Kenya Stockholm Blog

WikiLeaks Releases: Nairobi Cable No. 21: Kivuitu’s Hypocricy Ahead of 2007 Elections

Viewing cable 07NAIROBI4429, KENYA ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL COMMISSION CHAIR: “THE PEOPLE ARE ON MY SIDE”

VZCZCXRO4830
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #4429/01 3171456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131456Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3422
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9684
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5584
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4922
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2389
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1649
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2469
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2394
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004429

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: KE PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL COMMISSION CHAIR: “THE
PEOPLE ARE ON MY SIDE”

REF: NAIROBI 4411 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: PolCouns Andre for reasons 1.4 B & D.

¶1. (C) Summary:  ECK Chairman Kivuitu expressed to the Ambassador his determination to perform his function in a neutral, professional manner, resisting those who would have him favor one party over the others.  He sees the press and “the people” as his allies in this effort.  His initial impression of the newest crop of Kibaki-appointed commissioners is that, while they are of little help to him, he has seen no signs of bias so far.  He insists on a five-year renewal of his contract to preserve the tenure of the position, but in fact intends to resign after one to two years.  End Summary.

¶2. (C)  Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Samuel Kivuitu joined the Ambassador and PolCouns for lunch at a restaurant popular with the political class.  Kivuitu explained, “I am followed everywhere I go.  I want to be sure no one can say I held a secret meeting with the Americans!” Kivuitu was feisty, determined and upbeat, showing no signs of the illness that had caused so much concern a month earlier.  He said that he was countering those who were attempting to influence him to act in an unethical, biased manner by using the press to take his case to the people.  He commented, “as long as the people are on my side, the others cannot hurt me.”

¶3. (C)  On the newly appointed ECK Commissioners:  “I do not know them.  As they know nothing, all the work falls on me. I need to get them trained and usefully employed.  They are not aggressively against me and they seem to be responsible. I see no signs of bias so far.”  Kivuitu suggested that USAID might provide a training workshop for the new commissioners (we are arranging this).  Kivuitu went on to say that the previous batch of freshly-appointed ECK commissioners “came in with an agenda: it was obvious they had been told to take over.  But I have powers as Chairman and prevented that from happening.”  Note: The ECK consists of 22 commissioners.  As of this date, all but three of the commissioners were appointed unilaterally by the Kibaki government, which is permitted under the law but contravenes an unofficial understanding that an inter-party consultative process would be used to identify commissioners.  Kibaki had championed this consultative approach when he was an opposition leader, but now chooses to ignore it. End Note.

¶4. (C) On his future: “I met with the President on Tuesday (6 November).  He left me with the impression that he intends to re-appoint me, but no firm commitment was made.  He is always like that.  You leave a meeting with him never knowing what was decided.  He favors whatever view is expressed to him by the last person to see him.”  Note: Kivuitu’s five year term comes to an end on 2 December, 25 days prior to the election.  His Deputy came into the ECK on a consultative basis and was recently re-appointed for another five years.  End Note.  He added, “I insist on a renewed five year term, as it is essential that this position have some degree of tenure. However, my intention is to resign the post after one year or two years at most.  I want to write and I want to serve in a new African Elections Institute funded by the Germans that some of my friends are joining.”  He mentioned in this regard, Dr. Afari Djan, (Electoral Commission, Ghana) and Christina Thorpe (Electoral Commission, Sierra Leone).

¶5. (C) Kivuitu went on to say, “If they make it impossible for me to run a fair election, I will not quietly resign and fade away.  No.  I will hold a mass meeting in Uhuru Park and explain to all the world why I had to resign.”

¶6. (C) On International Observers:  “We absolutely welcome them.  The earlier you inform me of who is coming and when the better.  We will set up a welcome desk at the airport and extend full courtesies.”

¶7. (C) On a Code of Conduct Signing Event: “We intend to organize such an event once we officially register all candidates.  Our authority to enforce the rules begins with the official campaign season three weeks prior to the election.”

¶8. Comment:  The Ambassador has advocated for Kivuitu’s extension with President Kibaki and his advisors.  As a 15-year veteran of the ECK, Kivuitu has the experience and the demonstrated firm commitment to neutrality that is required to guide the ECK through what is likely to be a close election.

RANNEBERGER

February 28, 2011 Posted by makozewe | News & Analysis, WikiLeaks Nairobi Cables | Leave a Comment

WikiLeaks Releases: Nairobi Cable No. 20: Shocking Views of Michuki About Raila’s Presidency

Viewing cable 07NAIROBI3993, KENYA ELECTIONS: INTERNAL SECURITY MINISTER MICHUKI ON ELECTIONS

• Extraordinary fear of a Raila Presidency by Michuki
• Michuki trotted out a laundry list of anti-Odinga propaganda
• Odinga would feel compelled to avenge the murders of slain Luos Tom Mboya and Robert Ouko
  
• Kalonzo Musyoka and Musikaro Kombo were promised positions in another Kibaki Presidential term
• Odinga wouldn’t last more than a few months in office due to possible assassination

VZCZCXRO4280
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #3993/01 2821146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091146Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2785
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9569
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5488
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4863
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2300
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1526
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2416
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2344
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003993

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: INTERNAL SECURITY MINISTER MICHUKI ON ELECTIONS

Classified By: PolCouns Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 B & D.

