strong contact with the centre through a rotational presidency. However, President Shariff, who comes from Johar near Mogadishu, is strongly opposed to the idea of autonomous regions.
Currently, there are three autonomous regions — Somaliland, Puntland and the central region of Galmudug, commonly known as Hiran. Unlike the secessionist Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia, Galmudug, is not trying to get international recognition as a separate nation. It considers itself an autonomous state within the larger federal republic of Somalia. Galmudug was established on August 14, 2006 and Mohamed Warsame Ali “Kiimiko” was elected president.
Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula refused to be drawn into discussing the progress of the war. He also denied that Kenya is seeking to divide Somalia into autonomous regions, but argued that the Somalia Transitional Charter that created TFG says that Somalia shall be a federal government, but leaves how to go about it to the Somali people.
“If it is the process that will bring peace to Somalia, then Kenya will support it. But we want it to be Somalia-driven, not Kenya-driven,” he said.
Rashid Abdi, a specialist on Somalia with the International Crisis Group, noted that the international community has not yet learned the lesson that re-establishing a European-style centralised state based in Mogadishu is almost certain to fail, because for most Somalis, their only experience with the central government is that of predation.
“Since Independence, one clan, or group of clans, has always used its control of the centre to grab most of the resources and deny them to rival clans. Thus, whenever a new transitional government is created, Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, or no support, fearing it will only be used to dominate and marginalise them,” he said.
Amisom spokesperson Paddy Asnkunda, told The EastAfrican that the peace process is expected to produce peaceful federated states, working more or less autonomously with a central authority in Mogadishu. He, however, maintained that the Somali political dialogue can go on even without the participation of Al Shabaab because, as he put it, “They have no support among the people and that’s what matters. They have lost political legitimacy by killing innocents.”
Autonomous regions aside, the focus is shifting to President Sheikh Shariff Ahmed and his role in the conduct of the war. After what appeared to be a misunderstanding in the early stages when he questioned Kenya’s intentions in Somalia, it is now emerging that Sheikh Shariff is a strong believer in Wahhabism, which is close to the Al Shabaab philosophy.
He is associated with the Salafi group that believes strongly in Sharia law. His kitchen Cabinet, called Al Sheikh, are mostly hardline Islamists, who blame him for appearing moderate. This group believes that the Djibouti agreement that brought together hardliners and secularists, is watering down the tenets of Islam.
While he remains ambivalent over the Kenya intervention, the TFG’s official mandate ends in August next year without initiating the expected Somalia national political dialogue. The concern for Kenya is that given the divisive politics and the short timeframe, it is unlikely the TFG will deliver significant progress on key transitional objectives, such as stabilising Somalia and delivering a permanent constitution.
That is why Kenya is looking at alternative ways of pacifying Somalia by trying to persuade the international community to concentrate its support on the more effective local entities, until a more appropriate and effective national government is negotiated.
As it stands, Kenya cannot afford to go to war right now. Aside from internal structural problems and the open question of next year’s general election, the struggling dollar has contaminated the economy further as the woes of our biggest trading partners bleed into our own problems. With a bloated government, which was put into power in part to keep the peace and which will continue to grow as constitutional changes create a more federal system, government expenditure has never been higher or, arguably, less productive. All of this comes in the shadow of a slow response to what experts are calling the worst drought in the region in 60 years. (As one Kenyan noted on Twitter, it seems that in Africa they always have money for war but never enough for food.)
Even so, the changing circumstances of al-Shabaab’s increasing aggression and apparent lack of central command have led to unspeakable violence against Somali and international civilians, and is a question that demands a robust answer. The troubling issue is whether the Kenyan government, even (or especially?) with French support, is in a position to manage the inevitable fallout.
By Nanjala Nyabola
Kenya has lost war in Somali ! Kenya must Stop being used by Imperialist>USA/FRANCE to fight dirty wars in Africa & the Horn>French ships, U.S. drones attack Somalia as Kenyan troops invade: U.S.-backed regimes abet imperialist aggression
SOURCE: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=27597
US prepares for military intervention in Somalia
SOURCE: http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=25968
Africa Lies Naked to Euro-American Military Offensive: The US and its Allies are Positioned to “Take” Much of the Continent
SOURCE: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=27992
Tourists in the Sahara & America’s “War on Terror
KENYA RED ALLIANCE (KRA)>fully supports Omar Hassans artical and speech>
This Artical Killed/Assasinated/Maimed/Raped/Coerced/Suffocated Kenyas Commissioner of Human Rights Mr Omer Hassan>———————–
By Hassan Omar Hassan
It is highly unlikely that Kenya’s next president would be a Kikuyu. President Kibaki is not the iconic Nelson Mandela. It did not matter at the point of Mandela’s exit as president of South Africa that a fellow Xhosa would succeed him.
