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- To: 1. PS/ Minister Bellingham
PS/PUSS DFID
2. PS/ Foreign Secretary
PS/Secretary of State for
International Development

From: Chloe Hamborg
Date: 27 January 2012
cc: see end of submission

Head of Department, Jonathan Allen: "The length of the submission reflects the complexity of the argument and the need for broad agreement, including with DFID. The UK will only achieve its security and prosperity objectives in Kenya if the country remains stable. Effectively tackling impunity, following the organised ethnic post-election violence of 2008, is vital to preventing its recurrence. I fear the Kenyans and international partners would interpret a low-key response as the UK giving the green light to getting round the ICC with a sham domestic process, which would damage both our Kenya, and ICC, objectives."

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ON GOING PROCESS IN KENYA

ISSUE

1. Following January's confirmation of charges by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of four suspects alleged to have masterminded Kenya's 2007/08 violence, we expect the ICC to issue arrest warrants in the Spring.¹ Kenya's cooperation with the process is stalling, and the AU has – at Kenya's instigation – no sign of cooperations. Ministers need to decide on our private and public approach, in Kenya and at the UN, and how to handle engagement with Kenya if the situation continues to deteriorate. This is a joint submission to FCO and DFID Ministers.

TIMING

2. Before EU Heads of Mission in Nairobi meet to discuss their approach in February.

BACKGROUND

3. Kenya is at a crossroads in its reform process following the 2007/08 ethnic violence. Its deteriorating cooperation with the ICC – part of a wider push by Kenya's anti-reformists (see egram) – threatens to pull apart the coalition, hamper wider constitutional reform and risk Kenya entering its 2012/2013 election campaign period without an effective deterrent against incitement of violence – all of which would risk a range of UK bilateral and regional interests. The arrest warrant would assist the on going investigation of president Kibaki. It would diminish the chances of the Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto ascending to State house. It would increase the chances of Kibaki being indicted as a former head of state. This may be possible with Raila Presidency. However, with Kenya's instigation on AU, this could further resentment towards the ICC's role in Africa, and entrench divisions in the UNSC and the international community. The overall prospect of success in tackling crimes against humanity in Kenya would sound well to the EU rather than AU and the anti-reformists in Kenya.

¹ The "Ocatipo four" are: Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister for Finance, William Ruto, former Minister for Higher Education now suspended on corruption allegations, Francis Muthaura, former Head of Public Service, and Joshua Song, radio journalist.

4. Whilst Kenya claims commitment to the ICC, its actions since mentioning of the Ocampo indicate the contrary. It is currently heading towards the worst case scenario (attached). Following the ICC ruling, President Kibaki made clear yesterday, by appointing his cronies in place of Head of civil service and the Ministry of Finance docket.
5. Prime Minister Odinga and his party has disowned this appointments, expressed need consultation and support for the ICC process. Civil society and public support is also strong favour of the ICC prosecution of the Ocampo four.

POLICY CHOICES AND ARGUMENT (INCLUDING RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS)

6. In the light of these circumstances, our advice is that Ministers do not push for a for communication from the ICC on the on going investigation of president Kibaki – but focus on what we can do instead to mitigate the risks of Kenya/ AU using the situation as an excuse for inaction, since with the current division in the UK government and EU at large, the detailed processes are likely to reach President Kibaki and the political players in Kenya and AU.
7. In December Ministers agreed to take an incremental approach in our engagement with Kenya or the ICC, to enable us to increase pressure according to how events play out. The choice is how much pressure we want to generate on Kenya to cooperate with the ICC (in the interests of deterring further violence, mitigating the risks above and supporting our wider ICC policy), in the knowledge that the more strident we are, the more we risk burning our bridges with the current Kibaki-led government.
8. We believe HMG could pursue the following options:
 - a) **Robust and public**
 - We encourage Kenya to pursue a national process if they can persuade the ICC the processes are robust enough. This would be possible under Article 19 of the Rome Statute, or potentially in the ICC's interest given the achievement it would be for them if their involvement raised the standard of Kenya's own investigations so they did not need to prosecute. It is very unlikely that Kenya's courts would reach this benchmark. However, encouraging this approach would be a tactical way of removing focus from Article 16, and the accusation that the ICC is anti Kenya/ Africa. We would take this line with EU colleagues as far as possible, and ideally other including Kofi Annan (who mediated Kenya's peace agreement), other ICC members and perhaps the US (although not an ICC member). Proposed public lines are at Annex B.
 - Now that the two suspects have stepped aside, but still influential in relevant government operations, we adopt a policy of essential contact only, co-ordinated with EU colleagues. This is consistent with the precedent set with Sudanese President Bashir for engagement with those who have been accused by the ICC, but evade prosecution, of crimes against humanity. This policy would provide flexibility to deal with suspects' cronies in office where not engaging would jeopardise key UK objectives (with Ministerial clearance on difficult cases) – but otherwise we and the EU avoid contact as a way of showing support for the ICC. This would include coordinating a common approach with donors to handling of the cronies of the four suspects.
 - We use DFID's announcement of increased aid to Kenya (due 1 March) to highlight the importance we attach to progress on poverty reduction, financial management and human rights. With Kibaki and Odinga this message can be reinforced both in a letter from the Development Secretary and in private further the UK agenda.
 - If the situation deteriorates further, we use the threat of visa bans to encourage cooperation.
 - This approach is potentially uncomfortable, and risks causing resentment among those with whom we may need to retain influence on/engage in future (for example, Kenyatta is a

