3 thoughts on “Martin Ngatia Speaks on Kenya-Somali War: Part 1”
Well said Brother Ngatia. Down with the Imperialists. Americans failed in 1993 when Somalis kicked them out. Now they are using Kenyans to clean up their dirt.
THE SOMALI CHARCOAL INDUSTRY—STRANGE BEDFELLOWS By George F. Ward
Volume 5 July 10, 2014
Recently, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and Interpol jointly released a study on the global environmental crime crisis. One of the report’s noteworthy findings is that worldwide revenue from forest crime, such as illegal logging, dwarfs that from more widely publicized wildlife crimes, such as trade in rhino horn. Unregulated and illicit trade in charcoal is a major form of forest crime. The report estimates that the unregulated charcoal trade in Africa involves the loss of at least $1.9 billion annually to African economies. Revenues from the charcoal trade flow in several directions, including to militias and terrorist groups. Revenues from the charcoal trade are the primary source of income for al-Shabaab, the Islamist terrorist group in Somalia. A look beneath the surface at the charcoal industry in Somalia reveals an unusual and disturbing intertwining of interests among several parties, including terrorists, Gulf-state business interests, and the Kenyan government and armed forces.
Trade in Somali Charcoal
Charcoal is not only the primary cooking fuel in Somalia, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, it is also especially prized in the Gulf states for its quality. Made largely from the wood of acacia trees, it is slow burning and aromatic, imparting a sweet aroma to the region’s grilled meats. Somalia’s charcoal exports to the Gulf have long been carried by a fleet of dhows and small freighters plying the route between Kismayo and Barawe in southern Somalia and ports in the Gulf region such as Khasab, Oman, and Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The ships often arrive in the Somali ports loaded with sugar, which is exchanged for the charcoal. In February 2012, the United Nations Security Council, concerned that the charcoal trade had become a significant source of revenue for al-Shabaab, passed a resolution banning that trade and calling on all nations to enforce the ban. Somali governments since the 1970s have also banned the export of charcoal. Unfortunately, the bans often have been ignored.
Enter the Kenyans
A report submitted to the United Nations Security Council on July 12, 2013, by the Security Council committee established to monitor the situation in Somalia provided extensive documentation on the involvement of the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali militias, and al-Shabaab in continuing violations of the UN and Somali bans. According to the report, when troops of the KDF and members of the allied Ras Kamboni militia entered the port of Kismayo in southern Somalia on September 28, 2012, they found some 4 million sacks of charcoal worth at least $60–$64 million. Comparable stockpiles existed in other Somali ports, including the al-Shabaab-controlled port at Barawe. KDF commanders almost immediately began pushing for the temporary lifting of the ban, ostensibly to provide for one-time export of the stockpiles.
In reality, the KDF demand was cover for maintaining the charcoal export business indefinitely. Despite the UN’s refusal to lift its ban and the continuing opposition of the Somali government in Mogadishu, KDF leaders and Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” leader of the Ras Kamboni militia, took the unilateral decision to begin the export of charcoal from Kismayo. The UN Monitoring Group was able to determine that at least 1.5 million sacks of charcoal worth $20–$26 million were exported from Kismayo in November and December 2012. In addition, large quantities of charcoal were transferred by land to the al-Shabaab-controlled port of Barawe. The exports were taxed by both the Ras Kamboni militia and al-Shabaab. The exported stocks were immediately replaced by new production from al-Shabaab-controlled areas of southern Somalia, where a forested area was leveled. All told, the Monitoring Group estimated that the rate of charcoal exports rose beginning in November 2012 to a rate of 24 million sacks annually, with a market value of $360–$384 million. This represented an increase of around 140 percent over the previous year. The new level of production would require 10.5 million acacia trees annually, implying the deforestation of 676 square miles and, as previously reported by Ashley Bybee in Africa Watch, severe humanitarian implications for local communities.
Strange Bedfellows
According to the recent UNEP/Interpol report, the Somali charcoal export trade has not in the meantime diminished. Al-Shabaab earns somewhere between $38 million and $56 million annually from charcoal exports from Kismayo and Barawe. In addition, the group collects “taxes” from charcoal traders at roadblocks and checkpoints. At one roadblock alone, al-Shabaab is reported to have collected $8–$18 million annually.