Yet Kibaki had an unparalleled opportunity to position himself as an iconic statesman, Africa’s reference point. We were at ‘Tahrir’ well before the Tunisians or Egyptians got there. Many then thought our democratic revolution of 2002 that ‘overthrew’ Moi and Kanu would give rise to the ‘African spring’.
Apart from some expanded roads with flyovers and an economic growth index, Kibaki’s legacy reflects an unacceptable institutionalisation of ethnicity. The imbalances in the recruitments in Public Service as supported by the report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to shameless dominance of all key sectors of Government. In 2002, it did not matter whether Kibaki or Uhuru Kenyatta became president.
From the unfortunate look of things, ethnicity will impact on the choice of president in the 2012 General Election. The 2007 presidential election were too ethnically charged. The Waki and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reports on the 2007 post-election violence provided a clear background as to some of the circumstances leading to the violence. Ethnic exclusion and imbalances, perceived victimisation particularly of Moi’s Rift Valley communities among a host of inequities and injustices.
You scar and bleed a nation when you willfully negate its sensitivities. To pass the microphone from one Njoroge to another, then to Nyoike and Murungi while addressing the soaring costs of energy. Or when Ndung’u passes the microphone to Kinyua then to Kenyatta to tell us why the shilling is losing ground. Or when the leadership of the country’s security apparatus is almost exclusively from Kibaki’s ethnic Kikuyu. You then wonder why there’s ethnicity in Kenya when the Government is working ‘tirelessly’ to patch your roads and build you new ones with flyovers. Kenyans are not idiots. We are a people endowed with sufficient talent, intellect and reason, alhamdulillah (Thank God)!
A possible Uhuru victory is premised on the G7 Alliance holding together. It cultivates on the common belief that Prime Minister Raila Odinga is behind their Hague predicament and consolidates itself on account of demonising Raila. If the cases proceed to full trial upon confirmation the unifying factor around the ‘Raila theory’ will puncture.
Many of the testimonies to the Waki Commission, the KNCHR and the Human Rights Watch on the violence in Rift Valley were from PNU co-ordinators and activists. I trust that a number of the Moreno-Ocampo witnesses in the Ruto case are too from this political divide. When the politics of the violence plays out at The Hague, many of the theories and conceptions would be demolished. The G7 Alliance, which provides a realistic formula for an Uhuru triumph might be unable to hold on account of these revelations.
The chances of ‘Kibaki’s men’ succeeding Kibaki rest on high improbabilities. It is therefore puzzling to read reports of how some of these operatives are attempting to centralise power through the devolution bills or such nonsense as locking out popularly elected governors from County security committees. Wisdom would dictate that there is more reassurance and ‘protection’ in decentralising power and ‘weakening’ the influence of the centre. In trying to decimate the motivation, one wonders what the Kibaki men know or are planning. Can they imagine a successor dictator president from outside their axis with an overloaded centre who proclaims to follow in these footstep and kufuata nyayo!
The writer is a commissioner with the KNCHR
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/columnists/InsidePage.php?id=2000047361&cid=651&
The Kenya Govt is Financing its war with Somali in a Criminal way by Withdrawing Money Illegallyfrom the Consolinditing Fund>http://marstv.marsgroupkenya.org/?v=ZkuUoadnu7I
Omar Hassan berin g defended by University Students>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMxELstXscA&feature=player_embedded
KDF joins African peacekeepers. Kenya is too poor to engage in war.
Stop the War Kenya is becoming too dangerous for the Common Mwananchi>
Scrumble for Somali>USA/FRANCE:Neocons>Using Kenmya/Ethiopa/STFG>
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/What+to+make+of+Kenya+s+confusing+adventure+in+Somalia/-/434750/1298434/-/item/1/-/11ml2pxz/-/index.html
KDF and govt looses war with Somali Watch the Video of these 2(two) legged Camels fighting in Parliament>http://www.presstv.ir/detail/215907.html
Kenya High top Military killed in Somali and There is many many deserters from the KDF fleeing the Islamist Army of Somali>http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/1315488/-/yx2v6yz/-/index.html
15 SOLDIERS KILLED IN 100 DAYS .
Monday, 30 January 2012 00:04 BY DOMINIC WABALA
Two majors and four lieutenants are among 15 Kenya Defence Forces officers who have been killed in the last 100 days since Kenya sent its troops to Somalia. In their quest to take over Dhobley, Ras Kamboni, Beles Qooqani, Tabda, Amuma, Buale, Dheere, Oddo, Fafadun, Afmadhow, Afgoye, Jilib, Dinsoor and Bardheere, Kenyan troops have paid the ultimate price.