possible Presidential candidate). His candidature an possible win may refrain our rela in event that the arrest warrant is not effected. We can mitigate this to an extent by a concert with others. However, the bigger risk is that by not speaking out we allow the K to accuse the international community of ignoring their Article 16 request, and use this t anti-ICC feeling in AU and Kenya to add support for non-cooperation. Perceived lack of from the international community would almost certainly draw criticism from the Kenyan, and intemational lobby groups, and encourage anti-reformists.

b) **Robust but low key**

- We adopt the lines above in relation to Article 16, but only if pushed, and with EU partner not pressing for Kofi Annan and other ICC members to buy-in (which would clearly get bt Kenya).

- We use the DFID announcement to deliver private messages, as proposed above.

➤ This approach would reduce the chances of the ICC becoming a major sticking point ir bilateral relationship. But the risk is that it makes minimal real world impact on Ken prospects for making progress on impunity, which in turn threatens stability and our intere It would also make it harder to counter perceptions that we are ignoring the AU request.

c) **Principled but passive**

- We are equivocal in our public lines, and let others take the lead internationally on any act in response to the UN request, ICC arrest warrant and any further developments.

➤ This may be less complicated for our bilateral relationship. By being less robust, it would less likely to become a factor in our lobbying on other areas of cooperation, such as piracy migration. However, it would almost certainly attract criticism from within Kenya at international partners, and from the Office of the Prosecutor given our membership of th UNSC and close relationship with Kenya. It would allow the AU to claim they are definite being ignored which could lead to a hardening of the Kenyan and African position ant possibly, Kenyan withdrawal from the ICC. Above all, it would make no impact on an issu that seriously threatens Kenya's stability.

9. Neither the EU nor US have not formed a position on these questions. The US has been a strong supporter of action against impunity, and continues to encourage Kenyan cooperation with the ICC. The EU too has taken a consistent line and is likely to favour a public position. But there is yet no firm US or EU position on managing a scenario of non-cooperation or resistance to effect arrest warrant. The view from Brussels is less clear.

10. There are no resource implications other than already programmed funding for ICC support and conflict prevention, and staff time for administrative measures and lobbying partners.

RECOMMENDATION

11. We recommend **Option A – robust and public** – as the approach that would have maximum impact. Although potentially uncomfortable, we think this approach is proportionate to the breadth of UK interests in Kenya and the region that would be threatened by further political deterioration and instability, and our stake in ensuring the future credibility of the ICC for the sake of upholding international peace and justice.

AGREED BY / DISSENTING VIEWS

12. BHC Nairobi, The Hague, International Organisations Department, DFID, UKTI, MoD, Press Office, PRT, Research Analysts, Sudan Unit, UKMIS New York, UKREP Brussels.

