Kenya and Tanzanian Independence Day Celebrations: Fri 10th December
More faya on Kenya and Tanzania Independence celebrations...
Where are “Wikileaks Cables” on Nairobi?
The latest Wikileaks release has not only made headline news but also sent different signals to affected countries around the world. The Cables, which are extremly amazing, are obviously an “eye opener” into U.S. Foreign policy. According to the data summary, the Cables for Nairobi also exist but it looks like so far, they have not been released. As the International press begins to feast on the Cables, and in the absence of the “Nairobi Cables” (probably stalted for later release), KSB is cutting it’s share of the cake by slicing out the “Harare Cables”.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000638
DEPARTMENT FOR P, AF, AND AF/S FOR MOZENA AND HILL,
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.
PITTMAN AND B. LEO; USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI
SUBJECT: The End is Nigh
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4b/d
Described in the Cables as "A tactician"
¶1. (C) Having said my piece repeatedly over the last three years, I won’t offer a lengthy prescription for our Zimbabwe policy. My views can be stated very simply as stay the course and prepare for change. Our policy is working and it’s helping to drive change here. What is required is simply the grit, determination and focus to see this through. Then, when the changes finally come we must be ready to move quickly to help consolidate the new dispensation.
THE SITUATION
¶2. (C) Robert Mugabe has survived for so long because he is more clever and more ruthless than any other politician in Zimbabwe. To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant tactitian and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly change the rules of the game, radicalize the political dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda. However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors: his ego and belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive focus on the past as a justification for everything in the present and future; his deep ignorance on economic issues (coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including supply and demand); and his essentially short-term, tactical style.
¶3. (C) While his tactical skills have kept him in power for 27 years, over the last seven this has only been achieved by a series of populist, but destructive and ultimately self-defeating moves. In reaction to losing the 2000 referendum on the constitution, a vengeful Mugabe unleashed his QGreen BombersQ to commit land reform and in the process he destroyed ZimbabweQs agricultural sector, once the bedrock of the economy. While thousands of white farmers saw their properties seized, hundreds of thousands of black Zimbabweans lost their livelihoods and were reduced to utter poverty. In 2005, having been forced to steal victory by manipulating the results of an election he lost, Mugabe lashed out again, punishing the urban populace by launching Operation Murambatsvina. The result was wholesale destruction of the informal sector, on which as much as 70-80 percent of urban dwellers had depended, and the uprooting of 700,000 Zimbabweans. The current inflationary cycle really began with Murambatsvina, as rents and prices grew in response to a decrease in supply.
¶4. (C) And now, faced with the hyperinflationary consequences of his ruinous fiscal policies and growing reliance on the printing press to keep his government running, Mugabe has launched Operation Slash Prices. This has once again given him a very temporary boost in popularity (especially among the police, who have led the looting of retail outlets and now seem well positioned to take a leading role in the black market economy) at the cost of terribledamage to the country and people. Many small grocery and shop owners, traders, etc.,will be wiped out; the shelves are increasingly bare; hunger, fear, and tension are growing; fuel has disappeared. When the shelves are still empty this time next week, the popular appeal of the price roll back will evaporate and the government simply doesnQt have the resources to replace the entire private commercial sector and keep Zimbabweans fed. It may attempt to do so by printing more money, adding even more inflationary pressure on a system already reeling from the GOZQs quasi-fiscal lunacy combined with the price impact of pervasive shortages. The increasingly worthless Zim dollar is likely to collapse as a unit of trade in the near future, depriving the GOZ of its last economic tool other than sheer thuggery and theft of othersQ assets.
¶5. (C) With all this in view, IQm convinced the end is not far off for the Mugabe regime. Of course, my predecessors and many other observers have all said the same thing, and yet Mugabe is still with us. I think this time could prove different, however, because for the first time the president is under intensifying pressure simultaneously on the economic, political and international fronts. In the past, he could always play one of these off against the other, using economic moves to counter political pressure or playing the old colonial/race/imperialist themes to buy himself breathing room regionally and internationally. But he is running out of options and in the swirling gases of the new Zimbabwean constellation that is starting to form, the economic, political and international pressures are concentrating on Mugabe himself. Our ZANU-PF contacts are virtually unanimous in saying reform is desperately needed, but won’t happen while the Old Man is there, and therefore he must go (finding the courage to make that happen is another matter, however, but even that may be coming closer). This is not some sudden awakening on the road to Damascus, but a reflection of the pain even party insiders increasingly feel over the economic meltdown. We also get regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of angry and increasingly open mutterings against Mugabe even in ZANU-PF’s traditional rural bastions. Beginning in March, the other SADC leaders finally recognized (in the wake of the terrible beatings of March 11 and the international outcry that followed Q another self-inflicted wound for Mugabe) that Zimbabwe is a problem they need to address. Thabo Mbeki appears committed to a successful mediation and is reportedly increasingly irritated with MugabeQs efforts to manipulate him or blow him off altogether. If Mugabe judges that he still commands all he surveys by virtue of being the elder statesman on the scene, he may be committing yet another serious blunder. Finally, one does well to recall that the only serious civil disturbances here in a decade came in 1998 over bread shortages, showing that even the famously passive Shona people have their limits. The terror and oppression of the intervening years have cowed people, but itQs anyoneQs guess whether their fear or their anger will win out in the end.
WHAT WILL THE END LOOK LIKE?
¶6. (C) This is the big, unanswerable question. One thing at least is certain, Mugabe will not wake up one morning a changed man, resolved to set right all he has wrought. He will not go quietly nor without a fight. He will cling to power at all costs and the costs be damned, he deserves to rule by virtue of the liberation struggle and land reform and the people of Zimbabwe have let him down by failing to appreciate this, thus he neednQt worry about their well-being. The only scenario in which he might agree to go with a modicum of good grace is one in which he concludes that the only way to end his days a free man is by leaving State House. I judge that he is still a long way from this conclusion and will fight on for now.