Michuki: Feared Raila Odinga's Presidency

¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: On October 8, the Political Counselor met with Minister of State for Internal Security John Michuki over lunch at Michuki’s swank hotel and country club on the outskirts of Nairobi. PolCouns had planned to have lunch with Michuki’s son Francis when Michuki unexpectedly joined the discussion.  Michuki, who is a close associate of President Kibaki, made a point to disparage Presidential challenger Raila Odinga, but was otherwise unusually relaxed, philosophical, and somewhat detached. He gave the impression of being much more interested in the state of his golf links than the state of the nation. This is in high contrast to his usually engaged and combative stance. Although he is historically close to Kibaki, Michuki is one of several prominent Kikuyus in the cabinet who have been conspicuously excluded from the new Party of National Unity (PNU) campaign leadership, and is strongly associated with Kikuyu tribal interests. End Summary and Introduction.

ODINGA THE DICTATOR
¶2. (C) Not surprisingly for a Kibaki loyalist, Michuki trotted out a laundry list of anti-Odinga propaganda. He warned that Odinga, if elected, would behave like a dictator and build a Moi-style cult of personality. Michuki reminded PolCouns of Odinga’s studies in East Germany, alleging that his undergraduate thesis had been on building nail bombs. Michuki claimed that the Odinga family (note: Odinga’s father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was a leading figure in the struggle for Kenyan independence, the country’s first vice president, and later an opposition leader) has long harbored a scheme to create a “Greater Luoland” in western Kenya, uniting Luo-speaking peoples of Kenya, Uganda, and southern Sudan. He noted the close ties between former Ugandan President Milton Obote and the Odinga clan, adding that Odinga would create an oppressive Obote-style regime.

¶3. (C) Michuki claimed that Odinga will say whatever he thinks will make him popular without thinking about the consequences, including telling Luos in Nairobi’s Kibera slum not to pay rent to their Muslim landlords. Michuki claimed that Odinga would feel compelled to avenge the murders of slain Luos Tom Mboya, an independence-era leader believed to have been killed by a Kikuyu, and Robert Ouko, a Moi-era foreign minister believed to have been murdered by Kalenjin Nicholas Biwott. (Note: Since the Kalenjin community has a traditionally antagonistic relationship with the Kikuyu and is currently largely backing Odinga, it is not entirely logical to suppose that Odinga would seek revenge against the Kalenjin.) Odinga would be pressured to avenge these deaths not only against the individual perpetrators, but against entire communities, said Michuki, setting off wider ethnic violence and possibly leading to a retaliatory attempt on Odinga’s life. An Odinga presidency would be ethnically divisive and short-lived, said Michuki, who added that he did not think Odinga would last more than a few months in office. Given Kenya’s history of high-profile political assassinations, this is not such a remote possibility.

THE KIBAKI CAMPAIGN
¶4. (C) Michuki admitted that the Kibaki campaign lacked internal discipline, tolerated too much infighting and was not staying on message. Kibaki is too loyal to those on his team, he added, even when their words and actions harm his political goals. Michuki conceded that both sides have some “bad characters” in their camps, but insisted that the Odinga-affiliated group, including William Ruto, Wycliffe Mudavadi, Cyrus Jirongo, Sally Kosgei and Fred Gumo, includes far more corrupt and criminal individuals. Michuki said that Kibaki is a peaceful man who is willing to retire gracefully if he loses and would not seek to use violence to secure victory. Michuki said that, in his role as Minister of State for Internal Security, he was committed to punishing political violence, regardless of who may be responsible for it. (Note: Michuki oversees all the police forces in Kenya and is charged with maintaining law and order.) Michuki believed that the recent surge in support for Odinga is a temporary one, and that when voters go to the polls, they will remember all that Kibaki has achieved and has done for them over the past five years. Michuki also defended Kibaki’s record on attacking official corruption, saying that prosecuting former President Moi would have been divisive, sparking ethic conflict and undercutting progress, and claiming that Kibaki’s is a government focused on the future, not the past.

POSTS FOR MUSYOKA, KOMBO
¶5. (C) Michuki noted that former Presidential hopeful Kalonzo Musyoka, an ethnic Kamba, could not be offered the Vice Presidency. The current Vice President, Moody Awori, is a Luhya, and the Kibaki team would lose more in Luhya votes than they would gain in Kamba votes by making the switch. Michuki noted that Kibaki might instead create a new post called “Chief Minister” for Musyoka to entice his support. Michuki said that Musikari Kombo, a Luhya who is currently serving as Minister for Local Government, would be offered the VP post and the politically underperforming “Uncle Moody” (the current Vice President, who failed to carry his own constituency in the November 2005 constitutional referendum) can move over to serve as Speaker of the House. Knowing our low opinion of corrupt businessman Nicholas Biwott, Michuki made a point of saying that Biwott would not be given a post in a second Kibaki government, but that Gideon Moi, the former president’s son, would be. (Note: Biwott, one of the richest men in Kenya, has been banned from travel to the United States for corruption and has been linked to the still-unsolved Ouko murder (see para 3 above); Moi is not much better as he has been repeatedly implicated in high-profile corruption cases linked to his father’s regime.)