The Ras Kamboni militia, which is currently allied with the KDF, was formerly associated with al-Shabaab. Like al- Shabaab, the Ras Kamboni militia shares in the income from charcoal exports and collects “taxes” at checkpoints and roadblocks. In Kismayo, the “Juba Business Committee” is dominated by Ras Kamboni. The members of the committee traded charcoal when al-Shabaab controlled the city and have continued since the KDF took over.
The consequence of these connections is a seamless network for the production and export of charcoal. The UN Monitoring Group noted the lack of any significant security incidents along routes on which checkpoints were variously controlled by al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni, the Somali National Army, and the KDF. In human terms, the charcoal market is dominated by a small number of professional traders, around 70 in number, who are based in Kismayo, the Kenyan border town of Garissa, and Nairobi. These individuals act as brokers for larger traders based mainly in the United Arab Emirates. All the Somalia-Kenya based traders deal with al-Shabaab in one way or another, and some are representatives of that organization. Some of the principals in the charcoal trade in the UAE are also directly linked with al-Shabaab.
Conclusion
This look into the mechanics of the Somali charcoal trade illustrates the complexity of the conflict in Somalia. Kenya, although formally a participant in AMISOM, which operates in support of the Somali national government, is also complicit in support of trade that provides income to al-Shabaab, its military opponent both inside Somalia and, increasingly, at home in Kenya. Since the charcoal trade is al-Shabaab’s primary income, it is not an exaggeration to posit that a portion of the resources used to carry out terror attacks in Nairobi and in Mombasa and other locations along the Kenyan coast is being generated with the acquiescence or even the cooperation of the KDF and Kenyan business interests. While al-Shabaab vows to continue its attacks on civilian targets inside Kenya as long as the KDF remains in Somalia, the self-interests of Kenyans inside the government, military, and business establishment will tend to prolong that deployment.
Well said Brother Ngatia. Down with the Imperialists. Americans failed in 1993 when Somalis kicked them out. Now they are using Kenyans to clean up their dirt.
Ngatia always tells it as it is. Clearly the Somali issue is not ours. We are being used by our man Obama.
THE SOMALI CHARCOAL INDUSTRY—STRANGE BEDFELLOWS By George F. Ward
Volume 5 July 10, 2014
Recently, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and Interpol jointly released a study on the global environmental crime crisis. One of the report’s noteworthy findings is that worldwide revenue from forest crime, such as illegal logging, dwarfs that from more widely publicized wildlife crimes, such as trade in rhino horn. Unregulated and illicit trade in charcoal is a major form of forest crime. The report estimates that the unregulated charcoal trade in Africa involves the loss of at least $1.9 billion annually to African economies. Revenues from the charcoal trade flow in several directions, including to militias and terrorist groups. Revenues from the charcoal trade are the primary source of income for al-Shabaab, the Islamist terrorist group in Somalia. A look beneath the surface at the charcoal industry in Somalia reveals an unusual and disturbing intertwining of interests among several parties, including terrorists, Gulf-state business interests, and the Kenyan government and armed forces.
Trade in Somali Charcoal
Charcoal is not only the primary cooking fuel in Somalia, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, it is also especially prized in the Gulf states for its quality. Made largely from the wood of acacia trees, it is slow burning and aromatic, imparting a sweet aroma to the region’s grilled meats. Somalia’s charcoal exports to the Gulf have long been carried by a fleet of dhows and small freighters plying the route between Kismayo and Barawe in southern Somalia and ports in the Gulf region such as Khasab, Oman, and Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The ships often arrive in the Somali ports loaded with sugar, which is exchanged for the charcoal. In February 2012, the United Nations Security Council, concerned that the charcoal trade had become a significant source of revenue for al-Shabaab, passed a resolution banning that trade and calling on all nations to enforce the ban. Somali governments since the 1970s have also banned the export of charcoal. Unfortunately, the bans often have been ignored.