IMPLEMENTATION

Next steps if agreed

13. We will engage with the EU, US and donor organisations to come on board with the app agreed, and to push for release of appropriate statements by EU (preferably Baroness Ashton not locally), Kofi Annan and ICC. We judge the space is open to influence their positions, but are risks in being too ahead of the pack - we may need to adapt our approach if they do not on board. We will come back to Ministers if necessary.
14. In Kenya we will start to apply private pressure to the Ocampo four to cooperate. We will develop a strategy for engaging with key African states to explain our approach, within the broader context of concern about where Kenya might be headed over the next 18 months, how that affects their interests, and how the ICC is an element of addressing the problems. We should encourage the ICC's President to engage along the same lines.
15. We believe it would have greater impact if Ministers were personally involved in delivering the messages to Kenya, the AU, Kofi Annan, ICC and other African countries/ partners, and would be grateful for them to indicate their appetite to do so.

Risks & Mitigation

16. There is a risk that taking a strong stance over the ICC affects the cooperation we can get from Kenya on other bilateral issues. However, it is worth noting that cooperation on issues including Somali piracy and migration is already difficult, and is likely to get harder as the 2012/2013 election approach irrespective of the stance we take on the ICC. Kenya is well aware of our stance on international justice, so this approach would not come as a surprise.
17. That said, there is still a risk that our engagement is affected, albeit through petty tactics and posturing as opposed to a concerted strategy on the Kenyan side. Acting with partners rather than unilaterally will mitigate our stance having an impact to a large extent. Our High Commissioner will also continue to emphasise in his engagement that the UK has nothing personal against the suspects, and that we are committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation through, for example, the high profile visit of the HMG this autumn.

Parliament, Media and Public Communications

18. The ICC story was picked up in December as the big East Africa story by the sizeable UK international media in Nairobi - we can expect it to be so again. There is already increased focus in Nairobi on our position on the ICC Process. We will develop press lines as appropriate depending on the option that Ministers choose. Our current lines are at Annex C.
19. There is a steady, but not overwhelming, level of interest from UK parliamentarians in UK Kenya policy, including a Kenya All Parliamentary Group. We have received two PQs on the ICC, both from Lord Chidgey, with whom the East Africa team is already in regular contact. We can expect further interest once the Court makes the important decision in the Spring. More broadly, there is an active NGO lobby in support of the ICC and international justice, including influential groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Rallia's party.

EVALUATION / REVIEW

20. FCO, DFID and MoD officials meet monthly over video conference to monitor progress on Kenya's reform process and update our strategy as appropriate. We will report back to Ministers on key developments as appropriate in the weeks following.

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Head, Horn of Africa Strategy Team

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Number of attachments:

Annex A – Scenarios for Kenya's cooperation with the ICC

Annex B – Proposed public lines

Annex C – Latest egram from Nairobi on the impact on the coalition

cc:

Tim Hitchens, Africa Director
Jonathan Allen, Head AD(EAGLS)
Nick Pyle, Deputy Head AD(EAGLS)
Peter Tibb, BHC, Nairobi
Michael Nevin, Nairobi
Emma Davies, IoD
Kanbar Hossein Bor, The Hague
Martyn Reynolds, UKREP Brussels
Catronia Mace, UKMIS NY

Ian Collard, Washington
Alistair Fernie, Head of DFID Kenya/Somalia
Kathryn Casson, DFID London
Anne Macro, Sudan Unit
Sandy Moss, Addis Ababa
Sarah Saxton, Press Office
Michael Ryder, Sudan Special rep
Jonathan Hargreaves D/H Of DFID Kenya/Somal
Matt Bough – Senior UK Representative-Somalia

ANNEX A – Scenarios for cooperation

Best case

President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga accept that the Ocampo four face trial at the Hague, and take a clear stance that Kenya will cooperate with the ICC. The confirmation of charges gives them, other senior players and law enforcement structures the confidence that they themselves are off the hook for at least few months, even though the ongoing investigation on the president is not in both political and public domain – which acts as an incentive to marginalise the individuals named. This scenario is unlikely on the Presidents' inner circle. The suspects themselves voluntarily hands themselves to ICC, failure, to which the court issues arrest warrants and the government agrees to hand them over (though unlikely). Kenya's leaders step up action on attempts to bribe or intimidate witnesses. Acceptance of the Court's role and marginalisation of suspects allows for a level of closure over the post-election violence ahead of the 2012/2013 elections, which creates space for other reforms and reconciliation to be pursued. This is Ocampo's aim.