Maj Samuel Keli Kavindu and Maj Kizito Wahiza Nyamohanga of the Joint Helicopter Command are the most senior Kenyan military officers to die since ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ was launched in October. The two were both commissioned as army officers in 1997. They died when a helicopter they were travelling in crashed at a military base near Liboi Primary School on the night of October 16, last year at about 7pm, close to 14 kilometres from the Kenya-Somalia border.
Operation Linda Nchi spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir said the helicopter developed mechanical problems and crashed before exploding. Defence minister Yusuf Haji yesterday paid tribute to the fallen soldiers and thanked Kenyans for supporting the war against the al Shabaab militia. “We are all mourning the death of these gallant soldiers who fought for their country. We send our heartfelt condolence to their families. We thank all Kenyans for the support they give to our forces on the warfront that gives them the morale to continue with the mission,” Haji said in Addis Ababa where he was on an official visit.
The Kenyan military spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna on Saturday termed their deaths as the ultimate price a soldier pays in his or her duty to protect the country from its enemies. “They stood in between the al Shabaab bullet and the Kenyan citizen. We are proud of them,” Oguna said at a briefing at police headquarters.
Corporal Francis Muli Solovea who was enlisted into the military in 1987; Corporal Noel Kipkurgat Kipkosiam enlisted in 1994; and Corporal Francis Imenyi Languchia enlisted in 1994, who were all attached to the Joint Helicopter Command, also died in the crash that claimed the first casualties in the war against al Shabaab. Lieutenant K.A Webi of the 1st Kenya Rifles who was commissioned into the Kenya Defence Forces as an army officer in May 2009 died in the line of duty on January 22 when his unit conducted a raid on al Shabaab camps in Delbiyow and Hosingow.
Another officer who was injured in the same incident and had been undergoing treatment at the hospital, Lieutenant Edward Okoyo attached to the 3rd Kenya Rifles. Also later died. He had only served for one-and-a-half years. He had been commissioned into the Kenya Defence Forces on June 30, 2010. Four AK-47 rifles, a large amount of ammunition, communication equipment and a collapsible water tank were recovered during the raid in which 11 al Shabaab fighters were reportedly killed.
Raymond Kirui, attached to 7 Kenya Rifles, and who joined the Kenya Defence Forces on October 25, 2010 died on November 24, last year when the vehicle he and 13 other soldiers were travelling in drove over an improvised explosive device in Bulla Garaay area near Mandera. Four of his colleagues were seriously injured and airlifted to Garissa hospital for treatment.
Lieutenant Evans Kipkorir Ngetich is another senior military officer who was killed by al Shabaab during fighting around Tabda area. He was attached to the 76th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. Six al Shabaab fighters were also killed in the incident. Kenya Defence Forces troops moving from Beles Qooani to Dhobley came into contact with al Shabaab fighters and a fierce gun battle ensued during which the senior officer sustained fatal injuries. Two other soldiers were also injured.
Lance Corporal Willie Njoroge attached to the 1st Kenya Rifles died during a confrontation between his unit and al Shabaab fighters in Somalia on December 29 last year. His unit had raided the al Qaeda linked insurgents base south of Beles Qooqani when he was killed. Five al Shabaab fighters were killed and many others injured during the incident. He joined he Kenya Defence Forces on August 3, 2002.
Others who have been killed are Yusuf Abdullah Korio, a private in the 15th Kenya Rifles. Korio joined the military in 1992 and died during combat on December 22 last year when during fighting between Tabda and Dhobley. Ronald Kipkemboi Kiptui, who joined the army on October 29, 2007 and was attached to the 7th Kenya Rifles, died on December 3, last year.
Two Kenya Navy officers, bombardier Edward Kiboi Mugo and gunner Kevin Mgogoyo Wamai, both of the 77 Artillery, drowned at sea on October 1 and October 2 when their boat capsized in the Indian Ocean. Mugo joined the military in 1994 while Wamai had served in the military since April 27, 2009.