¶7. (C) The optimal outcome, of course, and the only one that doesnQt bring with it a huge risk of violence and conflict, is a genuinely free and fair election, under international supervision. The Mbeki mediation offers the best, albeit very slim, hope of getting there. However, as Pretoria grows more and more worried about the chaos to its north and President MbekiQs patience with MugabeQs antics wears thin, the prospects for serious South African engagement may be growing. Thus, this effort deserves all the support and backing we can muster. Less attractive is the idea of a South African-brokered transitional arrangement or government of national unity. Mbeki has always favored stability and in his mind this means a ZANU-PF-led GNU, with perhaps a few MDC additions. This solution is more likely to prolong than resolve the crisis and we must guard against letting Pretoria dictate an outcome which perpetuates the status quo at the expense of real change and reform.
¶8. (C) The other scenarios are all less attractive: a popular uprising would inevitably entail a bloodbath, even if it were ultimately successful; MugabeQs sudden, unexpected death would set off a stampede for power among ZANU-PF heavy weights; a palace coup, whether initiated within ZANU-PF or from the military – in which Mugabe is removed, killed, exiled or otherwise disposed of, could well devolve into open conflict between the contending successors. Similarly, some form of “constitutional coup” i.e., a change at the top engineered within the framework of ZANU-PFQs “legitimate” structures could well prove to be merely the opening bell in a prolonged power struggle. None of the players is likely to go quietly into the night without giving everything they have, including calling on their supporters in the security services. Moreover, experience elsewhere would suggest that whoever comes out on top initially will struggle, and more than likely fail, to halt the economic collapse. Thus, there is a good prospect of not one but a series of rapid-fire Qtransitions,Q until some new, stable dispensation is reached.
¶9. (C) The final, and probably worst, possibility is that Mugabe concludes he can settle for ruling over a rump Zimbabwe, maintaining control over Harare and the Mashona heartland, the critical forces of the National Reserve Force and CIO and a few key assets Q gold, diamonds, platinum and Air Zimbabwe to fund the good times. Under this scenario the rest of the country, in one of the comradeQs favorite phrases, could Qgo hang,Q leaving it to the international community to stave off the worst humanitarian consequences.
WHAT OF THE OPPOSITION?
¶10. (C) ZimbabweQs opposition is far from ideal and I leave convinced that had we had different partners we could have achieved more already. But you have to play the hand youQre dealt. With that in mind, the current leadership has little executive experience and will require massive hand holding and assistance should they ever come to power.
¶11. (C) Morgan Tsvangarai is a brave, committed man and, by and large, a democrat. He is also the only player on the scene right now with real star quality and the ability to rally the masses. But Tsvangarai is also a flawed figure, not readily open to advice, indecisive and with questionable judgment in selecting those around him. He is the indispensable element for opposition success, but possibly an albatross around t heir necks once in power. In short, he is a kind of Lech Walesa character: Zimbabwe needs him, but should not rely on his executive abilities to lead the country’s recovery. Arthur Mutambara is young and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and smart as a whip. But, in many respects heQs a light-weight who has spent too much time reading U.S. campaign messaging manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman Ncube has proven to be a deeply divisive and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the sooner he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is useful to many, including the regime and South Africa, so is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet. The prospects for healing the rift within the MDC seem dim, which is a totally unnecessary self-inflicted wound on their part this time. With few exceptions Q Tendayi Biti, Nelson Chamisa Q the talent is thin below the top ranks. The great saving grace of the opposition is likely to be found in the diaspora. Most of ZimbabweQs best professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen and women, etc., have fled the country. They are the oppositionQs natural allies and it is encouraging to see signs, particularly in South Africa and the UK, that these people are talking, sharing ideas, developing plans and thinking together about future recovery.
¶12. (C) Unfortunately, among the MDCQs flaws is its inability to work more effectively with the rest of civil society. The blame for this can be shared on both sides (many civil society groups, like the NCA, are single-issue focused and take the overall dynamic in unhelpful directions; others, like WOZA, insist on going it alone as a matter of principle), but ultimately it falls to the MDC as the largest and the only true political party, to show the way. Once again, however, these are natural allies and they have more reason to work together than fight against each other.
STAYING THE COURSE, PREPARING FOR CHANGE
¶13. (C) If I am right and change is in the offing, we need to step up our preparations. The work done over the last year on transition planning has been extremely useful, both for stimulating a fresh look at our own assumptions and plans and for forging a common approach among the traditional donor community. But the process has lagged since the meetings in March in London and should be re-energized. It is encouraging in this respect that USAID Washington has engaged the Mission here in discussing how we would use additional resources in response to a genuinely reform-minded government . I hope this will continue and the good work done so far will survive the usual bloodletting of the budget process.
¶14. (C) The official media has had a field day recently whooping that “Dell leaves Zimbabwe a failed man”. That’s not quite how it looks from here. I believe that the firm U.S. stance, the willingness to speak out and stand up, have contributed to the accelerating pace of change. Mugabe and his henchman are like bullies everywhere: if they can intimidate you they will. But ther’re not used to someone standing up to them and fighting back. It catches them off guard and that’s when they make mistakes. The howls of protest over critical statements from Washington or negative coverage on CNN are the clearest proof of how this hurts them. Ditto the squeals over Qillegal sanctions.Q In addition, the regime has become so used to calling the shots and dictating the pace that the merest stumble panics them. Many local observers have noted that Mugabe is panicked and desperate about hyperinflation at the moment, and hence heQs making mistakes. Possibly fatal mistakes. We need to keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do him in. Equally important is an active U.S. leadership role in the international community. The UK is ham-strung by its colonial past and domestic politics, thus, letting them set the pace alone merely limits our effectiveness. The EU is divided between the hard north and its soft southern underbelly. The Africans are only now beginning to find their voice. Rock solid partners like Australia donQt pack enough punch to step out front and the UN is a non-player. Thus it falls to the U.S., once again, to take the lead, to say and do the hard things and to set the agenda. Hundreds, maybe thousands, of ordinary Zimbabweans of all kinds have told me that our clear, forthright stance has given them hope and the courage to hang on. By this regimeQs standards, acting in the interests of the people may indeed be considered a failure. But I believe that the opposite is true, and that we can be justifiably proud that in Zimbabwe we have helped advance the PresidentQs freedom Agenda. The people of this country know it and recognize it and that is the true touchstone of our success here.
DELL
Sammy Kasule CD Lanuch 04
Kasule and Trubadur
Sammy Kasule CD Release Party 3
Top Kenyan Artist Moses Trubadur came to show support
Mext Attraction: Jamhuri Bash 11th December
Spree on a Wednesday and bash on a Furaiday period!
