Consequences of Raila’s deal with Kenyan Muslims
For the United States, the deal meant that once Raila came to power, the free handedness with which the US government was fighting terrorism in Kenya would come to an end
For the United States government that has gone to war in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism, one big strategic error Raila may have made to reduce US support of his quest for Presidency was to reach a public deal with Kenyan Muslims that once he occupied State House, no Muslim would be taken to Guantanamo.463 For the US government, this kind of deal had wide reaching implications even though in the eyes of millions of Kenyans and the 20 percent of Kenyan Muslims, this kind of deal was long overdue.
Although it was populist and intended to rake in votes for Raila Odinga, especially in the Coast Province dominated by Muslims, the United States government is unlikely to have been comfortable with the deal because of the difficulty of supporting a regime whose leader had openly made it clear that cooperation with the US government would not include arresting and repatriating Kenyan terrorist suspects to Guantanamo for interrogation.
Raila’s deal with Kenyan Muslims amounted to drawing the boundary as to what the US government could and could not do in Kenya. The message Raila was sending in the name of capturing the Muslim vote was that once he became President, Kenya would no longer be a puppet of the United States, especially on its war against terrorism. Raila had himself been at the forefront in the fight against the anti-terror bill464 that was also opposed by Kenyan Parliamentarians who later shot it down, much to the chagrin of the United States government.
By reaching a deal with Kenyan Muslims,465 Raila was confirming to the US government that his opposition to the Bill was not accidental but a well-thought-out position, which he intended to widen by preventing the transportation of Kenyan Muslims to Guantanamo for torture. I wish to argue that the US government took an early opportunity to congratulate Kibaki after the rigged elections because they were uncomfortable with Raila. The consequences of congratulating Kibaki minutes after Kivuitu announced the results might not have been apparent to the US government, which must have been hoping that Kibaki would be able to govern after rigging without the kind of chaos that erupted in Kenya, forcing the US government to make a significant and tactical retreat. If the early congratulation of Kibaki by the Bush Administration was based on intelligence, it must have been a massive failure of this intelligence because the congratulatory note was inconsistent with political realities on the ground.
If Raila could prevent the US from picking up Kenyans at will to be repatriated to Guantanamo, what kind of message would he be sending to other African leaders? That the US government could also be defied “Mugabe style” and further risk involved in this kind of political message is that other African or Third World countries that were already being used to “capture terrorists” could have been inspired to question this overt imperialist policy. Putting the deal in writing and circulating it to the public must have made the situation even worse because then, it could have been difficult for Raila to make an about turn, arguing that he never made such promises or that his message might have been taken “out of context.” Despite the US government’s discomfort with the deal, it made Raila popular in the eyes of Kenyans because the deal portrayed him as a strong leader who could stand up against unacceptable imperialist policies that were routinely being forced down the throats of Kenyan leaders in the name of US interests, from Kenyatta, Moi to Kibaki dictatorships
For the United States, the deal meant that once Raila came to power, the free handedness with which the US government was fighting terrorism in Kenya would come to an end. Translated in real terms, it meant that the activities of the FBI and the CIA agents, whose task is to track down terrorists in Kenya and repatriate them to Guantanamo, would come to an abrupt end. When Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, went to hide in Kenya, he was quickly captured through the help of former dictator Daniel arap Moi who cooperated with Western intelligence agencies to hand Ocalan to the Turkish government. In summary, the Raila-Muslim deal defied United States Foreign policy on terrorism and tended to undermine the Bush Policy on the war against terror that was being sold across the world and that was responsible for justification of the war in Iraq. Preventing the United States from repatriating terrorist suspects to the United States also carried the risk of radicalizing opinion in Africa and the Third World about uncritical acceptance of US foreign policies implemented through the cooperation of other countries. If Kenya could defy the United States on the question of repatriating suspects to Guantanamo, why should Uganda or Tanzania, Togo or Malawi accept to play ball?
Another issue is that the signing of an MoU with Kenyan Muslims portrayed Raila as a pro-Muslim leader, a portrayal that was unacceptable to the United States, which was waging war on Islamic States such as Iran and Sudan on grounds that these countries were harbouring terrorists. The decision to defend Muslims from repatriation to Guantanamo could give Muslims morale and, theoretically, encourage Islamic militants from the Middle East, Asia and other countries to use Kenya as a safe haven. This could easily be facilitated through the acquisition of Kenyan passports, which is easy through corruption. The danger for the US government is that it would have no control of Islamic militants who could enter Kenya and begin anti-US operations in the country, especially if such militants were Kenyan passport holders. In short, terrorists could take Kenyan citizenship and enter the country with the United States being unable to intervene.
For the United States, Raila’s deal with Kenyan Muslims was embarrassing because former regimes — the Moi and Kibaki dictatorships — were playing ball, especially on cooperation in the war against terrorism. When the US Embassy in Nairobi was bombed, former dictator Moi is among the people who demonstrated in the streets of Nairobi to show solidarity with the United States war on terror. The policy mooted by Raila that Kenyan Muslims would not be repatriated to Guantanamo also demonstrated a level of independent thinking on the part of Raila Odinga that was unacceptable to US imperialism, which is used to dealing with puppets ready to dance to any political tune composed by the United States government. This tendency of independent thinking on the part of Raila Odinga was incompatible with imperialist policy of political control and manipulation. Another issue is that the MoU with the Muslims carried with it the risk of radicalization of Muslims in Kenya by providing proof that it was possible to oppose or resist US policy in Kenya, especially on the thorny issue touching on the fight against terrorism. The MoU was, politically speaking, an alternative anti-US policy mainly associated with anti-US regimes like Venezuela and North Korea, countries where the US government can never dream of entering with the purpose of picking suspects to be repatriated to Guantanamo. The United States was not yet ready to see a Kenyan President who could show alternative thinking — rebellion to US policy to what Kenyans are used to.
However, the biggest problem, according to my analysis, is that the MoU Raila signed with Kenyan Muslims must have created a lot of anxiety to the US government because it could open the way to fresh and new anti-US policies in Kenya, especially if the United States was not playing ball. If Raila could defy the United States on the question of repatriating Muslims to Guantanamo, what else could he do? With huge imperialist economic, political and strategic interests in Kenya, the risk is that future anti-US policies could be linked to economic activities of Western multi-national companies with devastating and unforeseen consequences. It is my thesis that these factors could have combined to portray Raila as a potentially dangerous President in Kenya and this thinking could have pushed the United States to congratulate Kibaki following the stealing of Raila’s Presidency.
Raila Odinga’s Stolen Presidency pages: 313-316
RELATED: Why did US imperialism congratulate Kibaki after Raila Odinga’s Presidency was stolen?
About the Author
You can try all the propagandas, BUT we have made our mind.
Let me teach you something son, MUSLIMS ARE NOT TERRORISTS. They are LAW abiding citizens. Those who break the LAW, cannot be SHIELDED by the fact that they are muslims ( Because they are NOT)
Terrorists should carry their own CROSS, period!!!! How do you take the actions of a crazy guy, killing innocent people ? Are these the kind of ELEMENTS Raila is protecting?
To all Kenyans, if you break the LAW, prepare to face the consequences alone.
Another thing, in Nairobi my neigbours are muslims, very nice people. We’re friends. If one becomes a crook and join the terrorist, do you think he will remain a friend of mine? He will be scratched forever. I will not even take a packet of milk and a half of bread to prison to visit him. Because i will not want to see him any more.
I think you should try another tactic. This holds no water in any class, be it baby Class.