In his book, Miguna decries Raila’s work with corrupt personalities and names both Caroli Omondi and Isahakia as key examples. Raila’s alliance with dirty personalities did not start when he became Prime Minister. In 2007, and as listed below, he worked with some of the most corrupt personalities known in Kenya’s history for strategic reasons. The agenda was to defeat the thieving Kikuyu ruling class which was looting the country’s e economy, violating human rights and running the country like a private business empire. In excerpts below, I detail these personalities together with their corrupt histories. The question which has to be posed is whether Raila had any better options in the political market place and whether his strategy of working with wealth grabbers was the only way out. Another question is whether the situation has changed ahead of next elections and whether there is any credible alternative to Raila as next President of Kenya.
Chasing The Presidential Dream: Raila Odinga’s Strategic Alliance With Political Opportunists
Before the advent of the November 21 Referendum, the unfolding crisis with the writing of a new Constitution after NARC came to power, the dumping of the MoU and the formation of ODM, William Ruto, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kalonzo Musyoka and Musalia Mudavadi who all became “leading lights” in ODM, were all members of the vanquished ruling Party KANU before they resurfaced to join Raila in the anti-Kibaki struggle. Uhuru Kenyatta was the Chairman of KANU Party, William Ruto, the Secretary General, while Musalia Mudavadi was the immediate former Vice President who served under none other than former Dictator Daniel arap Moi, a ruthless dictator who plundered Kenya’s economy for twenty four years.
However, Raila decided to work with these politicians, some of whom had frustrated his efforts towards rising to the Presidency after he accepted to merge his NDP Party with Moi’s KANU. Raila accepted to work with Uhuru Kenyatta who was central in his departure from KANU four months before the December 2002 elections. Despite the unpredictability of these newfound political allies, Raila convinced his supporters that unity with previous enemies was the way out. In fact, there was little alternative because Raila could not mobilize to defeat the Wako Draft of the Constitution using LDP alone. He needed support countrywide. Who were the opportunists Raila decided to work with in the process of chasing his Presidential ambitions?
(For more about this chapter already excerpted here at KSB detailing corrupt practices of personalities mentioned, see: William Ruto, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi, Henry Kosgey (not yet uploaded) plus those summerized below). These personalities were still firmly in ODM at the time Stolen Presidency was published).
Najib Balala, Charity Ngilu, JJ Kamotho, Moody Awori et al.
Other opportunists whom Raila Odinga decided to work with for the sake of chasing Presidential ambitions were Najib Balala, Charity Ngilu, JJ Kamotho, Moody Awori, Uhuru Kenyatta, George Saitoti, William ole Ntimama, Sally Kosgey and a host of others. Balala was a member of KANU and although his joint work with Raila Odinga began before the NARC era, this does not eliminate the fact that he quit KANU to join LDP when Raila was quitting KANU because he read the political mood correctly and envisioned the coming dethronement of KANU from power soon after Raila fell out with Moi as a result of the Uhuru Project. The case of Balala is the same as the case of JJ Kamotho who had been working with the Moi dictatorship for decades but quit to join LDP when KANU appeared to have been sinking. Even in cases where Kamotho had lost elections after being thrown out of Parliament by his own people, Moi would nominate him and then proceed to give him a Ministry to run. After he was rejected by the electorate, he was nominated to Parliament by Moi who made him Minister of Education. When he was in KANU, he was one of Raila’s staunchest critics within but when his opportunism informed him that time was up in KANU in the run up to the December 2002 elections, he is one of the “far-thinking” opportunists who ditched Moi to join Raila Odinga in LDP ahead of the formation of the Rainbow Alliance that later joined hands with Kibaki’s team to defeat Moi.
Kamotho also falls in the same category with Moody Awori who jumped from KANU during the Raila-Moi crisis, joined LDP and after NARC came to power, he ditched Raila to work with Kibaki after he was appointed Vice President following the death of Kijana Wamalwa, former Vice President. Awori had built his fortunes under the tutelage of Moi but opportunism encouraged him to dump Moi at the eleventh hour when political equations indicated that KANU’s hold on power was weakening because of the anti-KANU wave that swept across Kenya. After he became Vice President, Awori did not say anything about the dumped MoU although it was crafted by his Party, LDP. The reason is that he could have been sacked by Kibaki after recommendations by the Mafia Team that was running State House.