Who is John “Kimeendero” Michuki?
From Colonial Administrator to corrupt Minister in Kibaki’s Kenya
Michuki masterminded raid on the East African Standard
He is also known as “The Rattle Snake.” His Kikuyu nickname, Kimeendero[89] means, “the one who crushes” and can, according to Raila Odinga,[90] be traced back to his days in the Colonial administration where he worked as a District Officer. Michuki acquired his “rattle-snake” nickname after police raided the offices of The East African Standard Newspaper, burnt copies of the paper that were destined for distribution, shut down KTN TV station and made away with computer hard disks among other equipment. The paper came under attack after it reported an alleged secret meeting between Kalonzo Musyoka, then an ODM-Kenya Presidential aspirant, and President Mwai Kibaki at State House Nairobi.[91] After Michuki admitted that the government was behind the commando style raid, he told Journalists that, “When you rattle a snake, you must be ready to be bitten by it.”[92] The Kiruki report about the Artur brothers who commanded the raid accused Michuki “…of supporting and condoning illegal activities of the Arturs. It recommends his prosecution and ban from holding public office.”[93] In the past, Michuki has had to deny charges that he was against the Mau Mau freedom fighters[94] during the anti-colonial war for liberation when he was employed to serve his British colonial masters.
Among the fat cats who surrounded Kibaki, Michuki was initially not a key policymaker but later Kibaki had reason to listen to him after he displayed unmatched ruthlessness in dealing with Matatu operators across the country.[95] Just like Kibaki, Michuki worked with Moi in KANU then moved to Ford-People following the dawn of the Multi-party era but when it became clear that Simon Nyachae’s Ford- People (which he was a member of ) was heading into a ditch, Michuki jumped ship and joined Kibaki in NAK. However, he remains an old buddy of Kibaki who did not come into contact with the President for the first time after he left Ford-People.
Once he got the NARC nomination in the run up to the December 2002 election, Michuki surprised Kenyans when one of his agents openly began to bribe the youth with money as part of Michuki’s election campaigns. In November 2002 at Iyego location, Michuki rebuked a group of youth who threw back a wad of Ksh50 bank notes back to an agent who was distributing the money. According to the youths, the Ksh50 “was an insult.” Upset that the youths were rejecting cash handouts, Michuki called their attention. According to one media report, “Former Kangema MP John Michuki, however, rebuked them by telling them that they were not mercenaries for hire and should take whatever was available.”[96] When the emissary who had been rebuffed fled to Michuki’s house, amid hot pursuit, The Daily Nation wrote that Michuki came out and gave the youths an additional Ksh50 each[97] thereby calming them down. After the 2002 elections, a report by the Kenya National Human Rights Commission claimed that Michuki was seen bribing voters in a by-election in full view of police.[98] Whether this amounted to vote buying or influence peddling is unimportant because Michuki was never charged. What is known is that Michuki is an old-timer who understands the money games in Kenyan politics and whose links with Kibaki dates back to the 60s when Kibaki was Assistant Minister of Economic Planning. In 1965, Michuki was appointed the first African Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and when Kibaki moved to the Finance Ministry in 1969, he worked with Michuki. It was after this connection that Michuki was appointed the Chief Executive of the Kenya Commercial Bank where he worked under Kibaki for nine years before plunging into elective politics.
Turbulent background
Kibaki was rounding up his fourth form at the colonial Mangu High School[99] when Michuki joined, and unlike other rich friends of Kibaki, the two are old buddies who did not bump into each other at Muthaiga golf course. Secondly, Michuki was the first African DC in Nyeri, Kibaki’s hometown, so he has been playing a huge leadership role in Kibaki’s very backyard. Another common Kibaki- Michuki denominator is that before Michuki joined Mangu High School[100] in 1951 where Kibaki was already a prefect, the “Rattle Snake” studied at Nyeri High School, which was also located at Kibaki’s home ground. It is from Nyeri where Michuki relocated his studies to Mugoiri Boys Secondary School,[101] which, unlike Nyeri, was a day school so he could commute between Chief Ignatius Murai’s home where he took refuge when life became difficult and Mugoiri Boys. Chief Murai was a personal friend of Michuki’s late father and he had no difficulty accepting to adopt the young Michuki.
When he joined Kibaki’s fat cats after NARC seized power in 2002, Michuki’s turbulent background may have had something to do with his “no-nonsense” position, especially during times of dispute regardless of whether the subject of dispute was a political entity like LDP or a blood relation. Michuki’s nephew Priest, Mr Bernard Njuru Mugo, knows better because he once found himself in court after he constructed a church next to Michuki’s land in Kangema.[102]
The ruthlessness and “tough attitude” of Michuki could also be linked to his tough life as a toddler and conflicting childhood experiences that he could have been trying to reconcile when he was Minister of Internal Security. A brief sampling of Michuki’s tribulations as a child could help deepen understanding of the rattle snake: For one, his peasant mother, Maryana Wanjiku, could not afford his school fees of fifty cents per month; Michuki had to trek from Kangema to Ngumberi to pick coffee at Cianda estate for ten cents per day to save money to finance his primary education; He dropped in and out of school when money ran out and worked as a tailor employed by an Asian in Nairobi to sew buttonholes in army uniforms where he was paid a shilling per dozen uniforms[103] done. His father, Chief Michuki wa Kagwi, who had forty-three women[104] and several children, passed away when Michuki was only eight-years-old and throughout his childhood, he had to struggle alongside his hard-working mother[105] who was determined to beat the odds. Still trying to deal with the tragic loss of his father, Michuki began life from humble beginnings by joining Primary school where he reportedly used to attend class without shoes.
Despite the rough and tumble of life, Michuki did make it to Worcester College in Oxford to study Administration between 1970 and 1979. Michuki is one of the pioneer Kikuyu nationalists who took a break during his studies to set up GEMA,[106] an ethnic outfit that sought to amend the Kenyan Constitution to block former dictator Daniel arap Moi from succeeding Kenyatta in the event of Kenyatta’s death. He set up GEMA together with Njenga Karume,[107] another Kikuyu die-hard who has been working hard apparently to pursue “Kikuyu interests” in Kenya’s political establishment.
