Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1801, SOMALIA – CODEL MARSHALL SCENESETTER: HOW
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001801
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR H – PLEASE PASS CODEL MARSHALL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PTER MOPS PINR OREP KE SO AF IZ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA – CODEL MARSHALL SCENESETTER: HOW
IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN RELATE TO SOMALIA
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S//NF) Summary: U.S. Embassy Nairobi warmly welcomes CODEL Marshall and looks forward to your September 1-3 visit. We note your questions regarding media reports that pressure in Iraq/Afghanistan has prompted al-Qa,ida to shift some of its operations/efforts to Somalia (ref A). To address this question, we have reviewed a body of available information from press, embassy, and other reporting. The rise of al-Shabaab and the increase in foreign fighters operating in Somalia warrants significant concern; several al-Qa,ida operatives, most notably Saleh Nabhan, have a history of involvement in East Africa and are currently cooperating with al-Shabaab leaders and involved in training foreign fighters in Somalia. We speculate that, due to pressure especially in Afghanistan, al-Qa,ida could consider Somalia a safer training ground for foreign fighters, some of whom may intend subsequently to travel to Afghanistan or Iraq. However, based on a review of foreign fighter trends and al-Qa,ida/al-Shabaab operations, we are unable to establish a strong correlation between recent military pressure on al Qa,ida in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased al-Qa,ida influence/efforts in Somalia. Nonetheless, there is a clear threat from al-Qaida linked extremists and growingnumbers of foreign fighters in Somalia over the past several years, which are directly challenging the efforts of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to establish itself. End Summary.
Foreign Fighters: Origins and Motivations
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¶2. (S//NF) Many of the foreign fighters currently operating in Somalia, particularly those who entered to fight the Ethiopians from 2006-2008, are ethnic Somalis, recruited from either neighboring countries or diasporas overseas and motivated in the past by a sense of Somali nationalism, jihadist propaganda, and the presence of foreign troops in the country. As widely covered in the press, this includes North Americans, including at least 20 young men who were recruited from Minneapolis alone, and recruits from European countries with large Somali diasporas. Fighters have also come from within East Africa, most notably Kenya and Sudan. In addition, press reports and our conversations with Somali government officials note the presence of an unknown number of non-Somali fighters from South Asia and the Middle East, including Pakistanis, Yemenis, and other unidentified &Arabs8. We speculate some of these fighters may have chosen, or been directed to, Somalia for training and to gain jihadist experiences because Somalia currently affords comparatively greater safety for camps and other sites than South Asia or Iraq.
¶3. (S//NF) Neither we nor the Somali government knows exactly how many foreign fighters are in Somalia, as reporting varies widely. Statements by Somali government officials mention several thousand foreigners, which we believe are exaggerations, or at best estimations based on fighter sightings and rumors. During the intense May and June fighting in Mogadishu, there were numerous reports of foreign fighters interspersed with al-Shabaab, likely directed from camps in Southern Somalia as reinforcements. Conversations with Somali political leaders, suggest that as of mid-August, significant numbers of al-Shabaab forces have left Mogadishu and dispersed across southern and central regions of Somalia.
¶4. (S//NF) The timing and motivation of foreign fighters arriving in Somalia appears tied to perceptions of internal Somali dynamics. Our conversations with Somali political leaders highlight that some foreigners were already present during the Council of Islamic Courts period, and that the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 both prompted some foreigners to flee, and provided motivation for a new influx of foreign fighters, including ethnic Somalis determined to drive Ethiopia out of Somalia. Al-Shabaab,s territorial gains in 2008, and the subsequent Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia in January 2009, prompted additional foreign fighters to join what was seen as a successful struggle. Regardless of their initial motivations, these young recruits are subject to indoctrination and use by violent, often foreign, extremists, as demonstrated by Shirwa Ahmed, an ethnic Somali from Minneapolis who became one of the suicide-bombers perpetrating multiple attacks in Puntland and Somalilandon October 29, 2009.
¶5. (S//NF) Al-Qa,ida leaders in early 2009 publicly endorsed the Somalia &jihad,8 capitalizing on al-Shabaab,s gains by launching a rhetoric campaign designed to encourage aspiring jihadis to travel to Somalia, and portraying Somali President Sharif as illegitimate. In the first half of 2009, Al-Qa’ida issued several videos praising al-Shabaab, denouncing President Sharif,s government, and urging fighters to travel to Somalia. Most notable among these propaganda efforts was a statement attributed to Usama Bin Laden titled &Fight on Champions of Somalia,8 and similar videos by senior al-Qa,ida leaders, including Aymen al-Zawahiri and Abu-Yahya al-Libi(Ref B).
¶6. (S//NF) Beyond the public support from al-Qa,ida videos encouraging foreign fighters to travel to Somalia, there is scant evidence of significant direct al-Qa,ida financial or military support for extremists in Somalia, or a foreign fighter pipeline from Iraq or Afghanistan. Other support for Somali militants, largely in the form of financing and smuggled weapons, comes from a variety of sources including Eritrea and conduits through Eritrea, diaspora remittances, smuggling from Yemen, and likely business donors in the Gulf States. These appear to be important external sources of support for anti-TFG militants in Somalia.
¶7. (S//NF) Within Somalia, al-Shabaab,s core leaders cooperate with several al-Qa,ida operatives with a long history in the region. Most notably, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was active during the 2006 Council of Islamic Courts, and currently remains in Somalia, has made a concerted effort to cooperate with key al-Shabaab leaders, and is actively recruiting and training foreign fighters. These senior level extremists are long-time operatives in East Africa, rather than new arrivals from Iraq or Afghanistan, although the new influx of foreign jihadis likely contains individuals with agenda’s beyond the Somali insurgency. Nabhan, with his transnational agenda and involvement in training foreigners, makes the situation even more dangerous.
Kenyan CT Efforts
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¶8. (S//NF) Kenyan security officials have worked to address the threat of terrorism in Kenya, and are aware of the trend in foreign fighters and the smuggling of support to al-Shabaab, some of which transits Kenya. Kenya fears that al-Shabaab will begin conducting cross border attacks, and has deployed military forces to positions in eastern and northern Kenya near the Somali border. Kenya has attempted to close this border, but the consistent flow of Somali refugees demonstrates the difficulties inherent to controlling this long, porous, and largely unregulated border region. In addition, the TFG and the Government of Kenya are secretly considering an offensive in the Juba region of Somalia, aimed at pushing al-Shabaab out of the key port of Kismayo and neighboring areas in Southern Somalia (reftel C).
Comment
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¶9. (S//NF) While we speculate that al-Qa,ida may consider Somalia a relatively safer location for foreign fighter training camps, at this point, al-Qa,ida,s efforts to
&shift8 focus towards Somalia appear to have consisted primarily of the aforementioned publicity campaign. There is some indication that vigorous effort by the U.S. and the Kenyans may have disrupted efforts by al-Qa’ida and the al-Shabaab to work more closely together. Even as a degree of increased stability in Iraq, and military pressure in Afghanistan may have encouraged a small number of foreign fighters to choose Somalia as an alternate venue for jihad, we lack evidence of significant numbers of fighters previously engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan diverting to Somalia. Likewise, while there are widespread reports of Pakistani and Arab fighters in Somalia, the timing and influx of these fighters appear primarily tied to developments in Somalia and perceptions of Somalia as a suitable location for jihad. Nevertheless, al-Qa,ida operatives coordinate with al-Shabaab,s core leaders, and continue to use Somalia as a staging and training base.
RANNEBERGER
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