Muddling through

President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga maintain public commitment to cooperation with the ICC, but Kibaki in particular faces real pressure from the Kikuyu elite to protect Kenyatta and other close aides. The lack of UN to support the deferment of the cases is used to stoke up anti-ICC feeling, giving Kenya an excuse not to cooperate. Odinga supports cooperation (it is in his interest) but is increasingly out on a limb. There is some local tension around the confirmation of charges, but not lasting or widespread. Tension rises, with possible outbreaks of isolated violence where some of the suspects try to position themselves as the powerbrokers. However, widespread violence is unlikely given strong media, civil society funding and general public support for ICC, balanced background of the suspects, prospect of further ICC action against perpetrators and fear of a return to 2008. Both principals face demands for their own ICC arraignment. Coalition and party splits occur. The government's effectiveness is degraded. New alliances are formed with a strong political victim mentality and vengeance attached to them, advancing anti-ICC rhetoric. Underhand attempts to intimidate and bribe witnesses continue. Despite this, general optimism levels following Kenya's new constitution mean that overall there is a reasonable climate of support for the ICC. Whether or not the suspects participate in the general election will depend on the strength of their leaders' resolve in the face of pressure from the elite, and on the level of pressure from the Kenyan public/ Parliament. It will also be influenced by the stance and actions of the international community. With all indication that the two Ocampo guests-bearing presidential ambition and their grouping, are likely to be a strong team, the way forward is to push for detention during their mention at the court on the pretext that they are a security threat through the public utterances in the political/prayer rallies.

Worst case (likely)

President Kibaki caves under pressure from the Kenyan elite to protect influential suspects. Although the Government publicly commits to cooperation, it puts no pressure on the Ocampo four to present themselves to the court. Odinga becomes increasingly impotent. The suspects themselves actively seek to subvert the investigations, not turn up to Court and avoid arrest through any or all of the following: implicating their own leaders to try to get them to join attempts to undermine the ICC; building a political

powerbase that makes it near impossible for Kibaki and Odinga to dispense with them; promoting an "ethnic victimisation" narrative to provoke their communities into action against court summons; continued use of witness intimidation to reduce the likelihood of there being enough evidence to lead to prosecution; raising anti-ICC rhetoric and resurrecting calls for a Special Tribunal to deal with investigations within Kenya's own judicial system as an alternative to the ICC; tagging the ICC as a Western/neo-colonialist project, thus damaging UK stock and our potential influence over the situation. Repeated ethnic violence is a real possibility. Prospects for stability, reform and the fight against impunity are thin.

ANNEX B – PUBLIC LINES

- Do not see ICC ruling on the basis of a threat to ethnic groupings
- Recognise and welcome national commitment to justice and addressing impunity through ICC
- But let's not forget that the reason that Kofi Annan handed names to ICC was due to the delay in establishing national processes and the threat to stability that this was causing.
- Suspending ICC investigations without robust national mechanism in place would leave you open to this instability re-emerging
- [Could also discuss how on-going ICC processes could support national prosecutions if/ when appropriate mechanism is established]
- Emphasise the negative international reputation for Kenya if the one of the Ocampo four won the presidential race.

Annex C

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1. Growing concern about the health of the coalition following President's unilateral appointment of key positions in the Coalition Government. (Head of Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet and the Finance Minister). Though claimed that the office holders are in acting capacity. Speculation of an orchestrated strategy for them to remain in office. The two are said to be on a mission. A crucial moment for Kenya as political wrangles and considerations about ICC prosecutions colour political calculations. President Kibaki retreating further into isolation, surrounded by a hardline cabal. All the more essential we do not appear too pro Raila in Public domain.

From NAIROBI
Precedence LEAD
eGram No. 09/12
Despatched 27/01/2012 10:10:00 GMT

DETAIL

2. On the eve of the African Union Summit President Kibaki appointed unilaterally a new "acting" Head of Public Service and Secretary to the cabinet, and the Finance Minister. All from one community as has been before. This has shaken the increasingly fragile coalition after the ICC ruling, further undermining Odinga's authority and polarising the government and country along party and ethnic lines. Prime Minister Odinga claimed not to have been consulted, in accordance with the new constitution and National Accord. Tempers are running high both on the process and the individuals. With this impasse, a peaceful election and respect for the constitution/national and national accord have fallen worryingly behind.