When Karume switched sides in 2002 elections to support KANU against Kibaki, thinking that Moi’s Uhuru Project could succeed to enable Kenyatta to take over Kenya’s Presidency, he had to depend on his old friend Michuki to find his way back to Kibaki’s circle of rich friends when the Uhuru Project collapsed and Kibaki seized power with the help of Raila Odinga. When Karume began to make his ways back to Kibaki, Raila was already at loggerheads with Kibaki because of the MoU, which Kibaki refused to honour since doing so could have sabotaged the Mount Kenya Mafia agenda that took over the leadership of Kenya through the back door led by top fat cats under the umbrella of DP’s “Council of Elders.” As he tried to search for serious political direction after Kenyatta died in his sleep in Mombasa, enabling Moi to begin entrenching himself in power, Michuki soon discovered that rubbing shoulders with GEMA ideas wasn’t so progressive at a time when he was not even a Member of Parliament. The situation worsened when he found himself in court charged together with Karume for failing to file returns for GEMA in the 70s. From then on, he cooled down his GEMA profile as he maintained his membership in KANU to search for new fortunes. The GEMA project was derailed because Moi was in power and the emergent cartel that came to surround Moi was hostile to GEMA forces, an organization that was seen to be anti-KANU. Michuki simply took his cue.
Land grabbing at Karura forest
When the “Rattle Snake” came back from studies in Oxford, he was already a political animal. He had so much confidence in his ability to dethrone Mr. Joseph Kamotho from his Kangema Parliamentary seat that he gathered the courage to make a debut in Parliamentary politics but failed because Kamotho beat him at the polls. He never gave up. In the 1983 snap elections, Michuki was at it again albeit under different circumstances. Kamotho had been tainted with the “Njonjo affair” and Michuki took advantage of Kamotho’s tribulations and diminishing popularity to capture the Kangema seat for the first time and enter Parliament — but that was then.
The Michuki who linked up with Kibaki after the December 2002 election was a new Michuki who had gone through a complete economic metamorphosis, in the process, transforming himself from wannabe GEMA supremo to become one of the “fat cats” who had a pivotal role in the running of the Kibaki government. He had acquired wealth or made enough money to enable him set up the exclusive Victorian-style Windsor Golf Club in Nairobi while he had (in his growing business empire) the Country Club also situated near the city centre. According to former Cabinet minister Francis Lotodo, the Windsor Golf Club was illegally allocated land at Karura forest together with the Belgian Embassy,[108] an issue that disturbed Lotodo because no one was talking about it. The grabbing of Karura forest was big news in Kenya, which prompted environmentalist Wangari Maathai to begin a campaign to save the forest. Michuki’s enemies have been accusing him (rightfully or wrongfully) of all sorts of misdeeds. In May 1999, Joseph Kamotho accused Michuki of having bought all tea seedlings in Muranga so as to ensure that other farmers did not plant tea.[109]
When NARC seized power, Michuki was not regarded as a critical member of Kibaki’s “inner circle” although he was one of the first Kibaki supporters to emerge in public with information that the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru (GEMA) communities had decided that they would support Mwai Kibaki as Presidential candidate in the December 2002 elections following a meeting of 40 GEMA MPs.[110] After the 2002 elections, Michuki worked his way meticulously using old links with the President and close contacts who had Kibaki’s ear. When Kibaki set up his Cabinet in January 2003, Michuki was handed over the Ministry of Transport and Communication (a distant Ministry) because he did not have the credentials necessary to get him a post within the Office of the President where the majority of the President’s trusted friends from DP were nestling. However, he remained a staunch Kibaki supporter and an opponent of the delivery of the Bomas draft of the Constitution because of his opposition to the creation of two centres of power.[111] At a public meeting, Michuki told his listeners that they should not worry about certain sections of the Constitutions, which Kenyans thought should be changed because political conditions that led to the proposals no longer existed since Kibaki was now in power.[112] He was suggesting that Kenyans should forget about the creation of the post of Prime Minister because Kibaki’s rule was fine. Michuki said that the Bomas draft of the Constitution “was drafted with Moi in mind” and since the former dictator was no more, the Constitutional talks had lost meaning.[113] Despite having been left out of the Office of President, Michuki’s luck was on the way. The ruthlessness with which he handled the marauding Matatu operators in the streets especially in Nairobi, together with his controversial policy of compulsory seatbelts[114] and speed governors for Matatus earned him accolades within Kibaki’s hawk-eyed cronies. After bamboozling Matatu operators with new rules to be implemented at short notice, Michuki was moved in to the Internal Security docket, hopefully to control crime that had spiraled across the country as idle unemployed youths sought food to eat in the absence of welfare.
Seat belts scandal
It did not take long before the “seatbelts and speed governor” rules drew eyebrows in Parliament. Macharia Mukiri, MP for Molo, demanded a Ministerial statement from Michuki “to clarify why the seatbelts and speed governors arrived at the port shortly after he gazetted new rules requiring that Public Service Vehicles (PSVs) be fitted with the gadgets.”[115] Mukiri also wanted to know why the containers used in importing the gadgets were marked as ordinary cargo and why the Kenya Revenue Authority could not ascertain their owner.
Once the issue of the seatbelts blew up in the open, the four 20-foot containers with the gadgets disappeared from Mombasa port although they were later tracked down by the media on their way to Nairobi after they were cleared in two batches. According to a report carried in The Standard, the seatbelts were imported from the UK in August 2002. The first batch of two containers aboard MV Float Bek were cleared by KenFreight forwarders, container number MAEU 6713984 aboard MV Ottensen was cleared by Mast Investment while the final consignment (container number GASU 2173078) was cleared by Saheh clearing agency.[116] When pressed by the media, Container Terminal Manager Mr. Julius Alusa did not have further details.