COMMENT
¶6. (C) Michuki’s Odinga-bashing seemed perfunctory and lacking in conviction. Much of the anti-Odinga rhetoric seemed designed to bait us into taking an explicit stance against Odinga based on his Cold War ties and socialist roots. The aristocratic and wealthy Michuki no doubt has a personal dislike for Odinga’s populism, but he did not seem to believe the propaganda completely even as he was trying to convince us of its veracity. Overall, Michuki seemed worried about Kibaki’s prospects, but also proud of the accomplishments of the last five years. We are aware of Odinga’s past and family ties, but we do not share Michuki’s view of Odinga as a dangerous radical who would destabilize the region and undermine Kenya’s economic progress. That said, Luos (Odinga’s ethnic group) have felt excluded from power since independence and might aggressively assert their newfound strength, especially in the first few months of the new administration, possibly provoking considerable social tension rather than creating an environment for inter-ethnic cooperation and reconciliation. Considering regional voter registration and turnout rates, we still see the race as too close to call despite Odinga’s current lead in the polls.

RANNEBERGER

February 28, 2011 Posted by makozewe | News & Analysis, WikiLeaks Nairobi Cables | 4 Comments

WikiLeaks Releases: Nairobi Cable No. 19: Uhuru Kenyatta Admits Police Involved in Criminal Gangs

Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1084, A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN’S MEETING WITHDEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KENYATTA

VZCZCXRO8976
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1084/01 1540458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030458Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9685
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6561
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0154
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001084

SIPDIS

AF/E FOR SUSAN DRIANO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KE

SUBJECT: A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN’S MEETING WITH
DEPUTY PM/FINANCE MINISTER KENYATTA

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (B and D)

Human Rights Defender Kamau Kingara of the Oscar Foundation executed in his car in Nairobi in March 2009 by a criminal gang which Uhuru says, operates within the Police Force

¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a May 12 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (A/S) Johnnie Carson and National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Africa Michelle Gavin expressed deep concern over political tensions in Kenya.  Gavin delivered a tough message from President Obama: the U.S. would not do business with Kenyans who obstructed reform or encouraged political violence. Kenyatta sought to deflect concerns, arguing that the government’s focus should be on economic rather than political reform, given Kenya’s multitude of idle youth. He blamed an irresponsible media and a slow moving Parliament for the lack of overall progress on the reform agenda.  A/S Carson and Gavin objected to Kenyatta’s assertion that the media and Parliament were to blame and exhorted Kenyatta to work expeditiously towards significant progress on the reform agenda prior to the August 4-6, 2009 AGOA Forum in Nairobi.  Kenyatta was diplomatic enough to pay lip service to the reform agenda but could not provide any tangible evidence of a commitment to change.  End Summary.

¶2.  (C) Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta on May 12, A/S Carson and NSC Senior Director for Africa Gavin expressed the deep concern of the new U.S. Administration over political tensions in Kenya.  While noting Kenya’s critical role in Africa and its positive history of partnership with the United States, A/S Carson said there was growing concern that the political tensions that led to the eruption of violence in 2008 were building up again as a result of the slow pace of reform.  He added that the tensions within the coalition appeared greater and stronger than the glue holding the coalition together.  A/S Carson also emphasized USG concerns about the recent extra-judicial killings of human rights activists from the Oscar Foundation.  A/S Carson said the killings had the hallmarks of a police hit and “shook a lot of human rights advocates.”  Particularly worrying, A/S Carson said, was the lack of prosecution or even the serious gathering of evidence.  A/S Carson reminded Kenyatta of the linkage between political and economic reform, noting that one cannot attract investment without political certainty and stability.  He said that failure to move rapidly on the political side will undermine what Kenya wants to do on the economic side.  No one wanted to see Kenya fall or go backwards and we wanted to help where we could.  Pointing to the upcoming August 4-6AGOA Forum, A/S Carson made clear that he wanted Secretary Clinton to come to the Forum with a positive message, but that without significant reform she would be coming with a harder message for the GOK.

¶3.  (C) Gavin made clear President Obama’s deep concern over Kenya’s political gridlock.  She indicated that the U.S. wanted to help but that the new Administration is not interested in business as usual with political elites obstructing reform or contributing to political violence.  The President is worried, she added, that Kenya is headed in the wrong direction.  Gavin emphasized the importance of addressing disenfranchised youth and noted that their plight spoke to the need for economic growth and implementation of the reform agenda.

¶4.  (C) Kenyatta said Kenya’s current political stalemate (over whether the Vice President or Prime Minister leads government business) could be managed and that it was simply part of the transition from one system of government to another.  In Kenyatta’s view, the power to lead government clearly rested with the Vice President; he said he could not understand the Prime Minister’s position in seeking to take over that power.  Moving to the reform agenda, Kenyatta asserted that the focus, due primarily to problems of youth unemployment and the serious criminal gang threat in Kenya, had to be economic — rather than political — reform.  According to Kenyatta, while the government had made progress on constitutional and electoral reform, focusing exclusively on the political front would be a mistake.  A/S Carson and Gavin demurred; it was important, they said, to move on both tracks expeditiously as economic and political progress were inextricably linked.  Kenyatta blamed an “independent Parliament” and “irresponsible media” for impeding progress on the reform agenda.