Enter the Kenyans
A report submitted to the United Nations Security Council on July 12, 2013, by the Security Council committee established to monitor the situation in Somalia provided extensive documentation on the involvement of the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali militias, and al-Shabaab in continuing violations of the UN and Somali bans. According to the report, when troops of the KDF and members of the allied Ras Kamboni militia entered the port of Kismayo in southern Somalia on September 28, 2012, they found some 4 million sacks of charcoal worth at least $60–$64 million. Comparable stockpiles existed in other Somali ports, including the al-Shabaab-controlled port at Barawe. KDF commanders almost immediately began pushing for the temporary lifting of the ban, ostensibly to provide for one-time export of the stockpiles.
In reality, the KDF demand was cover for maintaining the charcoal export business indefinitely. Despite the UN’s refusal to lift its ban and the continuing opposition of the Somali government in Mogadishu, KDF leaders and Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” leader of the Ras Kamboni militia, took the unilateral decision to begin the export of charcoal from Kismayo. The UN Monitoring Group was able to determine that at least 1.5 million sacks of charcoal worth $20–$26 million were exported from Kismayo in November and December 2012. In addition, large quantities of charcoal were transferred by land to the al-Shabaab-controlled port of Barawe. The exports were taxed by both the Ras Kamboni militia and al-Shabaab. The exported stocks were immediately replaced by new production from al-Shabaab-controlled areas of southern Somalia, where a forested area was leveled. All told, the Monitoring Group estimated that the rate of charcoal exports rose beginning in November 2012 to a rate of 24 million sacks annually, with a market value of $360–$384 million. This represented an increase of around 140 percent over the previous year. The new level of production would require 10.5 million acacia trees annually, implying the deforestation of 676 square miles and, as previously reported by Ashley Bybee in Africa Watch, severe humanitarian implications for local communities.
Strange Bedfellows
According to the recent UNEP/Interpol report, the Somali charcoal export trade has not in the meantime diminished. Al-Shabaab earns somewhere between $38 million and $56 million annually from charcoal exports from Kismayo and Barawe. In addition, the group collects “taxes” from charcoal traders at roadblocks and checkpoints. At one roadblock alone, al-Shabaab is reported to have collected $8–$18 million annually.
The Ras Kamboni militia, which is currently allied with the KDF, was formerly associated with al-Shabaab. Like al- Shabaab, the Ras Kamboni militia shares in the income from charcoal exports and collects “taxes” at checkpoints and roadblocks. In Kismayo, the “Juba Business Committee” is dominated by Ras Kamboni. The members of the committee traded charcoal when al-Shabaab controlled the city and have continued since the KDF took over.
The consequence of these connections is a seamless network for the production and export of charcoal. The UN Monitoring Group noted the lack of any significant security incidents along routes on which checkpoints were variously controlled by al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni, the Somali National Army, and the KDF. In human terms, the charcoal market is dominated by a small number of professional traders, around 70 in number, who are based in Kismayo, the Kenyan border town of Garissa, and Nairobi. These individuals act as brokers for larger traders based mainly in the United Arab Emirates. All the Somalia-Kenya based traders deal with al-Shabaab in one way or another, and some are representatives of that organization. Some of the principals in the charcoal trade in the UAE are also directly linked with al-Shabaab.
Conclusion
This look into the mechanics of the Somali charcoal trade illustrates the complexity of the conflict in Somalia. Kenya, although formally a participant in AMISOM, which operates in support of the Somali national government, is also complicit in support of trade that provides income to al-Shabaab, its military opponent both inside Somalia and, increasingly, at home in Kenya. Since the charcoal trade is al-Shabaab’s primary income, it is not an exaggeration to posit that a portion of the resources used to carry out terror attacks in Nairobi and in Mombasa and other locations along the Kenyan coast is being generated with the acquiescence or even the cooperation of the KDF and Kenyan business interests. While al-Shabaab vows to continue its attacks on civilian targets inside Kenya as long as the KDF remains in Somalia, the self-interests of Kenyans inside the government, military, and business establishment will tend to prolong that deployment.
Ambassador George F. Ward is editor of IDA’s Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/AfricaWatch/africawatch-july-10-2014-vol5.pdf