That is when the mystery around the speed governors also emerged. The speed governors were imported in 1995 by Kamsons Limited when the idea of speed governors first came up. The interesting aspect of this importation is that Kamsons Limited was owned by none other than Deepak Chimunlal Kamani[117] who was at the centre of the mega Anglo-Leasing scandal that nearly led to the collapse of the Kibaki government. Conspiracy theorists wondered why specifications of speed governors recommended by the government fitted those that were imported into the country a long time ago. Matatu Owners Vehicle Association was convinced that Michuki had been holding consultations with Deepak Kamani and Dickson Mbugua (regarded as a sell-out by Matatu owners) in a hotel in Nyeri.[118] If these allegations were true, then they could throw some light into the underhand dealings of Minister Michuki. Be that as it may, the new rules ignited Matatu owners to threaten strike actions as Samson Kiamati, Chairman of Matatu Owners Association, called on Kibaki to sack Michuki from the Transport Ministry because he was “an arrogant and ivory tower”[119] leader whose agenda, Kiamati claimed, was to plunge the industry into chaos.
There was no investigation by the government despite the serious allegations and the seatbelt rule was implemented to the letter. Michuki was not new to controversy. In November 2003, he was summoned to appear before the Public Investment Committee together with Professor Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi, Industry Minister, in connection with a cranes contract worth Ksh1.5 billion for Mombasa port. The three had allegedly postponed the tender twice to allow for Numerical Machining Complex, a parastatal, to place their bids[120] although the rules barred ministers from interfering with the tendering process. The critical problem for critics such as MP Otieno Kajwang’ was that the postponement may have been linked to shady deals with Michuki having been accused of fronting for another unnamed company.[121] According to a report published in The Nation Newspaper, “Mr Kajwang’ said Prof. Nyong’o and Dr. Kituyi had sought an extension of the tender to allow Numerical to put in their tender, while Mr. Michuki had allegedly acted in the interests of one of the companies” [122] believed to have been the Nairobi-based Triton Solutions whose Managing Director was Mr. Raj Devani.[123] When the PIC submitted its report, it ruled that “…Prof Anyang’ Nyong’o, Dr Mukhisa Kituyi and Mr John Michuki interfered with KPA tendering process, contrary to government procedure.[124]” The scandal deepened even further when Mr. G.O Magore, Chairman of Numerical Machining Complex that was allegedly behind the Ksh1.5 billion bid, disowned the bid, saying that the Complex had not entered into any joint ventures with Industrial Plant (K) Limited[125]that was allegedly neck deep in the scandal. The bid was later quashed by the government amid calls that Michuki and other Ministers who were involved resign or face the sack. However, nothing happened.
The ink had not dried when Michuki got into new controversy, this time involving his son Francis Michuki. The problem was that Michuki had directed Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) to lift a waiver for Siemens Atea (in which Michuki’s son was an agent) requiring a 30 percent local shareholding for telecommunication companies that wanted to operate in Kenya.[126] CCK had previously turned down requests by the company for the waiver and when Michuki overturned the CCK decision in a case that involved his son, critics saw a clash of interests in the case, putting Michuki under fire. According to Mutahi Ngunyi, who wrote an Opinion piece in The Nation Newspaper, Michuki was engaging in corruption in relation to both the cranes tender and the waiver saga of Siemens Atea in which his son was involved[127] even though Michuki denied wrongdoing. Then there was the case when Ntonyiri MP Maoka Maore demanded explanations in Parliament as to why Minister Michuki had travelled to China and allegedly met Huawei Company management as a tender related to the firm was pending before him.[128] At the time of the trip, Maoka Maore was unsure whether the tender had been opened or not while it was also not clear why Telcom bosses visited Huawei Company before the tender was awarded.[129]
Other scandals that followed Michuki after he became Cabinet Minister simply disappeared into thin air without proper explanations, probably because of the influence he wielded in government. For example, the “Government’s Property Investigation Committee” reported that along with other Cabinet Ministers like Prof George Saitoti, Michuki had acquired a government house in Nairobi’s Upper Hill on Menengai Road, demolished it and developed a block of maisonettes while the Committee also found that in 1969, Michuki acquired a government house that was the residence of Kangema District Officer in Kangema township, Michuki’s Constituency.[130] No action was taken on the reports.
Michuki had earlier been named in Parliament by MP Orwa Ojode as the Minister who demanded US$3 million from Artur Margryan and his brother Artur Sargsyan (drug peddlers) as “protection fee.”[131] In another development, the April 20, 2007, edition of The East African Standard reported that Michuki was the Minister whose name featured in an alleged plot “…to kidnap and possibly assassinate Baringo Central MP Mr. Gideon Moi.”
Crime had reached an alarming level in Kenya, ranging from car jackings and armed robberies to bank heists and highway robberies. It is at this time that the cabal around Kibaki decided to bring Michuki in to be in charge of internal security to save the government’s image that was going down the drain with each and every media report about crime. One of the first drastic measures Michuki took was to order police to “shoot to kill” anybody found carrying firearms,[132] a call that drew outrage from religious groups, civil society and politicians alike who were all getting concerned that Michuki was driving Kenya back to the days of the Moi dictatorship.
Michuki lived up to expectation because when the election was rigged, he was in charge of internal security, which was responsible for security forces that killed hundreds of Kenyan protestors in the streets. When the rigging became public knowledge, Michuki slapped a ban on live reporting by Kenyan media “for security reasons” as the new Kibaki administration, which had been sworn in after Raila Odinga’s Presidency was stolen, began to systematically convert Kenya into a police State.