¶5.  (C) On the subject of extra-judicial killings, Kenyatta condemned the actions but said there must be a greater understanding of the context in which they are taking place.  He lamented the powerful draw of Kenya’s pernicious criminal gangs, including Mungiki, on
Kenya’s growing multitude of idle youth.  Zigzagging, he conceded that the police are likely involved with the criminal gangs, and claimed that the Oscar Foundation had links with Mungiki.  In closing, Kenyatta sought additional USG assistance for Kenya.  He complained that the U.S. decision to deny Kenya access to MCC funds was based on misperceptions — rather than the reality — of corruption in Kenya.  If Kenya was so bad, Kenyatta asserted, it would not be receiving support from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.  Kenyatta said he wants a partnership with the U.S. rather than hammers and conditions, which he said moved regularly.

¶6.  (C) Comment:  In the face of repeated expressions of concern by A/S Carson and Gavin about Kenya’s lack of reform and potential collision with renewed violence, Kenyatta appeared both defensive about the government’s muddling and non-committal toward changing the status quo.  Kenyatta was diplomatic enough to pay lip service to the reform agenda, but could not provide any tangible evidence of a commitment to change.  End comment.

¶7. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Carson and NSC Senior Director for Africa Gavin.

RANNEBERGER

February 28, 2011 Posted by makozewe | News & Analysis, WikiLeaks Nairobi Cables | 3 Comments

WikiLeaks Releases: Nairobi Cable No. 18: Uhuru Kenyatta Drinks Too Much

Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1296, UHURU KENYATTA – PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE REFORM PROCESS.

• Ruto worked against Special Local Tribunal
• A Kikuyu Presdient after Kibaki is not viable
• Minister of Security Saitoti is considered too old, not charismatic, and tainted by the Goldenberg corruption scandal

VZCZCXRO9757
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1296/01 1771213
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261213Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0005
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6607
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3251
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3123
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001296

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KE
SUBJECT: UHURU KENYATTA – PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE

REFORM PROCESS

REF: NAIROBI 767

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 b,d
Summary

Uhuru: WikiLeaks cables says he drinks too much.

¶1. (C) Uhuru Kenyatta appears to be working towards a presidential run in 2012. While many have pointed out that replacing President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, by another Kikuyu, would be unlikely due to anti-Kikuyu sentiments prevalent across much of Kenyan society, Kenyatta may be encouraged to attempt a presidential run due to shifting political dynamics that make potential challengers seem weak.  Interestingly, Kenyatta seems to appreciate the need to be seen as pro-reform, and we should encourage him to push for action on key reform issues. Alternatively, the potential for Kenyatta to foment violence to achieve political ends cannot be ruled out (he is reportedly a key figure on the list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence). End summary.

Kenyetta Preparing For 2012 Presidential Bid
¶2. (C) Although in public and private Uhuru Kenyatta has avoided openly declaring presidential ambitions for 2012, he appears to be moving to pave the way for a presidential run. While conventional wisdom says that another person from the Kikuyu ethnic group cannot succeed President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, political dynamics that make potential challengers seem weak may be encouraging Uhuru and his potential supporters to rethink this.

¶3. (C) Kenyatta is taking steps that are clearly intended to bolster his political standing and mobilize support. His appointment as Finance Minister was seen by many as an implicit endorsement by Kibaki; it provides a powerful platform for Kenyatta to pursue presidential ambitions. The budget which he recently submitted to Parliament (septel) has virtually bought many parliamentarians as a result of vast expansion of the funds designated for the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The CDF is used to fund projects in parliamentary constituencies. While use of CDF funds has become more transparent and accountable over the past couple of years, parliamentarians still wield enormous influence over use of the funds, and employ them to enhance their political standing and support. No budget presentation has ever been greeted with such enthusiasm by parliamentarians.(It is important to note that expansion of the CDF, if used transparently ) and therein lies the rub ) can serve a legitimate purpose of helping stimulate the economy through infrastructure projects; the economy is suffering greatly due to the aftermath of the post-election violence and the world financial crisis. Through this tactic, Kenyatta also increases the support he is likely to receive in working behind the scenes to ensure that parliamentarians never approve an independent special tribunal to hold accountable those involved in post-election violence. It is generally assumed that Kenyatta,s name (and that of his prospective ally William Ruto) are on the list of suspects the Waki Commission gave to Kofi Annan. (The danger of being identified for investigation and possible prosecution is one of Kenyatta,s principal vulnerabilities.)

Kikuyu Politics Favor Kenyetta
¶4. (C) Kenyatta must move to ensure solid control of his KANU party as a potential presidential vehicle. KANU is currently the second biggest partner to Kibaki,s Party of National Unity (PNU), holding 14 seats in Parliament, mostly representing non-Kikuyu regions. Ex-President Moi,s son Gideon could compete for control, but at the end of the day an accommodation could be worked out.(Kenyatta was Moi,s designated successor and ran in 2002 on the KANU ticket.) Gideon Moi and other KANU stalwarts have been pressing Kenyatta to focus his energies on rebuilding KANU.