One other officer, Philip Onyango, from the same unit is still presumed missing at sea since the incident. The Kenya Defence Forces has in its medical scheme a system of compensating the families of soldiers who die in the line of duty apart from taking care of the burial arrangements. The family of the dead soldier is always the first to receive the news after his or her seniors. This is done by a team of officers who are dispatched to the deceased soldier’s home to personally break the news.
Policemen and civilians have also been killed in grenade or improvised explosive device either lobbed into buildings or planted on roads. KDF entered Somalia in October with a mission to weaken and destroy al Shabaab militia. The militia have termed Kenya’s entry an act of war and threatened to retaliate. They have so far claimed responsibility for a number of attacks within Kenya that have left several people, mainly civilians, dead.
Bring our soldiers in Somalia back home
By WILLIAM OCHIENG’
Posted Wednesday, February 1 2012 at 20:00
We have bombed them, whacked them and clobbered them. What next? Every event, however nice or ugly, must have an end – be it a dance, sex or beer-drinking. If you outstretch the limit you might die.
The government must decide when to put a stop to our foray in Somalia. To roam all over Somalia chasing Al-Shabaab will be futile. We think they have been taught a lesson. All that remains is to tell them: “Behave yourselves, or else, we will return”.
Yes, let a team of our army join the pan-African force in Mogadishu to support the Somali Government to do its work. The point, however, is that Kenya has no capacity to hold Somalia for long. We have better things to do with our funds.
Many of our institutions are asking for better salaries, and some of our trunk roads have began to fall apart.
It is time to quit. After all, we are not colonisers!
What has shocked us are the brutal conditions in which Al-Shabaab have held their people. It is a pointer that there are many human beings who have not crossed the road from wildlife to modernity.
Al-Shabaab did not care that there was a big drought, and famine in their country. They even denied the donor communities the chance to distribute food to their people. Will the feeble Mogadishu Government ever humanise these brutes?
We must do the Barack Obama thing: Call our boys back home, stay armed, alert and vigilant. We must work with the international community as we keep our borders safe and secure.
Indeed, our policy should be to keep 100 miles of bordering Somali territory clean of Al-Shabaab. Should they attack us again, then we must (in collaboration with the United Nations Security Council) determine the next phase of conflict.
For many years, since the Shifta war in the 1960s, we kept our defence force away from the international spotlight. Some of our neighbours have boasted that the Kenya Army would be a walk-over in any fight.
Well, our forces have shown that they have mettle.
But we cannot keep them slogging in a dysfunctional war. Fighting Al-Shabaab is like keeping weaver birds off a garden, knowing you cannot chase each bird to its nest. Our army must be trained to help modernise and expand our infrastructure, rebuild our forests, and manage disasters.
There is also the question of whether that country, if properly reconstituted, could in the future resume its earlier agitation for a “greater” Somalia. We hope not, but in case that agitation returns, it should be met by a multilateral force that includes Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
Besides, it is hoped that the Somali citizens of neighbouring East African countries will not be lured to take part in utopian ethnic bandwagons.
Ultimately, however, it is our hope that the Somali Republic will be absorbed into the East African Community, where it rightly belongs.
Somalis are a very industrious and friendly people. Their economy combines agriculture, in a few well-watered valleys, with pastoralism. They have been traders and fishermen for centuries, and it is suspected that Somalia, like neighbouring territories, might have vast oil deposits.
Prof Ochieng’ teaches history at Maseno University.
On 16 October 2011, Kenya’s armed forces invaded southern Somalia in the midst of a severe regional famine. Their purpose is to capture the port city of Kismayu and to remove the Al Shabaab Islamist militia from the region. This presentation will review the background to Kenya’s military action, setting it in the context of the securitization of development in the wider region of eastern Africa. Refugees still flood across the borders of Ethiopia and Kenya, simultaneously presenting a humanitarian and a security challenge. Famine has been both a cause of the invasion and a cloak behind which its politics can be hidden: issues of international responsibility, and of citizenship and surveillance, loom large. It will be argued that the Kenyan invasion implies a strengthening of sovereignty in this region, through the militarization of politics. The weak states of eastern Africa are being remade at their borders through warfare and conflict. A decade on from 9/11, the global war on terror is having a profound impact upon the region where the threat of al Qaeda first became manifest to the world.