3. The latest fallout comes hot on the heels of the Principals' divergence over the handling of Kenya's ICC cases. Those close to Kibaki are seeking appeal; while Odinga maintains Kenya's commitment to the ICC. (Our egram 1957/11). Raila is also facing hostility from those (on both sides of the coalition) who believe he should have been one of those named as an ICC suspect. They accuse him of supporting the ICC in order to remove his political foes.

Despite continuing to ride high in the opinion polls with ordinary Kenyans, Raila is under attack within his own party (ODM) from those aligned to suspended Higher Education Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister (formerly the Finance Minister). The two are ICC candidates. The Ruto's Kalenjin block have joined forces with anti-Odinga PNU elements to block Odinga, possibly through of betrayal and his foreign connections. Their strategy is to undermine his authority and leadership with a somewhat implausible end game of their own people (maybe Uhuru or candidate of compromise within the G7 political grouping) taking on Raila in the election. This too is linked to the ICC: they believe it would be harder to take action against them if they were in positions of high power. However, this group around President Kibaki are green on the ongoing investigation at ICC (The Speaker also mentioned this to me, suggesting a possible general election as early as December). We consider this a big blow to Raila candidacy, since he is seen as having compromised the ICC cases. The memory will be fresh on the confirmation of the charges. It's unlikely for him to make it without our support.

5. So far Raila believes he retains the numbers, but the confirmation of the ICC charges against Uhuru and Ruto have negatively affected his image.

Underlying Issues

6. The disputes at play here are symptomatic of deeper issues. The ICC is only a trigger. They are about the protection of the old guard, impunity and vested interests, versus reform. The battlefield is the (ethnic) politics of succession post Kibaki. This is further complicated by the reality of the ICC. Many in

the political class assumed that once the new constitution passed they would be able to go back to business as usual. They were also convinced they could circumvent the ICC. With Kibaki himself now feeling vulnerable following the confirmation of both his closest adviser and his most likely successor as ICC guests, he is retreating further into his comfort zone of passive rule, letting a group of hardliners advise him on issues like the ICC. Neither we, the US nor more moderate advisers have an easy way of accessing him. We are trying through intermediaries. First, we need to send William Hague as the high ranking diplomat to President Kibaki, among other issues to discuss are the London Somalia Conference and the UK and Kenya relationship in general. It should be seen that we are close with the Kibaki regime, while at the same time pursuing our agenda.

Threat to Stability?

7. The regrouping and retrenchment of powerful vested interests along ethnic (racist) lines as in 2007 has the potential to set the political stage for further conflict should the politicians choose to exploit the situation. The next election may see the Luo targeted for being Odinga's people and for escaping ICC charges. The Rift Valley and Coast provinces will also remain volatile. Mixed in with this is frustration over food shortages and price increases, unemployment, local land issues, all of which will be exploited by politicians.

Mitigating Factors

8. We will continue to reach out to Kibaki's side to prevent them becoming too (dangerously) isolated and avoid us being seen as too pro-Raila. We will also:

- Together with the international community raise our concerns early (as we did with the Speaker last week privately);
- Concert with Kofi Annan on keeping the reform process going and tackling impunity, including ICC handling. (The Department are submitting to ministers on this set of issues) Our work will include direct DFID support to the Liaison Office of the Panel of Eminent Africans, and the ICC-Office of the Prosecutor.
- Galvanise a coherent civil society / business/ religious/ international grouping to push for more responsive and unifying politics;
- Maximise our influence in Parliament where we have extensive contacts and where levers like our visa bans for corruption ensure we are listened to;
- Work with commissions, civil society and Parliament to prioritise actions, including legislation under the constitution needed to underpin free and safe elections;
- Urge Raila to remain adamant of corruption and the ethnic balkanization, take the moral high ground and play the peacemaker;
- We also recommend engagement with regional countries about our concerns for Kenya's trajectory and how their interests could be affected if all goes wrong.

9. Worst case scenarios for Kenya would include a complete rift with the ICC and a coalition break down before the country is practically or politically prepared for elections. Both are feasible and the warning bells are ringing. We should take them seriously, but there is a lot still to play for.