¶5. (C) Kikuyu political dynamics seem to be favoring Kenyatta. There has been an emerging realization among Kikuyu professionals, progressive politicians, and others that it would not be healthy for the nation or wise politically to seek to have another Kikuyu replace Kibaki.  That said, however, many Kikuyus, including the still dominant political class, fear the potential consequences of electing a non-Kikuyu (the concerns include worries about their economic and political interests, including the potential for another ethnic group to exploit anti-corruption efforts against them). Kenyatta is slowly but steadily emerging as the most likely potential presidential designee of the Kikuyus — should they decide to back a candidate for president. Other contenders are not gaining traction. Minister of Security Saitoti is considered too old, not charismatic, and he is tainted by the Goldenberg corruption scandal.  Kikuyu dissident Martha Karua, the former Minister of Justice and head of the NARC-K party within the PNU, has not gained wide support in the Kikuyu Central Province. (Vice President Musyoka, the nominal head of the Kamba community, which is closely related to the Kikuyu community, remains a potential standard-bearer if at the end of the day the Kikuyus decide that they should not field their own candidate. However, that would be seen as a Kikuyu-Kamba condominium, which might well be worse than a straight-out bid by Kenyatta if he can get crucial support from the Kalenjin community.)

¶6. (C) While Kibaki will not play a decisive role in designating his preferred successor, his standing as the principal Kikuyu elder and the power that State House wields, mean that obtaining his support is important. A number of sources report close contacts between Kibaki and Kenyatta, and between those two and William Ruto, a potential ally. Kibaki,s naming of Kenyatta as Finance Minister was seen as at least giving Kenyatta the platform to make a play for leadership.

Potential Kenyetta-Ruto Alliance
¶7. (C) Ruto has made a number of private visits to State House in recent months, and he and Kenyatta are in close contact. They worked together behind the scenes to ensure defeat of the special tribunal bill. One rationale for cooperation is the importance they attach to promoting the welfare of their respective ethnic communities (Kenyatta,s Kikuyu community in Central Province and Ruto,s Kalenjin community in Rift Valley) in order to avoid a repeat of what happened last year during the post-election violence. Although tensions between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities remain high and make an alliance problematic, the political imperatives driving potential cooperation between Kenyatta and Ruto cannot be dismissed.(Some of the thinking runs along these lines: an alliance among the Kalenjins, Kikuyus, and the Kambas assures a winning majority. In the event of violence in response to such a victory, such violence could be contained to PM Odinga,s Luo ethnic community in Nyanza Province and to his supporters in Nairobi,s Kibera slum.)

¶8. (C) Tentative, behind the scenes cooperation between Kenyatta and Ruto is focused on a deal whereby Ruto uses his influence among Kalenjins to facilitate the reintegration of the Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Rift Valley; in return, Ruto would get a significant share of important economic positions for his Kalenjin political allies. What is particularly problematic in a potential Kenyatta-Ruto alliance is who would get top billing on the presidential ticket, but there is some sense that Ruto might accept the position of vice president or prime minister, and thus prepare the ground for a presidential run in 2017.(Ruto is in his 40s.)

¶9. (C) Most observers, rightly in our view, believe that attempting to have another Kikuyu succeed Kibaki is a recipe for serious instability ) perhaps for a meltdown much more severe than that experienced last year. While some sort of arrangement could emerge between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, this seems a distant prospect given what happened last year.  (Importantly Moi, rather than Ruto, is still seen as the head of the Kalenjin community and there is bad blood between those two. If Moi supports Kenyatta, Ruto could decide to stay with Odinga, which would mean a split of the Kalenjin vote.)

Politicians Compete For Youth Vote
¶10. (C) Yet another indication that Kenyatta may be preparing the ground for a presidential run is his tacit support for the creation of a national youth movement. Struck by U.S. outreach efforts to grassroots youth movements in support of the reform agenda, parliamentarians and other politicians are scrambling to try to co-opt the youth.  One of the most important of these efforts is the plan underway by Kibaki,s son Jimmy and several parliamentarians to launch a national youth movement on July 4. Although Jimmy has publicly claimed this is intended to push for change across the political spectrum, this is a ridiculous assertion given Jimmy,s position as a charter member of the vested interests.

¶11. (C) There are some indications that this new youth movement is intended to co-opt and destroy the grassroots youth movements which have been emerging across ethnic lines to push peacefully and in a non-partisan manner for change (see reftel on our efforts to encourage this). Jimmy and those behind establishment of this new youth movement attempted to get the Ambassador to attend the launch, which he declined to do. One of those heavily involved in setting up this youth movement made clear that it is intended both to bolster Jimmy,s eventual political prospects (probably to run for his father,s parliamentary seat in 2012) and potentially to serve as a source of support for Kenyatta.