We must pull out foreign troops, give Somalia back to its people
The United Kingdom will host a conference on Somalia next week on February 23. I have also been invited to the UK to attend a conference on Somalia next month. This conference seeks to bring together “senior level practitioners and policy makers, community representatives, analyst and academics… and draw on expertise from the US and Europe, alongside Somali experts, academics and community leaders based in the UK, Somalia and East Africa”. Both the conferences are broadly organised under the auspices of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Over the last few years, I have been invited to various international initiatives and conferences on Somalia. Internationally, there is broad acknowledgement that fight against terrorism cannot be won only through military means. I am also not in doubt that no solution for Somalia will succeed if the people are not in the centre and in deed own the process. My principle though for participation has been to support any genuine efforts aimed at the resolution of the crisis in Somalia. Human rights actors both locally and internationally are alive to the attendant violations as a consequence or under the guise of combating terrorism directly linked to the Somali crisis. The impact of the crisis to Kenya’s Muslim community and in particular Kenya’s Somali community is evident. The resolution of this crisis has Kenya’s Muslim community as one of the principal beneficiaries.
I am pleased that the international community has been unequivocal about supporting military intervention in Somalia under the command of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom). Kenya’s request to join the Amisom was undoubtedly as a consequence of being left with no choice. Military action is costly both in human and a financial sense. Demonstrated zeal to combat terrorism usually attracts the West’s military and financial support. Not this time! Where all major powers have diplomatically or politically supported Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, there has been less zeal to provide more tangible military and financial support. A prolonged incursion has an obvious financial cost which will eventually bite the taxpayers. Such a state of affairs will occasion questions as to the strategy or wit of the military operations.
Most of the present day military engagements were at the onset popular and legitimate. This is in particular reference to Afghanistan and Iraq. As the cost of war soared, casualties increased and no end was in sight, respective populations across a host of Western nations started to ask the hard questions.
What began as popular and legitimate security/military interventions cost politicians their popularity and power, the taxpayers their resources and raised critical questions as to the justifications of the military operations. In my view there were numerous strategic oversights or assumptions on our part. In particular, international support that was not forthcoming as fast as was hoped. We claim to have weakened the Al Shabaab yet need international support to enter Kismayu. We now hope that the partnership between the Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda will attract an international coalition. It is your ‘war’, fight it!
Yet in the alternative, this partnership also ushers the entry of international jihadists who are being left ‘idle’ owing to US pullout in Iraq and the intention to pull out of Afghanistan. This might lead to the increase of violence in Somalia. As the world seeks a solution to Somalia, we must aim at ending the violence, pull out foreign troops and give Somalia back to its people. This will be my message to the conference!
The writer is a lawyer and former commissioner with the KNCHR
30 Kenyan civilians killed in revenge attacks by Somali al-Qaida group since Kenya’s incursion
By Associated Press, Published: February 18
NAIROBI, Kenya — An al-Qaida-linked Somali militant group is suspected of killing at least 30 Kenyan civilians since Kenyan troops entered Somalia, a police spokesman said Saturday.
Eric Kiraithe said the killings are believed to have been carried out by sympathizers of the Somali insurgent group al-Shabab since October in Kenya. He said most of the attacks were carried out in towns near the border between the two nations.
Police say that dozens of Kenyan youth have been recruited by al-Shabab and are operating in the country. Al-Qaida announced earlier this month that it was merging with al-Shabab.
A Kenyan man admitted to being an al-Shabab member and was sentenced to life in prison late October after pleading guilty to throwing a grenade at a packed bus stop that killed one person in the capital city.
Kenya blames the militant group for several kidnappings, including those of four Europeans on Kenyan soil.
Soon after Kenya’s military incursion, al-Shabab vowed to bring down skyscrapers and carry out suicide bombings in Kenya’s capital.
The militant group claimed responsibility for the July 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda which killed 76 people watching the World Cup final.
Military spokesman Col. Cyrus Oguna said the government is in discussions with influential religious leaders and community leaders to intervene to seek the release of more than 10 Kenyans being held captive by al-Shabab.
He said since the operation began the Kenyan army is now 68 miles (nearly 110 kilometers) inside Somalia but their advance has been slowed down because efforts to pacify the local communities.
“Pacification must continue until we are confident that the area is very stable very secure allow us to move forward,” Oguna said.
http://www.metacafe.com/watch/5554562/al_kataib_media_and_inspire_the_believers_part_3_of_3/