Raila Odinga’s Stolen Presidency (p 68-75) By Okoth Osewe
[89] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[90] Ben Agina: “Charge Michuki With Treason, MPs Demand” – The East African Standard (Nairobi)12.072006
[91] “Riddle Over Story Source Triggers a Political Crisis Like No Other” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 03.03.2006
[92] “State Owns Up to Raid” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 02.03.2006
[93] “Top Names That Should Be Probed for Their Role in Saga” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 28.09.2007
[94] Abiya Ochola: “I Wasn’t Against Mau Mau, Says Michuki” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 24.10.2007
[95] Muriithi Muriuki: “Michuki: I’ll Not Budge On ‘Matatus’ – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 30.01.2004
[96] Antony Kariga: “Youths Turn Down Cash Handout” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 15.11.2002
[97] Antony Kariga: “Youths Turn Down Cash Handout” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 15.11.2002
[98] Alex Ndegwa: “KNCHR Releases Bribery List Implicating Ministers” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 05.11.2006
[99] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[100] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Michuki (last accessed 020808)
[101] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[102] “Court adjourns Popat case” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 31.10.1998
[103] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[104] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[105] Joe Ombuor: “Michuki: From ‘Kimendeero’ to Security Minister” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 21.05.2006
[106] Gordon Opiyo: “Ties That Bind And Blind Kibaki Government” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 11.12.2005
[107] Gordon Opiyo: “Ties That Bind And Blind Kibaki Government” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 11.12.2005
[108] Njeri Rugene: “I’ll Never Revoke Karura Allocations’ – Lotodo´” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 11.12.1998
[109] Muthui Mwai and Macharia Wa Mwati: “Kibaki A Paper Tiger – Kamotho” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 30.05.1999
[110] “Kibaki Our Man, Say Gema MPs” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 07.02.2001
[111] Maina Muiruri: “LDP, NARC Battle Takes Centre Stage At Bomas” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 14.09.2003
[112] Macharia Gaitho: “Michuki’s Goof Highly Disturbing” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 16.09.2003
[113] Fred Oluoch: “Does Kibaki Have the Will for a New Dispensation?” – The East African (Nairobi), 22.09.2003
[114] “Seatbelts for ‘Matatus’ in Safety Crackdown” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 08.10.2003
[115] “House Demands to Know Seatbelt Owners” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 16.10.2003
[116] Willis Okech: “Seat Belts Leave Port for Nairobi” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 03.2003
[117] Otsieno Namwaya: “What You Did Not Know” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 03.11.2003
[118] Otsieno Namwaya: “What You Did Not Know” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 03.11.2003
[119] Bernard Namunane: “Kibaki Urged to Sack Transport Minister Michuki” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 22.10.2003
[120] David Okwembah: “Three Ministers Face Grilling Over Contract” – The Daily Nation, 08.11.2003
[121] Ben Agina: “Ministers Challenged On Kenya Ports Authority Tender Saga” – The East African Standard, 08.11.2003
[122] David Okwembah: “Three Ministers Face Grilling Over Contract” – The Daily Nation, 08.11.2003
[123] “Public Investments Committee Questions Michuki for 90 Minutes Over Tender” – The Daily Nation, 18.11.2003
[124] Joseph Murimi: “How State Firms Lost Billions in Bogus Deals” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 11.11.2004
[125] David Okwembah “Firm Disowns KP Tender Bid; Three Ministers Summoned By Public Investments Committee” – The Daily Nation, 11.11.2003
[126] Mwenda Njoka “Query As Michuki Clears Son’s Firm” – The Daily Nation, 15.11.2003
[127] Mutahi Ngunyi “Sacrifices the President May Have to Make” – The Daily Nation, 16.11.2003
[128] “Claim of Michuki Trip to China Stuns House” – The Daily Nation, 23.07.2004
[129] “Claim of Michuki Trip to China Stuns House” – The Daily Nation, 23.07.2004
[130] Patrick Mathangani: “Ministers Saitoti, Michuki May Face Cabinet Probe” – The Daily Nation (Nairobi), 28.09.2003
[131] Alex Ndegwa And Peter Murigi: “MP Claims Security Minister Demanded $3 Million From Arturs” – The East African Standard, 20.04.2007
[132] Cyrus Ombati: “Security Minister Issues Shoot-to-Kill Order” – The East African Standard (Nairobi), 22.03.2005
Welcome to 2010 Jamhuri Day Spree at Scandic Plaza
Ambassador Purity: Moved the first "Mashujaa Day" to Denmark
After she unabashedly hosted the first Mashujaa day in Copenhagen in October this year (which was poorly attended to say the least), Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary aka Lady Ambassador, Her Excellency, Mrs. Purity Wakiuri Muhindi, may at last be listening to her Constituents called Kenya-Stockholmers – kudos to Purity this time around.
Dennis Otieno, Joseph Wachira, Anna Mwihia and Marcus Ondiek, a group of Kenya University students in Stockholm, took contact with KSB to report that they lodged a complaint with Ambassador Purity to stop shifting national days outside Stockholm. Although this was a rare “moment of Hallelujah”, it mimicked the act of casting the “species of KSB fish” from a small jag of water into the gigantic Baltic Sea during a hot summer afternoon!”
In fact, the Bagarmossen Church members could have been called to total attention, raised their hands in the air and said in chorus “thank you Jezzussss” with their eyes closed and their heads focused towards the sky. They could then have proceeded to open their King James or Jerusalem bibles to praise the Lord for having opened the eyes of the University students “to see the light” about Purity and her crazy ideas of relocating Kenyan national days outside Stockholm.
This year, the Embassy has scheduled Jamhuri day spree at Scandic Sergel Plaza Hotel in Stockholm, not Denmark, Oslo or Helsinki, capitals with a scanty population of Kenyans compared to Stockholm. The “wining and dining” at tax payer’s expense will take place on Wednesday, December 8th from 17.30-19.30 so fix your calendar and sharpen your appetite for them Nyake sticks driven down with red wine, Heineken or withiki! This time, don’t boycott because we are in a Coalition government with both ODM and PNU on the eating table!
Apart from external pressure, it is understood that Deputy Ambassador H.E Arthur Amaya Andambi is also doing a good job by constantly advising the Ambassador on the best strategic options available especially when it comes to the hosting of public holidays. Intelligence from the Embassy say that Andambi has been trying to soften Purity to relax her “negative attitude” towards Kenyans in Stockholm “because of crap” written at KSB.
Kenya national days do not belong to Purity
Trouble started after the wedding in summer of Princess Victoria and the new Prince Daniel when KSB attacked Purity for having allowed herself to be relegated to the Church pavement during the wedding ceremony. Although Sam Pippo claimed that she was actually in the Church, a photo taken by a KSB Paparazzi located her at the pavement.
KSB had also questioned why the Ambassador decided to wear one of her “worst Kitenge” during the occasion when she had several and more elegant options. Since then, spies at the residence say that the Ambassador dumped the “offending Kitenge” while she also introduced Asian attire in her wardrobe in a moment of personal protest and to “break the Kitenge monotony” that was according KSB a lot of propaganda.