Kenyetta Election Could Push Reform Agenda
¶12. (C) Kenyatta,s potential ambitions could be helpful in pushing the reform process.  During a recent conversation with the Ambassador, Kenyatta claimed that he is privately pushing Kibaki to carry out key reforms, particularly with respect to the police and judiciary. It seems possible that ) given the clear public frustration with the slow pace of reform and our stated concerns — Kenyatta appreciates the need for him, KANU, and PNU to be seen as more pro-reform. He claimed to the Ambassador that he is urging removal of Police Commissioner Ali and Attorney General Wako.

¶13. (C) If he decides to pursue the presidency, Kenyatta has several major strengths, but these are balanced and potentially offset by important weaknesses. Kenyatta is bright and charming, even charismatic. He is enormously wealthy, and therefore has not had to engage in corruption. Although his wealth is the inheritance from his father,s corruption, the Kenyatta family still holds a special status. Kenyatta,s liabilities are at least as important as his strengths. He drinks too much and is not a hard worker (though he surprised everyone by the acuity of the budget, which reportedly resulted from some tough work over long hours). Perhaps most importantly, Kenyatta has been closely linked to the Mungiki (which emerged in the aftermath of the Mau Mau and began as a movement in defense of Kikuyu traditional values, but which has long since morphed into a well-organized mafia-style criminal organization). The reason that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the Mungiki. (The links between the Mungiki and various Kikuyu politicians are at best murky.) Ironically, Kenyatta,s links to the Mungiki make him one of those who feels strongly that extrajudicial killing must stop (since many of the extrajudicial killings have been carried out by the police, under Commissioner Ali,s direction, against the Mungiki).

¶14. (C) Kenyatta may see shifting political dynamics as opening the way for a presidential run.  Odinga is increasingly perceived as feckless, unable or unwilling to govern effectively and move forward the reform agenda. There is growing disillusionment within his camp (as conveyed by key interlocutors of Odinga,s Orange Democratic Movement, ODM, party to the Ambassador).  Odinga,s being seen as in a weakened position may be wishful thinking given his political resilience and the fact that he could yet emerge as a reformer, but he has clearly lost significant popular support. The ODM seems both directionless and less united than before.

¶15. (C) Comment: Although talk of calculations with respect to the 2012 presidential election seems very premature, the reality is that politicians are already maneuvering with that in mind. Those considerations will influence their calculations with respect to the reform agenda. The popular dynamic in favor of reform will influence politicians, behavior in a positive direction to some degree, but this will be weighed against considerations of ethnic alliances, fund-raising, and personal politics. Continued intensive U.S. pressure for implementation of reforms will help drive considerations in the right direction towards reform steps. End comment.

RANNEBERGER

February 28, 2011 Posted by makozewe | News & Analysis, WikiLeaks Nairobi Cables | 77 Comments

WikiLeaks Releases: Nairobi Cable No. 17: Uhuru Kenyatta Channelled Funds to Mungiki

Viewing cable 10NAIROBI11, Kenya: Inadequate Witness Protection Poses Painful Dilemma

VZCZCXRO0838
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #0011/01 0051141
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 051140Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0322
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000011

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/05
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC KCRM KJUS UG KE
SUBJECT: Kenya: Inadequate Witness Protection Poses Painful Dilemma

CLASSIFIED BY: Mitchell Benedict, Political Counselor, DOS, POL;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1.     (U) This is an action request. Please see para 17.

Mungiki gang on terror mission

¶2. (S) Summary: In recent months, post has noted an increased level of intimidation against witnesses to Kenya’s late 2007-early 2008 post-election violence. This trend is consistent with security threats against other human rights defenders (HRDs) whose activities conflict with vested political interests. The government of Kenya (GOK) passed legislation establishing a witness protection program in 2006 but has yet to establish a functional program. Most experts are concerned that, even if implemented, the program will have critical vulnerabilities and be subject to political interference. Amendments have been proposed to the legislation to attempt to address these concerns. In 2007, civil society groups formed an ad hoc network to protect HRDs, but awareness and capacity are limited and the network has likely been penetrated by the Kenyan intelligence service. Our ability to assist HRDs is limited in both scope and duration, and has recently proved to be inadequate to fully support recent applicants. The number of non-HRD witnesses who will require long-term protection is likely to increase significantly, especially if the International Criminal Court (ICC) moves ahead with indictments against senior political leaders for their roles in the post-election violence. Robust action by Kenya’s Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), or much less likely Kenya’s courts, could also act as triggers for threats against witnesses.

¶3. (S) Summary, continued: Inadequate witness and HRD protection mechanisms within the GOK and civil society — and insufficient support for witness protection by the international community — are major impediments to the prosecution of organizers of post-election violence, whether at the ICC or (much less likely) in Kenyan courts. A continued lack of witness protection will also inhibit the work of the TJRC. Therefore, we request additional resources (via the Human Rights and Democracy Fund or other appropriate mechanism) to support civil society in developing alternative witness protection/HRD protection networks. We also request that the Department examine the parameters of the existing Human Rights Defenders’ Fund to determine whether additional resources can be made available, especially for witnesses or HRDs who require longer-term protection. To the extent legally possible we should be in touch with the ICC on this issue, and we should urge strong support by the EU and key member states for witness protection.  End summary.