The case of opportunist Uhuru Kenyatta is even more pathetic. He was tossed from left to right by agents of the Moi dictatorship who plucked him from the Kenya Tourist Board by convincing him that he would be the next President of Kenya after Moi. He agreed and went by Moi’s Uhuru Project, went ahead to frustrate Raila Odinga’s Presidential bid during his dangerous games with Moi and when Uhuru failed to make it to State House because Kenyans refused to buy the Moi bait, Uhuru Kenyatta waited for an opportunity then jumped over to Raila’s side during the Referendum. He moved the whole of KANU into an alliance with ODM, tried to build his profile as a Presidential candidate then quit ODM when PNU hawks allegedly convinced him that he would be Presidential material come 2012. He dumped ODM alliance as his top officials such as William Ruto and Henry Kosgey remained behind.
There might not be much to say about the opportunism of Saitoti who should not have been in politics after the December 2002 elections. As former Vice President in Moi’s KANU, Saitoti has had a web of corruption scandals surrounding him. Because of the “no action” policy of Kibaki’s government against the corrupt in former Moi’s regime, Saitoti escaped being sent to prison. When Raila disagreed with Moi just before the December 2002 election, Saitoti joined Raila Odinga in setting up the Rainbow Alliance. He was angry with Moi who had stripped him of his post as Vice President. After the betrayal of the MoU by Kibaki, Saitoti joined Kibaki’s camp by dumping Raila Odinga. In the last election, which saw the stealing of Raila’s Presidency, Saitoti was firmly with Kibaki who blessed him with the Ministry of Internal Security soon after Kibaki stole Raila’s Presidency. In Kenya, opportunism pays in many ways.
That brings us to the case of Charity Ngilu who has never worked closely with Raila Odinga but who joined Raila’s camp after weighing her options. The problem with political opportunism is that if you make the wrong judgement, you could end up in a ditch. Kamotho made the wrong judgement this time around, joined PNU and was ditched by the electorate because he had been away with Luos for too long, only returning home when fire was burning at his former homestead in LDP. He went back to PNU after he had abused Kibaki several times when he was having a good time in LDP. At one point in May 1999, he said that Kibaki was a “paper tiger” after accusing Michuki of having bought all tea seedlings in Muranga to ensure that farmers could not plant tea.306
Ngilu was Kibaki’s friend and she ought to take responsibility for being part of the infrastructure that contributed to the dumping of the MoU because she never rose to speak up against the betrayal. When the country was faced with the crisis of a new Constitution when Kibaki’s boys refused to let go, Charity kept her silence because she was on Kibaki’s side. When Kibaki dumped her by keeping her away from State House soon after Kibaki named his Cabinet, Ngilu also began to take an anti-Kibaki stand in her politics.
In the run up to the December 2007 elections, she was basically alone as she constantly remained undecided on whether to present herself as a Presidential candidate, join Kibaki, go it alone in some way or join Raila Odinga’s ODM. Charity does not have any ideological positions that could have prevented her from swaying to whatever side because just like other politicians who joined Raila Odinga in his quest for Presidency, Charity’s politics are being driven by strong opportunism. In the last minute, she tried to join forces with Kalonzo Musyoka but she noticed that Musyoka was not going anywhere with his ODM-Kenya splinter group. Therefore,
she decided to jump onto the ODM bandwagon as she began to sing anti-Kibaki songs that had been composed by ODM. Then there is Sally Kosgey and William Ole Ntimama who all worked with Moi and frustrated the struggle for political pluralism during their days in government. When their day of shifting Alliances came, they dumped Moi’s KANU to join Raila Odinga because ODM was the Party of the moment. Lack of ideology in Kenyan politics is responsible for last minute defections to different political parties, especially during election time, and this is normal in Kenya. The issue is that Raila appears to have understood the role of opportunism in Kenyan politics and desisted from making permanent enemies. Raila could also be accused of being an opportunist because he has always been changing parties without being driven by ideological considerations. The difference is that Raila has always been the “kingmaker” and other opportunists have always had to run in his direction.