Since the Victoria wedding, Purity has appeared in Kenyan-Stockholm public on two occasions – when the Kenya Football Team reached the finals of the African Challenge Cup on 31st July (which is another story not yet told) and when Easther Wahome came to Stockholm on 23rd October 2010. In both occasions, she refused to don a Kitenge, having opted for an “Asian alternative” probably to try and confuse KSB apparatus. When Andambi learnt the extent to which KSB reports were changing Purity’s way of operation, he decided to intervene. Readers will remember that the Embassy no longer sends invitation cards during public events because of persistent KSB attacks on grounds that since such cards are never sent to everybody, the practice was discriminatory.
The Kenyan Embassy in Stockholm is responsible for the whole of Scandinavia and although the idea of hosting national days in different countries may sound welcome and democratic, it essentially beats logic. A Jamhuri invite to diplomats based in Stockholm has more meaning because naturally, the Embassy has better contact with diplomats in Stockholm than in other countries on the basis of joint work at different levels.
By moving away from Stockholm without proper reasons to host Kenya National days, the Embassy is isolating the very diplomats who are supposed to be collected together as an appreciation of joint work and solidarity with countries friendly to Kenya. Stockholm is the preferred headquarters of many Embassies and this makes it more convenient when it comes to hosting National days so when Purity suddenly deviates from this expectation, it is equally natural that thinking Kenyans begin to question her real motives.
There is no denying that in Scandinavia, the population of Kenyans is largest in Stockholm. National celebrations is of key interest to Kenyan citizens around the world and when you are an Ambassador and you are organizing a function of such national importance, common sense dictate that you do so while seeking a gathering point where you are likely to attract maximum crowd. As far as Kenya national days are concerned, there is nowhere in Scandinavia where one is likely to get a bigger crowd of Kenyans than in Stockholm. Consequently, when Ambassador Purity transfers these functions to other capitals, surely, our Plenipotentiary ought to be put on the carpet to establish her motivation.
Ambassador Purity must be made to account
The Embassy does not belong to Purity. Likewise, Purity did not create Kenya national days so she ought not to decide where national days are held because these are not like birthdays of family members. The only explanation why Purity may be resorting to her personal whims when it comes to moving national days away from Stockholm is because she is misusing her powers, knowing that since her appointment was motivated by First Lady Lucy Kibaki, nothing will happen to her after all. In short, we can say that she is acting with impunity, the very impunity the country is seeking to get rid of. It is therefore important that every time she runs away with our national days, she ought to expect fire.
There is this weak argument that Kenyans in other countries in Scandinavia also deserve to get national days hosted in their countries of residence. This argument could have held a lot of water. However, a few years of experiment by Ambassador Purity in Norway, Denmark and Finland have been disastrous because attendance (especially by Kenyans) has been extremely low. Diplomats from other countries based in Stockholm but without representation in other Scandinavian countries have also not been able to travel abroad to attend a Kenya national day and this tendency has reduced attendance and undermined Purity’s “external projects”. Under the circumstances, continued relocation by the Kenyan Embassy of national days to other capitals in Scandinavia is unjustified unless Purity can come up with a better explanation.
The Embassy has a web site and one rarely encounters these functions reported at the web page, a site which, nevertheless, is dead because it is only updated during national days namely; Madaraka, Mashujaa and Jamhuri principally to direct Kenyans where the two hour drinking spree will be held. We have seen the Ambassador going round Scandinavia with her “external hosting” projects but where are the reports? If detailed accounts and pictures cannot be published at the web site, is it because the attendance is normally too low and shameful to justify the funds spent on these functions or is the lack of publicity a general cover up of failure of national days celebrated outside Stockholm?
The logistics of organizing a Kenyan national day away from Stockholm is obviously larger when transport of Embassy staff, accommodation in Hotels, meals, allowances of Embassy personnel (working away from station on a public holiday), a Benz Taxi for Purity in Oslo or Helsinki (among others) are factored in. With these extra bills footed by the tax man, is it an attack on Ambassador Purity if the logic behind her relocation of national days away from Stockholm is questioned?
Public officials in Kenya are being made to account for their activities by the public and in extreme cases, Ministers have been forced to “step aside” to allow for investigations following allegations of corruption. Likewise, public officials in Stockholm (and other capitals) must also be made to account for their actions. Apart from acting according to her dreams on the question of hosting national days, Kenyans need to know why despite the expiry of her “tour of duty”, in Stockholm, Ambassador Purity Muhindi has not been recalled by her boss, President Mwai Kibaki. Purity’s continued presence at the Embassy is a violation of the rules but do I say?
Okoth Osewe
The Standard Publicity of Mwaura’s Election
Notice man Nzoro on the left...
When Mark Gaya Delivered his Birthday Present…
In case you thought that Marky never gave Lydia a present, here it is...
Commentary: “KKK Alliance” is Dead And Should Be Buried
Only uncritical readers lap the KKK propaganada
A worn-out cliché in Kenya has it that Kenyans in Diaspora “have been away for too long” that they should have no business commenting on issues back home because “they have lost touch with reality”. According to a common pontification that routinely finds expression in the mainstream media, the family of Diaspora Kenyans have “nothing to teach” poor countrymen back home because Kenyans abroad “are not on the ground” and should therefore just “shut up” even if the country is burning.
However, a cursory look at political analysis in the Kenyan media sometimes exposes a pathetic level of mediocrity that ought to be called to attention. A case in point is the flood of analysis of the impending 2012 election and the moribund “KKK Alliance” which is supposed to be led by the ODM renegade, William Ruto, Deputy Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka. This troika of latter day opportunists are constantly sold by the media as a “formidable force” that key players “will have to recon with” because the still to be formed KKK Alliance “will be a big factor” come 2012. It is in the face of such spurious conclusions that an intervention becomes necessary.
Kalonzo Musyoka
Following the theft of the December 2007 elections, Kalonzo Musyoka was basically written off as a politician. After assisting PNU cling on to power by collaborating with thieves who stole elections and installed president Kibaki in the middle of the night, Kalonzo is more popular as the ultimate “Judas Iscariot” in Kenyan politics than a Messiah of the Kamba people. His Party, ODM-Kenya, has been taken over by his opponents who have argued that his cooperation with PNU was a personal decision for personal gain, not a party policy.