Increasing Threats and Extrajudicial Killings

¶4. (S) Kenya’s government, political leaders, and criminal gangs have historically utilized intimidation and varying degrees of violence against opponents. During the post-election crisis period in early 2008, Kenya experienced extensive violence, returning to relative calm after the signing of the National Accord in February 2008. However, since the March 2009 killing of two directors of the Oscar Foundation (a local NGO which documented and publicized cases of extrajudicial killings by GOK security forces) by suspected members of a police death squad, we have noted a steady rise in the number of individuals threatened or killed for apparent political reasons. A number of witnesses who testified before the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence, also known as the Waki Commission, have already been threatened. Two classes of post-election violence witnesses are most vulnerable: ethnic Kalenjin witnesses in Rift Valley province, and ethnic Kikuyu witnesses to post-election violence in Nairobi and Central province, especially those with links to the Mungiki movement. However, due to the widespread and complex nature of the post-election violence, witnesses can come from all ethnic groups and walks of life, and unlike HRDs, are not part of a civil society network.

¶5. (S) Politically-motivated intimidation and violence in Kenya spans a broad spectrum of perpetrators and victims. After the Oscar Foundation murders, post helped four witnesses to relocate to Uganda after they were allegedly threatened by the police. Members of Parliament and their staff who have sought to advance legislation to establish a local tribunal to try suspects implicated in post-election violence have received death threats. One parliamentarian’s aide received a text message stating “u better stop associating with him…do you want we start counting your days also” two days before three suspects attempted to kidnap the aide. Since 2007, security forces have often used lethal and excessive force when apprehending suspected members of the Mungiki, an ethnic Kikuyu movement linked to various criminal activities, especially in Nairobi and Central province. In November 2009, Mungiki spokesman Njuguna Gitau was killed on a busy Nairobi street by suspects alleged to be undercover police officers. At the time of his death, Gitau was working to register a political party to represent Mungiki and youth interests.  According to one source, Gitau may have been the lynchpin to channel funding from Uhuru Kenyatta to the Mungiki during the post-election violence.

¶6. (S) Of particular concern for Kenya’s reform process are increasing threats to witnesses of the post-election violence. As the ICC prepares for potential prosecution of key organizers of the violence, multiple sources indicate that implicated political leaders, notably cabinet ministers William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, are directing a campaign of intimidation against potential witnesses. The ICC has not yet launched a formal investigation into crimes committed during the post-election violence, but has already expressed concern about threats to witnesses. ICC representatives have met with GOK officials regarding lack of progress in establishing its national witness protection program. The ICC does not have its own witness protection program, but rather must rely on national programs to keep witnesses safe. Some NGOs have noted a clear connection between visits by Chief Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo and other ICC officials and subsequent intensifying pressure on witnesses. Kenya’s TJRC has also expressed the desire to set up an independent witness protection unit, but has not taken any action to date and is itself suffering from a lack of agreement about its mandate (i.e. whether to focus on truth-finding, justice-seeking, or promotion of reconciliation). An additional update on the TJRC will be reported septel.

GOK Witness Protection Remains in Limbo

¶7. (S) Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs Mutula Kilonzo has publicly acknowledged receiving “bundles” of letters from post-election violence witnesses reporting intimidation, many of whom testified before the Waki Commission, and who have therefore already attracted unwelcome attention from post-election violence inciters and organizers.  While Kilonzo notes that threats will complicate any prosecution of post-election violence suspects, he continues to argue that he is powerless to protect them and accuses Attorney General Amos Wako, who is responsible for oversight of the witness protection program, of failing to fulfill his duties. (Note: Wako was recently subjected to 212f visa sanctions for his role in several high-level corruption cases, and does not appear to feel any sense of urgency with regard to his witness protection mandate. Moreover, any witness protection program carried out under Wako would not be credible.  Kilonzo’s suggestion that he has no ability to realize implementation of the witness protection program is disingenuous at best. End note.)

¶8. (S) Since the Witness Protection Act was passed in 2006, the Witness Protection Unit (WPU) housed within the Attorney General’s office has been officially “launched” at least four times, most recently in October 2009. The WPU, headed by prosecutor Alice Ondiyeki, now has staff and furnished office space, but has yet to accept a single witness for protection. To date, the current and former DOJ Resident Legal Advisors have provided technical assistance with drafting the Act and numerous trainings to WPU staff, including the consultative visit of Heather Cartwright, a nationally-respected expert on witness protection. Judge Ann Williams, a judge from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal, has also provided training to prosecutors staffing the WPU. Currently, South African expert Gerhard van Rooyn is embedded within the WPU and is providing technical assistance. His position is funded by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

¶9. (S) Under the Witness Protection Act, the WPU is under the authority of the Attorney General (AG). Security is provided by members of the Kenya Police Service, and the AG has to give approval for anyone to enter the program, although in practice he has devolved authority to select participants to Ondiyeki as head of the unit. The WPU is funded as a line item in the AG’s budget, which is controlled by the Ministry of Justice.