For Raila Odinga, working with opportunists was part of the political strategy for power but when he succeeded in mobilising all available opportunists in the political field and eventually won the Presidency, Kibaki stole it from him thereby plunging Kenya into crisis. Raila’s joint work with opportunists who had fought him tooth and nail when circumstances dictated is proof that opportunists can help bring about changes because they helped in defeating both Moi and Kibaki. The baggage with opportunists is that they are unpredictable political animals bound to change positions at any time without notice as long as they believe that their personal interests might not be taken care of in any situation. Sometimes, they make mistakes and lose but sometimes they succeed. Those who worked with Raila closely and who built ethnic bases of support to enhance their opportunism benefited because they are currently Cabinet Ministers in Raila’s or Kibaki’s camp. Their Constituents could be starving but opportunism also carries with it a level of “I don’t care attitude” because opportunists work for their stomachs and not for the interest of the people. Kenyans could probably learn the pattern of political opportunism among the country’s politicians as the nation continues to reflect on how Raila defeated Kibaki before Kibaki stole his Presidency.
Chapter Eight: Raila Odinga’s Stolen Presidency: Consequences and the Future of Kenya (pages 163-177)
About the Author
Osewe take a hike with this Raila stolen presidency…if all people in kenya n even those in turkana or samburu can be reading or getting access to the news day in day out like we do,they cant vote for Raila cz for once look at Miguna*s book…how corrupt ,evil,and inhuman he is….read it then you will know wat u write about him next….
KSB: If I knew yr main problem, I could be able to address yr concerns. I am not campaigning for Raila here. I am excerpting a book I wrote and I am doing it on my blog. What is wrong with that? I don’t know why you are itching. I don’t need yr advice on how to run KSB.
Moment of bravado that changed Kenya
By KAMAU MUTUNGA
Posted Tuesday, July 31 2012 at 19:00
In the early hours of 1 August, 1982, exactly 30 years ago today, Kenyans woke up to a coup attempt by junior rebel officers of the Kenya Air Force against the government of then president Daniel arap Moi.
More than 100 soldiers and 200 civilians died, including two (West) Germans, an Englishwoman, and a Japanese male tourist and his child. Two Asian women committed suicide after being raped, and the economic damage kissed the Sh500 million ceiling.
The madness lasted less than 12 hours, but the damage is still with us. The mastermind, Senior Private Hezekiah Ochuka Rabala, was Kenya’s “president” for less than six hours, but the adverse ripple effects of the abortive coup lasted more than two decades.
Yet the poorly planned coup could have been nipped in the bud.
Lieutenant Leslie Kombo Mwamburi of the Kenya Air Force, Nanyuki, had informed his superiors about the impending revolt, even giving the date and time of the onslaught. Mwamburi had taken oath of allegiance to the coup but had a change of heart and sold out the plot, as he later testified during the court martial that followed at the Lang’ata Barracks.
Also, a month to the coup, Peter Ngare Kagume, the acting commander of the Kenya Air Force, Nanyuki, informed commanding officer Colonel Felix Njuguna of the plot. Nothing was done.
At Nairobi’s Moi Air Base, where the coup was plotted by the swimming pool, Air Force commander Major General Peter Mwagiru Kariuki had been informed about the coup plans. The Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Joseph Mulinge, asked Major General Kariuki to ensure that the informer was arrested and made to give the details and names.
Major General Kariuki, despite pleading that he had been misled by the military intelligence that a coup was impossible, was later discharged from the army and jailed for four years in January 1983 for failing to suppress the mutiny.
The Special Branch too, which had infiltrated the military, knew about the coup and even had the names of the perpetrators-to-be. Indeed, two days to the coup, James Kanyotu, the then spy chief, had asked President Moi for permission to arrest, among others, Sergeant Joseph Ogidi (who had tried to recruit Mwamburi), Corporals Charles Oriwa, Walter Ojode, Bramwel Injene Njereman, and Senior Privates Protas Oteyo Okumu and Hezekiah Ochuka.
But the President did not deem it fit that the police should get embroiled in military arrests as that would have been tantamount to insubordination. The matter, he said, would be dealt with internally on Monday, 2 August.