His Kamba people are still furious with him because following his collaboration with PNU, Kambas across the country were beaten senseless and chased out of their abodes because of the perception that they were part and parcel of thieves who stole elections. During the Referendum on a new Constitution, Kalonzo failed to mobilize his people to vote “Yes” because of waning influence among his people. How then will Kalonzo lead his people into a KKK Alliance?
Kalonzo’s problems are confounded by the fact that Charity Ngilu, the Minister of Health who is in ODM, has a huge influence in Kamba land that is constantly threatening Kalonzo’s authority. When Kalonzo is projected as the King-pin in Kamba politics, where are the facts that could lead to this conclusion?
Uhuru Kenyatta
Since the days of Kenya’s first President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Central Province, the origin of the largest ethnic group in Kenya, has had no anointed leader. Current President Mwai Kibaki is not a “Kikuyu leader” but the beneficiary of being at the right place at the right time. Every ethnic group in Kenya wants their kith to be in State House and when it emerged that Kibaki had the greatest chance in both 2002 and 2007, Kikuyus voted for him en masse. By projecting Uhuru Kenyatta as the Kikuyu flag bearer in the theoretical “KKK Alliance”, the assumption is that the young Uhuru will be the “Kikuyu leader” come 2012. However, what are the facts?
When Kimendeero John Michuki recently proposed Uhuru Kenyatta to be promulgated Kikuyu leader to guide the community in 2012, he was widely condemned, not by the Luo, the Luhya or the Kalenjin but by the very Kikuyu leaders who believe that there is no room for ethnic leaders in Kikuyu land with the most vocal opponent having been Martha Karua, Chairperson of Narc-Kenya. The view was that no one could impose a leader on the Kikuyu and that every leader must fight it out personally. The point is that there is a huge split within the Kikuyu when it comes to ethnic leaders in current Kenyan politics so how will Uhuru Kenyatta lead the Kikuyu into the yet to be formed KKK Alliance?
Secondly, it is an accepted fact that come 2012, Kenya will not have another Kikuyu President and even Kikuyus at the grass roots are united on this point. Why? During her 47 years of independence, and assuming that Kibaki completes his term, Kenya shall have had a Kikuyu President in State House for 25 years (Kenyatta 15 years and Kibaki 10 years).
Instead of seeking for a Presidential candidate, the Kikuyu are seeking for a political partner who will be able to guarantee and safeguard their economic interests in Kenya after 2012. Today, that partner is Raila Odinga whose stolen Presidency is widely accepted by millions of Kenyans who went to the streets to demand haki yao. Even if Uhuru Kenyatta joins the KKK Alliance to work with traitor Kalonzo et al, any Kikuyu leader who seeks an Alliance with Raila Odinga is likely to enjoy a bigger sway of the Kikuyu vote because of two reasons.
Just like the Kalenjin, Kikuyus at the grass roots have experienced the fallacy of “wealth trickling down” because their man is in State House. They are tired of paying the price of their man “being in power” without any tangible benefits. Following the stealing of Raila Odinga’s Presidency in 2007, Kikuyus at the grass roots paid the ultimate price because it is their houses which were torched in the Rift Valley, hundreds of their people murdered in cold blood and others chased from their houses across the country because their man had stolen the vote.
Today, hundreds of IDPs still languishing in the camps are Kikuyus who have been left without help despite their man occupying State House. Assuming that he joins the KKK Alliance, how will Uhuru Kenyatta convince millions of skeptical Kikuyus about the need to work with the Kalenjin after tragic historical experiences that have tended to isolate the Kikuyu? My take is that any progress on any Uhuru-based KKK Alliance will only be realized if no Kikuyu leader teams up with ODM in an alternative Alliance and there is no shortage of Kikuyu leaders seeking this opportunity. Why are commentators presenting a skewed analysis of the situation?
Further, Uhuru did play with Ruto in the run-up to the Referendum before he dumped him to join Raila and Kibaki in the “Yes” camp. The KKK Alliance could have been built during the Referendum and the only reason why it did not materialize is that it was not viable.
William Ruto
Going by Kenya’s brand of ethnic politics, and after Moi, a Kalenjin, held power for 24 years, is Kenya ready for another Kalenjin President? This sums up Ruto’s case of ever making it to State House in 2012. Although Ruto is a very vocal politician, he lacks a sound strategy, either because he doesn’t understand the ethnic nature of Kenyan politics or his advisors are deliberately misleading him for some reason.
Ruto could have been a force to recon with if his Referendum experiment had succeeded but it crashed and he lost with a landslide majority. How will he emerge from this huge defeat to set up a national Alliance that will propel him to State House? What is known is that when Kibaki lost the Referendum in November 2005, he lost the vote two years later so how will Ruto convert the Referendum defeat into a victory?
Ruto’s fortunes could have matured easily in ODM than in any other unknown formation but he missed it due to misplaced ambition. When he joined ODM, Kenyans almost forgot his dirty past during his days in KANU where he opposed the re-writing of a new Constitution and declared that Moi ought to rule Kenya for 100 years. Apart from corruption charges facing him in court, and his possible indictment by ICC notwithstanding, Ruto has not yet cultivated a national image that could hand him Kenya’s Presidency. He is still fighting for “his people” (the Kalenjin) and until he begins to fight for the Luhya, the Luo, the Kikuyu and others, his Presidential ambitions will continue to remain a pipe dream.
The Kalenjin at the grass roots chased away the Kikuyu and seized their land. This is the status quo that the Kalenjin at the grass roots would like to maintain. Any political Alliance with Uhuru Kenyatta might meet with opposition in Kalenjin land because of the issue of land confiscated from the Kikuyu. After several evictions of the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley dating back to “ethnic clashes” that were engineered by Moi, the Kikuyu do not trust the Kalenjin so how will an Alliance between the two ethnic groups be forged at the grass roots?
The KKK Alliance is dead and its proponents ought to have been preparing for its funeral, not its resurrection. However, it will remain alive at the rhetorical and propaganda level because after the Referendum, KKK proponents went bankrupt while the media needs sensation to keep newspaper sales up and running. The main victims are the uncritical readers who may be lapping the KKK package without second thoughts.
Okoth Osewe
Official 2010 Jamhuri Day Bash: 11th December
For the first time, official 2010 Jamu bash all Night long
About KSB
New Book On Kenya December 2007 Election Crisis: In Circulation
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