¶10.  (S) In a recent briefing to members of diplomatic missions in Nairobi, van Rooyn laid out his vision for Kenya’s witness protection program. Van Rooyn’s fundamental concern is that the WPU as it currently exists is too closely linked to the AG and security forces and therefore will not be able to provide politically neutral protection, especially to witnesses who could implicate senior government officials in serious crimes. Van Rooyn has drafted proposed amendments to the Witness Protection Act to overcome what he sees as fatal flaws in the existing legislation. The key elements of the amendment make the WPU independent of the Attorney General (and, by extension, the Ministry of Justice) and create an autonomous, dedicated police unit for witness security with the authority to carry weapons. Van Rooyn also cited the need for vetting and revetting of WPU staff, include polygraphing, to ensure autonomy and confidentiality.

¶11.  (S) There are, however, two concerns with this approach: one is that under the GOK budgetary system, a completely independent body can be starved for finances (and therefore rendered impotent) unless it has a budget line and devolved authority over how to spend its finances. As van Rooyn pointed out, the requisite financial support demands concurrent political will to make witness protection work. He added that, given the length of time many witnesses might need to spend in the program, the government would need to fund witness and unit operating expenses for at least three years. Other such bodies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, have effectively been prevented from carrying out their mandate through successive budget cuts. The second concern is that the Police Commissioner and other senior law enforcement officials are likely to oppose the independent police unit, which could presumably be compromised by corruption or infiltrated by intelligence officials in the same way that existing police units could be compromised.

¶12.  (S) An additional obstacle is that the AG and WPU staff now say they cannot admit anyone into the program or otherwise move forward with implementation until the amendment is either passed or rejected by Parliament, thus building in an automatic additional delay of several months. In November, the AG announced his intention to introduce the amendment to the cabinet and thence to Parliament, but it had not moved forward by the time Parliament adjourned on December 10.

Civil Society: Limited Capacity, Likely Compromised

¶13.  (S) In November 2007, Kenya human rights NGOs established a national human rights’ defenders network, supported by and in partnership with post and other like-minded missions. The HRD network, led by the NGO Kenya Human Rights Commission, has set up a network of referral points and safe houses. In 2009, the network provided protection to 51 at-risk individuals. The HRD network has not attempted to provide protection for non-HRD witnesses.

¶14.  (S) An assessment of Kenya’s HRD network conducted by the East and Horn of Africa HRD Project in October 2009 concluded that the network is hampered by a lack of capacity and funding, is largely unknown outside civil society circles, and has poor communication security procedures. Organizations active with the HRD network report that they have been monitored and/or threatened by agents of the Kenyan intelligence service. As a result, member organizations often reject applicants whose bona fides are unknown to them and do not widely publicize the existence of the network. Extensive use of cell phones by the HRD network and individuals under protection further compromises their safety as calls can be monitored by the GOK.

Embassy Resources Inadequate

¶15.  (S) Post’s primary instrument for assisting at-risk HRDs is the Human Rights Defenders Fund, administered by Freedom House in coordination with the Bureau of Democracy Rights and Labor (DRL). While the Fund provides rapidly deployable funding to assist HRDs in-country or in the initial stages of relocation abroad, the relatively small amounts and one-off nature of the grants limit the utility of the Fund for HRDs with long-term protection needs. For example, post used the Fund to assist four witnesses to the Oscar Foundation murders to relocate to Uganda and apply for refugee status. Each witness received funding adequate for three months of living expenses. However, the government of Uganda took eight months to process their applications for refugee status (possibly due in part to domestic political sensitivities), during which time the witnesses were evicted from their housing and had no legal means of employment. All four ultimately returned to Kenya, where they remain at risk. Post’s assistance to HRDs is also subject to surveillance. The Poloff responsible for the program has received two anonymous phone calls in which email correspondence to HRDs was cited and the officer was warned against continued support to the individuals.

Action Requests

¶16.  (S) An apolitical, confidential state-run witness protection program is ultimately the best long-term solution for Kenya. However, this is not a viable possibility in the short to medium term.  We are concerned that lives are at risk in the interim. Any decisive forward action by the ICC will substantially increase already significant pressure on witnesses.  The TJRC will prove ineffective, whether the desired end-state is truth, justice, or reconciliation, unless it can create a safe environment for witnesses and victims to come forward.

¶17.  (S) First, in order to formulate effective support for witness protection in Kenya, we need to know more about the ICC’s plans and what it is prepared to do in this arena. We request the Department to consider contacts with ICC interlocutors via the Department, Embassy Nairobi and The Hague about their game plan for witness protection, including the number and type of witnesses they would likely present, which witnesses would need protection and for how long, and whether there are high-priority witnesses with “smoking gun” evidence or whether the cases will rest on circumstantial evidence from many witnesses. Second, we request that the Department examine the parameters of the existing Human Rights Defenders’ Fund to determine whether additional resources can be made available, especially for witnesses or HRDs who require longer-term protection, and explore other mechanisms as well. Third, we are discussing these issues with the EU and key member state colleagues in Nairobi (especially the British, French, Dutch, and Nordics), and suggest the Department consider appropriate demarches.

RANNEBERGER

February 28, 2011 Posted by makozewe | News & Analysis, WikiLeaks Nairobi Cables | 3 Comments