But alas! At midnight on August 1, the coup, which envisaged seizing control of the Voice of Kenya, the Kenyatta International Airport’s control tower, the Wilson Airport, the General Post Office, and the Central Bank of Kenya “to protect people’s money”, besides blowing up State House Nairobi, JKIA, and President Moi’s home in Kabarak, started in earnest.
Retired President Moi was never the same again after surviving the coup by “stupid fellows who had no manners”, as Charles Njonjo termed them.
Here is how the failed 1982 military coup affected Kenyans, directly and otherwise:
Era of political repression
President Moi once told Ronald Ngala to “take it easy, our time will come”. Ngala was then wondering why Moi allowed himself to be cold-shouldered and demeaned by hirelings in the Kenyatta administration.
Well, the attempted coup provided him with an arsenal to settle old scores and assert himself by systematically instituting an oppressive one-man state through consolidation, centralisation, and personalisation of power while neutralising disloyal elements, real and imagined.
In his book, African Successes, David Leonard notes that the coup attempt was “a piece of good luck” for Moi. The attempt legitimised Moi’s reorganisation of the command structure of the armed forces and the police. Once the attempt had been made and suppressed, he was able to remove leaders from positions that were most threatening. The armed forces and the police “were neutralised”.
Ben Gethi, the Commissioner of Police, for instance, was detained at Kamiti and later retired “in public interest”. Moi also eliminated Kikuyu and Luo officers from the military and put in Kalenjin and non-ethnic challengers. For instance, he named General Mahmoud Mohammed — an ethnic Somali — the army chief of general staff.
With the disciplined forces in the hands of handpicked loyalists, the political structure was next. President Moi had a Bill enacted that granted him emergency powers, and the provincial administration and civil service came under the Office of the President, for the first time in post-independence Kenya. In effect, a DC could stop an MP from addressing his constituents.
Next was Parliament, whose privilege to access information from the Office of the President was revoked, thus subordinating it to the presidency. The Legislature could only rubber-stamp — not check — the excesses of the Executive. That is how, in 1986, it imposed limitations on the independence of the Judiciary, where Joseph Kamere, Attorney General at the time of the coup, was replaced with Cecil Miller.
Two expatriate judges — Derek Schofield and Patrick O’Connor — resigned, lamenting that the judicial system was “blatantly contravened by those who are supposed to be its supreme guardians”.
Parliament also gave police powers to detain critics of Moi’s authoritarian regime. Detention without trial, which had been suspended in 1978, was reintroduced through a constitutional amendment: George Anyona, Koigi Wamwere, Gitobu Imanyara, John Khaminwa, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kiraitu Murungi, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, among others, were detained in inhumane conditions. Many fled the country afterwards. Others died.
It did not end there. The freedoms of the press, expression, association, and movement were curtailed.
In effect, Kenya became a police state.
Omnipresent head of State
President Moi ensured that his presence was felt everywhere; he stared at you from the currency in your wallet and mandatory portraits in every business premise. Streets, schools, a stadium, university, airport, and monuments were named after him. He gobbled half the news time on radio and TV, where he was always the first bulletin item.
Ministers wore lapel pins with his photo on them. Indeed, one Cabinet minister in the Moi government was said to have had a dozen suits, each with its own pin lapel… just in case he forgot and wore the wrong suit!
Moi was felt in the education system, in which students recited a loyalty pledge, learnt about the Nyayo philosophy in GHC, and drank Nyayo milk. In the remotest parts of the country, the local chief was the president’s eyes and ears.
Comical ‘mlolongo’ system
Kanu replaced the secret ballot with a system where voters lined up behind candidates in 1986. Parliamentary candidates who secured more than 70 per cent of the votes did not have to go through the process of the secret ballot in the General Election in what was more or less a “selection within an election”.
In case of disputed polling over a head-count, a repeat was not possible. Kenyans lost their right to vote for parliamentary candidates of their choice, with ridiculous consequences.
Take the case of Kiambu coffee picker Mukora Muthiora. He “defeated” the late Njenga Karume for the Kanu sub-branch chairmanship.