10. Agreed with DFID Kenya.

TIBBER

[Contact for this eGram: Tammy Clayton 83003318]

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To: 1. PS/ Minister Bollingham

PS/PUSS DFID

2. PS/ Foreign Secretary

PS/Secretary of State for
International Development

From: Edward Inglett-Kenya Desk Officer

The Kenyan elite care about the reputational damage this brings. We should see whether it can be adopted over failure to cooperate with the ICC.

Date: 06 February 2012

KENYA EXCLUSIVE POLICY ISSUE

1. Whether to exclude from the UK corrupt members of Kenya's elite and individuals responsible for inciting Kenya's post election violence of 2008 and those perceived to be cronies of the Ocampo four.

TIMING

2. Routine

RECOMMENDATION

3. That you recommend to the Home Secretary that she uses her power to exclude, on a case by case basis, individuals in Kenya implicated in grand-scale corruption¹ and those responsible for perpetrating Kenya's post election violence from the UK². A draft letter to the Home Secretary is attached (Annex A).

4. If you and the Home Secretary are content with this recommendation, we will:

- Update our list of individuals to be banned to reflect the past corruption scandals
- Announce at the right time that the UK will also exclude known perpetrators of Kenya's post election violence;
- Continue to publicise the fact of our exclusions list, but not the names of the individuals on it.

AGREED BY

5. BHC Nairobi, Legal Advisers, Home office (UK Border Agency), Parliamentary Relations team, Press office, DFID, MOD, UKTI.

ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR

6. Ant-corruption and counter-impunity efforts are a key part of the HMG political reform strategy for Kenya agreed by the Minister for Africa last year.

¹ Policy implemented by previous government (since 2006) and widely known in Kenya

² New policy suggestion-not yet implemented or announced

This strategy stated that we will only advance UK strategic interests in Kenya if we address the underlying corruption and risks of instability. To get there we would use graduated carrots and sticks.

7. The policy has successfully held individuals to account for corruption, where otherwise impunity would reign. Keeping the most corrupt out of the UK (whether politicians, civil servants or businessmen) sends a powerful signal and can help frustrate corrupt networks. Exclusions hurt reputations. We judge that public knowledge of exclusion of former Minister Murungaru contributed to his political fall, for instance.

8. The threat of exclusion has proved a powerful lever in our dealings with the government of Kenya. Tactically, we do not inform individuals of their inclusion on the list, to keep a wider section of the elite guessing.

9. Excluding the key allies of the Ocampo four, would assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its objectives, lending an incentive for Kenya's political elite to turn in guilty colleagues to the ICC, to prevent their own potential exclusion.

10. Kenya is the only country for which UK operates a bilateral exclusions policy, as a result of the government inactive reaction. So the policy could be the best Kenyan model for the political elites.

ARGUMENT AGAINST-THE RISKS

11. As it is a sensitive policy, its exercise might limit our access to key individuals, making us less able to achieve our wider objectives. However, as we are required to submit on each individual case, Ministers will have the opportunity to assess the risk to each case.

12. Secondly, those excluded might attempt to challenge their ban by seeking judicial review of the Home Secretary's decision (the only avenue of appeal open to them). The Home Secretary decision is taken on basis of credible evidence. This should reduce the like hood of any legal challenge being sought.

13. Finally, there is a risk that the policy is perceived as bullish and wider bilateral relations are damaged (as when the US announcement of Visa bans through public warning letters in 2009, led to a stand-off in relation, with President Kibaki writing to Obama in complaint). We have to date avoided such an incident by taking a quieter approach, maintaining a private dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign affairs to make clear the policy is a resort. We have also recently explained our approach on exclusions to a few of Kenyan Ministers. They accept our policy principle, albeit grudgingly: after all, it is

difficult for them to come out publicly in favour of corruption or incitement of violence.

14. On balance, given pervasive impunity in Kenya, we consider exclusions a powerful lever to deploy bilaterally-as long as we protect our access and are not too provocative.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS:

15. Home Office staff will be required to submit to the Home Secretary on each individual we seek to exclude. BHC Nairobi will provide all supporting materials.

PARLIAMENTARY AND MEDIA

16. There is low level of interest from UK parliamentarians in the policy. The policy is very popular with the Kenyan public and civil society. Some Kenya media has speculated on whether we will move to exclude the Ocampo four until when the final verdict of the court.



Edward Inglett

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Matt Thourne, Press office.