Karume was then a former assistant minister for Cooperative Development. Provincial Commissioner Victor Musoga declared Muthiora the winner, yet he never participated in the election.
‘The den of dissidents’
The coup provided Moi with the opportunity to crack down on lawyers, authors, activists, scientists, and (especially) university lecturers perceived to be critical of his authoritarian rule. Most were detained for what the State called “over-indulgence in politics” and having “Marxist leanings”. Among these were Prof Edward Oyugi and Mukaru Ng’ang’a.
Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, then a University of Nairobi law lecturer, had earlier been detained for having “seditious” literature purportedly advising “J M Solidarity. Don’t be fooled. Reject these Nyayos”.
Other university lecturers did not fare any better, such as Mau Mau historian Maina wa Kinyatti, Al-Amin Mazrui, Kamonji Wachira, Prof Micere Mugo, and Dr Kimani Gecau, who fled to Zimbabwe.
The University of Nairobi, which Moi called a “den of dissidents with foreign backing”, was closed for almost a year after the coup. It was never the hotbed of “intellectual pyrotechnics” again.
People’s Redemption Council sought ‘equality’
Every uprising, bloodless or otherwise, has triggers. The 1982 coup attempt was precipitated by, among others, official corruption, abuse of power, and economic degradation. Turning Kenya into a single-party state, besides the more apparent poor conditions in the armed forces — particularly the lack of recognition for non-commissioned officers — also fuelled discontent within the forces.
The Kenya Air Force officers who were implicated in the coup were predominantly from the Luo community, which James Waore Diang’a, the mastermind of the revolt, said was under-represented in the army and politically shortchanged. The Moi Cabinet at the time of the coup, Diang’a noted in his book, 1982, had only three Luos.
He had recruited Hezekiah Ochuka in 1981, but his plot was discovered by intelligence moles. Diang’a was arrested on 15 January that year and charged with treason. But the court martial concluded that since his accomplices could not be traced, it was impossible for one man to overthrow the government. He was accused of “planning an act of sedition” and jailed for three years at Kamiti.
But his bloody dream never faded.
The charismatic Ochuka took it over in March and recruited members of the People’s Redemption Council, mostly from the Air Force bases in Nairobi and Nanyuki, with him as chairman. The Czechoslovakia-trained John Odongo Langi would link the plotters through transport and logistics.
That done, setting a date for the coup was next. Sunday had minimal activity, and thus minimal collateral human damage. The army was out in Lodwar for military games and the top nabobs were at the opening of the ASK show in Nyeri by the president that Friday, 30 August.
Rumours that the Kikuyu were planning to overthrow Moi and instal Kibaki forced the plotters to fast-track the coup date to 1 August. But forces loyal to President Moi helped crush the uprising.
http://www.nation.co.ke/Features/DN2/How+1982+coup+changed+Kenya/-/957860/1467488/-/m1ppqp/-/index.html
RAILA’s sister FELT LIKE striping & walking naked in Kisumu – MIGUNA
Wednesday August 1,2012 – Ruth Adhiambo, Raila’s younger sister called me on the day Caroli’s suspension was announced, and cried: “Miguna, I’m on the sky right now…flying high into the sky…I’m tempted to strip naked and walk through Kisumu streets dancing stark naked because of joy! Caroli is gone; please tell me it is true that he is gone!”
His sister was very happy to see, that, at last, Caroli had been fired.
It shows how these thugs are hated even by very close relatives to Raila
But Raila Odinga cannot fire these thugs, for there is a special jobs, apart from being special secretaries and whatever, as indicated in the book, these guys are making deals and money, for Mheshimiwa waziri mkuu,, these guys are his front men and so are so much worthy to Raila Odinga.
If Caroli cuts a deal,, let’s say worth two billion, 50% goes to the reformer the mheshimiwa,, 30% goes to Caroli, 10% to Isahakhia and the rest, shared among those
small fish around the office (OPM) who buys BMW’s for their wives and girlfriends, expensive suits for themselves to look presentable.
So Raila will do all he can to make sure nobody touches on Caroli and Isakhia, over his dead body.
What a great African reformer!
MIGUNA
M. forum
Kenyan Daily Post